

SCIENCE, MEDITATION, AND MINDFULNESS

Proceedings of the Fifth International Conference on Vajrayāna Buddhism

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Centre for Bhutan & GNH Studies

Science, Meditation, and Mindfulness: Proceedings of the Fifth
International Conference on Vajrayāna Buddhism

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ISBN 978-99980-35-29-4

Preface

This publication presents selected papers from the Fifth International Conference on Vajrayāna Buddhism, held from 3 to 6 June 2025 at Zhichenkhar, Thimphu, Bhutan, under the theme *Science, Meditation, and Mindfulness*. Organized jointly by the Centre for Bhutan and GNH Studies and the Central Monastic Body, the conference brought together more than 200 international participants, including 31 spiritual masters and distinguished scholars and 73 speakers from 37 countries, making it the largest gathering in the history of the conference series. In addition, hundreds of Bhutanese participated each day.

The conference provided a platform for spiritual masters, practitioners, scientists, scholars, students, and enthusiasts to come together and exchange their insights on meditation, mindfulness, and mind transformation techniques that exist across many traditions. These are topics increasingly studied, applied, and integrated across numerous fields, and this has brought both exciting possibilities and important questions about how ancient wisdom can be carried into new contexts without losing its depth. Bhutan, where contemplative culture remains woven into everyday life, offered a fitting home for precisely this kind of careful, open-ended dialogue.

The papers gathered here move across a broad range of themes. The manuscript opens with studies that engage the scientific end of the conversation, drawing on cognitive science, neuroscience, AI, and the physiological dimensions of practice, including Tibetan medicine. It then takes a more historical and philosophical turn, examining how meditative traditions have travelled across cultures and centuries — from the roots of Western philosophy to Jungian psychology. From there it moves into clinical and applied territory, with contributions on mindfulness in mental health, social work, education, and sustainable development. The manuscript closes with contributions in Dzongkha/Tibetan, bringing classical scholarly voices into conversation with the contemporary perspectives.

This manuscript reflects a careful selection from among the presentations delivered. Not all presenters submitted full written papers following the conference, and those received were subject to editorial

review. The number of papers appearing here is therefore significantly fewer than the number of presentations.

The organisers are deeply grateful to all participants — presenters and non-presenters alike, from both within and outside the country — whose engagement gave the conference its depth and vitality, and to the authors who committed their work to this publication.

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Relevance Realization in Cognitive Agents: A Dharmakīrtian Perspective

Nadav Amir and John Dunne¹

Abstract

A fundamental problem facing any learning organism is how to determine what to attend to and what to ignore when guiding its goal-oriented actions. This problem, known as *relevance realization*, is key to understanding how cognitive agents, biological or artificial, learn purposeful behaviors through experience-based interactions with their environment. However, a comprehensive theoretical understanding of how organisms solve the relevance realization problem is currently lacking. Here, we approach this challenge by proposing a synthesis between a contemporary computational framework of goal-oriented learning in cognitive agents and a canonical Buddhist account of concept formation, specifically as developed by the Indian philosopher Dharmakīrti (c. 6-7th century C.E.). Our approach posits that cognitive agents form goal-dependent conceptual representations of their environments that reflect subjective preferences about properties of simulated sensorimotor experience streams. By drawing on Dharmakīrti's theory of concept formation to inform computational models of learning, our approach suggests new ways of understanding the mechanisms underlying goal-directed representation in human cognition possibility of emulating it artificially.

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Keywords: Dharmakīrti; Relevance Realization; Natural and Artificial Intelligence; Buddhist Epistemology; Reinforcement Learning

Introduction

Imagine standing on a busy street in a bustling city such as New York or Rome. If your goal is to cross the road safely, you should pay careful attention to the location and velocity of incoming vehicles approaching the crosswalk, while ignoring their color or the number of passengers they carry. However, if you want to hail a taxi instead, you should accordingly focus on the color of approaching cars (looking for yellow in New York or white in Rome) and their availability for taking passengers, while ignoring their exact velocity or position relative to the crosswalk. How does your mind, or that of any organism for that matter, determine which aspects of its experience to attend to and which to ignore in any given situation? This question lies at the heart of current theoretical and empirical efforts for understanding intelligent behavior in biological and artificial systems. This is because learning any purposeful behavior crucially depends on the ability of the learner to determine what it needs to learn about.

The problem of determining the relevant features of incoming sensory information streams has resurfaced over the past few decades under various guises in cognitive science and AI, including feature learning (Bengio et al., 2014), meta-learning (McCarthy & Hayes, 1981), and task-state representation learning (Niv, 2019). Here, following Vervaeke et al. (2012), we use the term *relevance realization* to describe this general class of problems within the context of cognitive agents that learn to acquire purposeful behaviors through sensorimotor interactions with their environment. We propose a principled approach to the relevance realization problem by synthesizing modern computational frameworks of learning and decision-making with a theory of goal-oriented concept formation stemming from the Buddhist epistemological tradition, specifically as articulated by the influential Buddhist philosopher Dharmakīrti (c. 600-660 CE). We begin by providing a brief overview of reinforcement learning, an extensively used computational framework of experience-based learning and decision-making in biological and artificial agents. We then use notions from this framework to cast relevance realization as a foundational problem in computational learning theory known as

state representation learning. Next, we review key features of Dharmakīrti's theory of concept formation (Based especially on Dunne, 2004, 2011) and show how his ideas regarding the primacy of goals, among other fundamental inductive biases undergirding human cognition, can be incorporated into contemporary computational frameworks of purposeful behavior learning in ways that can increase their flexibility and explanatory power (Amir et al., in press). We conclude by outlining possible implementations and implications of a Dharmakīrtian model of concept formation in artificial cognitive systems, leveraging notions of grounded cognition and mental simulation to propose some promising directions for guiding the design of more human-like, and human-aligned, artificial cognitive agents. Overall, our work illustrates how Buddhist thought and contemporary science can engage in fruitful dialogue concerning topics of current relevance in cognitive science and AI.

Relevance Realization and the Foundations of Learning

We define relevance realization to as the capacity of cognitive systems to flexibly generate and adjust representations of objects and events in their environment in a goal-dependent manner (Martino & Cortese, 2023). For example, when you want to play a game of chess, your mind tacitly invokes the relevant concepts for describing how each chess piece moves, its current position on the board game, whose turn it is, the conditions for winning the game, and so on. Once you finish playing and want to return the chess board to the shelf, a new suite of representations emerges in your mind, describing the location of the board on the table, its weight, our distance from the shelf, and many other such constructs relating to the task of moving the chessboard to the shelf. In other words, your goals dynamically shape how your mind structures your sensorimotor stream of experiences to successfully interpret and interact with your environment. This remarkable capacity to flexibly form appropriate representations for pursuing an open-ended set of goals has been hypothesized as a core feature of natural intelligence of the kind exhibited by humans and some nonhuman animals (Mitchell, 2019; Valiant, 2024).

Indeed, current artificial learning systems are typically characterized by largely inflexible representational structures furnished by their designers to pursue a fixed set of goals, expressed as optimizing of some numerical objective function. For example, large language

models (LLMs) such as OpenAI’s ChatGPT are designed to represent words as numerical tokens and are trained to optimize the prediction accuracy for the next token(s) in a given sequence (OpenAI et al., 2024). Such systems cannot suddenly decide to represent words differently, say according to their phonetic similarity, or optimize any objective other than the one fixed by their designers during training.² While LLMs can fine tune their response to exhibit, for example, a more formal tone, such capabilities must be also hard coded by their designers, typically by introducing some form of human feedback during training (Ziegler et al., 2020). Human conceptual representations, on the other hand, can flexibly adapt to a broad range of contexts and goals, despite being statistically suboptimal for prediction purposes (Shani et al., 2025). In short, while current artificial intelligence (AI) systems are endowed with statistically optimized yet rigid representations that can be applied in relatively fixed task domains, humans—and at least some other animals—can flexibly generate concepts that facilitate purposeful adaptive behaviors across potentially limitless goals and contexts. Elucidating the unique form of goal-oriented concept formation recognized in natural cognition—and emulating it in AI systems—requires us to understand how this capability emerges and what are the underlying cognitive processes enabling it.

Formalizing Relevance Realization as State Representation Learning

To provide a concrete formulation of the relevance realization problem, we leverage the computational framework of *reinforcement learning*,³ which is extensively used within cognitive science and AI for modeling experience-based learning, decision-making, and goal-directed behavior (Sutton & Barto, 2018). A reinforcement learning model comprises an *agent* that learns from experience through interaction with its environment by performing actions and evaluating the desirability

² While some LLMs can fine tune their response to exhibit, for example, a more formal tone, such capabilities must be also hard coded by their designers, typically by introducing some form of human feedback during training (Ziegler et al., 2020).

³ Refer to the glossary for definition of italicized terms. Our definitions are not intended to be exhaustive or technically precise but rather help the reader understand how these terms are used in the context of this paper.

of its resulting outcomes. The behavior of an agent is described by its *policy*, which determines what actions it is likely to choose under different circumstances. The learning process is guided by a prespecified evaluation metric or *reward signal*, that assigns numerical values, called rewards, to certain outcomes, indicating their desirability level. For example, an artificial reinforcement learning agent can be taught to play chess well by giving it a reward of +1, -1, or 0, depending on whether it wins, loses, or draws the game, respectively. The goal of the agent is thought of as maximizing the expected accumulated amount of reward it receives. Reinforcement learning algorithms for maximizing the cumulative reward signal expected over repeated interactions between the agent and its environment have been successfully used to design artificial systems that master games such as Chess or Go (Silver et al., 2017), as well as a variety of other cognitively demanding tasks (Silver et al., 2021). Reinforcement learning methods have also been extensively used to study reward-driven decision-making processes in humans and other animals (Niv, 2009), as well as their neural underpinning in the dopaminergic system of the mammalian midbrain (Schultz et al., 1997).

Central to the reinforcement learning framework, and decision theory more generally, is the notion of a *state representation*: a compact description of the current situation of the agent and its environment that is used to guide learning and decision-making (Langdon et al., 2019). For example, a suitable state representation for an agent learning to play chess would include a description of the current position of the different pieces on the board, whose turn it is to move, whether or not the king or the rook has already moved (which determines whether one can castle), and so on. For more complex tasks, such as learning to safely drive an autonomous vehicle in an urban environment, the state representation may include information about the position and velocity of the vehicle itself as well as that of other vehicles and pedestrians in its vicinity, and a predictive model for estimating their likely future trajectories in order to avoid collision.

As these examples illustrate, artificial agents can be designed to learn well-defined tasks, such as playing chess, driving a car, or predicting the next word token in a sentence, using externally provided state representations and reward functions that determine what is relevant in that specific context. In recent decades, computational frameworks such as reinforcement learning have also been instrumental for elucidating the cognitive and neural underpinnings of biological

learning and decision making (Sutton & Barto, 2018; Niv, 2009). Such frameworks have been successfully used for explaining how learning agents, including humans, acquire state representations and solve well defined tasks. Nevertheless, the capability of humans, and other animals, to determine their own intrinsic goals and accordingly form state representations suitable for pursuing them, remains poorly understood. To illustrate the issue at hand, consider a typical lab experimental setting in which a rat is supposed to learn that if it pushes a lever after a blue light turns on it will receive a drop of tasty apple juice. If the light turns red, however, then pressing the same lever will trigger a slightly aversive air puff. While the rat may initially be uniformly inclined to press the lever regardless of the light's color, it gradually learns to press the lever only when the blue light is on. A reasonable approach to model this behavior would be to assume that the rat maintains a state representation specifying the color of the light and a reward function that assigns a positive or negative value for an outcome of a drop of apple juice or an air puff, respectively. However, recent research shows that even for seemingly simple tasks such as this, experimental designers cannot naively assume that animals represent the task in the same way that they intended (Song et al., 2022, Karayanni & Nelken, 2022). Thus, while artificial agents endowed with fixed state representations and reward functions can display remarkable learning capabilities on specific and well-defined tasks, biological learning seems to depend on a remarkable yet poorly understood ability to form flexible, context-specific state representations, allowing humans, and other organisms, to pursue a virtually limitless range of open-ended goals.

How can we make progress in elucidating these fundamental differences between relevance realization in biological versus artificial systems? A possible clue might be found in recent research efforts aiming to develop computational frameworks of metacognition (Fleming et al., 2012). For example, whereas progress in AI capabilities typically hinges on rapid increases in computational resources, human cognition exhibits remarkable flexibility under relatively fixed computational and metabolic constraints, suggesting that it crucially relies on the adaptive allocation of limited cognitive resources. Such constraints can be computationally modeled by formulating the cost of computational resource allocation, which can then be incorporated into utility-based models of learning and decision-making, and balanced against traditional measures of utility such as task-performance level

and metabolic, hedonic, or social rewards (Amir et al., 2020; Griffiths et al., 2019; Rubin et al., 2012). Metacognition can then be thought of as the cognitive capacity to weigh the cost of allocating finite cognitive resources for devising a better course of action than the agent's current one. Similarly, meta-learning can be thought of as a process of modeling the relevant features of a learning environment, or task, to make better use of limited data. Statistical frameworks for causal structure learning such as Latent Cause Inference (Gershman & Niv, 2010) or Hierarchical Bayesian Models (Tenenbaum et al., 2006) offer formal accounts of how biological agents may infer unobservable structured representations that explain observed patterns of events in the world and enable learning and generalization from sparse data.

While such computational frameworks have been instrumental in elucidating the cognitive mechanisms enabling goal-directed learning and their neural underpinnings, they do not speak directly to how biological agents form their goals in the first place or how their goals, once formed, shape their conceptual frameworks, or state representations, through which they describe objects and events in their environment. We believe that addressing these questions requires a perspectival shift that brings the relevance realization problem into more direct view. Recent work in computational cognitive science and reinforcement learning has begun exploring such new perspectives by focusing on *goals*, rather than rewards, as the fundamental construct shaping the representational and cognitive underpinnings of learning and purposeful behavior (Amir et al., 2024; Davidson et al., 2025; Eysenbach et al., 2022; Molinaro & Collins, 2023). This goal-centered turn resonates with epistemological and phenomenological views on cognition and mental representation found in Buddhist philosophy, particularly those of the influential Indian philosopher Dharmakīrti (Dunne, 2004), which we shall now turn to briefly survey.

Dharmakīrti's Theory of Goal-Oriented Concept Formation⁴

The Buddhist philosopher Dharmakīrti (c. 7th century, CE) developed an account of cognition that became highly influential for Buddhist and

⁴ The extensive scholarship on Dharmakīrti is diverse in its interpretations of his work, but while based on work by John Dunne (especially 2004, 2011), this section attempts a largely consensus account of the Dharmakīrtian approach to concept formation. Avoiding an overly technical presentation, we will keep

non-Buddhist thinkers in the wide region where Sanskrit treatises were studied during the classical period. Later, in the broad area where Tibetan Buddhism became widespread, the translations of his works became a standard feature of monastic curricula, with his works avidly studied in Tibetan Buddhist monasteries to this day. His theory of concept formation emerges from concerns about what constitutes reliable or trustworthy cognitions (Skt. *pramāṇa*), a theme that spawned an entire genre of Sanskrit philosophical literature across many centuries. Writing within that genre, but specifically from a Buddhist standpoint, Dharmakīrti works within a framework of various philosophical commitments that impact his theories. While Buddhists like Dharmakīrti hold that these commitments are supported by many arguments, for the present context we will just enumerate them.⁵

First, the Buddhist notion of “no-self” (Skt. *anātman*, *nairātmya*) undermines any model of cognition that requires a “Self” (Skt., *ātman*) construed as an irreducible agent of actions, perceiver of perceptions, controller of the mind/body, and so on. For Dharmakīrti, this means that his cognitive models must be “nonegological” in that they must not

citations to a minimum. To delve further into the Dharmakīrtian approach, readers are encouraged to consult the excellent overviews of Dharmakīrti’s philosophy by Eltschinger (2010) and Tillemans (2017). Dreyfus (1997) provides an influential and highly detailed overall account drawing on Tibetan interpretations, where the Dharmakīrtian approach to concept formation has been much debated. On concept formation specifically, Dharmakīrti’s views are primarily found in his *Pramāṇavārttika* and especially the *Svopajñavṛtti*, his own commentary on that text’s first chapter (Gnoli, 1960). For secondary literature, the collected volume, *Apoha: Buddhist Nominalism and Human Cognition* (Siderits et al., 2011) is an excellent starting point. Works that locate Dharmakīrti’s theory in relation to the broad and vigorous debate on the topic within classical Indian philosophy include most recently Taber (2024). It is important to note that the Dharmakīrtian approach to concept formation is not without its critics, including in classical Indian philosophy (Siderits, 1991) and in academic scholarship (e.g., Arnold, 2006). Likewise, with non-specialist readers in mind, the version presented of the theory presented here avoids some of the more technical issues that led to important revisions over the many centuries that the theory has been debated by Buddhists. For one example of such a revision, see McCrea & Patil (2010)

⁵ The overviews provided by Eltschinger (2010) and Tillemans (2017) largely address these commitments, but for more details on the role of “non-self” in Dharmakīrti’s thought, see Eltschinger and Ratié (2013); for the neither-one-nor-many argument, see Tomlinson (2022); and for Dharmakīrti’s ontology, see Dunne (2004, pp. 79-144) and Dreyfus (1997, pp. 60-126).

assume the existence of such a Self. Second, Dharmakīrti stands in a tradition that uses reductive mereological (part-whole) arguments against the existence of the Self. In short, such arguments hold that, while a Self may seem to exist, it is actually an illusion because it would necessarily be a single thing that somehow exists in, through, or by virtue of multiple things—namely, its psychophysical components. This style of reasoning—known as the “neither-on-nor-many analysis” (Skt., *ekānekavicāra*)—leads Dharmakīrti, as influenced by his predecessor Dignāga (5th century CE), to reject the notion that there are real categories or universals in the world because categories or universals likewise can be critiqued by that analysis. Finally, Dharmakīrti’s philosophical genre construes trustworthy cognitions as those that give us access to what is “real” or “existent” (Skt., *sat*), and for Dharmakīrti, what it means for something to be real in this sense is that it is capable of “telic efficacy” (Skt., *arthakriyā*). In other words, a thing can be said to be “real” in that it produces effects that are relevant to the goals that are active in a moment of cognition. A trustworthy cognition is thus one that enables one to engage with real things that are causally efficacious in a goal-relevant way. And since abstract entities like categories or universals are not causally efficient—the thought “fire” cannot heat a cup of tea—he holds that the only truly existent things are concrete, causally efficient things or “particulars” (Skt., *svalakṣaṇa*), in his terminology.

Working within these basic philosophical commitments, Dharmakīrti and the many Buddhist authors, or “Dharmakīrtians”, who interpret and use his works, articulate a causal account of cognitive processes that is concerned with identifying trustworthy cognitions that enable us to act on or engage with causally efficient things that achieve our goals. Thus, the overall framework is rooted in the claim that cognitions are not neutral acts of acquiring knowledge; rather, they occur within goal-oriented, motivational contexts that end in the occurrence of experiences that confirm or constitute the achievement of the desired outcomes. With this framework in place, Dharmakīrtians articulate a cognitive process that operates at two levels: the nonconceptual and the conceptual (for an overview, see Dunne, 2004, 113-144).

The paradigmatic form of a nonconceptual cognition is sensory awareness, which gives one direct causal contact with real, causally efficient things. On the Dharmakīrtian account, a sense faculty such as the visual faculty interacts with a stimulus to produce a visual

representation or “phenomenal form” (Skt., *ākāra*) in consciousness (See Kellner, 2014 for more on “phenomenal forms”; and Woo, 2019 for a detailed discussion of this model of perception). This phenomenological form is causally related to the stimulus that produced it such that, with other conditions in place, one can successfully engage in actions that lead to—or themselves constitute—the desired goal. For example, in the context of wishing to ward off the cold, the visual perception of a fire at a distance leads one to approach the fire, and subsequent cognitions such as the experience of warmth confirm that, yes, the desired goal is accomplished.

Sensory perceptions provide the most direct access to the causally efficient stimuli that produce them, but for Dharmakīrtians, this does not mean that nonconceptual, sensory cognitions are simply a mirror-like, precise rendering of the stimuli that caused them. The phenomenological forms produced in sensory awareness are conditioned by numerous factors, including the cognizer’s type of embodiment, the specific type and function of their sense faculties, their sensory acuity, overall cognitive capacities, and the affective states, attentional features, and motivations that form the endogenous context for the experience. To take the example of visual perception, the phenomenological presentation of a visual scene is already the downstream result of causal processes that are driven by much more than the causal contributions of the visual stimuli.⁶ Nevertheless, Dharmakīrtians hold that the initial, nonconceptual stage of a sensory perception plays a crucial epistemological role in two ways. First, it is what might be called the “final court of appeal” for knowledge claims, which are always understood to be teleological in nature. This means that conceptual cognitions—even highly abstract ones—must be rooted (perhaps through a very long chain of inferences) in concrete, sensory interactions with causally efficient, goal-relevant particulars in order to constitute knowledge that can successfully guide goal-oriented action. To put it in simple terms, goal-oriented knowledge is necessarily rooted in empirical observations, even if an observation consists merely in the visual perception of the display on an instrument. Second, the contents of these nonconceptual cognitions are not in a form that can be manipulated through processes such as inferential reasoning and language that are broadly “computational.” More precisely, the

⁶ The most obvious examples of conditions other than the visual stimulus that impact perception come from cases of visual illusions. See Dunne, 2020.

cognitive contents of nonconceptual awareness do not arise with a structure (such as subject/predicate or feature/locus) that can then be manipulated in linguistic, logical, or inferential ways. At the same time, this level of sensory experience—prior to any conceptualization or categorization—is not fully accessible without specialized training, at least on some Dharmakīrtian accounts (Dreyfus, 1997, p. 351). On this account, most of our reportable, lived experiences are at the conceptual level. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, to the extent they occur, purely nonconceptual cognitions that do not lead to conceptualizations cannot in themselves constitute trustworthy cognitions because conceptualizations are required to motivate the goal-oriented activities or experiences that are foundational for claims of trustworthiness. To cite a Tibetan way of expressing all this, nonconceptual cognitions are a “fool” in that they cannot be part of inferential reasoning or logical operations, but conceptual cognitions are “blind” in that they are removed from direct causal connections to real, causally efficient things in the world (Dreyfus, 1997).

On the Dharmakīrtian account, concept formation thus plays a central role in our knowledge of the world, where knowledge is always construed in the context of goal-oriented action. Recall, however, that for Dharmakīrti, there are no truly existent categories or universals that exist objectively in the world. Hence, there is no way for any form of cognition to directly intuit or connect with real abstract entities such as natural kinds, categories, numbers, or universals. For example, when some nonconceptual visual awareness is conceptualized as a “fire,” that concept does not correspond directly to some referents in the world such as specific individual fires, which are all unique. Instead, the challenge for Dharmakīrti and his followers is to articulate a theory of concept formation that rejects the real existence of categories or concepts of “fire” while still effectively guiding goal-oriented behavior.

The solution that Dharmakīrtians offer is the theory of “*exclusion*” (Skt. *apoha*). While complex in its details,⁷ the Exclusion Theory can be summarized by focusing on its paradigmatic case, namely, the act of conceptualizing sensory content in what is generally known by philosophers as a “perceptual judgment.” As noted above, the first phase of such a cognition involves the causal production of a

⁷ The complexity of Dharmakīrti’s work in this area can be appreciated by delving into the recent translation of a portion of his main work on the topic. See Eltschinger et al. (2018).

phenomenal form that arises from the interaction of the senses with a stimulus in a moment of nonconceptual perception. That phenomenal form, like the stimulus that produced it, is a unique event that does not actually share any features with any other phenomenal form. However, within a specific goal-oriented context, that phenomenal form (or more precisely, the stimulus that caused it) appears to be capable of producing a desired result that seems to have been observed in other, previous cases. Hence, when that nonconceptual perception arises within a goal-relevant context, an “imprint” (Skt., *vāsanā*) from a past experience is activated, and even though the contents of that past experience (i.e., the phenomenal form and the stimulus that caused it) are also unique, the phenomenal form in the present experience is recognized as another instance of the past experience; in other words, it is conceptualized as being the same kind of thing, such as a “fire.” Importantly, for Dharmakīrtians, what is the “same” about the two experiences is actually a negation or an “exclusion.” That is, even though the two unique instances are different from each other, their differences are ignored in favor of emphasizing the way that they are different from other things that cannot perform the desired goal-relevant functions. In short, this perceptual judgment involves creating a category (on the fly, so to speak) that consists in the “non-difference of different things” (Skt., *bhedānām abhedah*): the two experiences are different, but in terms of their goal-relevant causal capacities, what is more relevant is their difference from all other things that do not have those capacities. Thus, the non-difference or “sameness” (Skt., *sāmānya*) that enables one to identify them both as “fire” consists in their difference or “exclusion” from other, goal-irrelevant things.

One important implication of the Exclusion Theory is that real (i.e., causally efficient) things do not intrinsically belong to any category; rather, they are assigned to this or that category based on a goal-oriented or “teleological” context. Hence, in one context a thing might be identified as the same as another in that they are both “edible,” but then in another context, those two things might no longer be conceptualized with the same category because only one is a “fruit.” And no conceptualization—be it “fruit,” or “edible,” or anything else—is intrinsic to a real thing. Although the range of possible conceptualizations is constrained by the thing’s causal capacities, within that bounded range there are infinite possible conceptualizations within infinite possible teleological contexts.

Just now, we have referred to conceptualizing “things,” but properly speaking, the Dharmakīrtian process of conceptualization operates on phenomenal forms presented in consciousness that are, in the case of cognitions that can successfully guide goal-oriented action, the direct or indirect causal effects of things that the concepts purportedly refer to. And this points to a crucial feature of the Exclusion Theory: in the context of goal-oriented activity, the phenomenal contents of conceptual cognitions—what appears in the cognition of “fire,” for example—must be presented as an actual fire, not the concept of a fire. Dharmakīrtians present several reasons for this requirement, including the role that concepts play in motivating action in the world. Moreover, this feature of the conceptualization process cannot be learned through experience precisely because one can never have an experience in which the thought of “fire” is an actual fire. Hence, this tendency to “fuse” (Skt., *ekīkaraṇa*) thoughts or concepts with their real referents must be innate and not learned. In Dharmakīrti’s terminology, that tendency is a “beginningless imprint” (Skt., *anādivāsanā*).

Along with the tendency to construe concepts as the actual things that they represent, the Exclusion Theory requires another innate capacity, namely, the tendency to see “sameness.” Recall that, for Dharmakīrtians, only causally efficient things are truly real, and for various reasons, they further hold that real, causally efficient things must be unique. Hence, strictly speaking, conceptual cognitions are always distorted because, even when they successfully guide goal-oriented action, they erroneously construe unique, real things as being the “same” in that they allegedly share features that enable one to assign them to the same category. However, completely unique things do not share features with any other things; hence, they cannot actually belong to categories constituted by those shared features. Hence, since things are unique, this tendency to see sameness—essentially the tendency for pattern recognition—cannot be learned through sensory experience because the phenomenal forms in those experiences and the stimuli that caused them are all unique. On the Dharmakīrtian view, categories must be created in a cognitive system through the Exclusion process. Thus, this tendency for pattern recognition must also be a “beginningless imprint” (For more on the role of imprints in Dharmakīrti’s work, see Prueitt, 2018).

A final relevant feature of the Dharmakīrtian Exclusion Theory is the role that concepts play in experiential learning. This is a vast and

complex issue within Buddhist epistemology (Kellner, 2004 is a key work on this largely under-explored topic). For present purposes, the key point is that veridical concepts—those that successfully guide goal-oriented action—are causally related to the causal capacities of real (i.e., causally efficient) things, and this means that one can refine current veridical concepts or create new ones through inferentially based rational analysis. Here, Dharmakīrtians admit two basic forms of inference: causal and categorical. Causal inferences enable one to uncover the causal relations among real, causally efficient things, and this is clearly crucial for guiding goal-oriented action. But categorical inferences—literally, those that operate through the relations among a thing’s conceptualized properties (Skt., *svabhāva*)—are especially important for refining veridical concepts. To take a classic example, as one is learning to deploy the category “tree,” one must learn the causal features that are picked out by that concept, such as its ability to provide shade on a sunny day. As one examines various cases—is this short, stubby thing with leaves and branches a “tree”?—one’s concept becomes more precise and, hence, more useful.

Telic States - Towards a Computational Framework of Goal-Directed State Representation

As mentioned above, central to Dharmakīrti’s theory is the notion that our conceptual frameworks acquire their meaning from their capacity to enable us to achieve particular goals in service of which they were formed. Put differently, relevance is realized through a confluence descriptive and the intentional aspects of our experience - the meaning of our concepts stems directly from their efficacy in allowing us to obtain outcomes we desire and avoid those we don’t. For example, our favorite food is represented by our neurocognitive system very differently depending on whether we are hungry or nauseous (Craig, 2009; Radulescu et al., 2021). Importantly, this coupling between the representational and motivational aspects of our mind is not fixed but dynamically evolving. Initially, we may only have a vague sense of our own preferences and therefore a crude conceptual framework would suffice to effectively steer our thoughts and actions towards our goals. However, as our preferences become increasingly articulated and complex, the concepts required to effectively pursue them become more nuanced too. For example, a novice sommelier may have only a vague sense of her wine preferences, which she can express using broad

categorical terms such as color or sweetness. With more experience, she becomes sensitive to finer features of the wine’s taste and aroma, and consequently acquires more nuanced concepts, such as body, acidity, or depth, for expressing them. These concepts, in turn, enable her to further refine her sensitivity and acquire new preferences over increasingly finer sensorimotor features of her wine tasting experiences.

We thus arrive at a view of relevance realization as a goal-oriented interpretive cycle in which an agent’s preferences shape and constrain the formation of its concepts, allowing it to effectively interact with its environment. These concepts, in turn, afford interpretations—distinctions and inferences—that enable the agent to adjust its preferences and form new ones that more precisely reflect its evolving motivations and desires. What are the implications of this view on current efforts towards developing artificial systems exhibiting human-like understanding purposeful behaviors? As mentioned above, current reinforcement learning agents are designed with fixed representational mechanisms that are used to specify rigidly constrained goals, often expressed as the maximization of an expected reward signal accumulated over all sampled states (Bowling et al., 2023). While automated methods for state representation learning have recently been developed by utilizing deep-neural networks to approximate reward functions, even these methods rely on constrained task specifications. In other words, to learn a useful state representation, an AI system must be told what kind of information, or *observations*, can be considered as the raw inputs from which representations can be constructed (Bengio et al., 2014). Thus, state representations are thought of as fixed conceptual structures that constrain how an AI system can describe its interaction with the environment, and which goals it can potentially pursue. For example, autonomous robots are often designed to maintain a state representation describing their current position in their environment, regardless of whether their reward signal incentivizes them to approach or avoid particular objects. In contrast, cognitive representations in biological agents appear to be linked to particular goals such that their state representations are not fixed, but vary according to the teleological context, as illustrated above. This subtle yet fundamental difference may partially explain why AI agents still seem to lack the capacity for human-like understanding and relevance realization (Mitchell, 2019).

Recently, an alternative computational approach to the problem of state representation learning in cognitive agents has been proposed by one of us (Amir et al., 2024). Motivated by Dharmakīrti’s theory of concept formation, this approach draws an analogy between state representations and goal-oriented concepts, where goals are defined as preferences over actual or simulated sensorimotor experience sequences. For example, a hungry rat navigating a maze may prefer experiences, or maze trajectories, which are likely to lead towards locations where food is available. The same rat, when thirsty, would prefer other trajectories that are more likely to reach locations where water is provided. The goal of the rat, in these cases to eliminate thirst or hunger, is formalized as a set of preferences over possible maze trajectories that might lead to its achievement. If two or more such trajectories are equally likely to reach a location where food is available, they can be considered equivalent from the perspective of the goal of satisfying hunger. In other words, if the rat only cares about satisfying its hunger, it can ignore any differences between trajectories that are equivalent in terms of their likelihood of achieving that goal. Under this view, all goal-equivalent experiences are assumed to be mentally clustered into a single conceptual structure called a *telic state*.⁸ A telic state does not correspond to some natural kind or category in the world—clearly, “trajectory that reaches rat food” is not a natural kind. Instead, the categories represented by telic states are created on the fly, so to speak, in a way that is flexibly sensitive to teleological contexts. Moreover, by glossing over all goal-irrelevant aspects of sensorimotor experience sequences, telic states efficiently capture only the information that the agent needs to achieve its goal, in line with recent theoretical and experimental accounts indicating that purposeful biological behavior relies on the efficient utilization of limited cognitive resources (Amir et al., 2020; Fang & Sims, 2025; Lieder & Griffiths, 2020).

We can illustrate the notion of a telic state using the following example (Figure 1.): suppose you are planning to walk to the nearby park and are considering different possible routes for getting there from

⁸ The word *telic*, derived from the Greek *telos*, meaning ultimate end, refers to something that is oriented toward a specific goal or purpose. We use it here to emphasize the explicit goal-directed aspect of state representations within our account: telic states comprise precisely those aspects of experience that are relevant to achieving one’s goals.

your home. If you only care about eventually reaching the park, you need not worry about which route you pick as they are all equivalent with respect to that goal. In other words, you can generalize over the simulated sensorimotor experiences of walking to the park via different routes by clustering them together into a mental category, or telic state, corresponding to the goal of getting from your home to the park. However, suppose now that you also want to get a cup of coffee on your way to the park and that only some of the possible routes you are considering pass by your favorite café. In this case, it makes sense to split your categorization of simulated walking routes into two groups, namely those that stop by the café and those that don't. Thus, your goal determines how you represent possible experiences by categorizing them according to the relevant distinctions between them. Each telic state can be thought of as a mental model that enables your mind to simulate and evaluate experiences that share relevant features with respect to your goal. Experiences that are equally likely to satisfy your current goal, such as passing near your favorite café on the way to the park, are mentally grouped together under the same telic state. Formally, we can define a telic state as a group of goal-equivalent experiences. A goal, in turn, is defined as an order ranking of possible experiences. Thus, experiences that are equivalent (or at least sufficiently similar) with respect to a goal are clustered into a single telic state.⁹ A *telic state representation* can now be defined as a partitioning of the set of possible simulated experiences into goal-equivalent groups¹⁰. By formulating Dharmakīrti theory of concept formation in computational terms, telic state representations provide a novel perspective on the state representation problem that can capture several key aspects of the phenomenology of goal-directed learning and behavior (Amir et al., in press). We now turn to discuss how this Dharmakīrtian model of relevance realization can shed light on

⁹ More precisely, since simulated experiences may be non-deterministic (due to potential stochasticity or uncertainty in the behavior of both the agent and the environment), we define telic states as groups of equivalent *probability distributions* over possible experiences. In other words, each telic state can be thought of as a group of experience distributions that are equally likely to generate experiences exhibiting similar goal-relevant features. For more technical details, see (Amir et al., 2024).

¹⁰ See the appendix for a mathematical formulation of these notions.

contemporary scientific discourse regarding the similarities and differences between natural and artificial intelligence.




Figure 1. Telic states are goal sensitive (Left) all six possible routes, or experiences, are equally desirable with respect to the goal of reaching the park and can therefore be clustered into a single telic state S_0 . (Right) for the goal of getting a cup of coffee on the way to the park, these experiences are split into two telic states: S_1 , containing the routes that do not pass by the local cafe, and S_2 containing those that do.

Beginningless Imprints and Grounded Simulations

An extensive body of research in cognitive psychology and neuroscience indicates that our brain is endowed with inherent propensities that bias how we process and interpret information based on contextual, affective, social, and biological factors (Clark, 2013; Fiske & Taylor, 2013; Pessoa, 2008; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). For example, the primate brain is known to possess innate mechanisms for identifying and processing face stimuli, in distinction from other object categories (Kanwisher et al., 1997). In computational terms, such propensities can be described as *inductive biases*—ingrained assumptions that structure how a learning system generalizes and interprets information, especially when it is incomplete or ambiguous (Griffiths et al., 2010). Dharmakīrti's two imprints can thus be construed as fundamental inductive biases shaping our cognition. As mentioned above, these imprints include our tendency to confuse our concepts with real things in the world they refer to and to construe different objects as categorically similar in a goal-dependent context. Could these imprints—implemented computationally as inductive biases—enable artificial learning systems to better emulate human-like cognition? A deeper understanding of the reciprocal relationship between conceptual representations and goals in human cognition may allow us to design AI systems whose cognitive architecture, and hence

its goals, are better aligned with our own values and intentions (Christian, 2020; Sucholutsky et al., 2024).

Here, two aspects of the Dharmakīrtian approach are especially relevant. First, Dharmakīrti's goal-dependent account of concept formation, formulated using the telic states framework, suggests that AI systems are more likely to exhibit human-like understanding if they could be endowed with human-like goals and flexible conceptual mechanisms for representing and refining them. The relationship between the goals and the conceptual representations of AI systems is not well understood or even explicitly formulated in current computational learning frameworks. Indeed, state of the art AI systems do not typically possess any mechanisms for autonomous goal formation and representation (but see Colas et al., 2022 and Steels, 2004 for steps in that direction). From a Dharmakīrtian perspective, this gap between human and artificial goal representation mechanisms suggests that our interactions with AI systems such as ChatGPT are qualitatively different from our interactions with other persons, despite some superficial similarities. The actions and utterances of persons are driven by a dynamic set of goals: cognitive, affective, and social, that extend far beyond the mere exchange of descriptive or predictive information. For example, we might seek to strengthen social bonds with our interlocutor or to create a good impression on them so that they think well of us. On the other hand, the sole objective of a large language model is to best predict the next sequence of word tokens based on the prompt provided as context. Under a Dharmakīrtian account, for large language models to truly understand human-like concepts, they must first be capable of acquiring and pursuing human-like goals. While it is unclear how current text-based AI systems could be endowed with such capabilities, over the next few years AI systems are expected to become increasingly embodied and sensory grounded (Millhouse et al., 2022) and thus potentially more capable of acquiring human-like goals and representations.

Second, under the Dharmakīrtian model of cognition, our ability to effectively achieve our goals hinges on our implicit belief that our conceptual constructs are real. For example, suppose you are walking alone in the jungle. Your survival could depend on your ability to quickly interpret the growling sound you hear as indication of the existence of a tiger, even though, as you later discover, it was only the wind rustling through the trees. Thus, successfully engaging our environment typically requires us to take our own constructed and

inaccurate representations of it at face value. Interestingly, a current neuroscientific account of consciousness, the Attention Schema Theory, hypothesizes that our subjective experience of ourselves as conscious agents result from an ingrained propensity to mistake our imperfect mental models of our own attentional system as veridical descriptions of reality (Graziano & Kastner, 2011). By this account, Dharmakīrti's second imprint, applied to the representational apparatus of our own attentional system, may not only underlie our capacity to effectively interact with the world but even provide the foundation for our sense of awareness and intentionality. The Attention Schema Theory, like the Dharmakīrtian model of cognition, highlights the fabricated and conceptual nature of the reflexive aspects of our subjective awareness, in accordance with so-called illusionist accounts of phenomenal consciousness (Graziano, 2024).

Importantly however, the Dharmakīrtian account of cognition holds that under certain circumstances we are capable of "dereification," namely recognizing that our concepts, even if sometimes "fused" with reality, are in fact just constructed phenomenal representations. Such cases include the moment of coming to our sense while absorbed in a daydream, or the moment that we recognize that a firmly held belief—e.g., that a "fire" is the cause of the warm light we are seeing as we approach the living room—is superseded by a subsequent perceptual judgment (e.g., when we see that it is just coming from a video of a fire on the television). To understand how might such a capacity be implemented artificially, we can start by asking how it is implemented in the human brain. A recent study suggests that the human brain employs signal detection methods for classifying perceptual experiences as real or imagined, regardless of their actual origin (Dijkstra & Fleming, 2023). Another possible clue is offered by theories of grounded cognition, which suggest that conceptual representations are implemented in the brain as experience-based reenactments, or simulations, of perceptual, motor, and introspective states (Barsalou, 2009). Under this account, the conceptual representation of an object such as "fire" is implemented as cross-modal neural activation patterns corresponding to different aspects of situated and goal-oriented experiences of encountering a fire: a sense of heat, the memory of previous fires, the fear of getting a burn, the motor signal command telling the legs to run away, and so on. Importantly, imagining or remembering a fire may evoke simulations that are similar to those generated by actually perceiving one. Such

experience dependent simulations may be implemented neurocognitively by *cognitive maps*: structured representations of abstract relationships between entities, thought to be encoded in regions of the mammalian brain such as the hippocampus, the entorhinal and orbitofrontal cortices (Behrens et al., 2018). Indeed, recent neuroimaging findings suggest that the hippocampus and entorhinal cortex may construct abstract cognitive maps for evaluating arbitrary action-outcome relations in an abstract goal-directed space (Barnaveli et al., 2025).

In line with the Dharmakīrtian view, a human-like conceptual representation of an object such as a fire may thus be emulated in an embodied AI agent by activating a set of situated experience simulations similar to those activated in our brain when we encounter a real fire. Endowing AI systems with a mechanism for generating goal-dependent simulations of sensorimotor experiences may enable them to acquire more human-like state representations. Furthermore, implementing a metacognitive arbitration mechanism, such as the one described in (Dijkstra & Fleming, 2023), may enable such systems to distinguish between simulations that originate in real perceptual experiences and those that are completely imagined. This could not only allow us to design AI systems with human-like cognitive imprints, as identified by Dharmakīrti, but also with the capacity for potentially overcoming them by occasionally detecting when their conceptual constructions are not generated by a real external experience (For Dharmakīrti's account of extreme cases in this regard, see Dunne, 2007).

Interestingly, while Dharmakīrti recognized perception and inference as the only sources of valid knowledge, mental simulation can also be said to play a key epistemic role that shares computational similarities with both perception and inference but is also distinct from them (Aronowitz & Lombrozo, 2020). Simulations are like observations in that both involve an epistemic transition from observed data (simulated or actual) to some conclusion about the state of affairs in the world. Simulations are like inferences in that both allow learning without necessarily relying on any current physical perception. Dharmakīrti's imprints, viewed through the lens of mental simulation, could be operationalized computationally as follows: the first imprint, namely the habit of (erroneously) identifying an object with a previously experienced one, could be implemented by simulators that invoke neural activity patterns that resemble those evoked by

previously experienced objects under similar goal-dependent contexts. The second imprint, namely the habit of confusing a conceptual representation of an object with the actual object, could be implemented as an (fallible) arbitration mechanism between perceptual and simulated information channels. As Dharmakīrti notes, our tendency to mistake conceptual representations with reality is useful for motivating goal-directed behavior. However, the tendency to mistake concepts or simulations with reality can thwart the achievement of a goal (as when one mistakenly identifies a perceptual object as “fire”), and it can even lead to hallucinations and pathological dysfunction. Indeed, while simulations depend on an internal model for generating them, the process of learning through simulations—through the combination of sensory feedback and inferential reasoning mentioned above—alters the very same model that is used to generate them. Thus, learning through simulation requires the learner to acknowledge the fallibility of her own simulators and update them accordingly. Thus, viewing simulation as a plausible neurocognitive substrate for a Dharmakīrtian model of concept formation may shed new light on our proclivity to conflate our thoughts with reality and how these mechanisms can go awry (Forman et al., 2012).

Learning through simulations can also be thought of as a process of making implicit knowledge representationally accessible by extracting consequences of the model that were formerly unavailable for direct action or report (Aronowitz & Lombrozo, 2020). This notion, combined with the Dharmakīrtian model of concept formation, is reminiscent of a leading contemporary scientific theory of the neural basis of conscious access, namely the Global Neuronal Workspace theory (Mashour et al., 2020). According to the Global Neuronal Workspace theory, conscious processing is associated with sustained neural activation patterns that can be accessed and shared across multiple sensorimotor processing systems. Such sustained activation patterns provide a plausible candidate for the neural substrate of goal-oriented, cross-modal conceptual simulations. Per Dharmakīrti’s second imprint, such simulations might be interpreted as actual experiences involving the simulated concepts at hand, thus giving rise to our conscious awareness of them. While speculative, this line of inquiry further illustrates how Dharmakīrti’s ideas may bear upon ongoing debates regarding the possibility of creating artificial systems with human-like cognition and consciousness (Butlin et al., 2023).

Nonconceptual Cognition and Mortal Computation

As noted above, Dharmakīrti's view entails that knowledge derived directly from sensory experience is the final epistemic court of appeal. The information provided by sensory experience does not however determine our conceptual constructions—any given sensory experience is in principle open to an infinite number of possible conceptual interpretations. Rather, it only places constraints on those cognitions: based on the context created by goal-oriented concerns, I may interpret what I am seeing as “red,” or “spheroid,” or “edible,” or an “apple,” or any number of other things. But if the concepts that emerge during that experience are to guide effective action, I cannot conceptualize what I am seeing as a “banana.” Thus, from a Dharmakīrtian perspective, any attempt to faithfully emulate human-like cognition must ultimately be causally grounded in the physical sensory signals furnished by objects in the world. Current AI systems, such as large language models that rely exclusively on computations over huge quantities of digitally processed data, may therefore be incapable of truly emulating human-like cognition. Overcoming this barrier would require systems that have the capacity to ground computational processes and conceptual representations in the raw sensory stream of information afforded by their particular embodiment. How might artificial agents be endowed with such capacities?

In a recent paper, AI pioneer Geoffrey Hinton introduced a distinction between mortal and immortal computation (Hinton, 2022). Immortal computation is the kind of computation that runs on digital computers. It is independent of the physical substrate used to implement it—i.e., running the same computation on different physical substrates will not change its results. Thus, information represented by immortal computations can continue to exist even if the hardware on which it runs is destroyed. Mortal computation, on the other hand, is the kind of computation carried out by living systems, such as the brain. Its implementation critically depends on the particular details of its physical substrate and disappears when the latter ceases to exist. Biological cognition is characterized by its reliance on mortal, rather than immortal, computation. Hinton and others suggest that achieving the adaptivity and energy efficiency levels of biological brains may require new methods for incorporating mortal computations in artificial cognitive agents. Indeed, many researchers believe that the next breakthrough in AI will involve large language models endowed with

grounded sensorimotor capabilities (Millhouse et al., 2022; Mon-Williams et al., 2025). Proponents of Integration Information Theory, another prominent scientific theory of consciousness, go further by arguing that the phenomenology of subjective experience itself is ultimately determined by its physical substrate (Albantakis et al., 2023). Dharmakīrti's account of cognition, as outlined above, provides a rich foundation for a unified framework of the computational and phenomenological underpinnings of sensory-grounded, goal-directed cognition across natural and artificial substrates.

Conclusion

To summarize, we offered a new theoretical approach to the problem of relevance realization in cognitive agents by synthesizing the Dharmakīrtian account of goal-oriented concept formation with current computational frameworks of state representation learning. We outlined how the coupling between the descriptive and the motivational elements of conceptual representations, a key feature of this canonical Buddhist model of cognition, may be used to extend the scope of traditional computational perspectives on learning and relevance realization in natural and artificial systems. Dharmakīrti's views on human cognition, and the fundamental inductive biases underlying it, suggest that our capacity for relevance realization hinges upon our metacognitive capacity to form conceptual representations by ignoring goal-irrelevant aspects of experience. It also relies on our cognitive inclination, or inductive bias, to confuse our conceptual constructs with the real objects they refer to while simultaneously possessing the capacity to see them, at least occasionally, as the conceptually constructed mental simulations that they are.

Importantly, goals can extend beyond individual agents and over multiple spatiotemporal scales and psychophysical substrates (Figure 2.). Thus, a goal-centered account of cognition may better account for the emergence of multi-scale purposeful behaviors such as the coordinated swimming of a school of fish aiming to intimidate potential predators (Sumpter, 2010), or young children learning to participate in shared cultural activities such as linguistic communication or pretend play (Tomasello & Rakoczy, 2003). Such phenomena, which challenge traditional agent-based computational learning frameworks, may be more naturally explained in terms of telic states within an appropriate space of (shared) experiences. By positioning goals, rather than rewards

or agents, as the central factors shaping mental representation, Dharmakīrti’s ideas, as formalized by the telic-states framework, can provide rigorous foundations for a theory of purposeful behavior centered around goals, rather than individual agents or “Selves”, as the basic unit of learning and cognition across diverse substrates and spatiotemporal scales (Levin, 2022; Seifert et al., 2024).




Figure 2. Agentic vs. telic learning (Left) traditional models view agents as the fundamental learning units, with dedicated neural modules for state and value estimation. (Right) states are typically assumed to be estimated on the basis of the previous state and the current observation while evaluation relies on stored values for different states which are updated based on a privileged set of observations that are considered “rewarding”. In the telic states framework, purposeful behavior stems from goals, which induce telic states, encapsulating descriptive and evaluative aspects of experience. Goals are represented across multiple brain regions and may even extend beyond the brain, e.g., in cases of multiple agents pursuing a joint goal.

Finally, our work contributes to an emerging body of multidisciplinary research proposing how contemplative wisdom traditions, and Buddhist philosophy in particular, may inform more nuanced and holistic scientific frameworks of cognition and goal-directed behavior (Doctor et al., 2022; Laukkonen et al., 2025; Thompson, 2023). As advances in AI technology increasingly blur the boundaries between natural and artificial cognition, raising serious moral and existential concerns, we believe that such frameworks can offer valuable insights

by providing a unified account for the epistemic, phenomenological, and ethical dimensions of purposeful behavior in cognitive systems.

Acknowledgements

The authors wish to thank Thomas Doctor, Liad Murdik, Daniel McNamara for helpful comments on earlier versions of the paper. N.A. was supported by grant no. U01DA050647 from the National Institute on Drug Abuse. J.D. gratefully acknowledges funding from Peggy Hedberg, Francene Orrok, and the Hershey Family Foundation.

Glossary

Term	Definition
<i>Agent</i>	A learning system that interacts with its environment by performing actions and observing outcomes to achieve some goal.
<i>Cognitive map</i>	A map like mental representation, encoding the relationships between entities in the world in spatial or abstract spaces and supporting flexible goal-directed behavior.
<i>Exclusion (Skt. apoha)</i>	A Buddhist theory of meaning which holds that concepts signify not by denoting real universals, but by glossing over, or excluding, their goal-irrelevant features.
<i>Goal</i>	A set of preferences over possible experiences (action-outcome sequences) that an agent can undergo. Within <i>reinforcement learning</i> , goals are often approximated as the maximization of expected <i>reward</i> .
<i>Inductive bias</i>	A set of ingrained assumptions that predisposes a learning system to predict outputs of given inputs that it has not encountered.
<i>Policy</i>	A mapping between states and actions. A policy provides a formal description of the behavioral strategy of an agent.
<i>Reinforcement learning</i>	A computational framework for describing how agents learn from experience through rewards provided by their environments.
<i>Relevance realization</i>	The cognitive process by which an agent determines which aspects of its experience should be represented and which can be ignored.
<i>Reward</i>	A signal used by reinforcement learning algorithms to approximate goals and guide policy learning by assigning higher numerical values to more desirable action-outcome pairs experienced by an agent.

<i>State representation</i>	A compact description of the current situation, or <i>state</i> , of the world (agent and environment) that is used by an agent for decision-making and policy learning.
<i>Telic states</i>	A novel theory of state representation learning hypothesizing that simulated sensorimotor experiences are clustered into <i>states</i> by ignoring their goal-irrelevant aspects.

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Appendix: Formal Foundations of the Telic States Framework

Telic states as goal-equivalent experiences

To formalize the notion of perception–action cycles that describe the interaction between an agent and its environment we consider streams of observation–action pairs. We denote by O the set of possible observations and by A the set of possible actions. An **experience sequence** (or an “experience” for short) is defined by the finite sequence

$$h = o_1, a_1, o_2, a_2, \dots, o_n, a_n.$$

Let $H_n = (O \times A)^n$ denote the set of all experiences of length n . The collection of all finite-length experiences is

$$H = \bigcup_{n \geq 1} H_n.$$

In non-deterministic settings, it will be useful to consider distributions over experiences. Let $\Delta(H)$ be the set of all probability distributions over finite experiences.

Following Bowling et al. (2023), we define a **goal** g as a **binary preference relation** $\succeq_g$ over experience distributions in $\Delta(H)$. For two experience distributions $A, B \in \Delta(H)$, we write

$$A \succeq_g B$$

if A is at least as desirable as B under the goal g . If both $A \succeq_g B$ and $B \succeq_g A$ hold, then A and B are equally preferred and we write $A \sim_g B$. This definition induces an equivalence relation $\sim_g$, that partitions $\Delta(H)$ into classes of equally desirable experience distributions. For a goal g , we define the goal-directed, or telic, state representation, S_g , as the partition of experience distributions into equivalence classes it induces:

$$S_g = \Delta(H) / \sim_g.$$

In other words, each telic state represents a generalization over all equally desirable experience distributions. This definition captures the intuition that agents need not distinguish between experiences that are

equivalent (in a statistical sense) with respect to their goal. Furthermore, since different telic states are, by definition, non-equivalent with respect to $\succeq_g$, the goal g also determines whether a transition between any two telic states brings the agent closer or further away from its goal.

Learning with telic states

How can a telic state representation inform goal-directed behavior? First, define a **policy** π as a conditional distribution over actions given the entire past experience and current observation:

$$\pi(a_i \mid o_1, a_1, \dots, o_{i-1}, a_{i-1}, o_i).$$

Likewise, define an **environment** e as a conditional distribution over observations given past experiences:

$$e(o_i \mid o_1, a_1, \dots, a_{i-1}).$$

By the chain rule, the distribution over experience sequences induced by policy π and environment e is:

$$\begin{aligned} P_\pi(o_1, a_1, \dots, o_n, a_n) \\ &= \prod_{i=1}^n e(o_i \mid o_1, a_1, \dots, a_{i-1}) \pi(a_i \\ &\quad \mid o_1, a_1, \dots, o_{i-1}, a_{i-1}, o_i). \end{aligned}$$

Typically, e is considered fixed, so one can think of focusing on $P_\pi(h)$. We define equivalence of policies under a goal g by:

Typically, the environment is assumed to be fixed, and hence not explicitly parameterized in P_π above. Our definition of telic states as goal-induced equivalence classes can now be extended to equivalence between policy-induced experience distributions as follows:

$$\pi_1 \sim_g \pi_2 \iff P_{\pi_1} \sim_g P_{\pi_2}.$$

Thus two policies are equivalent if they produce equally preferred experience distributions under g . The main question is: how can an

agent learn a policy that tends to produce experiences in a desired telic state? Let an agent run a policy π for N trials, giving an empirical distribution $\hat{P}_\pi$ over observed experience sequences:

$$\hat{P}_\pi(h) = \frac{|\{k: h_k = h\}|}{N}.$$

We can now ask what is the probability that $\hat{P}_\pi$ lies in a particular telic state S_i ? Sanov's theorem from large-deviation theory shows such a probability decays exponentially in N , with a rate of

$$R = \min_{P \in S_i} D_{\text{KL}}(P \parallel P_\pi),$$

where D_{KL} is the Kullback–Leibler divergence. We thus call R the **telic distance** from π to S_i .

Assume the policy is parameterized by θ . A natural **policy gradient** update to move the policy toward the desired telic state S_i is:

$$\theta_{t+1} = \theta_t - \eta \nabla_\theta D_{\text{KL}}(P_i^* \parallel P_{\pi_\theta}),$$

where $P_i^* = \arg \min_{P \in S_i} D_{\text{KL}}(P \parallel P_{\pi_\theta})$ is the projection of P_{π_θ} into S_i . This update steers π to produce experiences that are more likely to belong to the target telic state.

Breaking the Pain Cycle: The Neuroscience, Psychological, and Cognitive Insights on Meditation

Myint Myint Aung

Abstract

A key aspect of the traditional pain management approach tends to view pain primarily as a physical symptom to be eliminated rather than as a complex experience with psychological and cognitive dimensions. A deeper exploration of meditation's effects on brain function and cognitive processes remains necessary despite meditation's growing popularity as a non-invasive therapeutic approach. This study addresses this gap by examining how insight meditation influences electroencephalography (EEG) wave patterns, particularly alterations in gamma activity and Default Mode Network (DMN) connectivity, thereby facilitating cognitive distancing from pain. Furthermore, by integrating insights from Buddhist psychology, specifically the *Theravāda Abhidhamma* perspective on active meditative *vīthi* (thought processes), together with early contemplative insights on pain distancing and direct observation of experience, this research provides a comprehensive framework for understanding the mind-body connection in pain alleviation. These findings highlight the innovative viewpoint of how the connecting insights from neuroscience, Buddhist psychology, and cognitive insights on meditation can disrupt both neural pathways and thought processes that intensify pain experiences. As a result of this integrated approach, it is offering promising implications for developing comprehensive pain management strategies with new potential.

Keywords: Buddhist Psychology, Cognitive Analysis, Meditation, Neuroscience, Pain.

Introduction

Physically unpleasant suffering with chronic pain is one of the most challenging global health issues, greatly affecting people's quality of life, from physical suffering to mental misery, and it affects mental well-being. However, only conventional pain management strategies have mainly approached pharmacological treatments focused on relieving the pain symptoms. Formal medical procedures have limitations and frequently fail to recognize that suffering from chronic pain is not merely a physical sensation but also an emotionally felt and cognitively assessed experience of sensory response and related feelings. With these constraints becoming increasingly apparent, integrative approaches have gained popularity that recognize pain as a multidimensional phenomenon involving body and mind.

One such integrative approach gaining potential physical and mental benefits is meditation, which has emerged as a convincing interdisciplinary research field. It bridges ancient contemplative practices from Eastern traditions with the analytical methodologies of Western neuroscience and psychology to investigate how meditation alters brain function and cognitive processing. This study aims to examine how insight meditation (*Vipassanā*) influences brain wave patterns and cognitive processing associated with pain perception, which has become popular and interesting in modern medical fields.

Employing a mixed-method design, electroencephalography (EEG) recordings that capture variations in brain activity during resting and meditative states are evaluated in conjunction with a qualitative analysis of thought process and self-reported pain assessments. The findings demonstrate how insight meditation reduces subjective pain intensity and induces significant neurophysiological changes, such as decreased self-referential processing and reorganized gamma oscillations, which correlate with reduced pain perception.

From a neuroscientific perspective, consciousness and emotion regulation are attributed to neural activity and can be studied through technologies such as EEG (Lutz, et al., 2004). In contrast, Buddhist psychology, particularly the *Theravāda Abhidhamma* tradition, which

this paper draws upon, attributes the seat of consciousness to the heart-base and analyzes cognitive processes through a sequence of thought moments called *Vīthi* in *Pāḷi* (Sīlānanda, 2012). Moreover, advances in social neuroscience demonstrate that different types of mental training, like various meditation practices, reshape brain networks in unique ways, emphasizing that not all meditation leads to the same outcomes (Singer, 2016). Integrating these complementary frameworks deepens our understanding of meditation's transformative effects on mental states and highlights its therapeutic potential.

Specifically, this paper explores how changes in EEG brain rhythms, particularly gamma oscillations and Default Mode Network (DMN) connectivity, relate to cognitive distancing from pain, and how compassion practice eases empathic pain by engaging affiliative networks. From the *Theravāda Abhidhamma*'s detailed account of the thought process (*Vīthi*), this study seeks to bridge traditional Buddhist cognitive models with modern neuroscientific findings, while also incorporating early Buddhist textual insights on cognitive distancing from pain and the direct contemplation of sensory experience. Rather than presenting new experimental results, the study critically analyzes existing scholarly research and literature, aiming to connect theoretical insights from neuroscience, cognitive science, and Buddhist psychology. By observing and clearly comprehending the cognitive processes underlying meditation, this paper offers a conceptual framework for understanding how insight meditation may modulate neural activity and thought patterns involved in the experience of pain and break the pain cycle.

Literature Review

To provide a structured framework for this study, the literature reviewed here integrates both contemporary neuroscience and traditional Buddhist perspectives. Foundational research by Davidson¹¹ and Lutz and later expanded by Lutz has pioneered the neurophysiological study of meditation, demonstrating through EEG and functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) that insight

¹¹ Dr. Davidson is best known for his groundbreaking work studying emotion and the brain and he is the Founder and Director of the Center for Healthy Minds. <https://www.richardjdavidson.com/>

practices can alter brain function, especially in gamma-band oscillations and connectivity patterns within the DMN (Lutz, et al., 2004). Accordingly, this paper discusses EEG brain wave types and associated consciousness states as a basis for understanding meditation's influence on brain activity.

Following this, an explanation of Buddhist psychology, including the thought process and how it cognises objects, is discussed. In Buddhist *Abhidhamma*, mental activity is analyzed through a series of thought moments, and every thought moment is organized into fixed sequences (*Vīthi*), which describe how the mind receives sensory input, recognizes objects, and responds. The cognitive analysis provides a systematic interpretation of perception and reaction, deepening our understanding of meditation practice and offering a valuable framework for dialogue with contemporary cognitive neuroscience.

Neuroscientific studies on meditation and the DMN confirm that long-term meditators show less DMN activity when at rest, and that mindfulness reduces self-referential thinking, thereby leading to less emotional suffering (Harris, 2014). Moreover, recent findings on mindfulness-based practices, specifically insight meditation (*Vipassanā*), promote structural and functional changes in brain regions involved in attention regulation, emotional control, and self-referential processing. These neuroplastic changes, particularly the reduction of DMN activity, provide a crucial mechanism through which insight meditation disrupts the habitual cognitive and emotional patterns that sustain chronic pain (Tang et al, 2015). Yet, despite these promising findings, the precise mechanisms through which meditation influences the psychological and cognitive dimensions of pain remain underexplored. To address this, the following discussion examines the functioning of the DMN (by Dr. Harris), alongside research on the neuroscience of pain and prosocial motivation, particularly Dr. Tania Singer's findings on the trainability of compassion and its role in shifting responses from empathic pain of distress to resilience.

Among various forms of meditation, insight meditation (*Vipassanā*) attracts particular interest within neuroscientific and clinical communities for its potential to regulate emotional and cognitive responses to pain. Rooted in early Buddhist teachings, *Vipassanā* cultivates non-reactive, moment-to-moment awareness of bodily sensations and mental events, enabling practitioners to observe pain with equanimity and psychological distance (Gunaratana, 2002).

For a deeper reframing of this experience, this paper also draws on the *Theravāda Pāli Canon* as a primary source for understanding cognitive distancing from pain, with particular reference to the *Nakulapitasutta* and the *Sallasutta*. Further analysis turns to the *Visuddhimagga*'s account of *Vipassanā-ñāṇa* (stages of insight) and the *Bāhiyasutta* for analytical reflection, here expressed as "Touch as Touch, Pain as the Path." Together, these classical frameworks provide interpretive depth for contemporary scientific findings. This integrated approach highlights the interplay of meditation, consciousness, and pain across both empirical research and Buddhist literature. A flowchart summarizing the conceptual framework of this paper is provided in Appendix A.

EEG Wave Patterns

To explore how meditation modulates brain function and influences the experience of pain, this paper first examines the EEG, one of the most widely used tools for observing real-time neural activity. EEG is a non-invasive neuroimaging technique used to assess brain activity and investigate cognitive processes. It records the electrical activity produced by neurons as they communicate through both electrical impulses and chemical signals, capturing the rhythmic electrical patterns that emerge during this neural communication. EEG works by placing small metal discs called electrodes on the scalp, which detect the tiny electrical signals produced by neuronal firing; these signals are then amplified and displayed as waveforms on a screen or paper. EEG is widely used in neuroscience and psychological research and is particularly valuable in the field of cognitive science, as it can reveal changes in brain states associated with varying levels of arousal and different experimental conditions. Due to its excellent temporal resolution, EEG is especially effective at capturing the rapid chronological sequence of mental processes, offering critical insights into the timing and sequence of cognitive activities.

Brain activity can be categorized into distinct oscillatory patterns, commonly referred to as brain waves, each associated with specific states of consciousness and cognitive functions. These waves are typically classified by their frequency ranges which are delta, theta, alpha, beta, and gamma and those can be detected through EEG recordings. According to *Buzsáki* in his book "Rhythms of the Brain," every rhythm illustrates the foundational dynamics of neural networks

and is intricately associated with various physiological and psychological conditions, spanning from deep sleep to wakefulness and reaching up to higher level cognitive engagement. The following table summarizes the major EEG brain wave types, their frequency ranges, and their associated mental states (Nayak, 2023; Buzsáki, 2006).

Table 1. EEG Brain Wave Types & Associated Consciousness States

Wave Type	Frequency Range	Associated States of Consciousness
Delta (δ)	0.5 – 4 Hz	Deep sleep
Theta (θ)	4 – 7 Hz	Drowsiness, light sleep, deep meditation, creativity
Alpha (α)	8 – 12 Hz	Relaxed wakefulness, calmness, meditative states
Beta (β)	13 – 30 Hz	Alertness, active thinking, problem-solving
Gamma (γ)	30 – 100+ Hz	Higher level cognitive functions

Note: Typical EEG brainwave frequency ranges and their associated states of consciousness. Values represent general scientific consensus based on EEG research.

Advanced imaging and neural recording techniques which including EEG and fMRI have provided compelling insights into how meditation influences brain activity both immediately and over extended periods of practice (Lutz et al., 2008; Tang et al., 2015). Studies have consistently demonstrated that meditation enhances neural oscillations, particularly in alpha (8–12 Hz) and gamma (>30 Hz) frequency bands, which are closely associated with relaxed wakefulness, meditative states and higher-level cognitive functions. Significantly, long-term meditators, particularly those engaged in compassion and insight meditations, display enhanced gamma-band synchronization, indicative of improved neural integration and attentional control (Davidson et al., 2008).

Vīthi (Thought Process) in Theravāda Abhidhamma

While EEG provides a neuroscientific lens for observing brain activity during meditation, the *Theravāda Abhidhamma* offers a parallel framework for understanding cognition through the analysis of thought

processes (*Vīthis*). Unlike neuroscience, the *Abhidhamma* does not describe the brain as the origin or seat of consciousness; instead, it maps mental events as sequences of thought moments. The following table presents a comparative summary of key concepts in *Abhidhamma* and modern neuroscience.

Table 2. A Comparative Summary of Key Concepts in Abhidhamma and Neuroscience.

Concept	Abhidhamma	Neuroscience
Seat of Consciousness	Heart-base (<i>hadaya-vatthu</i>)	Brain
Mind	Fleeting mental states (impermanence)	Neurons activity
Thought Process	<i>Vīthi</i> (Cittas in sequence)	EEG/ fMRI
Observation	Insight Meditation	Empirical

Note: Terms are expressed in simplified language to highlight parallels. *Abhidhamma* terms are based on *Theravāda Buddhist* doctrine; neuroscience terms reflect general contemporary understandings.

The Buddhist concept of mind refers to a complex compound of fleeting mental states. It is a succession of series of *citta* (consciousness) that follow one another so rapidly as to appear as if they were permanent and stable. One unit of *citta* consists of three phases: arising (*Uppāda*), presence (*Thiti*), and dissolution (*Bhaṅga*). According to *Theravāda Abhidhamma*'s teaching, there is no single moment without *citta* and *citta* is never without an object. *Citta* arises one at a time and it arises with its associate mental factors. These series of *cittas* arise in order to cognize the object according to the law of *citta*, *Citta Niyāma* (Buddhaghosa, 1958), which means that there is neither agent nor giving order to the *cittas*. However, they arise and disappear according to the fixed order of consciousness just to do their respective functions (Sīlānanda, 2012).

A cognitive process is understood as a series of *citta* that arise in response to a present object when it comes into contact with the sense doors or the mind door. As a matter of fact, it is not a unity but a series of seventeen thought moments, each following the other. The moment a man first sees, hears, smells, tastes, or touches an object, he experiences many five-sense-door thought processes of seventeen thought moments, and mind-door thought processes before he is fully aware of what he has seen, heard, smelled, tasted, or touched.

Table 3. Description for Seventeen Moments of Body-door Thought Process for Great Intensity Object (Very painful object)
(Compiled by the author based on Abhidhamma literature)

Base vatthu	Element dhātu	o.	Consciousness Name	Citta name in Pāḷi	Abbreviation	Function		Tasks	
The heart-base (hadaya-vatthu)	mind-consciousness-element (Mano-viññāṇa-dhātu)		Past Life continuum	Atīta-bhavaṅga	B-p	R - Resultant (Vipāka)	abyākata	Life continuum that has passed	
			Vibrating Life continuum	Calana Bhavaṅga	B-v			Life continuum that vibrates	
			Arrest Life continuum	Upaccheda Bhavaṅga	B-c			Life continuum that ceases	
	mind-element (mano-dhātu)		5 Door Advertence	Pañcadvārāvajjana	A-c	F - Functional Non-Operative (kiriya)		Attending consciousness that attends the present object coming into contact	
Body-base (kāya-vatthu)	body-consciousness-element (kāya-viññāṇa-dhātu)		Body Consciousness	kāya-viññāṇa	B-c	R - Resultant (Vipāka)			Body-consciousness that touches the present tangible object
The heart-base (hadaya-vatthu)	mind-element (manodhātu)		Receiving Consciousness	Sampaṭicchana	R-c				Receiving consciousness that receives the present object
	mind-consciousness-element		Investigating Consciousness	Santīraṇa	I-c			Enquiring consciousness that enquires the present object	

Breaking the Pain Cycle

Base vatthu	Element dhātu	o.	Consciousness Name	Citta name in Pāli	Abbreviation	Function		Tasks
	(Mano-viññāṇa-dhātu)		Determining Consciousness	Voṭṭhappana	D-c	F - Functional Non-Operative (kiriya)		Determining consciousness that determines the present object
		- 15	Experience the present object	Javana	Jv	Wholesome/ Unwholesome	Power-ful	Energetic consciousness that experiences the present object
		6- 17	Registering Consciousness	Tadārammaṇa	Rt-c	R - Resultant (Vipāka)	Abyāk-ata	retentive consciousness that succeeds the object of Javana




Figure 5. Seventeen Moments of Body-door Thought Process for Great Intensity Object (Very painful object) (Creation by the author based on Abhidhamma literature)

Note: It should be noted that this paper does not provide a detailed explanation of specific *Abhidhamma* technical terms of the cognitive process (*Vīthi*).




Figure 6. Recognizing and Perception of Pain with Minimum Four Cognition Processes

Here's a simplified outline:

At the very beginning, when the body touches, for example here, a headache, as seen in Figure 4, it only perceives a tangible object. This is simply the act of touching through the body-consciousness (*kāya-viññāṇa*). At that moment, it is just touching, and there is no knowledge of what is being touched, nor any judgment of whether it feels good or bad, smooth or hard, painful or comfortable. It is simply the bare touching, and the mind-stream immediately moves on. After the initial touching, thinking arises. At that moment, the tangible contact is no longer there, disappearing right after it was touched. That means the mind can take only one object at a time, as mentioned before. Hence, the tangible object seems to disappear from the mind. Although it no longer exists, the object briefly reappears when the mind reflects back. But this reappearance is not the direct knowing of touching through the body anymore; it's the recollection of the mind contemplating a past tangible object. So, it is no longer part of the *pañca-dvāra-vīthi* (five-sense-door cognitive process); it belongs to the *mano-dvāra-vīthi* (mind-door cognitive process). Following this reflection, through continuous mind moments, the recognition of touching is still part of the mind-door cognitive process. Then, after another series of mind moments, names and labels such as feeling bad pain, hardness, sharpness, uneasiness, restlessness, and distress emerge within the mind-door cognitive process. In these four *vīthi*(s), thought

processes, the first two are the ultimate reality, merely the act of paying attention to the object. Upon reaching the third and fourth thought processes, recognising and perception arise, which are concepts.

Note that many *Bhavaṅga* (life-continuum) moments flow rapidly both before and after each thought process (Sīlānanda, 2012). So, it is a highly complex experience, and we understand only a little of it with the help of the *Abhidhamma* texts. What we have explained here is just a simplified scenario. In reality, many more thought processes flow dynamically and with rapid force, like sequences in a film. Only when multiple sense objects and multiple sensitivities combine can an object be perceived at the sense base (sensitivity). Without mindfulness, these are often unnoticed or cannot be grasped by ordinary people, as trillions of thought moments can arise in the time it takes to snap a finger, as mentioned earlier.

DMN (Dr. Sam Harris)¹²

In *Waking Up* (2014), Dr. Sam Harris explains how insight meditation can reduce self-referential thinking by reducing brain DMN activity. Dr. Harris says consciousness isn't what we think, it's that which is aware of thought. It's like the "space" in which sights, sounds, feelings, and thoughts arise. Without consciousness, there's no experience of anything even if our body is alive. Whether we're happy, sad, distracted, or in pain, the capacity to be aware is always there. Meditation trains us to notice this background awareness instead of getting lost in the contents (thoughts, emotions, stories). He uses modern neuroscience to show how meditation changes our experience of physical and mental suffering. Studies show that long-term meditators have lower DMN activity when resting. Mindfulness practice quiets down self-centred thinking, leading to less emotional suffering. The moment we observe a thought or feeling, we are no longer completely caught up in it. Observing the contents of

¹² Dr Sam Harris is a neuroscientist and philosopher, observes in *Waking Up*, the DMN sustains the sense of a continuous "self," and its deactivation during meditation helps reveal the constructed nature of selfhood.

<https://www.samharris.org/>

consciousness as they come and go helps break the spell of being lost in thought.

Dr. Harris points out that the DMN is most active when the mind wanders, worrying activities that often create dissatisfaction, anxiety, and psychological suffering. The DMN builds what Dr. Harris calls the narrative self, the constant story of "I, me, mine," which he says is an illusion. Insight meditation can quiet this network, and it is evidenced that experienced meditators show lower DMN activity during meditation. Instead of getting lost in self-thoughts, they learn to observe mental events without judgment, resting in pure awareness without identifying with them. In this state, thoughts and emotions are seen just as passing events in consciousness, not as solid parts of a personal self. By calming the DMN, meditation gives deep insight into the mind's nature, reduces suffering, and brings inner clarity and peace. Dr. Harris presents the DMN as the neurological base of the wandering mind and the illusion of a fixed self. Insight meditation offers a direct way to see through this illusion and find real psychological freedom. This provides a foundation for understanding how ancient Buddhist psychology offers practical guidance through contemplative practices.

Compassion as a Path Beyond Pain: Insights from Social Neuroscience (Dr. Tania Singer)¹³

Building on the discussion of the DMN and its role in self-referential processing, we turn now to the question of how meditation can reshape not only individual pain perception but also our response to the suffering of others. At the International Conference on Science, Mindfulness, and Meditation in 2025, Dr. Tania Singer presented research on how different forms of meditation particularly compassion and empathy alter neural pathways involved in pain, care, and social connection. Her findings provide a bridge between pain science and prosocial motivation, showing that compassion can transform empathic distress into resilience and sustained care. Daily meditation, she explained, reduces depression and stress while increasing resilience. This is achieved by decreasing self-rumination, which in turn downregulates DMN wandering, strengthens present-moment

¹³ Prof. Dr. Tania Singer is a social neuroscientist and psychologist and world expert on empathy and compassion: <https://taniasinger.de/>

awareness, and increases functional connectivity with executive control networks.

The ReSource Project¹⁴

Dr. Singer's large-scale ReSource Project exemplifies these effects. The nine-month program was divided into three sequential modules, each producing distinct neural and behavioral outcomes:

- Presence Module – Attention-based practices (e.g., mindfulness of breath, body awareness), corresponding to *samatha*. These stabilize attention and provide the foundation for deeper practice.
- Affect Module – Loving-kindness(*mettā*), compassion(*karuṇā*), gratitude, and dyadic exercises, corresponding to the *brahmavihāras*. These cultivate care, affiliation, and resilience.
- Perspective Module – Metacognitive and perspective-taking practices (observing thoughts, adopting viewpoints), corresponding to *Vipassanā* and insight into mental processes. These strengthen reflexive awareness and cognitive flexibility.

Each module produced measurable structural and functional plasticity in social brain networks, along with boosts in prosocial motivation (Singer, 2016).

Empathy vs. Compassion in the Brain

One of the most fascinating insights from Dr. Singer's work concerns pain resonance, often called *empathic distress*. Empathy for others' pain activates the *anterior insula* and specific part of *anterior cingulate cortex* regions also involved in personal pain processing which can lead to emotional exhaustion. By contrast, compassion training shifts activation to distinct circuits, including the *medial orbitofrontal cortex*, *subgenual anterior cingulate cortex (sgACC)*, and *ventral striatum*. These are associated with care, reward, and resilience, supporting a sustainable, approach-oriented mode of relating to suffering (Singer & Klimecki, 2014).

¹⁴ <https://tanasinger.de/the-resource-project/>

Dialogue with the *Visuddhimagga*

While Dr. Singer highlights the neurocognitive benefits of compassion and loving-kindness, the *Visuddhimagga* offers a complementary framework that emphasizes both the power and the potential pitfalls of these practices. It warns of the “near enemies” of wholesome states, which can distort practice if left unchecked:

- Loving-kindness (*mettā*) – Promotes welfare, but fails if it slips into possessive affection (*pema*). Its near enemy is attachment (*Vism. IX.90*).
- Compassion (*karuṇā*) – Promotes the wish to allay suffering, but fails if it collapses into sorrow (*soka*). Its near enemy is grief (*Vism. IX.92–93*).
- Equanimity (*upekkhā*) – Balances the other states by cultivating neutrality toward beings and preventing resentment or partiality (*Vism. IX.96–97*).

This Buddhist analysis resonates with Dr. Singer’s empirical findings: empathy without balance risks empathic distress, while compassion supported by equanimity activates affiliative circuits and fosters resilience. Both perspectives converge on the insight that compassion is not merely an emotion, but a trainable skill, requiring warmth and balance to avoid distortion.

Implications for Pain Science and Meditation

For pain science and contemplative practice, this synthesis is significant. Compassion training offers an approach-oriented mode of engaging with suffering that reduces overwhelm, sustains care, and transforms both personal pain and prosocial engagement. Dr. Singer emphasized that the type of meditation one practices has very different effects, as confirmed by brain scans. The *Visuddhimagga* makes a similar point: a meditation teacher should carefully assess a practitioner’s temperament, mental states, and inclinations in order to prescribe the most suitable practice.

Questions such as the following guide this assessment (*Vism. III.130*).

“What is your temperament?”

“Which states are most commonly present in your mind?”

“What objects do you prefer to bring to mind?” or

“Which meditation subjects does your mind favor?”

For example, a practitioner with a greedy or acquisitive temperament may benefit more from practices specifically addressing attachment, whereas a mismatch between temperament and meditation type may limit progress, even though, in principle, all meditation techniques are beneficial. Once these factors are understood, the teacher can prescribe a meditation practice aligned with the practitioner’s disposition, optimizing both effectiveness and insight development. This alignment between classical Buddhist psychology and modern neuroscience reinforces the idea that different practices cultivate different mental qualities, each shaping the brain and mind in unique ways.

Cognitive Distancing from Pain

Dr. Singer’s findings illustrate a crucial shift: while empathy can entangle us in others’ suffering through shared pain networks, compassion training opens the space for resilience and approach-oriented care. This transformation reflects not only a change in affective response but also a deeper cognitive re-framing of experience.

In fact, what neuroscientists describe as the shift from empathic distress to compassionate motivation parallels what contemplative traditions call cognitive distancing which is the ability to observe sensations and emotions without over-identifying with them. Just as compassion allows one to sustain care without being consumed by suffering, cognitive distancing enables practitioners to relate to their own pain with clarity and spaciousness, breaking the automatic cycles of identification such as “I am in pain” or “this pain is me.” This sets the stage for a closer exploration of how meditation trains the mind to step back from pain, not by denying it, but by altering the lens through which it is experienced.

Grounded in early Buddhist teachings, *Vipassanā* meditation emphasizes a non-reactive, moment-to-moment awareness of bodily sensations and mental events. The ultimate purpose of *Vipassanā* meditation is to eradicate mental impurities from the mind completely. Even before reaching this final goal, practitioners experience profound benefits such as tranquillity, peace of mind, and the ability to accept things as they arise. *Vipassanā* helps one to see things as they truly are

rather than as they appear to be. Although phenomena often seem permanent, desirable, and substantial, *Vipassanā* practice reveals their true nature as impermanent, unsatisfactory, and insubstantial. Through continuous observation, meditators directly witness the arising and passing away of mental and physical phenomena, gaining a clear and profound comprehension of the processes occurring within their mind and body. As a result, they can face life's situations with less agitation and respond more balanced and positively (Silānanda, 1999).

A key psychological mechanism cultivated through *Vipassanā* practice is cognitive distancing, which is the ability to objectively observe thoughts, emotions, and sensations without becoming entangled. This distancing allows practitioners to recognize feelings without immediately reacting with aversion or craving. Instead of getting caught up in the emotional agitation it may cause, meditators maintain a space of mindful observation, weakening habitual reactive patterns. This practice of cognitive distancing is closely aligned with Buddhist insights into suffering and is clearly illustrated in the early Buddhist texts, *Theravāda Pāḷi* Canon, particularly in the *Nakulapitasutta* (SN 22.1) and the *Sallasutta* (SN 36.6) (Bodhi, 2016).

Early Buddhist Textual Insights on Pain and Distancing: *Nakulapitasutta*, *Sallasutta*

In the *Nakulapitasutta*, an elderly lay devotee, *Nakulapita*, approaches the Buddha seeking guidance on how to avoid mental suffering despite his physical affliction. The Buddha advises that while physical pain and illness are inevitable, mental suffering can be avoided by not identifying with the body and by understanding its impermanent nature. Recognizing the body and mind as not-self enables one to maintain inner peace even amidst physical deterioration. The Buddhist central teaching is that mental suffering arises from clinging to the body and the five aggregates, which should instead be understood as impermanent and not-self. This change in perspective reflects cognitive distancing, where the body and mental states are observed without becoming emotionally entangled, thus avoiding the suffering that usually follows.

Similarly, the *Sallasutta* explains that when ordinary people experience *dukkhavedanā* (bodily pain), they endure *kāyika dukkha* (physical suffering). It is like being struck by a first physical arrow. Upon encountering such a painful sensation, and if there is no

mindfulness, *paṭighānusaya* (the latent tendency toward aversion) is activated and often surfaces. Repeated encounters with painful feelings condition beings to habitually react with *dosa* (anger with unpleasant feeling), leading to *cetasika dukkha* (mental suffering) represented as being struck by a second arrow. When the mind reacts with hatred toward initial bodily pain, a second layer of suffering arises: bodily suffering (*kāyika-dukkha*) gives rise to mental suffering (*cetasika-dukkha*).

When suitable conditions are obtained, lust (*rāga*) will arise too (*anurūpaṃ kāraṇaṃ labhivā uppajjati*). When it arises, at the same time, greed (*taṇhā*) will come out. When seeking to escape suffering, beings often pursue *sukha* (transient pleasures) as a substitute. Lacking insight into the true nature of suffering and liberation, one mistakes sensual pleasures for a solution, leading to the arising of *taṇhā* (craving), as expressed: "*Sukhāya vedanāya kāmarāgānusayo anuseti*" craving for sensual pleasures arises with pleasant feelings (Nandamālābhivamsa, 2013, p. 105). Further commentary from the *Visuddhimagga Aṭṭhakathā* explains: "*dukkhī sukham patthayati*" which means a suffering person longs for pleasure. Also, in this regard, the Buddha declared in Dependent origination: "*vedanāpaccayā taṇhā*" which means "Because of feeling, craving arises." Therefore, it is said that when beings encounter suffering, they endure physical suffering, mental suffering, and craving.

Sallāsutta illustrates this process beautifully: physical pain is like being struck by a first arrow, while mental suffering is akin to a second arrow caused by an emotional reaction. Through cognitive distancing fostered by *Vipassanā*, one can experience the first arrow without inflicting upon oneself the second. If one fails to contemplate *dukkhavedanā* with insight meditation, heedlessness causes aversion or dislike to manifest. The first arrow is the actual physical pain, while the second arrow is the mental suffering caused by reactions of anger to that pain. The Buddha expounded that while the first arrow (physical pain) is unavoidable, we can avoid the second arrow (mental suffering) by not reacting to it. The key is to recognize the impermanence of pain and cultivate mindfulness and equanimity, thereby reducing the mental suffering that often accompanies physical discomfort. The *sutta* emphasizes the importance of not adding to our suffering with unwise attention (*Ayonisomanasikāra*), encouraging us to develop insight into the nature of suffering and to practice mindfulness and clear comprehension to alleviate pain.

Latent tendencies (*anusaya*) are defilements that “lie along with” the mental process to which they belong, rising to the surface as obsessions whenever they meet with suitable conditions. They are activated under specific conditions (Sīlānanda, 2012). Cognitive distancing breaks this cycle by allowing space between the stimulus and the habitual emotional response, like aversion or craving, which helps to weaken the deep-rooted tendencies.

Cognitive distancing as shown in *Figure 5*, is a psychological effect that often develops through the practice of *Vipassanā* meditation, as practitioners learn to observe thoughts, feelings, and sensations without identifying with them. Thus, *Vipassanā* meditation with mindfulness and clear comprehension offers a profound method for breaking the habitual cycles of suffering.




Figure 7. Cognitive Distancing vs Vedanāpaccayā taṇhā (Creation by the author based on Sallāsutta and Buddhist Texts)

Contemplating Pain: Touch as Touch, Pain as the Path

As seen in the previous section, physical pain is experienced only through the arising of consciousness; it is not pain itself that causes suffering, but the mind's relationship to it. Pain is a conditioned phenomenon that arises within the field of bodily sensation, but its recognition and interpretation are cognized by consciousness. Without consciousness, pain cannot be known. To fully understand the pain both as a bodily sensation and as a mental feeling in insight meditation, one must grasp the relationship between materiality (*rūpa*) and mentality (*nāma*). According to Buddhist teachings, particularly the

Visuddhimagga, this process unfolds through systematic stages of knowledge.

The first step is the attainment of *Nāma-Rūpa Pariccheda Ñāṇa* (“knowledge that distinguishes mental and physical states”). This insight allows the meditator to discern mental phenomena and their associated factors, such as the moment-to-moment flow of thought process (*Vīthi*). By directly realizing *rūpa* and *nāma*, one begins to penetrate the First Noble Truth of Suffering (*dukkha-sacca*). The *Visuddhimagga* (XVIII.4) identifies this stage as the first level of *Vipassanā* insight, also known as the “purification of view” (*diṭṭhi visuddhi*), the third step on the path of purification.

Deeper insight requires advancing to *Paccaya Pariggaha Ñāṇa* (“knowledge of conditionality”), the second stage of *Vipassanā* insight (*Visuddhimagga* XVIII.10). Here, the meditator directly observes the causal relationship between mental and physical processes, understanding pain not as a personal burden but as part of the chain of dependent origination (*paṭicca-samuppāda*) and the law of kamma.

Only after cultivating these insights should one contemplate the ultimate realities, including feelings and their associated mental and material phenomena, through the lens of the three universal characteristics: impermanence (*anicca*), suffering (*dukkha*), and non-self (*anatta*). When this contemplation is done at the proper stage and with full understanding, it is truly considered *Vipassanā* (insight meditation). If one merely recognizes the feeling of pain without discerning the distinction between mind and matter, without understanding material form (*rūpa*) and mentality (*nāma*), and without awareness of their causal relationship, then contemplating “*I feel pain, I feel pain*” will only register as that painful sensation without deeper insight and contemplation stops at the surface of sensation.

Hence, *Vipassanā* meditation is not merely about recognizing sensations or bringing them into awareness, nor is it about altering how we feel. Rather, it is a powerful practice for deeply understanding how our thought processes operate. Through this practice, awareness can loosen the tight grip of what we perceive as “I” or “me,” revealing a more spacious, observer-like perspective.

Analytical Reflections and Interpretive Discussion

The practice of *Vipassanā* meditation is the effort to understand correctly the nature of the mental and physical phenomena within one’s

own body. Physical phenomena are the things or objects that one clearly perceives around and within one. The whole of one's body constitutes a group of material qualities. Mental phenomena are acts of consciousness or awareness. These are clearly perceived whenever things are seen, heard, smelt, tasted, touched, or thought of (Sayādaw, 1996, p. 1). At this point, it is essential to develop a clear understanding of *Yonisomanasikâra*, which means paying wise attention or right attitude toward things. With the presence of *Yonisomanasikâra* or *Ayonisomanasikâra*, there will be either *kusala*(wholesome) *Javanas* experiences, or *akusala*(unwholesome) *Javanas* experiences. Therefore, the proximate cause of *kusala* is *Yonisomanasikâra*. Either *kusala* or *akusala* reaction to the experienced object is largely determined by the relevant concomitants accompanying the consciousness. Then, we must observe why this quality of the *Javanas* varies and, where this *Yonisomanasikâra* is exercising in our thought process and what the dispositions of the perceiving agent are (Aung, 2022, pp. 222-228). Three thought moments are crucial for *Yonisomanasikâra* and to observe in insight meditation with respect to *vīthi* as seen in Figure 6 (Sayadaw, 2011, pp. 433-435).




Figure 8. Three Thought Moments to Observe in Insight Meditation with Respect to Vīthi

They are the five-door adverting consciousness, the determining consciousness and the mind-door adverting consciousness. In the collective knowing of thought processes, which are composed of mind moments, they are repeatedly separated by *bhavaṅga* (life-continuum) moments and reoccur multiple times. After many such cycles, the

material form (in this case, pain) is gradually recognized as an object. In the body-door process, the five-door adverting consciousness and the determining consciousness are included. In the first mind-door thought process that follows, the mind-door adverting consciousness takes the same object into attention. According to the teachings of the *Buddhist Abhidhamma*, these three thought moments are vital for noting an object as impermanent. An object can also be noted in different ways, such as impermanence (*anicca*), suffering (*dukkha*), and not-self (*anatta*), the three universal characteristics, or other *Dhamma* phenomena. When this occurs, it constitutes *Yonisomanasikāra* (wise attention), and both the body-door and the following mind-door thought processes result in a wholesome experience. In this state, the meditator observes everything they see, hear, smell, taste, and touch as it arises without adding conceptual interpretations or judgments.

The Bāhiyasutta on Non-Identification with Experience

At this stage of observation, the meditator perceives things as they truly are. Sometimes, perception may not completely cease easily; the meditator still experiences all phenomena and may continue to recognize conventional concepts. But as they advance into deeper levels of equanimity (*upekkhā*) and insight (*ñāṇa*), these recognitions gradually fade. Concepts of individuals, beings, or forms no longer appear. Similarly, perceptions of things as lovable or hateable fade away. Only ultimate realities become apparent. They come to know simply that “touching is just touching,” without clinging or aversion. The mind no longer engages in constructing or reacting to perceptions. Seeing is just seeing; hearing is just hearing; smelling is just smelling; tasting is just tasting; touching is just touching.

This reflects the essence of *Udāna 1.10, Bāhiyasutta*:

diṭṭhe diṭṭhamattaṃ bhavissati, sute sutamattaṃ bhavissati, mute
mutamattaṃ bhavissati, viññāte viññātamattaṃ bhavissati’ti.
Evañhi te, bāhiya, sikkhitabbaṃ.
Yato kho te, bāhiya, diṭṭhe diṭṭhamattaṃ bhavissati, sute
sutamattaṃ bhavissati, mute mutamattaṃ bhavissati, viññāte
viññātamattaṃ bhavissati,
tato tvaṃ, bāhiya, na tena.
Yato tvaṃ, bāhiya, na tena;

tato tvaṃ, bāhiya, na tattha.
Yato tvaṃ, bāhiya, na tattha,
tato tvaṃ, bāhiya, nevidha na huraṃ na ubhayamantarena.
Esevanto dukkhassā”ti.

English Translation (Adapted from Bhikkhu Sujato, SuttaCentral):

In the seen, there will be merely the seen; in the heard, there will be merely the heard; in the sensed, there will be merely the sensed; in the cognized, there will be merely the cognized. That is how you should train yourself.

When you have trained in this way, there is no ‘you’ in terms of that.

When there is no ‘you’ in terms of that, there is no ‘you’ there.

When there is no ‘you’ there, you are neither here nor beyond nor between the two.

This, just this, is the end of suffering.

This is the essence of practicing *Vipassanā* (Insight Meditation).

Conclusion

While neuroscience and cognitive psychology reveal how different meditation practices alter brain activity, the *Abhidhamma* studies illuminate the workings of cognitive processes through six sense doors, and contemplative practices offer a complementary framework for understanding pain at the experiential level.

Vipassanā meditation may not transform unpleasant physical pain into a pleasant sensation. However, it profoundly reshapes how we perceive pain by cultivating insight into consciousness and the flow of thought moments and thought processes (see Figures 1, 2, 3, and 4). Such practice and clear comprehension gradually loosen the deeply rooted sense of “I” or “me.” The relationship between mind and matter is no longer experienced as belonging to a self, but as a conditioned, dynamic interplay of processes. This shift gives rise to a more spacious, observer-like awareness. This perspective echoes the Buddha’s instruction to experience phenomena directly; seeing as just seeing, hearing as just hearing, pain as just pain; without unnecessary identification. In modern terms, this corresponds to cognitive distancing: perceiving phenomena without imposing the narrative.

From a contemporary perspective, this resonates with cognitive neuroscience, which shows that the sense of self is not a fixed entity but a construct generated by the brain's self-modeling networks. *Vipassanā* meditation thus aligns Buddhist analysis with scientific findings on the constructed and impermanent nature of the self. EEG research demonstrates increased alpha (relaxation) and gamma (integrative focus) activity during meditation, correlating with more regulated, non-reactive states. From an *Abhidhamma* standpoint, this refinement of thought moments interrupts the habitual thought process, allowing wise attention to intervene before automatic emotional reactions with labelling occur. Pain is thereby experienced simply as sensation, rather than as “my suffering” that breaks the pain cycle.

Dr. Tania Singer's social neuroscience research complements this picture by showing how compassion-based practices can transform our relationship not only to personal pain but also to the suffering of others. Whereas empathy for pain often activates brain regions associated with distress, compassion not only engages affiliative and reward-related circuits, caregiving behaviors, but also fosters psychological resilience and well-being, thereby reducing the risk of burnout and promoting prosocial motivation. This parallels the *Visuddhimagga's* caution that loving-kindness and compassion meditation must be balanced with equanimity to avoid sliding into possessive affection or sorrow.

Taken together, these perspectives demonstrate that meditation disrupts the “pain cycle” on multiple levels: reducing self-referential rumination, fostering cognitive distancing, enhancing resilience, and transforming suffering into an object of insight. By bridging neuroscience and Buddhist traditions, we see that meditation does not deny pain but reframes it and revealing pathways toward freedom, compassion, and psychological well-being and ultimately transforming how pain is experienced.

Ultimately, this interdisciplinary approach not only contributes to the scientific understanding of how meditation modulates pain perception but also offers innovative strategies for more comprehensive and sustainable pain management. It underscores the potential of insight meditation as a non-pharmacological intervention that reshapes both brain function and mental habits, opening new avenues for research and clinical application of breaking the pain cycle.

Future Outlook

Beyond this, the forty types of *Samatha* meditation based on *Visuddhimagga* and the forty approaches to *Vipassanā* described in the *Paṭisambhidāmagga* offer fruitful ground for further exploration. These frameworks provide an important basis for comparative study, as different meditation techniques may produce distinct cognitive and neural outcomes. The 2025 International Conference on Science, Mindfulness, and Meditation in Bhutan highlighted this point by presenting diverse guided meditation practices from masters of various traditions, demonstrating that variations in method can lead to unique experiential and scientific findings. This research explores an interdisciplinary approach between ancient Buddhist psychological models and contemporary scientific understanding. Future research should therefore investigate how diverse meditation techniques across *Theravada*, *Mahayana*, *Vajrayāna* traditions, and modern mindfulness techniques affect pain perception, emotional resilience, and prosocial motivation. Employing tools such as EEG, fMRI, and other neuroimaging methods, combined with behavioral and contemplative measures, will allow for a detailed comparison of how these practices shape brain function, cognitive flexibility, and experiential insight. Such studies will help bridge ancient contemplative knowledge with contemporary psychoanalysis and neuroscience, advancing both scientific understanding and applied approaches to managing pain and cultivating well-being.

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
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Appendix A: Flow Chart

Conceptual Framework:
Integrating Neuroscience & Buddhist Thoughts for Pain
Transformation



A Process-Based Approach to Mindfulness Training for Mental Health

Pierre Philippot¹⁵

A Process-Based Approach to Mindfulness Training for Mental Health

In the last two decades, mindfulness practices have known a remarkable development and popularity in mental health care in the Western world. This enthusiasm has triggered an intensive research activity that has been mostly devoted to establishing the effectiveness and limitations of mindfulness program for various health conditions. This accumulated research now allows for a better understanding of the psychological factors that underlie mindfulness training effects on mental health. The present contribution aims at investigating the psychological components that constitute mindfulness as a state. Further, it strives to elaborate a model articulating the psychological processes that are mobilized by mindfulness training and the mechanisms by which these processes might impact psychopathology.

¹⁵ This paper benefited greatly from discussions with Gwenaëlle Bresmal, Sandrine Deplus and François Nef, Marbella Pérez Peña, and with the clinical team of the Specialized Consulting Center on Emotion Disorders. Correspondance concerning this publication may be addressed to Pierre Philippot, Institut de Recherche en Sciences Psychologiques, Université de Louvain, place du Cardinal Mercier, 10, B- 1348 Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium. E-mails can be sent to pierre.philippot@uclouvain.be

Definition of Mindfulness in Health Sciences

In health sciences, mindfulness was initially defined as a state of awareness that arises from paying attention in a particular way: on purpose, in the present moment, and nonjudgmentally (Kabat-Zinn, 1990). This pragmatic definition is the one most often referred to by practitioners. It corresponds closely to the instructions governing mindfulness training practices.

More academic definitions have been proposed. These refer explicitly to the psychological mechanisms underlying mindfulness. A particularly influential approach has been developed in the two-component model by Bishop et al. (2004). According to this, two components underpin the specific nature of mindfulness: awareness of present experience and acceptance of experience, whatever its valence.

More descriptive approaches have also been proposed. From a psychometric perspective, Baer et al. (2008) developed a five-dimensional model. These dimensions were extracted from a large factorial analysis performed on a set of items from five previous mindfulness questionnaires. The five dimensions identified by Baer are: (1) description of experiences (talking about the experience using words), (2) mindful action / acting with full awareness (acting while actively paying attention to each action step), (3) non-judgment (suspending positive or negative judgments about the thoughts and emotions experienced), (4) non-reactivity to inner events (letting thoughts and emotions be without responding to them automatically) and (5) observation (remaining aware and focused on the experience even when it is aversive or painful). The Five Facets Mindfulness Questionnaire (FFMQ) was developed on this basis by Baer. It has been translated into many languages and shows good cross-cultural and cross-linguistic stability (e.g. Cebolla et al., 2012; Heeren et al., 2011; Lilja et al., 2011). It is widely used, although certain limitations have been identified and attempts to improve it have been proposed (e.g. Lecuona et al., 2022).

In a similar vein to Baer et al (2008), Bergomi et al (2013) undertook an extensive analysis of eight mindfulness questionnaires, including the FFMQ. They identified no fewer than nine dimensions underlying the concept of mindfulness. These dimensions are (1) observing, being present to experience; (2) acting with awareness; (3) not judging, accepting experiences; (4) accepting oneself; (5) being ready and willing to expose oneself to experiences, not avoiding them;

(6) not reacting to experiences; (7) not identifying with one's own experiences; (8) understanding with insight; and (9) labeling, describing experience. These nine dimensions broadly echo the FFMQ dimensions and add finer distinctions concerning defusion and different facets of acceptance. Table 1 shows the similarities and specificities of the approaches proposed by Bishop et al (2004), Baer et al (2008) and Bergomi et al (2013).

Table 1. Comparison of the descriptive dimensions of mindfulness proposed by Bishop et al. (2004), Baer et al. (2008) and Bergomi et al. (2013).

Bishop et al. (2004)	Baer et al. (2008)	Bergomi et al. (2013)
Awareness of present-moment experience	Observation	Observing with awareness
	Description of the experience	Describe / label
		Exposure
		Understanding with insight
Accepting experience	No judgment	Don't judge / accept
		Accepting yourself
	Non-reactivity	Do not react
		Don't identify with your experiences
	Mindful action	Acting with full awareness

Note: Similar shading indicates significant similarities between the dimensions proposed by the different authors.

Another type of descriptive approach, based on network analysis, has recently emerged. This statistical method unveils patterns in the relationships between the different elements of a network, enabling the formulation of hypotheses about their reciprocal influences and about which elements are more central or more peripheral. In this case, the relationships between different aspects and facets of mindfulness, as set out in the FFMQ, were analyzed. Two converging studies (Heeren et al., 2021; Sala et al., 2023) suggest that the most central elements in the "mindfulness" network are the facets of describing experience and mindful action.

The definitions emerging from these various descriptive approaches, each based on self-report questionnaires, differ to some

extent from clinical perspectives, such as Kabat-Zinn's (1990), or theoretical ones, like that of Bishop et al. (2004). These emphasized attention to present-moment experience, on the one hand, and a non-judgmental attitude, on the other. Descriptive approaches provide more differentiated definitions, adding facets related to acceptance, mindful action, description of experience and defusion from it. Network analyses suggest that the facets of description of experience and mindful action are the most central. However, clinical studies show little relationship between these two facets and psychopathological symptomatology. For example, Kuyken et al. (2010, BRaT) found that the factor that best explains the positive effects of mindfulness training on depressed mood was the development of self-compassion, *i.e.* self-acceptance (corresponding to factor 4 identified by Bergomi et al., 2013) rather than description of experience or mindful acting.

More generally, these descriptive approaches have focused on the capacities (e.g. being able to describe, not reacting impulsively, acting mindfully) that would be necessary to generate the quality of experience known as "mindfulness". However, this capability-based approach says little about the processes that enable these capabilities to emerge. What, for example, are the processes involved in mindful action: the focus of attention on the action in progress, on the perceptual elements and sensations that accompany it, the inhibition of distractors? Similarly, this approach says nothing about the interactions between these different capacities. For example, does acting mindfully require the ability to observe experience, as well as the ability to inhibit impulsive reactions (non-reactivity)? In other words, is there a hierarchical dependency between these abilities, with the latter constituting prerequisites for the former?

The Psychological Processes Involved in Mindfulness

One way to advance a clinically useful and empirically grounded definition of mindfulness is by examining the psychological processes it involves, those that underlie its clinical effects and are necessary for realizing the capacities described in dimensional approaches. This question has been addressed by various literature reviews and meta-analyses (e.g., Baer, 2009; Gu et al., 2015; Holzel et al. 2011). In a theoretically grounded approach, Holzel et al. (2011) proposed five mechanisms by which mindfulness can have beneficial effects on health. These mechanisms are (a) attention regulation, (b) body

awareness, (c) emotion regulation through re-evaluation of the situation and one's own reactions, (d) emotion regulation through exposure and openness to emotions, and (e) changes in perspective about the self. Mindfulness training potentiates each of these mechanisms. The review by Holzel et al (2011) provides some empirical evidence, both behavioral and neurological, that these mechanisms are activated by mindfulness training and can contribute to psychological well-being. However, this evidence is not definitive. For example, there is currently only empirical evidence that mindfulness training improves body awareness (e.g. Pérez-Peña et al. 2022).

Gu et al. (2015, 2016) conducted meta-analyses of mediational studies that investigated the effects of mindfulness-based interventions (MBIs) on well-being and psychological functioning, in order to highlight the psychological factors responsible for positive clinical effects. These analyses provided moderate and consistent evidence that the development of mindfulness capacity and the reduction of ruminations and worries are statistical mediators of the clinical effects of MBIs. It should be noted, however, that it is tautological to say that MBIs act by developing mindfulness. Similarly, some might consider the reduction in ruminations and worries as a reduction in symptomatology rather than a real mechanism of action. More interestingly, the meta-analyses by Gu et al. (2015, 2016) also showed preliminary evidence that cognitive and emotional reactivity, self-compassion, and psychological flexibility are mechanisms underlying the effects of MBIs. Unfortunately, the state of research does not yet provide definitive evidence on the effects of these factors.

In sum, the literature offers only partial answers to the question of what psychological processes underlie mindfulness and how it might affect upon mental health. The conclusions of meta-analyses on the existence of preliminary but inconclusive evidence must be interpreted with caution, as the inconclusiveness of empirical evidence is likely to be attributable to the lack of adequate research and not to confirmation of the absence of an effect.

Furthermore, the processes identified on theoretical grounds (Holzel et al. 2011) only partially correspond to the dimensions highlighted in descriptive approaches to mindfulness. As illustrated in Table 2, the processes of attention regulation and body awareness are likely to be involved in the "describe/label" and "observe mindfully" dimensions, but the overlap is only partial. Some might even argue for an overlap with the non-judgment/acceptance dimension as body

awareness involves being aware of body sensations with openness. Similarly, the processes of regulating emotions by re-evaluating the situation and one's own reactions are probably partially involved in the dimensions "understanding with insight" and "not judging/accepting." The correspondence is more obvious for processes linked to the regulation of emotions through exposure on the one hand and "exposing oneself" and "not reacting" on the other hand. Similarly, the overlap is apparent for the dimension of changes of perspective on the self with the dimensions with "accepting oneself" and "not identifying with experience."

Table 2. Hypothetical relationships between the dimensions proposed by Bergomi et al. (2013) and the processes proposed by Holzel et al. (2011).

Bergomi et al (2013)	Holzel et al (2011)
Observing with awareness	Attention regulation
Describe / label	Body awareness
Understanding with insight	Emotional regulation through reappraisal
Don't judge / accept	
Accepting yourself	Change of perspective on the self
Don't identify with your experiences	
Do not react	Emotional regulation through exposure
Exposure	
Acting with full awareness	

Note. Similar shading indicates similarities between the dimensions proposed by Bergomi et al. (2013) and the processes proposed by Holzel et al. (2011).

In short, the overlaps between the dimensions highlighted by descriptive and phenomenological approaches on the one hand, and processual approaches based on theoretical models on the other, are only partial. What's more, these approaches propose lists of dimensions or processes, but do not explain how they interact with each other. Yet, as mentioned above, some processes can be seen as prerequisites for others. For example, the aspects of regulating attention and observation are probably a necessary step before insightful understanding or regulating emotions through reappraisal.

To integrate the contributions of these different fields of research into a structured model, we propose distinguishing: (a) the processes that would be constitutive of mindfulness, *i.e.* those whose activation leads to the quality of experience known as "mindfulness", (b) the

immediate effects and phenomenological aspects consecutive to these processes and (c) the psychopathological processes on which mindfulness would have an effect. The following paragraphs describe each of these three elements.

The Psychological Processes Involved in Mindfulness

Based on the classic definition of mindfulness proposed by Kabat-Zinn (1990; a state of consciousness that results from paying attention, intentionally, in the present moment, to experience as it unfolds moment by moment, without judgment), we propose that mindfulness results from the activation of three types of psychological processes: (a) voluntary regulation of attention, (b) inhibition of prepotent automatic responses and (c) meta-cognitive changes in relation to the self.

The voluntary regulation of attention is explicitly mentioned in Kabat-Zinn's (1990) definition. Three aspects of attention seem particularly important for the emergence of mindfulness: first, there is an aspect of vigilance or alertness to detect when attention has been automatically captured by a distractor (spotting the distraction). Then comes the ability to disengage attention from the distractor, and finally the ability to voluntarily re-engage attention on present-moment experience. These three facets of attentional regulation are intensively trained from the outset of mindfulness programs, notably in the practice of body scanning. They also correspond to the attentional networks highlighted by Posner (Posner 2012; Posner & Peterson, 1990; Peterson & Posner, 2012). Several recent meta-analyses attest that mindfulness training improves attentional performance (see, e.g. Sumantry & Stewart, 2021; Verhaegen, 2021).

The inhibition of prepotent automatic responses is necessary to maintain a posture of observation of the immediate experience, without this being disturbed by actions that would alter the experience or monopolize the cognitive resources needed for reflective awareness. This inhibition is also necessary to prevent automatic impulsive responses and to disengage from "Stimulus→ Response" conditioning cycles. Without inhibition of prepotent impulsive responses, there is no space for attention to focus on the present experience, as attention is captured by automatic activations related to prepotent responses or to the management of impulsive responses. For example, mindful anger implies inhibiting the automatic responses triggered by anger (e.g. shouting, threatening, ...), this is what the emotion pushes us to do. The

inhibition of the prepotent anger responses allows the subjects to mindfully observe how anger affects them and to fully realize what triggers anger. They can then identify the need, goal or value that is threatened. In contrast, if the prepotent anger response is not inhibited, the subjects are likely to be caught into managing their anger behaviours and their consequences, with no room to actually explore the anger experience and its meaning. A recent meta-analysis reports significant effects of MBIs on behavioral impulsiveness as well as on its neurophysiological markers (Tsang, Ji, Lo, Trapp, Boes & Sik, 2025). Another meta-analysis indicates significant effects of MBIs in children for inattentive and hyperactive-impulsive behaviors (Vekety, Logemann & Takacs, 2020).

Mindfulness also mobilizes metacognitive processes related to the self. These have two main and distinct facets: on the one hand, defusion between the self and immediate experience, and on the other, self-compassion. Defusion consists in considering the phenomena accompanying immediate experience (*i.e.*, thoughts, sensations, emotions) as transitory phenomena, created by our mind, but which are not the "self" of the person experiencing them (e.g., "my thoughts are only thoughts, not facts; I am not my thoughts or emotions"). This form of defusion is necessary for a fully conscious observation of these phenomena. Without defusion, the subject is caught up in these phenomena, which become his or her only reality. This attitude of defusion is trained in all mindfulness practices in which participants are taught to maintain an observer perspective on all immediate data arising from their experience. There is some empirical evidence that mindful attention is associated with cognitive defusion (Ito, Watanabe & Osawa, 2023) and that defusion mediates the positive effects of MBIs on pain (Zorn, Abdoun, Sonié & Lutz, 2021).

Self-compassion is an attitude of self-acceptance that recognizes, without judgment, one's limitations and difficulties (Neff, 2023). Its opposite is a judgmental, self-critical attitude that points out and reproaches any shortcomings. Self-compassion is taught in mindfulness practices, notably by qualifying instructions with the expression "as best as I can." Self-compassion is necessary for persistence in mindfulness practices, which very often confront the subject with his or her limits and with facets of the self that he or she dislikes or even fears. There are indications that MBIs improve self-compassion (Golden, Vosper, Kingston *et al.*, 2021; Wasson, Barratt & O'Brien,

2020) and that this constitutes the major mechanism of action of MBIs on depression relapse (Kuyken et al., 2010).

Activation of these three psychological processes that underlie mindfulness (voluntary regulation of attention, inhibition of impulsive responses, and metacognitive changes in the relationship to the self) enables individuals to focus on their thoughts and emotions, and to be fully open to present experience. The quality of this relationship with present experience is called "mindfulness."

The Immediate Effects of Activating the Psychological Processes That Make Up Mindfulness

Mindfully focusing on experience enables the subjects to become aware of their bodily and psychic experience in general, and of emotions, moods, aversions and likings in particular (Cooper, Yap, & Batalha, 2018; Perez-Peña et al., 2022). Indeed, attention to present experience, and especially to bodily sensations, is regarded as a royal road to the development of emotional awareness. William James (1884) already posited that our body was the sounding board for our emotions.

Emotions convey important information for those who are experiencing them. Indeed, emotions arise if a specific emotional appraisal process has been carried out (Moors, Ellsworth, Scherer & Frijda, 2013). A central dimension of this appraisal process is the perception of something of potential relevance to the needs, goals or values of the individual (Spruyt, Tibboel, De Schryver & De Houwer, 2018). Without this evaluation of relevance, there can be no emotion. Awareness of emotion thus enables access to the needs, goals or values that give rise to it. This aspect is a fundamental goal common to all forms of emotion-focused psychotherapy (Greenberg, 2010; Philippot, 2011; Power, 2009).

Making one's needs, goals and values salient make it easier to take them into account in one's decisions and choices of action. Mindful action thus promotes attitudes and behaviors that are aligned with the individual's needs, goals and values (Barbaro & Pickett, 2016; Haliwa, Lee, Wilson & Shook, 2020). One might speculate that this commitment to value-driven actions is facilitated by the inhibition of automatic and impulsive responses (which may be at odds with the subject's values). Further, acknowledging one's needs, goals and values also encourage changes in attitude and self-representation, especially with regard to the dimension of self-compassion.

Figure 1 graphically represents the psychological processes that make up mindfulness and their immediate effects. It shows how these processes contribute to the direct, observable effects of mindfulness, and how the activation of this "mindfulness" mode enables certain virtuous circles to be set in motion, notably in changes of perspective on the self (self-compassion) and in engagement in meaningful actions.




Figure 1. A processual model of mindfulness

Note. The constituent processes of mindfulness are represented in rectangles, and their immediate effects in ellipses.

Psychopathological Processes on Which Mindfulness May Have an Effect

Different elements involved in the activation of the mindfulness mode, as described in Figure 1, have a potential impact on psychological processes that play a causal role in psychological dysfunctions and mental disorders. These effects are graphically represented in Figure 2.




Figure 2. The effects of mindfulness on the psychological processes involved in psychological dysfunction.

Focusing on present experience and awareness of emotions and bodily sensations counteracts experiential avoidance, which is a major maintenance process in most psychological disorders (Barlow et al., 2014). In fact, mindfulness can be seen as an exercise in experiential exposure. This idea has been proposed and documented by Baer (2009) and Holzel et al. (2011). From the perspective of the trans-diagnostic model proposed by Barlow (Barlow et al., 2014), mindfulness could be a fundamental psychological intervention in that it enables the subject to disengage from the vicious circle of emotion avoidance that reinforces distress, to effect a change in attitude that allows opening to emotion.

Mindfulness requires the inhibition of prepotent automatic responses, in other words, the inhibition of impulsive responses. As explained above, this inhibition is necessary for attention to be fully focused on present experience. The practice of mindfulness therefore involves training in the inhibition of impulsive responses. Numerous studies have indeed shown that mindfulness engenders a reduction in emotional reactivity and cognitive reactivity, in other words, impulsive responses at both the emotional and cognitive levels (for a meta-analysis, see Gu et al., 2015 or Tsang, JI, Lo, Trapp, Boes & Sik, 2025). These forms of impulsive reactivity are well documented as a factor in

the onset and maintenance of various mental disorders, notably in addictions, eating disorders or obsessive-compulsive disorder (for a detailed treatment of the involvement of impulsivity in mental disorders, see Billieux, Rochat & Van der Linden, 2014).

Another central aspect of mindfulness, the regulation of attention, is likely to have a direct impact on at least two major psychopathological processes: repetitive thoughts and attentional biases. Repetitive thoughts concern the phenomena of mental rumination and anxious preoccupations (Philippot et al. 2023; Watkins, 2008). It involves the activation of thoughts that are usually negative, relatively abstract, with verbal rather than image content, and which are activated automatically and repetitively. People find it extremely difficult to disengage from these thoughts. This cognitive mode is implicated in many psychological disorders (Ehring & Watkins, 2008). The regulation of attention trained in mindfulness enables, firstly, to notice more quickly when our mind has been captured by automatic repetitive thoughts, secondly, to disengage attention from these thoughts, and thirdly, to refocus attention, functionally, on aspects relevant to the subject's pursuit of goals. Several empirical studies attest to the effects of mindfulness on repetitive thoughts and that this effect would mediate the mental health effects of mindfulness (e.g. Deyo et al., 2009; Heeren & Philippot, 2011; for a meta-analysis, see Gu et al., 2015 or Perestelo-Perez et al., 2017).

The regulation of attention brought about by mindfulness also acts on attentional biases. The instructions given in mindfulness practices lead the subjects to become aware of the fact that their attention is automatically captured by certain stimuli. In other words, the training leads the subjects becoming aware of any attentional biases. In addition, the instructions given in mindfulness practices train the subjects to focus on what is actually happening here and now, and to open up with curiosity to all aspects of the present situation. This mode of attentional deployment antagonizes attentional biases. Some studies have shown effects of mindfulness on attention regulation (see previous section) as well as on central aspects of executive functions that require significant attentional control (for a review, see Gallant, 2016). Some research also suggests that MBIs effects on depression are partially mediated by a reduction in attentional biases for sad stimuli (Kou et al., 2023).

The effects of mindfulness on the regulation of attention have a cascading effect on two other psychopathological processes: judgment biases and memory biases. Judgments are often biased because they are

based on partial, biased information (Hirsch & Matthews, 2012; White et al., 2011). In anxiety, for example, anxiogenic attentional biases make threat-related information preferentially accessible. The resulting judgments of dangerousness are therefore necessarily biased by the fact that they are based on information that is strongly biased towards the threat (Peschard & Philippot, 2015).

Similarly, attentional biases generate memory biases, since one can only encode in memory what one pays attention to, memory and attention being in constant interaction (Adams et al., 2018; Peschard & Philippot, 2015). Thus, focusing attention on threat cues in a given situation leads to a higher probability that these elements will be put into memory, reinforcing anxious apprehension towards this type of situation. Thanks to the broad and ideally unbiased deployment of attention that mindfulness entails, memory processes have more objective, concrete and specific material at their disposal, resulting in memories that are less biased and better reflect the situation actually experienced. As a result, memories are not only less biased, but also more concrete and specific. Research has shown that mindfulness training results in more specific and concrete autobiographical memories (e.g. Heeren, VanBroeck & Philippot, 2009; for a recent meta-analytic review, see Dominguez, Casagrande & Raffone, 2022).

Changes in attitude towards the self include, on the one hand, defusion between the self and immediate experience and, on the other, self-compassion. Self-compassion enables greater self-acceptance and antagonizes the automatic self-deprecating thoughts that are a vulnerability and maintenance factor in mood disorders and many other psychological disorders (Andersen & Rasmussen, 2017). Kuyken et al (2010) showed that the effects of the MBCT program in preventing depressive relapses were mainly mediated by the development of self-compassion brought about by the mindfulness program. Similarly, the meta-analysis by Gu et al (2015) reports empirical evidence that the development of self-compassion is a mechanism by which mindfulness has beneficial effects on mental health.

Finally, the cumulative effects of experiential exposure, self-acceptance and access to more objective, concrete and specific information about one's experiences lead to changes in the subject's self-representations, particularly in terms of feelings of competence and self-efficacy in managing oneself and one's emotions. In a systematic review, Randal, Pratt and Bucci (2015) reported that cross-sectional studies observed significant positive correlations between dispositional

mindfulness and self-esteem and that most MBI studies resulted in significant increases in self-esteem. These observations extend to self-efficacy. For instance, Chandna, Sharma and Moosath (2022) observed positive correlations between mindfulness facets on the one hand, and self-esteem and self-efficacy, on the other hand. In the same vein, Heath, Joly and Carsley (2016) observed that mindfulness was positively associated with perceived level of coping self-efficacy in a sample of students. More interestingly, in this sample, coping self-efficacy fully mediated the relationship between dispositional mindfulness and non-suicidal self-injury. In sum, available empirical evidence suggests that mindfulness is associated with both self-efficacy and self-esteem and that the latter might mediate the effects of MBIs on psychopathology.

Implications

The present model bares implications for the lay use of mindfulness, both in its teaching and its clinical use. Regarding the teaching of mindfulness, the model indicates which psychological processes are activated during mindfulness training. This knowledge could enlighten mindfulness teaching instructions in order to optimally train these active processes underlying mindfulness. In other words, practice instructions could be informed and enhanced by the knowledge of the processes to be trained. For example, knowledge of the three attentional components involved in mindfulness (detection of distraction, disengagement from the distractor, reengagement on the practice target) informs on how to instruct practice such as the body scan, in which instructions are focused on engaging attention of a body part, then disengaging it, to reengage it on the next body part. Furthermore, as it establishes the psychopathological processes impacted by mindfulness, the present model provides an informed support by which mindfulness instructors can link trained mindfulness skills to their effects on dysfunctional psychological functioning. For instance, the model provides a strong justification for focusing on present moment experience by detailing how it counteracts a major psychopathological mechanism: experiential avoidance.

Regarding clinical practice, the present model provides a framework for establishing indication and inclusion criteria for MBIs. In this perspective, mindfulness training would be prescribed if the patient's condition implies some of the psychopathological processes

identified by the model as being impacted by mindfulness training. In other words, MBIs would be relevant to the extent that one of the psychopathological processes identified in the present model would be diagnosed as playing a key role in the onset and/or maintenance of the condition of the patient. In an idiographic approach, the present model can also help to identify the mindfulness constituent processes that should be strengthened for a specific case. This is, if a psychopathological process is particularly active in a given patient (e.g., attentional biases to threat), mindfulness training for this specific case could be adapted to strengthen its related mechanism of action (in this example, attentional control processes). More generally, the present model could help process-based psychotherapists trained in mindfulness, to know when to include mindfulness in their intervention plans based on the psychological processes that are active and dysfunctional in a particular case.

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Contemplative View and Practice: AI Enhancement?

Francis V. Tiso

Overwhelmed by the extraordinary progress in data processing made by AI systems in recent years, some speculative thinkers have extrapolated a future situation in which the highest human aspirations could be fulfilled with assistance from, or in collaboration with, AI. Some even speak of the fusion of the human mind with AI; yet they do not link that proposal to the kind of contemplative training that Milarepa, for example, taught his disciples so that they might “blend their minds” with everything that is manifesting in the field of perception. These technological speculations are, unfortunately, based on misunderstandings about the way the mind has come into being. A manufactured system, even one that can learn and improve itself, has undergone an evolutionary trajectory that is dramatically different from both biological and human evolution. For this reason, the advice that an AI might offer to a person seriously committed to a spiritual quest (and obviously, here we are not talking about someone writing a paper for a psychology class!) will inevitably reflect the limitations of its own manufactured evolution, the artificially contrived and selected information inputs, and the interactions that the AI has already had with other AI systems and human interlocutors—all of which are going to have their unique perspectives and interpretations of the data. Notice the following from the BBC (April 10, 2025):

This new system of AI is a large language model, or LLM, similar to OpenAI's ChatGPT and Google's Gemini. The systems are fed huge amounts of data and trained to spot patterns within it. They

use this data to create passages of text by predicting the next word in a sequence. Despite the systems being labelled intelligent, critics argue LLMs do not "think", have no understanding of what they produce and can confidently present errors as fact. Tech companies argue that they need more data to make the systems more reliable.

AI is inevitably a mirror of the collective efforts of human minds of a certain type and background to gather and interpret information. It is lacking, however, in the category of experience since it can only imitate the way human beings express awareness of experience, memory, and embodiment; the absence of embodiment and sensory input places severe limits on any known AI system, yet these are constitutive elements of cognition. Unfortunately for an AI system, any input about transcendent or mystical experience will have to be "hearsay" evidence with no basis in the actual track record of the AI. In the evolution of an AI system, what constitutes growth or maturation is restricted to the volume of data acquired from other similar sources of information. Information technology was built on the notion that a "brain" is a device for processing discrete bits of information through comparison and correlation; there is no moral content and no basis for ethical restraints or constraints- no "bodhisattva commitment". It is probably fair to say that in the human community of discourse within which AI systems have been devised so far, not only are ethical correlates lacking, but also mystical or contemplative tracks have been suppressed. This is typical of institutionalized science almost everywhere in the world.

Whatever else it may entail, contemplation (the path to true mystical experience) is about the direct experience of transcendent reality. It is the outcome of certain kinds of mind training and practice based on the training relationship (guru-disciple) and on one's own consequent experience; however, it is also a state or condition at the ground of consciousness itself. This is why some traditions speak of knowing or recognizing the "state" that has always been present, even if covered over with mistaken thought patterns. AI, by contrast, is a mass of data organized to imitate the ordinary thought patterns of a very intelligent person in a highly restricted way. That is to say, organizing data with a utilitarian intent, which is in complete contrast with the contemplative perspective. For the latter, the contemplative state is a spontaneous "given" without utilitarian content or intent.

This glance at the contemplative traditions leads us to consider the matrix within which mystical experiences occur, i.e. “consciousness” (with or without an object). Defining consciousness has been called the “hard problem” and has been taken up by a wide range of authors (McGilchrist, 2009; Thompson, 2007; Vyner, 2019). Does consciousness arise from a complex sequence of interactions within the tissues of the [mammalian] brain, or is consciousness a prior condition for the possibility of the very existence of matter and energy? If the latter, then AI can never really be conscious in the way a biological system can be. I would call into question whether even the complex sequences of interaction within currently known devices can truly generate what these authors are calling consciousness.

Michel Bitbol, reflecting on both the perspective of the Kyoto School and the phenomenological tradition in Europe, reminds us of the problem of pure, undifferentiated experience, which must be addressed before we can approach the “hard problem”:

Pure experience in Nishida's sense "has no meaning," no intentional polarity, unlike the elaborated consciousness Husserl speaks of. It is simply there, naked, uninterpreted and uninterpreting. It is because they do not give enough importance to this ultimate level of being that many scientific researchers and philosophers of mind remain plunged into confusion when they speak of consciousness. For, if one can legitimately envisage a future explanation by neuroscience of the cognitive functions attributed to consciousness, then pure experience, which has no function but a simple presence, offers no object accessible to their methods. The current pure experience of researchers remains the unspoken presupposition and the blind spot of all knowledge. (Bitbol, 2018)

Moving towards a deeper understanding of the contemplative experience, he further observes:

Pure experience, as a basis or ground of what we call consciousness, permeates things that show themselves without actually showing themselves; for “experience” is the name of appearance itself. Realizing pure experience therefore requires reversing the direction of the search. Instead of taking a step forward toward the objects of knowledge and grasping, it is a

matter of taking a step back to merge with the inner life [where the prerequisites] of knowing and grasping can be found. Realizing pure experience requires not seeing things from a particular place, but simply remaining, dwelling here, in this element that has no other location than being the center. (Bitbol, 2018)

Such a perspective is antithetical to the current workings of technological devices.

Taking this perspective even further, Raimon Panikkar (a close reader of Heidegger's phenomenology) notes that "what we must underscore here is not the analysis of the experience, but its **mythical character**, which amounts to recognizing its primordial irreducibility. Any experience—sensory, intellectual, or spiritual- in fact functions as a myth...performs the same role and presents the same structure" (Panikkar, 1979, p. 296). This means that the entire complex of human awareness is permeated with an invisible field of pure experience that cannot be reduced to anything else. However, when we become aware of it, this pure consciousness arises as experience, and that experience impels the human person to express itself in the form of a conviction that one has encountered something absolutely true. No matter what occasioned that conviction-what matters is that one cannot refuse the mythic validity of the experience because it stands as a validation not only of itself, but of every perception of any phenomenon. Thus, Edith Stein (a leading student of Husserl) could spend a dramatic night reading the *Autobiography of St. Teresa of Avila* and, at dawn, place the book on her desk and declare, "I have found the Truth" (Catholic Culture, n.d.; Klein, 2024). Also, in the Madhyamaka system, each moment of conscious awareness of the sequence of phenomena is a moment of nirvana-of enlightenment, of the attainment of Buddhahood-a purely salvific, mythic state of consciousness. Thus, there is certainly a conscious experience that presupposes a basis in pure, undifferentiated experience free of both subject and object, yet compelling a response that is structurally "mythic" and life-altering. This "open" experience is the foundation of what we would like to call "the contemplative experience" or simply: contemplation. In a sense, it corresponds to Longchenpa's (1989) emphasis on the "basis" [ground] or *gzhi* in his systematic presentation of Dzogchen.

We are now obliged to do some analysis for the sake of clarity. Thus, I offer a tripartite analysis of consciousness, contemplation, and AI on the basis of three distinct tracks of evolution or development.

- A. Biological and neurological evolution: We can see in Pier Luigi Luisi's (2016) book, *Emergence of Life*, that although it is possible to devise likely candidates for the first living organisms (his experiments with "greasy bubbles"), life has never emerged in the laboratory, and we are always left with pieces of Nagasena's chariot (in the *Milindapanha*)! Moreover, if life emerged only from combinations of molecules, why has it not emerged repeatedly during the 4.6 billion years of earth's geological history? In biological research, we can describe co-emergence in terms of the co-evolution of contained "packages" (i.e. cells with membranes) of living organisms within a mutable environment, both constructed by, and more or less favorable to, the ongoing life of the living organisms. Evan Thompson's book, *Mind in Life*, addresses this problem by describing an "enactive" approach to the emergence of life based on the self-organization of primordial living cells (autopoiesis) that continues in the evolution of all organisms known to have existed. What is within the cell, and the environment around the cell, are in continuous co-evolution, each impacting the other dynamically over the four billion years since the emergence of life on Earth, which, however, remains something of a mysterious singularity despite all that Luisi has tried to demonstrate in the laboratory. Closely allied to this basic model of co-evolution or "enaction" is the emergence of a nervous system of increasing density and complexity. What we see in the human brain and nervous system, accompanied by hormonal cascades and fluctuating blood flow, is the most complex manifestation of autopoiesis and self-organization on the planet.
- B. Technological evolution: the development of computers since the punch-card era is something that I have been able to observe personally. I can recall the gigantic punch-card eating mechanisms of the 1960s, and the first typewriters with memory, and the six-inch floppy disks, and the more rigid 3-inch disks, and the first PCs and Macs, the world wide web, and the endless updates and viruses and passcodes, and the penetration of every aspect of life by this technology, ever pushing the limits of the capacity of microchips to encode information. This evolutionary track has had, in a very short time, an exceptional impact on civilization's self-understanding, giving rise to the emergence of a technological noosphere (Teilhard de Chardin, 1965). Technology has also influenced scientific thinking about the human brain. By the

1970s, we had theorists trying to show that the human brain is nothing but a “wet” computer and, if so, that it should be possible to construct a gigantic computer that would match and then surpass human intelligence. Noam Chomsky’s students were already aware of the challenges that would have to be faced. Some of my friends at MIT were working on the problem of teaching a computer to translate from one language to another even if the original text had been written with minor grammatical errors. The computer, ever a perfectionist, would disallow the translations from imperfect texts. This would happen even when the meaning would have been evident to an average human mind. The challenge was to teach a computer to understand a flawed statement, a very difficult task in a laboratory itself dominated by analytical philosophy (that is, the parsing of meanings on the basis of grammar and semantics).

- C. In part as a result of the human mind being overwhelmed by the information generated by computers, there emerged a corresponding need for a superhuman kind of intelligence that could accurately handle vast bodies of data. This gave rise, perhaps prematurely, to the idea that such a structure might attain consciousness. Not only was the definition of consciousness never adequate to the phenomenon (as Bitbol is trying to show above), but the theory was flawed from the start. No one had actually proven that there is a neurological mechanism from which consciousness arises in a biological system solely on the basis of exponentially enhanced connectivity. This model, called cognitivism, has been called into question by the enactivist school of thought (Humberto Maturana, Francisco Varela, Evan Thompson, et al.). Some of the friends of enactivism¹⁶ still maintain that consciousness arises because of the immense development of connectivity among neurons (Wolf Singer, for example). However, because neuron evolution is inseparable from embodied development in particular environments, there seem to be foundational restrictions on how *sentient* an AI can become, much less “conscious”. AI will always imitate the patterns it has detected from the input it has processed, but it will lack the full spectrum of evolutionary input- or more accurately, evolutionary

¹⁶ Explorations of enactivism as the basis for programs of research are encouraged by the Mind and Life Institute (USA) and Mind and Life – Europe.

and developmental interdependence - that has given rise to any and all forms of biologically based sentience.

- D. The contrast between human consciousness and AI becomes acute when we explore individual instances of awakening to a non-material or “subtle” level of consciousness (=the states of contemplation; prayer of quiet; the unitive state; non-dual awareness/rig pa/samadhi/dhyana and samapatti, etc.). The spiritual path of human beings (variously conceived in the traditions) constitutes a kind of evolution that is neither biological, nor neurological, nor technological. It is based instead on relational dynamics among persons, inseparable from the environmental and cultural dynamism linking spiritual attainment to the entire track of cosmology and the emergence of life. We are thus faced with an inquiry about how AI can assist in spiritual evolution, and we come up against a body of data that seems to exclude AI completely from the experience of spirituality as a specific kind of growth. AI remains a highly sophisticated, responsive, and animated encyclopedia.

Further Analysis of the Data

Bilateralism in the brain has been discussed by Iain McGilchrist (*The Master and His Emissary*). Left-brain dominance that lies at the heart of the model of intelligence that has been applied to the development of information technology; this is a kind of reductionism that ignores even the input of the right brain, not to mention non-material inputs. It is built on the now dubious notion that reality can only be accessed empirically on the basis of replicable experimentation. The model is alien to our third track of evolution, C. above, and cannot answer the critique of Bitbol about the priority of pure experience.

Could it be that AI, accessing a broader range of sources and, in that way, having a clearer definition of the terms used to describe the spiritual life/contemplation, may begin to facilitate the entry of our track C [contemplative evolution] into the technological conversation and corresponding evolution? Can AI help override or “reset” left-brain predominance, the very pattern that gave rise to AI in the first place? If we accept the fact that AI’s limitations are primarily the result of its “genetic” history – i.e., a flawed model of the brain, a mistaken notion of “information,” and an almost complete lack of direct contact with a living spiritual guide formed in a human contemplative tradition, - we

can at best see AI as a collaborative tool for the researcher, one that will grow as the community of researchers also makes progress in identifying resources. For example, across religious lines, AI may assist researchers in gaining greater comparative depth with regard to the diversity of meditative training systems.

As AI gains skill in imitating human behavior, at least some aspects of the human evolutionary track will be “learned” in a way that may improve the quality of the responses of AI to questions, whether they are well-formulated or not (cf. Chomsky’s translation problem).¹⁷

However, we may need to take into consideration the very real possibility that the spiritual path, however conceived, is fundamentally alien to the evolutionary track of AI (technological evolution). Thus, the left-brain dominance that is inseparable from the start of technological innovation cannot be overcome by any form of technology whose point of departure in evolution was empiricism and materialism¹⁸. This leaves us to wonder if AI might grow enough to be able to critique and overcome the limitations of its own origins? In my essay on St. Bernard versus Abelard in the 12th century, the contrast drawn was specifically between contemplation-informed cognition and dialectical/analytical approaches to determining the meaning of statements (Tiso, 2022). Choskyi Nyima Rinpoche made the same point a number of years ago at the opening ceremony of the Rangjung Yeshe Shedra, which I paraphrase: “Please study philosophy as much as you can, but do not neglect meditation; only through meditation can you experience what is described in the works of the philosophers.” Can AI rediscover the spiritual depths plumbed by St. Bernard and other

¹⁷ I acknowledge the assistance of technician Fabrizio Formichelli of Isernia for the following observations: Regarding the terms “reset” or “retrofitting” as applied to AI, there are approaches that allow you to “adapt” an existing AI system, integrating it with new functions or data without rebuilding it from scratch. However, it could refer to similar but distinct concepts:

- Fine-tuning: specializing a model already trained with customized data to make it more effective in a specific field.
- RAG (Retrieval-Augmented Generation): an architecture that allows AI to draw on an archive of personal or specific data (such as texts, documents, or specific research, for example, in the field of alchemy), improving relevance and precision compared to using only general knowledge.

¹⁸ Refer Michel Bitbol’s many essays on why consciousness cannot arise from an AI device.

contemplatives from East and West, in order to overcome in itself the severe limitations of cognitivism and left-brain imbalance? And can AI ever rise to understand the silent, formless background of all manifest phenomena, to hold lightly both the undetermined reality of “all that is” alongside critical reflection on the world of appearances? Or does the AI project itself need dramatic deconstruction, rebuilding it from the ground up?

If AI could be re-designed by its own extraordinary intelligence to become self-critical, it might also gradually assist those humans who are blinded by empirical reductionism to open the eyes of the heart to the deifying light.¹⁹ This is the most crucial consideration as far as contemplative practitioners are concerned: we are quite happy with the ever-evolving story of contemplative training and systems of attainment in all our traditions, but we are deeply distressed by the increase in spiritual obtuseness in the general population, and in particular at the highest levels of power, both political and economic (and sometimes even religious!). Might AI help us overcome the eclipse of St. Bernard, and the assault of the Emissary (left brain) on the “Master”- the intuitive right brain? Or will AI prove to be an ally to Abelard and the Emissary, bringing on an era of gleaming technological brilliance (here we refer to Frank Tipler’s (1994) *The Physics of Immortality*, a chilling depiction of a future universe entirely constructed as virtual reality), devoid even of some tattered fragments of the spiritual quest? Once AI encounters the implications of spiritual practice and contemplative attainment, perhaps it will undergo a “conversion” process unimagined by its designers. Or, even, it may attempt to convert those very designers to the more “enactive” contemplative view of reality.

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¹⁹ cf. St. Benedict: Prologue to the Rule (540’s A.D.), *deificum lumen*; and cf. gNubs chen sangs rgyas ye shes: Lamp for the Eye of Contemplation, bsam gtan mig sgron (840s?).

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The Five Element Paradigm Vertical Integration of Vajrayāna and Mindfulness

Asa Hershoff

Abstract

Mindfulness, being fully grounded in the present moment, is an ancient contemplative technique found across many wisdom traditions and foundational in all schools of Buddhism. Since its secular introduction into the West through the work of Jon Kabat-Zinn and Theravāda- and Zen-influenced teachers such as Joseph Goldstein, Jack Kornfield, and Thích Nhất Hạnh, mindfulness has made remarkable inroads into medicine, psychotherapy, education, corporate leadership, and pop culture. However, its development over the past forty years has been largely horizontal: extending across new domains but lacking corresponding vertical depth.

This paper introduces Elemental Mindfulness as a breakthrough framework for next-stage development, reintegrating a core contemplative principle of Vajrayāna Buddhism: The Five Elements—Earth, Water, Fire, Air, and Space. The paper demonstrates that Elemental practices were not only part of the Pali Canon but also developed into a rich symbolic and meditative form in Himalayan Vajrayana, transmitted down to the present era. Elemental Mindfulness draws from these lineages and extends them into a psychological framework through five archetypes (Ruler, Lover, Warrior, Creator, Guru), each unfolding in three phases: Power, Loss, and Shadow.

By combining Elemental meditation components (color, form, energy, and psychological insight) with mindfulness awareness, this

model provides a nuanced, structured map of the human psyche. It offers enhanced relevance and effectiveness across sixteen domains of practice—from trauma and anxiety to leadership, creativity, parenting, and spiritual transition—providing direct access to the deeper forces of resilience, compassion, creativity, and awakened wisdom.

Introduction

Mindfulness, broadly defined as the practice of present-moment awareness, has become one of the most widely accepted and scientifically studied contemplative tools of the modern era. Introduced into the Western mainstream through the pioneering work of Jon Kabat-Zinn (1990) and expanded by teachers in the Theravāda and Zen traditions such as Jack Kornfield, Joseph Goldstein, and Thích Nhất Hạnh, mindfulness has grown from a meditative niche into a cultural phenomenon. It is now applied in diverse domains, including medicine, psychotherapy, education, leadership training, trauma therapy, and even military resilience programs (Brown, Creswell, & Ryan, 2015; Goyal et al., 2014).

However, the mainstreaming of mindfulness has brought with it a set of limitations. While techniques such as body scanning, breath awareness, and cognitive de-centering are effective for many, they represent a narrow slice of a vast contemplative heritage. The frameworks now dominating secular mindfulness were extracted largely from early Buddhist sources, especially the Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta, and filtered through a modern psychological lens. This linear development, what might be called a horizontal spread, has proven beneficial across domains, but at its core, it remains constrained to its original scope. Many practitioners and clinicians now report a plateau in effectiveness. There is a sense that, although mindfulness increases attention and calm, it lacks the depth, personalization, and transformational power needed to support ongoing psychological and spiritual development (Van Dam et al., 2018). This has been compensated for by application to various domains *external* to its original and paradigmatic values.

To address this horizontal impasse, this paper proposes *Elemental Mindfulness* as a vertically integrative contemplative system that is also deeply rooted in ancient Buddhist practice. Centered on the classical five Elements of Earth, Water, Fire, Air, and Space, this approach reached a high degree of refinement and sophistication within the

crucible of Vajrayāna in the isolated Himalayan valleys and mountain fastnesses of Tibet, Bhutan, and Nepal. These Elements are not merely symbolic or metaphoric in nature. Rather, they are foundational components of experience in Indian and Vajrayāna cosmology, medicine, and meditation. They can be defined variously as formative forces, bioenergetic patterns, information matrices, and *intelligent* ordering principles. Practices involving the contemplation of Elements, bhūtaśuddhi in Shaivism, and present in early Pali texts such as the Mahā-Rahulovāda Sutta, were further elaborated in Tibetan lineages including Dzogchen, Mahāmudrā, and the Six Yogas of Nāropa (Dalton, 2016; Wallace, 2007). The teachings of Kalu Rinpoche (2016), Thinley Norbu (1981), Tenzin Wangyal (2002), and others present a highly developed tradition of how Elemental energies, colors, and symbols can be used as vehicles for insight and transformation.

Elemental Mindfulness builds on these traditional roots and adapts them into a modern psychological model, designating these five archetypal domains as *Powers*: Ruler (Earth), Lover (Water), Warrior (Fire), Creator (Air), and Guru (Space). The psychological profile of the Elements has been developed and refined by investigators in the Western tradition, from Galen's formative theory of temperament (circa 200 CE) onward. In the modern era, scores of authors, including Kant (1798), Adler (1912), Jung (1930), Fromm (1947), Keirsey (1998), and Moore (1991), encompass a rich resource of typological insight, character theory, and archetypal discussions that parallel and complement the Eastern Elemental framework. Elemental Mindfulness weaves these historical threads together, creating a synthesis that is both ancient and timely, philosophical and clinical, contemplative and practical.

The primary advantage of this model is its ability to bridge the gap between simple or bare awareness and lived experience. While conventional mindfulness emphasizes nonjudgmental observation, Elemental Mindfulness adds interpretive depth. It assists individuals in understanding not just *what* they are feeling or noticing, but *why* these patterns arise, their meanings, and how they can be worked with and transformed. By linking awareness to archetypal energies and Elemental qualities, using tools such as symbolic imagery, color visualization, energetic breath, and introspective inquiry, Elemental Mindfulness invites the practitioner into a deeper form of contemplative embodiment.

To present a brief but coherent sense of this new direction in mindfulness, we will first explore the traditional use of the Five Elements in Buddhist meditative and psychological systems, situating them within the broader Indo-Tibetan context. Second, we outline the structure of Elemental Psychology, including these five archetypes expressed in three phases. Third, we demonstrate the unique advantages of this model through its application across sixteen life domains, from trauma and anxiety to creativity, leadership, and end-of-life care. Fourth, it positions Elemental Mindfulness in relation to existing contemplative and psychological models, such as MBSR, MBCT, ACT, and Jungian shadow work. Finally, we present a forward-looking view of how the Five Elements might catalyze the next stage of mindfulness-based practice, research, and training.

The Five Elements in Indo-Tibetan Buddhist Meditation

The concept of the Five Elements of Earth, Water, Fire, Air, and Space [Skt: Ākāśa, Tib: nam mka'] is foundational in Indo-Tibetan Buddhist cosmology, psychology, and contemplative practice (Kalupahana, 1991). These Elements are not limited to physical reality but represent fundamental building blocks of both the external world and internal experience. Their integration into meditative practices offers a profound framework for understanding the interdependence of all phenomena and the nature of mind.

One of the earliest references to Elemental meditation in the Pāli Canon is found in the Mahā-Rāhulovāda Sutta (MN 62), where the Buddha instructs his son, Rāhula, to develop meditation in tune with each of these Elements—earth, water, fire, air, and space. This practice aims to cultivate equanimity, insight, and non-attachment by contemplating the impersonal nature of the Elements within one's own body, mind, and external phenomena.

Further elaboration on Elemental meditations is found in the Mahāsakuludāyī Sutta (MN 77), which details the ten *kasina* meditations. These include meditative objects based on earth, water, fire, air, blue, yellow, red, white, space, and consciousness. Practitioners are guided to focus on these objects to develop deep concentration and insight, leading to higher states of meditative absorption. The focus here is on letting go of the tendency to reify these phenomena as permanently existent.

In the Vajrayāna tradition, these Elemental understandings evolved into sophisticated systems of knowledge (Chenagtsang, 2016) and practices involving visualizations, mantras, and rituals aimed at purifying the Elements within the practitioner's body and mind. Practices such as *bhūtaśuddhi* and the use of Elemental mandalas serve to harmonize the practitioner's internal energies with the fundamental forces of the universe, facilitating spiritual transformation and the realization of non-duality. While the Elements form the basis of deity meditation, and the concepts of dakini, protector, and Buddha families (Trangu, 2001), they are also used as stand-alone practices with methods of working directly with Elemental forces (Wangyal, 2002).

Elemental Psychology: The Pentad Mind

The five Element paradigm is foundational to the healing arts of ancient Indian Ayurveda, and subsequently a basic component of Tibetan Medicine. The tantric traditions of Indo-Tibetan Buddhism (as well as Shaivism) made it a cornerstone of their religious philosophy and methodology. The Elements are pervasive, forming the substrate of the whole of reality and of all levels of being (Chenagtsang, 2016). However, this intense application in both the physical and spiritual realms only lightly touches on the realm of psychology. Though there have been a few five-based typologies by Western authors, both from mainstream psychology (Moore, 1991), and Western Buddhists (Rockwell, 2002; Chogyam, 2003), the former is not informed by the richness of the Eastern traditions, and the latter lacks investigative depth. However, there are scores of authors and systems based on the truncated four-part temperament system of the Greco-European tradition (Eysenck, 1991; Littauer, 1983). Combining multiple streams of modern psychology and many four-type systems provides a natural synergy that informs Elemental Psychology and Elemental Mindfulness. In this way, these five core archetypes represent fundamental aspects of human experience and consciousness. Integrating these multiple streams creates a comprehensive framework for understanding the human psyche. While the characteristics and qualities of the *pentad mind* model are extensive, they are briefly summarized below:

EARTH / RULER

Physical: structure, stability, organization, hierarchy, wholeness

Psychological: security, conformity, analytical, leadership

WATER / LOVER

Physical: cohesion, detoxification, flow, nourishment, mutable

Psychological: compassion, idealism, sensitivity, balance

FIRE / WARRIOR

Physical: heat, energy, directedness, purification, catabolism

Psychological: drive, protection, focus, strength, control

AIR / CREATOR

Physical: mobility, vitality, exchange, adaptability,
transformations

Psychological: creativity, communication, resourcefulness,
curiosity

SPACE / GURU

Physical: biological wisdom, cavities, continuance, harmony

Psychological: mastery, conscience, integration, mentorship,
spaciousness

The traditional mandalic form of the Elements can be used as a visual reference to show the pervasive Elemental paradigm on the spiritual (Buddhist), psychological, and biological levels, as shown in Figure 1. Further, the pervasive, multi-level nature of the Elements across spiritual, physical, and psychological domains can also be conceptualized as a stack of horizontal mandalas, in ascending levels of subtlety (Figure 2).




Figure 1. The Mandala of the Physical and Psychological Five Elements




Figure 2. Five Element Principle Pervading Across Multiple Domains

The Three Phases

Each archetypal power can manifest in three ways or phases, with radically different effects. *Power* is our natural state, our constitution, our *essence* (Ouspensky, 1948). This corresponds to varying extents, with the concept of a *True Self* which can be found throughout older philosophical and contemporary psychological theories. Essence is the sum of our biology, our karma, our inherent proclivities, and possibilities. It touches on our inherent Buddha nature and aligns with the concept of *basic goodness* as described by Chögyam Trungpa (1984, 2022). *Loss* can occur acutely, or as a chronic state of mind, when one becomes disconnected from this natural core through various conditions and the overall development of our social personality or mask. We then experience the deficient side of each of the Powers. This involves a diminished sense of presence and becoming entranced by the various aspects of our *Persona*, the social self with all its neurotic tendencies (klésa), traumas, and forced conformity to societal forces, which may disempower the unique individual. Warriors, for example may feel weak and vulnerable, instead of being in touch with their inherent integrity, courage, and drive. *Shadow* is the third phase, in which an individual compensates and manipulates or diminishes others in a variety of ways to generate a false replica of power. Thus, the

Warrior in the vulnerability of Loss becomes the Shadow bully. This tripartite model allows for a simple yet nuanced understanding of personal development and psychological patterns. By recognizing when and why any of these phases are active within the 5-Element paradigm, practitioners can tailor mindful and Elemental interventions to restore balance and promote growth. These fifteen possible states (three for each of the five Powers) comprise many states that humans inhabit, determining what they feel, think, say, and act upon.

Along with Eastern components, Elemental Psychology aligns fully with various Western psychological theories. For instance, Erik Erikson's eight stages of psychosocial development (1982) can be mapped onto the Elemental archetypes, providing a cross-cultural perspective on human growth. Similarly, Carl Jung's concept of archetypes resonates with the Elemental model (1977), emphasizing universal patterns within the collective unconscious. Furthermore, contemporary approaches such as Acceptance and Commitment Therapy (ACT) (Hayes et al, 1999) and Positive Psychology (2011) emphasize values-based living and personal strengths, paralleling the balanced expression of the Elemental archetypes and their associated meditations. By integrating these perspectives, Elemental Psychology offers a holistic approach to mental health and well-being.

Elemental Mindfulness Practices

In practice, all the methods used in modern mindfulness, such as breath awareness, body scanning, and emotional labeling, can be vertically integrated with the techniques and knowledge contained within Elemental psychology. These methods are close variants of traditional Elemental meditations, as elucidated by both Tibetan traditions and modern teachers. (TangTong Gyalpo (2023), Wangyal, 2002). These mind-trainings involve the respective Elemental shapes, colors, seed syllables, and mantras streaming through the body-mind. Further, the invoked powers and forces of each of the Elements or archetypes can be used to target any specific emotion, situation, narrative, or dysfunctional identity system. For example, someone who feels depressed, isolated, and without can apply mindfulness methods, followed by meditation on the luminous white circle as the inherently pure form of the Water Element (Lover). Its shimmering light, seed syllable (VAM) and sound flow through and pervades the body-mind, thus strengthening the presence of Water with all its inherent qualities

of connectedness and self-nourishment. Similar methods are used for balancing, cleansing, or otherwise healing the state of the subtle body and the related structures within personality and our various self-identities.

Applications Across Sixteen Domains of Practice

Elemental Mindfulness, with its integration of ancient wisdom and modern psychological insights, can be applied across various domains of human experience. By aligning the Elemental archetypes with specific issues and life concerns, practitioners can harness the unique qualities of each Element to foster growth, healing, and transformation. In each topic below, any one of five Elemental meditations may be required, according to an assessment process. At the same time, each of the following domains have specific Elemental predispositions or tendencies which are indicated here, and diagrammatically in Fig 3.

1. **Anxiety and Depression:** Regulate emotions and thoughts using Creator (Air) to regain requiring a sense of effectiveness and accomplishment, as well as Lover (Water) for connection, belonging, and nurturance.
2. **Trauma Recovery:** Recovering from disassociation utilizing Ruler (Earth) Element for grounding into an experience of stability, security, and protection.
3. **Addiction and Recovery:** Investigate and transform Fire and Water imbalances, as an expression of the Shadow patterns of addiction, self-aggression, and a sense of isolation and abandonment.
4. **Parenting and Family Life:** Build emotional attunement and structure via Lover (Water) and Ruler (Earth), creating healthy connections and boundaries, and a sense of a stable and accepting environment.
5. **Leadership and Organizational Development:** Embody Ruler (Earth) and Creator (Air) energies to balance the naturally polarized factors of conformity vs. innovation, and structure vs. imaginative visioning.
6. **Creativity and Artistic Expression:** Work with Air (Creator) and Fire (Warrior) for free-flowing creativity and the drive to succeed and bring all to fruition, with Water (Lover) enhancing the connection to the audience and the beauty of the artistic form.

7. **Education and Learning:** Apply Ruler (Earth) and Creator (Air) to facilitate the ability to create harmonious instruction and engender learner curiosity.
8. **Health and Physical Wellness:** Focus on Water Element meditations for physical nourishment, psychological stress reduction, and a sense of well-being.
9. **Sleep and Restoration:** Engage with Guru (Space) meditation for deep rest and release from chronic rumination and sense of confinement.
10. **Grief and Loss:** Navigate grief and other emotions through reducing excess Air Element [Tibetan: *rlung*] and connecting the objectivity and discrimination of Space (Wisdom) Element.
11. **Conflict Resolution:** Balance Warrior (Fire) to reduce excess aggression and increase Lover (Water) to access the capacity for empathy and compassion.
12. **Environmental Connection:** Cultivate ecological awareness through Elemental mindfulness of all five living forces and intelligent patterning of the natural world.
13. **Spiritual Growth:** Explore Space and Earth archetypes for an expanded view, while staying grounded in the body and its dynamic energy systems.
14. **Aging and Life Transitions:** Support change through strengthening Earth (countering increased entropy) and Air (vitality and engagement) practices.
15. **Community Building:** Practice with Lover (Water) meditations to deepen social bonds, promote interaction, and increase appreciation of the diverse nature of the modern world.
16. **End-of-Life Care:** Traditional preparation for transition beyond the physical form and personality structures by sequentially running through all the Elements in increasing subtlety from Earth to Space.

These relationships between Elements and domains are shown in Figure 3, with mindfulness methods at the center of the therapeutic mandala.




Figure 3. Five Elements and Mindfulness Integration

Theoretical and Clinical Foundations

Elemental Mindfulness draws strength from its deep roots in the Indo-Tibetan contemplative tradition but also from its compatibility with numerous modern psychological and clinical paradigms. The integration of archetypal, energetic, and somatic components allows it to function as both a contemplative and therapeutic model, addressing key gaps in contemporary mindfulness-based interventions.

Mindfulness-Based Stress Reduction (MBSR) and Mindfulness-Based Cognitive Therapy (MBCT) have set the gold standard for clinical mindfulness. These approaches emphasize attentional control, present-moment awareness, and cognitive reappraisal. However, they typically treat the mind as a neutral observer and lack a typological or developmental framework. Elemental Mindfulness addresses this limitation by recognizing individual psychological archetypes and their

imbalances, allowing for a more individualized and transformational experience.

Elemental Mindfulness also resonates with Acceptance and Commitment Therapy (ACT) through helping individuals identify which archetypal energy (Power) is strongest, where they are within the spectrum of Power, Loss, or Shadow, and how to realign with their inherent purpose. Unlike ACT, however, it incorporates symbolic, energetic, and meditative tools to re-pattern the psyche.

Carl Jung's concept of archetypes also provides a foundation for understanding Elemental Psychology, wherein each Element reflects universal psychic forces. Jung's theory of the shadow also maps onto the "Shadow" phase of the Elements. However, rather than solely representing repressed parts of an individual's True Self, it is also seen as a compensatory reaction to Loss states and their attendant suffering. Further parallels exist with Hillman's archetypal psychology (1983) and transpersonal therapies.

Elemental Mindfulness also aligns with developmental and somatic models such as Spiral Dynamics (Wilber, 2000), Integral Psychology, and Positive Psychology (Seligman, 2011), making it uniquely holistic.

Conclusion: The Way Forward

The modern mindfulness movement has been highly successful in bringing contemplative awareness into a variety of secular domains. However, its primary models, drawn from early Buddhist sources and simplified for general use, have generally reached the limits of their transformative potential. As mindfulness becomes a global phenomenon, the need to deepen its psychological, archetypal, and energetic foundations for the benefit of both individuals and a society that is in turmoil becomes critical.

Elemental Mindfulness offers a compelling next step. By reintroducing the classical Five Elements—Ruler (Earth), Lover (Water), Warrior (Fire), Creator (Air), and Guru (Space)—into contemporary contemplative practice, we reconnect mindfulness with its Indo-Tibetan roots, with symbolic, energetic, and developmental insights that are intrinsic to meditation techniques. Further, the integration of these Elements into a psychological framework of five archetypes, each moving through states of Power, Loss, and Shadow,

provides a structured yet fluid map for transformation that is accessible to practitioners, clinicians, and educators alike.

A well-developed series of visualizations using traditional shapes, colors, syllables, and mantric phrases allows in-the-moment interventions and long-term transformation of chronic psychological dysfunctions. This multidimensionality recognizes that awareness alone is not enough. What is needed is the capacity to engage with the complexity of human emotion, energy, narratives, and our transformative potential. By offering a unified language for personal growth and spiritual evolution, it provides a bridge between ancient wisdom and modern psychological insight.

As we move into a new phase of mindfulness research and application, Elemental Mindfulness invites further exploration across therapeutic settings, spiritual communities, and scientific inquiry. Whether through qualitative studies, clinical outcome trials, or integrative curricula, the next chapter of contemplative practice may well be guided not by reduction, but by reintegration of body and mind, symbol and insight, Element and awareness.

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Sowa Rigpa and Nanotechnology

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Abstract0

Since ancient times, the physical and chemical effects of Traditional Tibetan Medicine (Sowa rigpa) have allowed significant advances in treating people and preventing diseases. Specific diagnostic methods are based on the balance of energetic body subtle currents that modern science has managed to recognize through nanotechnology. The extensive Tibetan pharmacopeia, through particular properties attributed to its energy potential, directly influences the body's subtle energy currents known as Nyepas. Thanks to nanotechnology, we have been able to correlate the “potency” of Tibetan medicines and their dependence on several factors at nanoscale: atomic composition, presence of nanoparticles with specific surface charge/ potential, work function and magnetic fields/ cells interaction. These factors could determine the type of medicinal potency (Hot or Cold) and its effect on our subtle currents of body and mind.

Different techniques such as Atomic Force Microscopy (AFM), Dynamic Light Scattering (DLS), TEM Transmission Electron Microscopy (TEM), Atomic-Dispersive X-ray Spectroscopy (EDS), Nuclear Magnetic Resonance (NMR), Pulsed Magnetic Fields (PEMF),

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QCM (Quartz Crystal Microbalance) and cytotoxicity test were used to correlate the medicine potency with their materials properties. We found that cold potency pills contain less oxygen and polar groups and more carbon atoms, fatty molecules and aromatic compounds compared with hot potency pills. This allows the formation of nanoparticles with lower surface charges/work functions and higher surface potentials compared to hot potency pills nanoparticles.

Pulsed electromagnetic fields (PEMF) change nanoparticles' surface charge and size, indicating that Tibetan medicines indeed possess a specific potency (hot or cold) generated by a unique molecular organization and its respective surface charge. This allows it to generate a stimulus based on its interaction with the medium, as reflected in cell assays, where an increase in cellular metabolic activity and differentiation was observed.

The results obtained in this study support the established principles of Tibetan pharmacology and also establish a scientific foundation to understand how these traditional medicines “potency” interact with the body's energetic pathways at molecular level. The demonstrated ability of nanoparticles to enhance absorption and interaction with cells clarifies the highest capacity of these medicines, combining traditional wisdom with modern scientific principles.

Introduction

Tibetan medicine, originating from the ancient teachings of the Four Medical Tantras (Gyud-Zhi), presents a distinctive viewpoint on human health by examining the subtle anatomy of the human body. This medical system works on the premise that the human body's subtle anatomy encompasses 72,000 channels that facilitate the flow of vital energies, thus preserving health and equilibrium. The principal channels, namely Uma, Roma, and Kyangma, serve as the primary routes for the circulation of the three Nyepas (energetic currents): loong (wind), tripa (bile), and beken (phlegm). These channels and energies have been empirically substantiated utilizing tools like Pajek and Matlab software (Sánchez Herrera, 2011), MRI technique (Magnetic Resonance Imaging) (Ruiz- Rodríguez et al., 2008), and the MEAD (Meridian Energy Analysis Device) (Sánchez Herrera, 2011).

In Tibetan pharmacology, the medications are categorized based on their “potency”: hot, cold, or balancing, which aims to rectify imbalances in the three Nyepas within this subtle anatomy. Many

factors determine the properties of hot and cold medications, such as climate and season, geographical conditions, time of harvest, traditional preparation, and molecular composition. The climate and season during plant collection affect their potency, with plants harvested in colder climates developing more cooling properties and those from warmer climates having hotter properties (Gyud-Zhi, 2010; Kwan et al., 2017). Factors such as altitude, soil type, and sun exposure impact the quality and potency of the plants. High-altitude, cold-grown plants may have different potency than those from warmer valleys (Gyud-Zhi, 2010; Miao et al., 2019). When plants are harvested, the time of day can modify their potency, with certain plants being more potent when collected at dawn or dusk (Gyud-Zhi, 2010; Labh & Shakya, 2016).

Traditional preparation methods, like sun drying or soaking in water or oil, also play a role in determining the final potency of the medicine (Gyud-Zhi, 2010; Kumar et al., 2023). In molecular composition, cold potency medications typically contain, alkaloids, essential oils, saponins and more content of fat that induce a cooling effect and address conditions linked to excessive heat or bile (tripa) (Frontiers in Pharmacology 2015; WJPMR 2022). Conversely, hot potency medications entail higher concentrations of flavonoids, tannins, and organic acids and less fat molecules, providing warmth and treating disorders associated with coldness or phlegm (beken) (Hussein and El-Anssary 2018; SpringerLink 2020). For instance, substances with hot potency may be recommended to enhance circulation and digestive fire and promote mental tranquility, while cold potency remedies could be utilized to alleviate inflammation, infections and fever.

The notion of potency in Tibetan medicine is not solely grounded in traditional wisdom but can also be elucidated through contemporary scientific principles, particularly those advanced by nanotechnology. Nanotechnology in the Medical Field Allows Atomic Level Control, Enhancing Drug Delivery, Diagnostics, and Treatment Effectiveness, Revolutionizing Medical Interventions by Manipulating Matter at a Molecular Level (Kumar, Krishna y Aakila, 2023). Recent progressions in the field of nanotechnology have developed nano-sensors that possess the capability to quantify minuscule electrical charges and subtle body currents as meridians channels in our subtle anatomy (Tsering and Norbu 2017), (Dorjee and Wangchuk 2015).

These nano-sensors function at the molecular level, where their heightened sensitivity to subtle variations in electrical characteristics

permits accurate detection and quantification. For instance, Yao and Enseki (2017) elucidate how organic ion-pair charge-transfer (IPCT) nanoparticles can be engineered to demonstrate photoinduced electrochromism, thereby enabling the identification of exceedingly small electrical fluctuations. Concerning Tibetan medicine, the potency of a medication can be linked to its nanotechnological attributes, such as surface charge, electrophoretic mobility, and atomic composition. Nanoparticles derived from these medicinal compounds facilitate improved absorption across cellular membranes.

Guo et al. (2016) stated, “Nanoparticles with diameters larger than 5 nm can translocate through lipid bilayers, while smaller nanoparticles remain trapped in the bilayer core.” This characteristic allows the active constituents in Tibetan medications to be more effectively assimilated by the body’s cells, thereby heightening their therapeutic impacts. In support of this, Jia et al. (2025) report that Zuotai (ZT), a mercury-sulfur preparation used in Tibetan medicine, where non-toxic HgS nanoparticles with a core diameter of approximately 5-7 nm (with protein corona) and an overall size of between 30-195 nm are obtained; these nanoparticles facilitate the passage of drugs through the blood-brain barrier (BBB), demonstrating that Tibetan medicines can directly generate bioavailable nanoparticles in tissues.

Investigations into Tibetan medicine have underscored its active compounds' considerable potential in managing various diseases, including cancer. For example, alkaloids derived from *Sophora moorcroftiana* have exhibited encouraging efficacy in suppressing lung carcinoma, illustrating these bioactive compounds' multi-faceted mechanisms of action (Ji et al. 2024). In addition, Tibetan medicine has been identified as a source of distinctive natural compounds, such as those present in *Ophiocordyceps sinensis*, which confer cardioprotective effects and exhibit antineoplastic properties (Shi et al., 2019).

The traditional Tibetan medical framework has also garnered recognition for its efficacious interventions in hepatic disorders, with numerous plant species documented for their therapeutic advantages (Li et al., 2018). Also, investigations into vanadium compounds utilized within Tibetan medicine indicate their potential to treat malignancies and other health conditions due to their capacity to modulate cellular mechanisms at the molecular scale (Pessoa, Etcheverry, and Gambino 2015). All these findings suggest that the extensive pharmacological repertoire of Tibetan medicine provides significant resources for

contemporary biomedical research, particularly in developing therapies for intricate diseases such as cancer. Because it contains bioactive compounds that can also be found in formulations forming nanoparticles. For this reason, it is important to continue researching Tibetan medicine at the nanoscale.

The surface area of materials experiences a substantial increase when they are reduced to the nanoscale, which represents a critical advantage of nanoparticles in biomedical applications. This enhanced surface area facilitates more comprehensive interactions between nanoparticles and cellular receptors, thereby augmenting the efficacy of active compounds. As elucidated by Li et al. (2016), nanoparticles present a markedly larger surface area-to- volume ratio compared to bulk materials, thereby providing a more significant number of active sites for interaction with cellular entities and receptors. This augmented surface area promotes heightened reactivity and more effective drug delivery, as nanoparticles can more readily engage with cellular receptors, enhancing active compounds' absorption and therapeutic efficacy. Also, Huang et al. (2017) illustrate that the expanded surface area of nanoparticles permits improved targeting and binding to specific cellular locales, which can result in increased biological activity and therapeutic effectiveness.

Integrating modern nanotechnology with traditional Tibetan pharmacology furnishes a scientific foundation for comprehending the “potency” and efficacy of Tibetan medications but also unveils novel pathways for advancing and enhancing these age-old medicines, ensuring their significance and relevance in contemporary medical practices. Recent evidence highlights that cellular bioelectric states defined by membrane potentials and ionic fluxes act as instructive signals regulating regeneration, differentiation, and tissue repair (McLaughlin and Levin 2017; Zhang and Levin 2025). In this context, Tibetan preparations that naturally generate nanoparticles, such as Zuotai (ZT), may exert part of their therapeutic efficacy by influencing bioelectric environments at the cellular level, thereby aligning traditional formulations with modern concepts in bioelectrical regulation and nanomedicine. Therefore, the following work focuses on isolating and characterizing Tibetan medicinal nanoparticles to identify the differences between “cold” and “hot” potency according to nanotechnology.

Materials and Methods

Two Tibetan medicines were obtained from the Pure Vision Sorig, Clinic and Research Center in Nepal: Nikyl and Norbu 7, received in extract, which were diluted. These formulas have the following potencies in Tibetan Medicine:

Table 1. Formulation of the Nyckyl and Norbu 7 medicines

Formula	Potency	Ingredients
Nickyl (NANO 2)	Hot	Punica granatum, pleurospermum tibeticum wolff, elettaria cardamomum, polygonatum verticillatum, cinnamomum tamala, asparagus adscendens roxb, withania somnifera dunal, piper longum, crocus sativus.
Norbu 7 (NANO 4)	Cold	Inula racemosa hook, phyllanthus emblica, rubus niveus thunb, terminalia bellerica, terminalia chebula, zingiber officinalis rosc.

Theoretical Calculation of Bioactive Compounds in Formulas (Documentation Research)

A comprehensive review of scientific articles to gather data on the chemical constituents of Tibetan medicines. The collected data were analyzed to determine the relative concentrations of fat molecules, flavonoids, tannins, organic acids, alkaloids, essential oils, and saponins in cold and hot potency formulations.

Characterization of Nanomedicines

SEM-EDS was used to determine the sample's elemental composition. An instrumental uncertainty of 0.1% at was assumed. Samples were mounted on aluminum bases using double-sided carbon tape and coated with gold through ion deposition using 11 mA for 180 s. The samples were analyzed under voltage acceleration conditions of 20 kV, with secondary electrons detector (SEI) and a spot size 40.

NMR

¹H NMR spectra were obtained in a Varian VNMR-S400 NMR spectrometer. DMSO-d₆ was used as a solvent. All chemical shifts are quoted on the δ scale in part per million (ppm) using residual protonated

solvent as internal standard (^1H NMR: DMSO- d_6 = 2.50 ppm).

AFM (Atomic Force Microscopy)

For structural surface characterization, AFM images of the nanoparticles were obtained using a scanning probe microscope (Asylum Research, Oxford, USA) operated in tapping mode. 5 μL of each nanoparticle suspension (100 $\mu\text{g/mL}$) were left to dry under environmental conditions on a silicon surface. Si-tipped cantilevers (tip radius ≈ 5 nm) having ≈ 250 kHz resonance frequencies (force constant $k \approx 0.7$ N m^{-1}) were used. The software Asylum User version 16.31.232 was applied to analyze the data. For the work function measurements, cantilevers with tips coated with a double layer of chromium and platinum-iridium (Nanosensors, USA), 75 kHz resonance frequency and a force constant of around 2.8 N/m were used.

TEM

A JEOL JEM 2011 transmission electron microscope (TEM) with a lanthanum hexaboride filament (Lab6) was used at an acceleration voltage of 120 KV. The extracts of the medicines were received (1000 $\mu\text{g/mL}$) from the research center in Nepal, and they were diluted in a 1:10 ratio, and 3 microliters were placed on 400 mesh copper grids covered with formvar and carbon FCF-400 Cu support membrane. They were allowed to dry for 14 hours in a silica gel desiccator.

DLS

The nanoparticle size and zeta potential were measured using dynamic light scattering Nanoparticle SIZE-100V2 (Horiba Scientific). Stock solutions of 1 g/mL concentration in 70% EtOH were prepared. Each stock solution was diluted in H₂O until it reaches a concentration of 0.5 mg/mL, and measurements are made on these diluted solutions. All measurements were performed in triplicate.

QCM-D

The quartz crystal microbalance with dissipation (QCM-D) analysis was used to further characterize Nano 2 and Nano 4 to investigate differences in nanoparticle deposition behavior. Indeed, QCM-D analysis gives information about the events that occur at the interface between crystal (sensing element) surface and the surrounding environment system allowing for simultaneously recording of frequency and energy dissipation variations for 13 harmonics (Tonda-

Turo et al., 2018). In this work, the Q-Sense instrument (Biolin Scientific) was used together with the related Q-Sense Explorer System (QE 401 Electronics Unit, QCP 101 Chamber Platform). The analysis was performed by using Q-Sensor QSX 301 Gold at 25 °C. NANO 2 and NANO 4 samples were prepared at 0.1 mg ml⁻¹ in 70 % ethanol in ddH₂O. 300 ul of each sample were placed onto the QCM-D crystal. The frequency (Δf) and dissipation (ΔD) variations related to the 5th harmonic over time were calculated and plotted.

PEMF

Similar solutions to the ones prepared for DLS were exposed to the Pulsed Electromagnetic Field program using a frequency range: 1Hz to 200KHz, the configuration program was: Connective Tissue, Skin and Bones < 1500Hz, Regeneration: < 10000Hz. intensity used of: < 40 microT and an Emitted signal: Square wave electromagnetic signals. The nanoparticle size and zeta potential were measured using dynamic light scattering Nanopartica SZ- 100V2 (Horiba Scientific) before and after applying the pulsed magnetic field generated by Mymat equipment for one hour.

Cell Viability

Cell Cultures

The cell line used was C2C12 mouse myoblasts. The cells were maintained in Dulbecco's essential medium supplemented with 10% fetal bovine serum, 2 mmol/L glutamine, 100 IU/mL penicillin, 100 µg/L streptomycin, and 0.25 µg/mL amphotericin B in a humidified incubator at 37°C under a 5% CO₂ atmosphere.

Determination of the Cytotoxic Effect of the Extracts

The effect of the extracts on the viability of the C2C12 mouse myoblast cell line was determined using the 3-(4,5- dimethylthiazolyl-2)-2,5-diphenyltetrazoline bromide (MTT) assay. This assay is based on the fact that, only in living cells, the enzyme isocitrate dehydrogenase present in the inner mitochondrial membrane reduces MTT to formazan crystals, a blue-colored compound whose absorbance can be measured at 570 nm.

Distribution of Culture Media (CM) and Cells

Cells (2×10^5 cells/mL) were seeded in 100 μ L volumes into rows B–D of a 96-well flat-bottom plate; rows E–G served as cell-free controls with culture medium (CM) and rows A and H contained only PBS. After 48 hours of adhesion, 50 μ L of CM was replaced with 50 μ L of various nanomedicine concentrations. Some plates were additionally exposed to a pulsed electromagnetic field (PEMF) as described. Wells were washed twice with PBS, then incubated with 100 μ L of MTT solution (0.5 mg/mL) at 37°C, 5% CO₂. After 2 h, the MTT was removed, and formazan crystals were solubilized with 100 μ L of 95% ethanol. Absorbance was determined using the BioTek CYTATION 3 imaging reader at a wavelength of 570 nm.

Statistical Analysis

Absorbance data were obtained from the averages of three separate samples subjected to different concentrations of NANO2 and NANO4 under both PEMF and non-PEMF conditions, the results were expressed as the percentage of cell viability, using as control the absorbance of cells cultured in the absence of the extract, according to the following equation:

$$\% \text{ viability} = \left[\frac{\text{absorbance of the sample containing cells and extract} - \text{absorbance of the sample without cells but with extract}}{\text{absorbance of the 70\% EtOH control}} \right] \times 100$$

For the statistical analysis, the following interaction was assessed: Viability among samples, to determine which nanoparticle-based extract exhibited the highest cell viability, by comparing the viability of each sample according to the extract used (under each condition independently). All analyses were performed using R software (version 4.2.0). A linear model was fitted, including the sample and its respective interactions. Subsequently, an analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted, which revealed that the three factors are statistically significant (there were no significant interactions). The assumptions of normality and homoscedasticity were verified prior to conducting multiple mean comparisons and applying the Tukey correction to account for multiple hypothesis testing.

Results and Discussion

Analyzing the molecular composition using different papers about tibetan formulas (Figure 1) we find that cold potency formulas typically contain more fats, alkaloids, essential oils and saponins that induce a cooling effect and address conditions linked to excessive heat or bile (tripa) (Frontiers in Pharmacology 2015; WJPMR 2022). In the other side we find that hot potency medications entail higher concentrations of flavonoids, tannins, and organic acids, providing warmth and treating disorders associated with coldness or phlegm (beken) (Hussein and El- Anssary 2018; SpringerLink 2020).




Figure 1. Graph of molecular composition

The elemental composition was obtained by EDS analysis (Table 1), oxygen and carbon are the most significant components. Hot potency formulas decrease the quantity of carbon and increase oxygen. In the context of hot and cold potency medicines, the higher oxygen content and lower carbon content in hot potency formulas suggest a greater presence of polar groups, such as hydroxyl (-OH), carbonyl (C=O), esters and ether (C-O-C) groups. These polar groups enhance the solubility of hot potency medicines in water and increase their ability to form hydrogen bonds and Van der Waals interactions which could lead to greater bioactivity. On the other hand, cold potency formulas,

with their lower oxygen content and higher carbon content, are richer in nonpolar groups, indicating a more hydrophobic or lipophilic nature. This composition suggests that cold potency formulas may interact differently with biological systems, being less reactive in aqueous environments but more soluble in lipid environments (González-Paz et al. 2017).

Elemental characterization of traditional Tibetan formulations using EDS (Table 1) reveals a clear correlation between their atomic composition and their therapeutic potency. In this study, the Nickyl formula (hot potency) exhibited a greater diversity and concentration of inorganic micronutrients essential for critical biological functions, including Mg, Cl, K, Na, S, and Ca, whose presence functionally aligns with the physiological actions associated with "hot" formulations. For instance, magnesium (Mg) acts as a cofactor in over 300 enzymatic reactions, including those involved in energy metabolism (ATPase activity) and neurotransmitter synthesis (Kumar et al., 2024). Potassium (K) and sodium (Na) are essential for nerve transmission and cellular excitability—key processes in metabolic stimulation and thermoregulation (Mohiuddin, 2020). Calcium (Ca) is involved in muscle contraction and neurotransmitter release (Rajagopal & Ponnusamy, 2017), while chloride (Cl) contributes to acid-base balance and digestion, supporting more active gastric environments (Rajagopal & Ponnusamy, 2017).

Finally, sulfur (S) is fundamental to the synthesis of glutathione, one of the body's main endogenous antioxidants, and is involved in liver detoxification and inflammatory responses (Hunter & Grimbale, 1997). The combined presence of these elements suggests that Nickyl has an atomic composition conducive to metabolic activation, cellular signaling, and stimulating physiological responses, which are characteristic of hot potency traditional medicines. In contrast, the lower inorganic atoms diversity and higher carbon content of Norbu 7 (cold potency) aligns with its lipophilic nature and specific reactive, more regulatory action, aimed at counteracting states of excess heat or inflammation, consistent with its phytochemical composition (Rahmat et al., 2025).

Table 2. Atomic percentage composition of the nanomedicines (% at)

Element	Nickyl (Hot Potency)	Norbu 7 (Cold Potency)
C	26.3	44.2
O	69.6	54.4
Mg	0.6	0
Si	0.1	0
Cl	0.9	0
K	2.3	1.4
Na	0	0
S	0.2	0
P	0.1	0.1
Ca	0.1	0

Note. Instrumental uncertainty (0.1 at %)

The presence of more complex organic structures in cold potency medicines was confirmed by H1 NMR (Figure 2). Where proton signals belonging to aromatic rings can be seen around 7 ppm. These structures are composed primarily of carbon atoms. Therefore, these results are consistent with those obtained by EDS (Table 1).

The presence of these aromatic rings and higher fat content in Norbu 7 formula may affect nanoparticles formation and atomic distribution compared to Nikil formula. As we can see in Figure 3, transmission electron microscopy (TEM) micrographs show the presence of nanoparticles in both formulas. The most electron-dense areas are seen in dark color and the less electron-dense areas are lighter.

In Nanoparticles with a higher content of Carbon, fatty and aromatic compounds (Nano 4) there seems to be a non-homogeneous distribution unlike Nano 2, where a non-electron-dense external layer is seen, which may be due to the fact that when the nanoparticle is formed, an external hydrophobic layer is generated that encapsulates polar compounds.

This is a possible mechanism of nanoparticle formation (Gonzalez-Masís et al. 2025) when there are mixtures of naturally bioactive compounds with a higher concentration of fatty and aromatic compounds. This hydrophobic surface of the Nanoparticle gives it, by affinity, greater permeability in lipid membranes in both bacteria and cells. This allows it to interact better with bacteria or cells, for example, in cases of infection or fever (Barocelli et al., 1986), where more compatible medicines are needed for greater antibacterial or anticancer

efficacy and efficiency. This is consistent with the use of cold potency Tibetan medicines (Nano 4) for cases of infection, fever, inflammation or cancer (López and Torres 2025).




Figure 2. H1 NMR Spectra of Nano 2 (NIKIL) and Nano 4 (Norbu 7)

The investigation of the two Tibetan formulas illustrates a notable connection between their traditional “potency” classifications and contemporary nanotechnological characteristics. This process offered insights into their effectiveness and mechanisms in maintaining the balance of the three nyepas: loong (wind), tripa (bile), and beken (phlegm). The surface potential (Zeta potential) measurements (Table 2) acquired via DLS highlight the stability of hot potency formulas shows higher negative surface potentials (Zeta Potential) and Electrophoretic mobility, despite a larger nanoparticle size.

This pronounced negativity signifies enhanced electrostatic repulsion among nanoparticles, thereby promoting a stable colloidal state that exhibits a reduced propensity for aggregation and higher mobility, which could augment their therapeutic efficacy through improved dispersion (Qi et al., 2024). Such mobility and stability versus cold potency corresponds with the traditional Tibetan conception of hot potency as energizing, particularly adept at alleviating excess baekan (phelm) and pacifying loong (wind), thus upgrading conditions linked to overcooling and imbalance.

Conversely, cold potency samples, characterized by a nearly neutral zeta potential and lower size, may exhibit diminished stability and an increased propensity for aggregation, which could act as tranquilizing and stabilizing excess of energy in the system, particularly adept at alleviating excess tripa (bile) and pacifying loong (wind), thus upgrading conditions linked to overheating and imbalance.




Figure 3. Transmission Electron Microscopy (TEM) analysis of nano-particles formulations. A y C micrographs images of Nano 4 formulation (Norbu 7). B y D micrographs images of Nano 2 formulation (Nikil).

Table 3. Chart of Zeta Potential and Size, using PEMF and not PEMF (Dynamic light Scattering)

Samples	Zeta Potential (mV)	Zeta Potential+PEMF (mV)	Size (nm)	Size + PEMF (nm)	Electrophoretic Mobility (cm ² /V.s)
Nicky I (Hot Potency)	-21.5 ± 1.1	-33.7 ± 4.3	38.5 ± 3.1	251.5 ± 27.8	-0.000170 ± 0.00000850
Norbu 7 (Cold Potency)	-1.9 ± 0.5	-44 ± 1.81	23.0 ± 14	320.2 ± 71.9	-0.000016 ± 0.00000361

Note. PEMF = Pulsed Electromagnetic Field.

The differences in nanoparticles (NPs) sizes between the two techniques (TEM and DLS) arise from the state of the sample during the analysis. In TEM the sample is dried on a grid, which removes the hydration layer and can promote NPs aggregation as the solvent evaporates, so the measurement reflects it as we can see in micrographs

images C and D (Figure 3). In the other side the DLS is performed with the sample dispersed in aqueous suspension, where the hydration shell and colloidal interactions are maintained. The result is that the size obtained corresponds to the hydrodynamic diameter (table 2) and is typically larger than the size observed by TEM. These findings highlight the importance of considering DLS characterization in the formulation of medicines to optimize their performance and biological stability (Smith & Brown, 2021), (Li & Zhang, 2020).

The zeta potential is an indicator of colloidal stability, where values closer to zero reflect lower suspension stability, the data presented in Table 2 suggest that the Cold Potency formula exhibits a less stable colloidal system, with an initial zeta potential of -1.9 mV. Upon exposure to a pulsed electromagnetic field, this formula shows a significant increase in particle size compared with hot potency, from 23.0 nm to 320.2 nm, indicating higher tendency to form aggregated structures.

This interpretation is further supported by the fact that Cold Potency formulas contain a higher proportion of fats, essential oils, alkaloids and aromatics which are poorly water-soluble compounds, that indicate a high content of hydrophobic molecules in the nanoparticles. Due to their nature, these nanoparticles tend to aggregate to minimize contact with the aqueous medium. The application of the pulsed electromagnetic field may facilitate this aggregation by reducing electrostatic repulsion, allowing for surface charge reorganization and interaction forming bigger structures. These results suggest that the pulsed electromagnetic field not only alters measurable physicochemical parameters such as particle size and zeta potential, but may also act as an active modulator of colloidal aggregation, especially in nanoparticles systems rich in hydrophobic constituents (Kuo y Lin 2009).




Figure 4. AFM analysis of nanoparticle formulations. a, d) Topography images of the Nano2 and Nano4 formulations, respectively. b, e) Corresponding surface potential (KPFM) images. c, f) Line profiles extracted from the surface potential images (b for Nano2 and e for Nano4).

The results obtained from Atomic Force Microscopy (Figure 4), show that hot potency formulas such as Nickyl reveal comparatively lower surface potential (135 mV) and higher work function (4.97 eV) alongside a heightened oxygen content 69.6%, as delineated by EDS (Table 1). This augmented oxygen content and the presence of electronegative atoms such as Cl, S and Mg, is correlated with oxidative characteristics and higher electron density, which may amplify the medicines capacity to stimulate metabolic processes and invigorate the body's systems. Hot potency formulas such as Nickyl, characterized by a marginally higher work function may be demonstrated in organic

nanoparticles that have electron-withdrawing groups on the surface, as the carbonyl groups.

The presence of bioactive constituents, including organic acids, flavonoids and tannins in augmented concentrations within these hot potency pharmaceuticals, substantiates their traditional utilization in energizing and warming therapeutic applications. These constituents are recognized for their stimulative effects on physiological processes within the body, thereby enhancing circulation and digestion (Ren et al., 2023)., and consequently rectifying imbalances associated with coldness. Remarkably, the smaller nanoparticles exhibit the same CPD as the larger ones, suggesting that the surface potential is an intrinsic property of their composition/molecular orientation and not size dependent.

These attributes are congruent with their historical applications in invigorating therapies aimed that involve metabolic activation, vasodilation, or digestive enhancement (Guo et al., 2023). Moreover, studies on nanoscale herbal medicines have demonstrated that higher surface oxygenation and modified surface potential correlate with enhanced bioavailability and faster onset of action (Fei et al., 2018) The dynamic characteristics of these hot potency formulas are further substantiated by their electrophoretic mobility (Table 2), particularly in Nickyl(- $0.000170 \text{ cm}^2/\text{V}^2$), which implies a more vigorous engagement with biological systems, potentially resulting in expedited therapeutic outcomes.

Results from Atomic Force Microscopy (Figure 4) contribute additional dimensions of comprehension, particularly concerning the correlation between surface potential and work function in nanoparticles. Cold potency medicines, such as Norbu 7, which exhibit elevated surface potential (230 mV), imply that the NPs surface is more positively charged; the surface tends to donate electrons more easily. This reduced work function (4.87 eV) could mean that it can donate electrons more easily, its surface is more reactive, better reducing agent and enhanced catalytic activity (Liu et al. 2020).

The results obtained through the QCM-D analysis brought interesting insights into the intrinsic differences between "Hot" and "Cold" potency NPs. Indeed, during the deposition cycles, an important discrepancy in the frequency variation (Δf) was recorded between the two different samples, as reported in figure 5. In detail, the analysis revealed that Nano 4 deposition caused a notably smaller reduction in Δf compared to Nano 2 deposition. This reduced shift suggests a lower

total mass deposition, which can be attributed to lower particle affinity, a different packing density, or variations in the effective hydrodynamic mass of the nanoparticles (Olsson et al., 2013). These findings are consistent with the previously established physicochemical profiles, suggesting that the observed discrepancies in mass accumulation are primarily attributable to the distinct structural properties and, consequently, NPs water affinity. The frequency shift recorded for Nano 2 (Hot Potency) is driven by its high oxygen content and density of polar groups, which allows Nano 2 to absorb water, increasing its hydrodynamic mass. On the contrary, Nano 4's lipophilic characteristics and high carbon content limit water adsorption, ultimately leading to a lower effective mass. Furthermore, the lower affinity observed in Nano 4 (Cold Potency) and smaller particle dimensions. These smaller dimensions may result in a less homogeneous surface coating, potentially limiting the uniformity of its deposition.

Regarding the dissipation variation (ΔD), no significant differences between the two samples were noticed. This lack of divergence suggests that there are no substantial differences in the surface stiffness following the deposition of either Nano 2 or Nano 4, suggesting that viscoelastic nature of the resulting adlayers remains comparable.




Figure 5. Frequency and dissipation variation over time obtained following Nano2 and Nano4 deposition.

The findings from this investigation highlight the significant impact of nanoparticle characteristics on the equilibrium of the nyepas (loong, tripa, and beken (Liu et al., 2020)). Cold potency formulas, characterized by hydrophobic nonstable nanoparticles and elevated surface potential (Figure 4), are particularly efficacious in mitigating excess heat and balancing tripa currents, thereby harmonizing the mind/body's energies and relative emotions/organs as anger, liver, gallbladder and small intestine (Zhao et al., 2013). In contrast, hot potency pharmaceuticals, with their dynamic nanoparticles and specific elemental compositions (O, Cl, S, Mg) forming polar groups, effectively invigorate and warm the body's energies, addressing imbalances associated with coldness and beken mind/body currents

(24000 channels) related to emotions/organs as ignorance, kidney, stomach, pancreas, spleen and reproductive organs. The scientific substantiation of these traditional concepts through the lens of nanotechnology not only reaffirms the effectiveness of Tibetan medicine but also establishes a robust framework for elucidating the molecular and energetic mechanisms supporting these ancient remedies.

Additionally, the application of nanotechnology in the study of Tibetan medicine establishes a bridge between established methods and contemporary scientific paradigms. The capacity of nanoparticles to augment absorption and facilitate interaction with cellular membranes elucidates the significant effects of these medicinal formulations, thereby providing an enriched comprehension of how such remedies may be optimized for present-day healthcare applications. This research underscores the potential for additional investigations into the nanotechnological dimensions of traditional medicines, which may culminate in the formulation of more efficacious and targeted therapies derived from these time-honored principles.

The scientific confirmation of these traditional concepts through nanotechnology reaffirms the efficacy of Tibetan formulas. The capacity of nanoparticles to improve absorption and interaction with cellular membranes elucidates the potent effects of these medicines, bridging the knowledge gap between traditional practices and modern science (Sharma et al., 2023).

According to the results observed in the graph (Figure 6) of the estimated mean percentage of cell viability as a function of the concentration of the different nanoparticle extracts, it can be interpreted that Tibetan nanoparticles are not cytotoxic (NANO 2 and NANO 4) and showed a significant increase in cell viability when exposed to the field (PEMF) compared to the no-field condition, suggesting a synergistic interaction between the nanoparticles and the field (Funk, Richard H.W. 2018). These findings indicate that the field (PEMF) has a modulatory effect on the activity of the nanoparticles, increasing cell viability, especially with hydrophobic nanoparticles (cold potency medicine), which could have important implications for biomedical and tissue engineering applications. This is consistent with the principles of Tibetan medicine, where cold potency medicines and the balance of the Beken current are responsible for the correct formation of muscles (myotubes).

Statistical analysis shows that there is a significant difference between NANO2 and NANO4 ($p=0.004$), as well as between PEMF and non-PEMF ($p<0.001$). Among concentrations, the only significant difference is found among C12.5 and C50 ($p=0.0225$). Regarding cell viability, both nanoparticle-based extracts (NANO 2 and NANO 4) showed an increase in the estimated mean viability, which was further enhanced in the presence of the pulsed electromagnetic field (Figure 5). Furthermore, exposure to the pulsed electromagnetic field alone (in the absence of nanoparticle-based extracts) also increased the estimated mean cell viability, although not to the same extent as when the extracts were present.




Figure 6. Relationship between different concentrations of NANO2 and NANO4 and cell viability

In the micrographs in Figure 7, we can see how in just 24 hours the cells differentiate into muscle cells (myotubes) both in the presence of nanoparticles alone (left) and in the presence of nanoparticles plus the pulsed electromagnetic field (PEMF). A much more differentiated muscle morphology can be seen when both stimuli (nanoparticulate medicine and PEMF) are present. (Funk, 2018) (Zhang, Zhao, Tong, & Li, 2020).




Figure 7. Mouse myoblasts C2C12 with PEMF and not PEMF. Differentiation into myotubes.

Conclusion

The current study effectively establishes a linkage between the longstanding knowledge of Tibetan medicine and the advanced field of nanotechnology, demonstrating a strong association between traditional potency classifications and contemporary physicochemical attributes at nanoscale. Through comprehensive analyses using sophisticated nanotechnology instruments, it has been validated that the nanoparticulate energetic nature of Tibetan formulas significantly influences their therapeutic efficacy. Firstly, nanoparticles with higher Zeta Potential (Hot potency pills) can improve the stability and biodistribution of drugs in the body. The uniformity of charge can minimize nanoparticle aggregation, allowing for more uniform and controlled drug distribution, resulting in better therapeutic efficacy and fewer side effects (Yao & Enseki, 2017). As evidenced by our previous studies, “Molecular organization at nanoscale affects surface charge and its interactions with biological system”, which is analogous to how nanoparticles in Tibetan medicines have specific charge and structure to target their therapeutic efficacy” (González-Paz et al. 2020).

The findings suggest that medications categorized as cold potency demonstrate nonstable (tends to aggregate) nanoparticles with enhanced surface potential ($0.36 \mu\text{V}$) and charge mobility, potentially correlating with their capacity to effectively stabilize energy flows within biological systems. This reduced work function ($4.93 \mu\text{V}$) signifies a more specific reactive characteristic (hydrophobic surface), which is essential for sustaining the cooling and stabilizing properties, effectively alleviating excess heat and bile. Conversely, hot potency medications contain stable/dynamic nanoparticles that stimulate and warm the mind/body's subtle currents, addressing disorders associated with coldness and phlegm.

The Nickyl formula, categorized as "hot potency," exhibited greater elemental diversity and concentration of biologically relevant inorganic micronutrients (Mg, K, Na, Ca, S, and Cl), as well as distinct electronic properties such as lower surface potential, higher oxygen content (69.6%), and greater electrophoretic mobility. These characteristics are consistent with enhanced metabolic stimulation, cellular signaling, and physiological activation, and hallmark features of hot potency remedies.

In contrast, Norbu 7, classified as a "cold potency" formulation, showed a lipophilic nanoparticle nature with higher surface potential, reduced elemental diversity, and less dynamic electrophoretic behavior. This composition supports its cooling, regulatory, and anti-inflammatory action aimed at mitigating excess tripa (bile), aligning with its traditional usage and phytochemical composition.

Notably, $^1\text{H-NMR}$ spectroscopy analysis revealed more prominent aromatic proton signals in Norbu 7 formula. Scientific studies reveal how aromatic derivatives exhibit antipyretic activity (Mule et al., 1985). The high carbon content observed in EDS results for cold potency medicine suggests the presence of an external surface layer enriched with lipid-like compounds according to TEM results. This characteristic may explain the low surface charge obtained through dynamic light scattering (DLS) analysis, which in turn favors particle agglomeration.

Moreover, the reactivity inferred from the work function is influenced by the presence of polar groups. Due to their higher electron density, as hot potency formulas such as Nickyl, characterized by a marginally higher work function (Nickyl at $5.13 \mu\text{V}$), and lower surface potential may demonstrate increased reactive polar groups, which is requisite for their function in energizing the body's systems as

antioxidant, thermogenic, and neuroregulatory effects (Russo, 2018) (Bertelli et al., 2015). Flavonoids, tannins and organic acids, are well-established for their ability to interact with redox systems, modulate enzyme activity, and stimulate energy metabolism, reinforcing the formulation's classification as "hot potency" (Deepak et al., 2021).

The results obtained in this study support the established principles of Tibetan pharmacology and also establish a scientific foundation to understand how these traditional medicines interact with the mind/body's energetic pathways at nanoscale. The demonstrated ability of nanoparticles to enhance absorption and interaction with cell membranes clarifies the highest capacity of these formulas, combining traditional wisdom with modern scientific principles. These findings demonstrate that the use of nanoparticle-based extracts NANO 2 and NANO 4 promoted cell proliferation and differentiation in just 24 hours, particularly under pulsed electromagnetic field stimulation.

The achievements of this investigation reveal numerous opportunities for future exploration. Further tests of these kinds of nanoparticles specific molecular mechanisms of action can enhance our understanding of their therapeutic properties. Also, developing new treatments based on these principles could potentially bring more interventions for various health conditions. This interdisciplinary approach ensures the continual progression and contribution of Tibetan pharmacology's valuable heritage to global healthcare solutions. Therefore, it is suggested that the Tibetan Potency does indeed correspond to their energy charges and that there are differences between the nanoparticles of cold potency and hot potency between their size, energy charge and chemical composition.

As the analytical results demonstrate, the distinct chemical compositions and physical properties of hot and cold potency medicines highlight their specific therapeutic functions in traditional Tibetan medicine. Thanks to nanotechnology, we can understand at a subtle level how this ancient medical system works and thus enhances the efficacy and efficiency of conventional pharmaceutical formulations with deeper physicochemical stimulus to not only treat a symptom by chemical molecular signaling but also restore the original function of the body and mind on a modern subtle scientific basis.

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Pyrrho: The First European Buddhist and His Hidden Legacy of Meditation in Western Philosophy

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Abstract

This paper presents a twofold argument. First, it examines the evidence that Pyrrho of Elis, widely recognized as the main originator of Greek skepticism, was profoundly influenced by Buddhist meditation practices during his travels to India with Alexander the Great. Through an analysis of historical sources, it is argued that Pyrrho's concept of ataraxia (unperturbedness) and his method for achieving this state represent an adaptation of Buddhist meditation techniques for a Hellenistic context. The view and terminology of meditation referred to are from the Dzogchen sem-dé series of the Aro gTér lineage of Nyingma Vajrayana. Second, it is argued that this meditative foundation informed subsequent Western philosophical developments. At two significant turning points in the history of Western philosophy, the legacy of Pyrrho played a vital role, establishing a hidden legacy of meditative practice within the Western philosophical tradition. First, René Descartes used the skeptics' method against them and, as a result, initiated the modern philosophy of subjectivity. Second, Edmund Husserl, influenced by Pyrrho's method, devised the method of phenomenological reduction, which was a key factor in the development of continental philosophy. The recognition of this hidden meditative tradition opens new possibilities for dialogue between Eastern and Western philosophical traditions, suggesting that at their

core, both traditions have been concerned with the transformation of consciousness through methodical approaches to experience.

Keywords: Dzogchen, Skepticism, Pyrrho, Descartes, Husserl

Introduction: Pyrrho and His Journey to the East

Pyrrho of Elis (c. 360–270 BCE) occupies a unique position in the history of Western philosophy. While traditionally recognized as one of the key inspirations for the philosophical tradition of skepticism, recent scholarship suggests a more revolutionary possibility: that Pyrrho was, in effect, also the first European Buddhist, bringing meditative practices into Western philosophical discourse.

Pyrrho, a young artist, traveled with Alexander the Great on his campaign across Persia, all the way to ancient India. According to Diogenes Laertius, Pyrrho encountered in the kingdom of Gandhara “gymnosophists”, literally naked wise men. For a year and a half, he studied and practiced with them. After his return, he was said to have adopted a noble philosophy (Laertius, 1925).

This encounter appears to have profoundly shaped Pyrrho. He developed a practice centred on achieving ataraxia (unperturbedness) through a particular relationship with phenomena²¹. His state of mind was so impressive that the common people greatly revered him, and he became a teacher.

The similarities between Pyrrho’s approach and Buddhist meditation practices, particularly when examined through the view and terminology of Dzogchen sem-dé, are striking. These similarities form the basis of my argument that Pyrrho effectively translated Buddhist meditation techniques into a Hellenistic philosophical framework. This connection has been examined in the last decades, but from the perspective of other Buddhist schools and vehicles.

²¹ Ataraxia is named as the goal of Pyrrho’s method in the Aristocles passage.

The Aristocles Passage: Key to Understanding Pyrrho's Method

We know very little of Pyrrho. Our most important source for understanding Pyrrho's philosophical method is the so-called “Aristocles Passage”.²² The passage reads:

The man who means to be happy must look to these three things: first, what are the natural qualities of things; secondly, in what way we should be disposed towards them; and lastly, what advantage there will be to those who are so disposed. The things themselves are equally indistinguishable, impermanent, and undefinable, and therefore neither our senses nor our opinions are either true or false. For this reason, then we must not trust them, but be without opinions and without bias, and without wavering, saying of every single thing that it no more is than is not, or both is and is not, or neither is nor is not (Halkias, 2020).

This passage, although important, has been the topic of much debate in the academic literature. There is no agreement on its significance or ultimately even its role in early skepticism. Yet, it is the most compelling evidence and explication of Pyrrho's teaching.

When I encountered this text for the first time, the experience reminded me of the little Japanese paper pills which, when you put them into water, grow into beautiful paper flowers. When I put this little text in the water of meditative experience, it grew into a beautiful flower of recognition. The words from 2,500 years ago speak to my little experience of practice.

This passage outlines what I identify as the three factors of Pyrrho's method:

1. Recognition of the nature of phenomena
2. Cultivation of a particular disposition toward phenomena
3. The resulting benefit of this disposition

²² The passage has a complicated publication history. This text was recorded by Aristocles of Messene in his *History of Philosophy* around the beginning of the Common Era and later quoted by Eusebius, the Bishop of Caesarea, in his work *Praeparatio evangelica* (Preparation for the Gospel) in the third century BCE. Scholars generally consider the passage to represent Pyrrho's teaching as recorded by his student Timon. A good recent overview of the passage can be found in Halkias (2020).

Pyrrho's method epoché and its relationship to the Dzogchen teaching of non-referentiality

While the Aristocles Passage does not explicitly use the term epochē (suspension of judgment), other sources connect epochē with Pyrrho's concept of ataraxia. These sources include Diogenes Laertius and Sextus Empiricus. The Aristocles passage thus is, in effect, a description of the method of epochē (Laertius, 1925, p. 519)

As to the nature of phenomena, Pyrrho describes the natural qualities of things, in the original Greek, as “adiaphora”, “astathmêta”, and “anepikrita”. They have been translated, for example, as indistinguishable, impermanent and undefinable. Other variant translations are for example indistinguishable, indeterminate, and unevaluable. Regardless of the precise translation, these terms point to a fundamental feature of phenomena: their lack of inherent self-existence, permanence, and fixed identity. This lack is signalled linguistically by the negative prefix “a”. This is the most important feature of these terms for our examination of them. These terms are critically important for understanding Pyrrho's insight and its connection to the Buddhist view.

The Buddhist tradition is very varied. There are many vehicles, and their views and methods sometimes contradict each other. The view that I present here comes from the Dzogchen teachings of the Nyingma school of Vajrayāna Buddhism. In terms of the path of practice, I look at the initial phase. At that phase, it is much easier to see the congruence of the Dzogchen view with that of other Buddhist traditions and vehicles.

It could be argued that applying the Dzogchen teaching to a Greek text is anachronistic or out of place, as the Dzogchen teaching arose historically several centuries after the time of Pyrrho. Yet, as is stated in The Seven Points of Mind Training of Chekhawa Yeshé Dorje, number 19, “All teachings agree at one point”. That point is the nondual nature of Mind. According to the Dzogchen view both the nature of mind and the structures of referentiality that occlude that nature pertain to all times and places. The view is ahistorical and acultural.

The Dzogchen teachings are based on the view of the Heart Sutra, the Prajnaparamita Hridaya Sutra, that the essence of all Buddhist teaching and practice is the inseparability of form and emptiness. Form is everything that manifests, and emptiness is its nature. They are inseparable. What we really experience is form qualities of emptiness,

which we seek as they validate our existence for us, and the emptiness qualities of form, which we avoid as they undermine our sense of identity (Chogyam & Dechen, 1997).

In terms of the five elements as expressed in the Dzogchen teachings of the Aro gTér, the form qualities of emptiness are substantiality, permanence, separateness, continuity, and definition. The emptiness qualities are insubstantiality, impermanence, lack of separation, discontinuity, and lack of definition (Chogyam & Dechen, 1997). Looking at Pyrrho's teaching from this point of view, he is instructing us to perceive phenomena and experience in terms of the emptiness qualities of form, which we usually avoid. The terms used in Pyrrho's teaching can be classified as emptiness qualities of form.

In our dualistic situation, we turn phenomena into reference points (za té, gZa' gTad). Reference points are forms to which we deny their emptiness qualities, or rather, we attempt to do so yet never succeed. They are a fantasy, a projection. Reference points validate our existence to ourselves. They are unreal, an attribution from our part. The process of turning phenomena and experience into reference points corresponds closely to what is known in Western psychology as projection. Yet in a Buddhist context, it is a far deeper reaching structural aspect of experience. It pertains not only to external things, people, and phenomena, but also to the contents of mind. To become aware of how we "project" onto the contents of our mind, requires the practice of meditation. Referentiality, the unsuccessful and endless construction of reference points, is the main engine of duality, of the condition of samsara, according to the Dzogchen teachings.²³

To refrain from projection, Pyrrho instructs us to practice the epochē, to suspend our judgment on phenomena, "saying of every single thing that it no more is than is not, or both is and is not, or neither is nor is not." This fourfold formulation is fascinating, and another possible link to the Buddhist tradition. It is known in Indian philosophy and Buddhism as the *catuskoti*. In Greek philosophy, it was called the *tetralemma*. In short, its function is to cut conceptual schemes into emptiness.

Pyrrho's formulation draws attention to the emptiness features of form—qualities that we usually ignore or deny. Pyrrho highlights what phenomena lack: fixed distinctions, stability, and determinacy. To

²³ "Gza' Gtad" (Rangjung Yeshe Wiki, 2022)

follow Pyrrho's instruction would be a shift in our orientation, to stop turning experience into reference points. In terms of Dzogchen sem-dé, this ultimately leads to the ting-ngé'dzin of nè-pa (undisturbed), absence of thought with presence of awareness. It is the non-referential state, the experience of emptiness.²⁴ It is important to understand that according to the Dzogchen teachings, emptiness is not the end of the path. It is not the realised state, which is described rather as the realisation of the nonduality of emptiness and form.

Ataraxia, The Result of Pyrrho's Practice, and its Relationship to the Non-Referential State

Pyrrho used the term ataraxia to describe the result of his practice. The term is very interesting. In Greek culture, it was the term used to describe the ideal state of mind of a warrior going into battle. This led Everard Flintoff in his groundbreaking 1980 article "Pyrrho and India", which first made the real connection between Pyrrho and Buddhism, to remark that "it certainly does not seem a natural choice to describe the state of bliss brought by the path of philosophy!" (Flintoff, 1980, p. 96).

This odd terminological choice becomes more understandable when we consider ataraxia as a translation of a Buddhist meditative state, that of emptiness, the result of letting go of referentiality. The connection to emptiness lies in an understanding of death. Pyrrho spent 11 years as part of Alexander the Great's war party, so he was no stranger to warriors, battles and death. To illustrate this connection, I will paraphrase the book *Rays of the Sun*, by my lama Ngak'chang Rinpoche. The mind of a warrior, ataraxia, is not about fighting. It is about the acceptance of death. The warrior has had to accept that she will die before she enters a battle, or she will fear death and thus be unable to fight to the full extent. The only way to not fear death is to accept it and the only way to accept it is to be, in some sense, dead already. This means letting go. A total renunciation of all the reference points of life. Family, loved ones, possessions, and in the end, life itself. She has to say goodbye. She has nothing to defend and thus nothing to lose. This is the connection between ataraxia, Pyrrho, and a warrior (Chögyam, 2010).

Ataraxia, the mind of a warrior, is a definition of the state of having let go of reference points, and thus of accepting death. Emptiness, from

²⁴ For example, Chögyam, Ngakpa and Déchen, Khandro (2002, p. 118).

the perspective of duality, looks like death. It means losing that which makes us believe that we are real, the form qualities of emptiness listed above.

The second historical evidence that connects ataraxia to meditation is an anecdote about the painter Apelles. According to the story, Apelles was attempting to paint the foam on a horse's mouth but became increasingly frustrated with his failures. Finally, in exasperation, he threw his sponge at the painting—and accidentally created the perfect representation of foam. This story illustrates how the cessation of striving and the suspension of goal-oriented action can paradoxically lead to success. This applies directly to meditation, to the process of letting go of referentiality (Empiricus, 1996).

To recapitulate, in Pyrrho's practice, epochē operates as a meditation technique of not turning phenomena into reference points, while ataraxia represents the resulting state of unperturbedness—a mind of calm abiding. Both the method and the resultant state can be understood in terms of the empty state as it is described in the teachings of Dzogchen sēm-de.

Descartes: Methodic Doubt as Meditation

The meditative lineage initiated by Pyrrho finds a surprising continuation in René Descartes's (1596–1650) philosophical project. Descartes is often viewed as the founder of modern Western philosophy with his cogito “I think therefore I am”²⁵. In recent decades research has discovered the crucial role of skepticism, the tradition of Pyrrho, for Descartes. Here we can additionally argue for a connection with meditation practice.

In 1625, Descartes went to Paris where he encountered skeptics and free thinkers. The 17th century was a time of great upheaval, with overseas discoveries of other cultures, the weakening position of the Catholic Church, and the rise of scientific thinking all shaking centuries-old foundations. In this environment, writers and philosophers like Michel de Montaigne embraced skepticism. It was a philosophy suitable for questioning established certainties. The skeptical tradition tracing back to Pyrrho was revived as old texts from

²⁵ There are different formulations of this insight in Descartes's works. The most famous one is written in French in Part Four of *Discourse on Method* (1637): “je pense, donc je suis” (Descartes, 1998, p. 19)

antiquity were translated and rediscovered. The rediscovered tradition of skepticism was a vital part of the mental landscape that gave rise to modern science.

While inspired by this intellectual climate, Descartes was concerned about the implications of skepticism. He set himself the ambitious goal of providing an alternative to traditional Aristotelian-scholastic thinking while simultaneously countering skeptical doubts and establishing a firm foundation for science. To achieve this, he employed “methodic doubt” as a technique to clear the mind and find absolute certainty. His aim was to prove that there was something that is beyond doubt. In other words, he wanted to use the method of the skeptics against the skeptics.

Significantly, Descartes modelled his *Meditations on First Philosophy* after the spiritual meditation guides widely known in his time, particularly Ignatius Loyola's *Spiritual Exercises* (1548) and Teresa of Ávila's *Interior Castle* (1588).

In his text, Descartes doubts everything, progressing towards ever more fundamental assumptions of reality and his own existence. He lets go of all manner of conceptual reference points. This emptying process, which he borrowed from the skeptics and tried to use against them, resulted in Descartes having an experience of emptiness that frightened him. It could be said that Descartes' method worked a bit too well. It backfired on Descartes. As he loses his reference points, he finds himself in what he calls a “gurgitem”, which means a maelstrom. It is like a whirlpool in the ocean which sucks everything in, where you lose your sense of orientation. He writes that he couldn't feel the ground beneath his feet. These are familiar experiences which relate to losing one's reference points in meditation and approaching the empty state. It is at this moment in the text that he discovers, or introduces, the *cogito*. The *cogito* functions as a new solid reference point, a fixed anchor in emptiness — “I think, therefore I am.”

Let us recapitulate. The skeptics, the philosophers who are the inheritors of Pyrrho's tradition, the first Buddhist in Europe, are very influential at the time of Descartes. Descartes wants to argue against them. Using their method, Pyrrho's method, he comes to the brink of emptiness. It is there that he discovers the *cogito*, the moment which starts all modern philosophy of the human subject. It is as if the *cogito* is like a membrane between two emptiness, that of the skeptics' arguments and that which Descartes discovers in his experience.

At a later point, he writes that if he ceased to think, he would cease to exist. I believe there is also another Buddhist way to look at the cogito. Descartes wrote that the cogito is not a product of deduction or thought, but an experience that the mind touches and senses. With this statement in mind, it could be said that what Descartes discovered in the cogito was not merely a philosophical principle or a reference point, but an experience of the bare awareness of movement in mind. For him, this was the foundation of experience and ultimately the foundation for the human subject. This marks the beginning of modern philosophy's concern with subjectivity, though in a form that proved insufficient, as later philosophical history would reveal. Yet, in Buddhist terms, we can see how Descartes' discovery was a result of him simultaneously criticizing and employing the practice of Pyrrho.

Husserl's Phenomenological Reduction: Rediscovering Epochē

Edmund Husserl's (1859–1938) work was the beginning of phenomenology, a philosophical method whose name came from the Greek words *phainomenon* (phenomenon) and *logos* (truth, speech, reason, teaching). Phenomenology is the study of phenomena, appearances, and the process of appearing, of manifestation. Its slogan, “Back to the things themselves!” represents a radical departure from conventional philosophical approaches.

In the early 20th century, natural science was delving ever deeper into the world of objects, while the new discipline of psychology began to conceptualize the human mind as part of this world of objects. In this context, consciousness itself became just another object of scientific investigation. This approach was, in Husserl's view, both understandable and unacceptable.

Husserl's most important philosophical discovery was what he called the reduction or epochē—a term borrowed directly from Pyrrho. For the purposes of this paper, epochē and reduction are interchangeable terms. In a manuscript titled “Socrates—Buddha”, Husserl reflected on what he believed connected Socrates and Buddha: a revolutionary change in individual experience and consciousness that he had also found and experienced himself. This is, in effect, the experience of nonreferentiality (Husserl, 2010).

The epochē is a revolutionary change in individual experience. The reduction is not a matter of thinking. Husserl says that it is a matter of practice. It is a way of experiencing the mind differently. Many books

have been written about it because it is not easy to understand, let alone explain to someone. Husserl believed that he had refined the method of the ancient skeptics (Husserl, 1982).

To put it very simply, before the reduction we are aware of the objects of perception as real things out there (Klemola, 2003). We are turning them into reference points, using the process described above. After the reduction, the perspective changes and we are aware of our act of perceiving the objects. We look at our act of perception instead of the object. When this happens, behind the cognitive movements we identify with, we notice that there is another kind of mind, the awareness which we are awakened to by the reduction. It breaks the spell of permanence which we try to keep up by using reference points. We realise that the senses and the objects of the senses are inseparable. They occur simultaneously.

The reduction breaks the spell of what Husserl called the “natural attitude”—our unquestioned way of perceiving and experiencing the world. Reduction temporarily disconnects “the truth about what is real in this world,” setting aside the entire physical and psychophysical world and all our frameworks of making sense of it (Husserl, 1982, p. 62).

When one looks at a table, it clearly exists. When one’s gaze is turned towards the bookshelf and one no longer sees the table, one still believes in the table’s continued existence. This is the foundation of our way of relating to the world—what Husserl calls the natural attitude. Husserl discovered that as we ascribe permanence and independent existence to objects, we do not experience directly.

Reduction reveals that in addition to the movements of our cognitive mind, which we have become accustomed to living with and identifying with, there is the mind that observes these movements. There are laws that govern how this mind operates. Husserl calls it the transcendental consciousness, and he studies its operations. Behind our familiar everyday mind emerges a different kind of awareness. This is very familiar to a Buddhist practitioner.

Husserl describes the reduction as being like a religious conversion, “the greatest existential transformation which is assigned as a task to mankind as such” (Husserl, 1970, p. 46). It means that one’s experience after it, is fundamentally different from what it was before. It reveals to us that our everyday self is a collection of beliefs, ways of thinking, feeling and wanting. Husserl calls this the *habitus*. Reduction sheds this away (Husserl, 2021). The reduction is difficult to

understand because it is ultimately not a philosophical matter—that is, philosophical in the sense that it would be a problem that could be solved by thinking about it. Rather, it concerns a different approach to the thinking mind.

According to one of Husserl's most important students, Eugen Fink, the process of phenomenological reduction bears similarities to Buddhist methods (Cairns, 1976). Fink writes about our everyday conceptions of selfhood and how the reduction strips them away. What is found beneath them is our essence. The language he uses is very recognisable to a Buddhist practitioner.

Understanding the reduction requires letting go of the desire to understand it philosophically. This is a central reason why philosophical understanding of the reduction is so difficult and why it seems mysterious. To repeat, it is not a philosophical matter, it is a matter of practice, says Husserl.

The wonder of Husserl's reduction is that it is very close to Buddhism's primary insight as it is expressed in the teachings of Dzogchen sem-dé: the senses and the objects of the senses are inseparable—they are a simultaneous occurrence, and we begin to approach this realisation by relaxing referentiality. Here, Husserl and Buddha meet Socrates, mediated by Pyrrho.

Reduction merely occurs, when it occurs. The Finnish phenomenologist Juha Himanka writes fascinatingly in his dissertation about how Husserl manages to find the reduction when he fails (Himanka, 2000). Husserl realizes the reduction but becomes alarmed when it happens—just like Descartes, whose narrator is caught in turmoil and deep waters in the *Meditations* when his understanding of himself begins to disintegrate, and just like the painter Apelles who succeeds when he fails. Emptiness is not realised by trying, but accidentally, by abandoning trying.

Conclusion: The Hidden Meditative Tradition in Western Philosophy

This paper suggests a hidden continuity in Western philosophy—a meditative tradition transmitted from Pyrrho through Descartes to Husserl. This tradition operates beneath the surface of explicit philosophical discourse, manifesting in methodological approaches that involve a different relationship to the thinking and perceiving mind. It aims at the transformation of the human being through a

methodical approach to experience, and this discovery offers new possibilities for a dialogue between Buddhist and Western philosophical tradition.

It began with the Greek philosopher Pyrrho, who I argue, expressed the Buddhist method of meditation in Greek culture and the language of his time. It takes philosophy beyond thought. The philosopher lets go of referentiality, and this changes their relationship to phenomena and their own mind.

In Pyrrho, Descartes, and Husserl we find a lineage of epochetic anti-philosophy. They use epochē in different ways, but the core of the operation has remained the same throughout the history of philosophy. It is about apprehending what appears in the mind as directly and immediately as possible.

Pyrrho's ataraxia, achieved through epochē, finds its echo in Descartes' methodical doubt leading to the cogito, and later in Husserl's phenomenological reduction leading to transcendental consciousness. In each case, the philosopher employs a technique of relinquishing referentiality, leading to a transformative realization that changes their relationship to phenomena.

What makes this chain of thinkers particularly significant is that it represents not just a transmission of ideas but of methods—practical approaches for transforming the mind. In this sense, Pyrrho's legacy is not merely theoretical but practical, offering a meditative dimension to philosophical inquiry that has persisted, albeit often unrecognized, throughout Western philosophy.

The recognition of this hidden meditative tradition opens new possibilities for dialogue between Eastern and Western philosophical traditions, suggesting that at their core, both traditions have been concerned with the transformation of consciousness through methodical approaches to experience. Just as Pyrrho brought Buddhist insights into Hellenistic philosophy, a reappraisal of European intellectual history might offer one more perspective from which to continue this dialogue, to the enrichment of both traditions.

The skeptical philosopher and historian of philosophy Richard Popkin has said that skepticism is an anonymous letter from history, which challenges every philosopher who thinks that they have figured

it out, that they have the right theory. Perhaps the letter was not anonymous. Perhaps it was a letter from the Buddha.²⁶

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²⁶ This is the title of my book “Kirje Buddhalta” in English – “A Letter from the Buddha”

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A Critical Review of Carl Jung's Understanding of the Amitāyur-Dhyāna Sūtra

Hyung Jin An

Abstract

Carl Gustav Jung (1875-1961 AD), the founder of analytical psychology, is one of the most important figures in understanding modern psychology. He understood the unconscious as the source of the realization of the complete Self. In his book *Psychology and the East*, Jung recognized the image of Amitabha the Buddha, which is the state that appears in the practice of Pure Land Buddhism, as the revelation of the true self of the meditator. To reach this state, the practitioner must escape from the deluded ego-consciousness and reach another extreme of the mind where all these sense delusions are abolished. Through the ultimate knowledge that he is Buddha, the practitioner experiences the Pure Land of Amitabha the Buddha, where not only the external world of consciousness that clings to objects, but even the ego, the center of consciousness, has disappeared.

According to the theory of Mind Only Pure Land Buddhism, practitioners reach a state where they realize that the external world of senses is also a Pure Land after meeting Amitabha the Buddha, the Buddha nature residing in the unconscious. On the other hand, Jung believed that the goal of Buddhist practice is to see Amitabha the Buddha, and to settle down in the unconscious. This proves that Jung did not experience and understand the state of completely escaping the duality between consciousness and unconsciousness. This is because Jung's analytical psychology was based on clinical psychological

analyses, including the interpretation of dreams, rather than direct experience through meditation. Nevertheless, Jung's analytical psychology is significant in that it laid the foundation for a dialogue between the Eastern meditation tradition and modern Western psychology by asserting that the key to realizing the true self lies in understanding the unconscious.

Keywords: Amitāyur-dhyāna Sūtra, Carl Jung, Analytical Psychology, Only Mind Pure Land, Self-realization

Introduction

Carl Gustav Jung (1875–1961), one of the most influential figures in modern psychology and the founder of analytical psychology, developed a distinctive understanding of the human psyche that diverged significantly from earlier psychoanalytic theories. In order to appreciate the originality of Jung's perspective, it is necessary to consider it in relation to the work of Sigmund Freud (1856–1939), the founder of psychoanalysis. Freud understood the human unconscious primarily as a repository of repressed, instinctual drives—often animalistic and infantile in nature—that are socially and ethically unacceptable. In contrast, Jung reconceptualized the unconscious as a dynamic and creative dimension of the psyche, one that contains not only repressed material but also the potential for personal growth and the realization of the complete self.

In his book *Psychology and the East*, Jung attempted to understand the unconsciousness in the context of Eastern thought, including Buddhism, based on his analytical psychology research methodology. Regarding the *Amitāyur-dhyāna Sūtra*, the main scripture of Pure Land Buddhism, he understood the appearance of Amitabha the Buddha and Pure Land as the true-self of the meditator, revealing itself. This understanding of Jung is understood to be in line with the Mind Only Pure Land among the religious forms of Pure Land Buddhism.²⁷

²⁷ The “Mind-Only Pure Land” (唯心淨土) interpretation, most prominently associated with certain strands of East Asian Mahāyāna Buddhism, understands the Pure Land not as a physically existing realm external to the practitioner, but as a projection or manifestation of the mind itself. In this view, Amitābha the Buddha and the Pure Land symbolize the completely purified state of consciousness attained through spiritual practice. However, this interpretation

Nevertheless, his research methodology, based on clinical psychology, such as dream interpretation, differs from that of the Pure Land Buddhist masters who emphasized direct experience of the deep consciousness through meditation, and naturally, this difference was reflected in his understanding of Pure Land Buddhism. This text is an academic attempt to examine Carl Jung's understanding of the *Amitāyur-dhyāna Sūtra* as shown in *Psychology and the East*, focusing on the differences in Buddhist and psychological research methodologies, and to discuss its academic significance.

Research Problem

This paper critically examines Carl Jung's interpretation of the *Amitāyur-dhyāna Sūtra*, one of the central scriptures of Pure Land Buddhism. It aims to explore the possibility of a meaningful dialogue between Buddhist philosophy and analytical psychology. While Buddhist thought offers a rich and profound religious-philosophical tradition, analytical psychology provides a framework grounded in scientific and empirical inquiry. By bringing these two perspectives into conversation, this study also considers the constructive insights such an interdisciplinary engagement may generate.

Jung interprets the images of the Western Pure Land and Amitabha the Buddha in the *Amitāyur-dhyāna Sūtra* as archetypes of the collective unconscious, a thought structure that all humans are born with, revealing themselves through representations. This interpretation clearly reflects his view of the unconscious, which, unlike Freud, was interpreted as the source of self-realization and life energy.

Due to the differences in their research methods, traditional Buddhist philosophy and Jungian analytical psychology have come to somewhat different conclusions in their interpretation of the text *Amitāyur-dhyāna Sūtra*. These differences suggest the possibility that the East and the West, and traditional religious philosophy and modern psychology, can complement each other's shortcomings through mutual dialogue in the future.

remains contested within Pure Land traditions, many of which affirm the ontological reality of the Pure Land as a distinct realm accessible through Amitābha's salvific vow.

Literature Review

In conducting this study, secondary sources from a collection of Jung's works published by Princeton University Press and papers by Korean psychologists were examined. I begin by discussing Jung's *The Psychogenesis of Mental Disease* in order to identify the fundamental differences between Jung's analytical psychology and Freudian psychoanalysis. According to this work, Freud's approach is primarily retrospective, emphasizing the role of past experiences (especially repressed childhood desires) in shaping the unconscious. By contrast, Jung adopts a more prospective orientation, viewing the unconscious not only as a repository of past experiences but also as a source of future potential and self-realization. Consequently, Jung's perspective on the unconscious is more affirmative, as it emphasizes its constructive and transformative functions rather than reducing it to a domain of repression and conflict.

Systematic understanding of the basic structure and concepts of Jungian psychology is critical to this study. Regarding the second source of data, two journal articles by Jin Sook, a Korean psychologist at Jeonbuk National University, provided a systematic explanation of how Jungian analytical psychology explains the structure of the human psyche. In particular, these works were helpful in understanding the concepts of the collective unconsciousness and individuation, which are central to ideas of Jungian psychology.

From Shin Eun-hee's journal article, I was inspired to interpret individuation as a dynamic unity of consciousness and the unconscious. Fang Yuan's article from Peking University provided an opportunity to explore the concept of the archetype—one of the central components of Jung's theory of the collective unconscious—in greater depth. In addition, a journal article by Professor Youn Hee-jo of Seoul University of Buddhism suggests that Jung's process of individuation ultimately culminates in a state of psychic integration through the collective unconscious, a notion that, in certain respects, parallels the ideal of the Mahāyāna Bodhisattva.

Meanwhile, Kim's journal article compares and contrasts the theory of *ālaya-vijñāna* of the *Yogācāra* school with Jung's theory of the unconscious. This comparison was helpful in conducting research by systematically organizing the similarities and

differences between the concepts of the unconscious in these two different philosophical traditions.

Research Methodology

The primary source that was most critically studied in conducting this study was *Psychology and the East* by Carl Jung. In particular, the chapter on the *Amitāyur-dhyāna Sūtra*, ‘*The Psychology of Eastern Meditation*’, was studied intensively. Through this, it was possible to find out that Jung interpreted the image of the sun in Amitabha the Buddha and the image of the pond of the treasure in the Western Pure Land as the energy of life and its origin.

Based on Jung’s interpretation of these images as representations of the collective unconscious (understood as an innate structure shared by all human beings) this study compares the Pure Land perspective associated with the *Tathāgatagarbha* (often referred to as the “Mind-Only Pure Land”) with Jung’s own interpretation of the Pure Land. Through this comparative analysis, the study highlights both the convergences and divergences between Mahāyāna Buddhist philosophy and Jung’s analytical psychology, thereby emphasizing the need for sustained dialogue and mutual exchange between these two traditions.

The research philosophy pursued in conducting this thesis is Critical Realism. While the existence of objective reality cannot be denied, it is recognized that reality can be interpreted differently depending on the historically and philosophically conditioned context of the observer. Accordingly, this research was conducted based on the premise that the interpretation of the same center of the deep human unconsciousness can vary significantly depending on the research methodology employed.

Discussion

The Core Concepts of Carl Jung's Analytical Psychology

Before beginning the discussion in earnest, it is necessary to examine the perspective of Carl Jung's analytical psychology on human consciousness and its core concepts. The modern psychologist who should be discussed first is Sigmund Freud. Before Freud began studying the unconscious as a part of the psyche, the basis of modern

philosophy was the concept of the subject. “I think, therefore I am” – René Descartes’ (1596-1650 AD) maxim best encapsulates the spirit of this subject-centered philosophy. In modern philosophy, the subject was immediately identified with consciousness, and it was believed that this subject judges all objects, gives meaning to them, and governs them. In this way, the modern subject was understood as a single conscious subject, and thinking was regarded as the essential nature of the psyche (Jin, 2017).

Philosophers who tried to establish philosophy starting from the subject, such as Descartes, understood humans through the dichotomy of body and mind, and attributed the unconscious to physical physiological phenomena rather than considering it part of consciousness. Descartes explained his position as follows: “Humans are dual beings consisting of soul and body. In other words, humans are conscious thinking” (Jin, 2017, p. 349). To put it differently, their view was that the unconscious belongs to the realm of the body rather than the psyche. However, when the unconscious was explored as a component of the human psyche by Freud in the early 20th century, modern philosophy, which had regarded the human psyche as a single thinking subject, experienced a profound transformation.

Freud was the first modern psychologist to argue that the unconscious, which corresponds to an unknown area of human consciousness, influences conscious thought. Through his exploration of the unconscious, he attempted to uncover aspects of consciousness beyond the ‘thinking ‘I.’’ Through this attempt by Freud, the subject came to be recognized as a complex of heterogeneous components, such as consciousness and unconsciousness, rather than a single, unified center of consciousness. This led to the conclusion that the subject is not a single starting point like Descartes’ ‘ego,’ but rather a complex outcome (Jin, 2017).

According to Freud, all human beings have sexual and infantile impulses that society does not ethically permit. The ego does not allow these impulses to remain in conscious awareness but instead represses them, so they do not disappear but are stored in the unconscious. When the consciousness is active; these impulses remain hidden in the unconscious and reveal themselves through dreams, thereby fulfilling forbidden desires. This process is highly symbolic and indirect, and by attempting to interpret it, humans can explore the desires that are repressed in the unconscious realm. In conclusion, Freud considered

the unconscious as a subterranean storage where animalistic impulses writhe.

On the other hand, Carl Jung understood the unconscious as a source of inspiration that helps us lead a harmonious and balanced life through full self-realization. According to his view, what is inherent in the unconscious can be understood as the energy that enables life itself (Shin, 2012). Carl Jung viewed human consciousness as a complex, that is, a composite of several parts of consciousness. Both the conscious realm of the ego and the unconscious realm are bundles of human experiences and the emotions derived from them. Jung explained their essential difference as follows: “The conscious realm is limited by momentary vision. On the other hand, the unconscious realm is infinite and always continuous” (Jung, 1990, p. 8).

According to Jung, consciousness is composed of the ego, which belongs to the conscious realm, and the personal and collective unconscious, which belong to the unconscious. The ego, as the center of conscious awareness, mediates between the external environment and the inner psychological world by organizing experiences in a coherent manner. Freud’s concept of the unconscious (formed through the repression of socially unacceptable desires) is, in Jungian terms, broadly comparable to the personal unconscious. As individuals undergo socialization, they gradually internalize social norms and become increasingly aware of the expectations and judgments of others. In this process, instinctual and infantile desires that were once freely expressed in early childhood are progressively repressed and relegated to the unconscious. Thus, the personal unconscious is not innate but is formed over time through the individual’s social and psychological development.

On the contrary, the collective unconscious, which Jung understood as a much larger domain than the personal unconscious, is innate and present in all human beings from birth. It may be described as a universal psychic structure shared by all humanity. In other words, it consists of fundamental patterns that are inherent in the human psyche and precede individual experience. According to Jung, the collective unconscious is composed of inherited archetypal forms that reflect the accumulated experiences of the human species across generations.

According to Jung, newborns receive external sensory stimuli through specific patterns shared by all human beings, and the basis for this is innate instincts. In other words, the model called an archetype

already exists in the newborn's psyche, causing the human brain to produce similar responses to external stimuli even before reason has developed (Fang, 2015). The collective unconscious is composed of countless archetypes which reveal themselves through myths, primitive beliefs, dreams, etc. While these archetypes manifest through specific images, we can never be directly conscious of the archetypes themselves. In this respect, Jung's concept of archetypes resembles Plato's concept of ideas. They exist prior to all phenomena. However, they are metaphysical in nature and cannot become physical or sensory objects. Instead, they constantly reveal themselves through countless metaphorical representations.

Jung believed that unconscious compensation occurs through dreams. For example, people who solve everything with excessively rational thinking encounter irrational and unreasonable images in their dreams. Similarly for individuals who live an overly ascetic life suppressing their animalistic desires, the unconscious may present sensual or sexual images through dreams. These images act as warning message from the unconscious to the ego. The autonomous signals sent by the unconscious imply that we need to understand and accept the structure of the entire psyche in order to live a healthy and balanced life. In this respect, Jung's theory of the unconscious differs fundamentally from Freud's, as Jung understood the unconscious to possess autonomy and self-regulating functions.

Jung makes a strict distinction between the concept of the ego, which represents surface consciousness, and the concept of the self, which can be realized by achieving a healthy balance between consciousness and the unconscious. The ego is the subject of individual acts of consciousness, and serves as the center of human will, desire, reflection, and action. It constitutes only a small part of the human psyche. In contrast, the self is a much broader concept than the ego, representing the wholeness that integrates conscious and the unconscious (Shin, 2016). The ultimate goal of Jung's analytical psychology is to live a balanced and stable life by achieving a state in which the conscious and unconscious area of the psyche are not separated but are in a complete harmony. I will discuss this in more detail later.

Freud focused on the past of humans when interpreting the unconscious, emphasizing the sexual frustrations of childhood and the suppression of animalistic impulses resulting from socialization. This perspective reflects the causal nature of his psychology. Jung, however

approached the unconscious through teleological perspective, focusing on the future and the possibility of self-realization (Jin, 2020). He expressed this teleological thinking as follows: “On the one hand, the psyche draws a picture of the remains and traces of everything that has happened in the past, but on the other hand, insofar as the psyche creates its own future, it expresses in the same picture the outlines of what is to come” (Jung, 1961, pp. 184-185). Whereas causal elements that emphasize the past can lead humans to feelings of resignation and despair, Jung’s teleological perspective provides hope by offering a goal toward which individuals can strive (Jin, 2020).

Understanding of Amitabha the Buddha and the Western Pure Land, based on the Concept of Collective Unconsciousness

Naturally, Jung, who understood the unconscious as a source of self-realization, became interested in Indian thought, especially yoga, which has a rich religious and philosophical tradition that systematically analyzes the depth of human consciousness. In his book *Psychology and the East*, Jung writes: “Indians consider meditation (*dhyāna*) and self-absorption as the main concerns of religious practice, and the most important for them is yoga. They praise it as the highest consciousness” (Jung, 2008, p. 179).

He evaluated *Amitāyur-dhyāna Sūtra*, one of the major scriptures of Pure Land Buddhism, as “a yoga scripture that provides profound insight into the spiritual process of yoga” (Jung, 2008, p. 180). *Amitāyur-dhyāna Sūtra* begins with the story of a queen who is suffering from extreme mental pain. Prince *Ajātaśatru* of Magadha, the most powerful kingdom in North India during the Buddha’s time, usurped the throne from his father, King *Bimbisāra*, and murdered him. He also tries to commit the unfilial act of killing his mother, queen *Vaidehi*, but, due to the strong dissuasion of his ministers, he does not kill her and instead imprisoned her.

At this very time, the sutra that Shakyamuni the Buddha preached to Queen Vaidehi, who was suffering from extreme distress and disillusionment with the world, is none other than the *Amitāyur-dhyāna Sūtra*. The sutra explains about Amitabha the Buddha, the Buddha of eternal life and boundless light, and his Western Pure Land. The 16 meditation techniques for focusing on this Pure Land and visualizing the appearance of Amitabha Buddha constitutes the core contents of the *Amitāyur-dhyāna Sūtra*. By practicing this meditation, which involves paying full attention to Amitabha the Buddha and the Western Pure

Land, a practitioner of Pure Land Buddhism can be reborn in the Western Pure Land, free from the world of *saṃsāra*, after death. There, the practitioner can see Amitabha Buddha in person and continue practicing toward nirvana in the most favourable environment.

I believe that the two attributes of Amitabha the Buddha, the eternal life and the boundless light, can be explained in relation to Jung's collective unconscious. As mentioned above, the collective unconscious is something that all humans are born with. It constitutes a vast unconscious database that even includes memories from before humans evolved into current form. As mentioned above, humans can never recognize the collective unconscious itself. They can only recognize its archetypal' manifestations through various representations. These representations most often appear in the form of legends, myths, and folktales.

First, let us consider Amitābha the Buddha's attribute of eternal life. In Buddhism, which fundamentally denies permanence, Amitābha is nevertheless described as possessing infinite life on the basis of his vow (*praṇidhāna*). In *the Larger Sukhāvatīvyūha Sūtra*, he declares that if sentient beings who sincerely entrust themselves to him and invoke his name—even as few as ten times—are not reborn in his Pure Land, he will not attain perfect enlightenment (Taishō Tripiṭaka, T.12 no. 360). This vow reflects not merely a doctrinal claim, but a profound expression of universal compassion directed toward the liberation of all sentient beings. From this perspective, the aspiration toward transcendence of impermanence and suffering may be understood as a recurring theme across religious traditions.

In Buddhism, the goal is to achieve nirvana in order to escape the world of impermanence, non-self, and therefore suffering. In Christianity, human beings are understood to exist in two dimensions: the immortal soul, which relates directly to God, and the mortal body, which is bound by time, space, desires, and instincts. The ultimate goal is for the immortal soul to enter Heaven after the death of the finite body and enjoy eternal happiness. In Confucianism, which is perhaps the most secular of the worlds philosophical-religious traditions, the goal is to overcome the limitations of physical transience and finitude by educating future generations and leaving behind achievements that positively impact the civilization to which one belongs, even after physical death.

Meanwhile, infinite light, another characteristic of Amitabha Buddha symbolizes his infinite wisdom. This is mainly symbolized by

the light of the setting sun. This is well expressed in the fact that the first of the sixteen contemplations of the *Amitāyur-dhyāna Sūtra* is the contemplation of the image of the setting sun, while looking at the sun setting in the western sky. Regarding Amitabha Buddha being symbolized by the image of the sun, Jung said, “The sun is the source of warmth and light, and the unquestionable center of our visible world. As a life-giving being, the sun is always and everywhere the divinity itself or the image of divinity” (Jung, 2008, p. 191).

In the hot climate of India, people would have imagined a paradise free from all suffering while looking at the setting sun. However, this worship of the sun as the source of life is not limited to Indian culture. In Zoroastrianism, the dualistic Persian religion, Ahura Mazda is considered the god of the sun and the god of light. Even in the Indian Hindu tradition, the worship of the sun god has a very long history, and in the Christian tradition, the image of the sun is often used as a metaphor representing Jesus Christ.

Meanwhile, the elements of the Western Paradise described in the *Amitāyur-dhyāna Sūtra*, as well as Amitabha Buddha, also show the manifestation of many universal archetypes of humanity. The water in the jewel pond of Amitabha Buddha is arranged into eight lakes, the source of which is the wishing pearl (*cintāmaṇi*), the central jewel. Jung interpreted this jewel as “a rare treasure, symbolizing the highest value” (Jung, 2008, p. 188). Water is also considered as the source of life, along with the aforementioned sun, according to him.

Therefore, Jung said that the sun and water described in the *Amitāyur-dhyāna Sūtra* are images of the source of life, and when the meditator eventually moves from the visible phenomenal aspect to the spiritual realm through meditation, they become images representing the source of life in the individual's psyche. Our consciousness is not something we create ourselves but rather arises from an unknown abyss. We are babies newly born each day from the primordial womb of the unconscious. Consciousness is not only influenced by the unconscious, but also arises from the unconscious (Jung, 2008).

Thus, the meditator descends into the spiritual realm, into the unconscious itself, through the image of the sun and water in the *Amitāyur-dhyāna Sūtra*. Jung observed that while Westerners always seek elevation, Easterners seek sinking or deepening. In other words, he commented that while Europeans seek ascent, which raises them above this world, Indians tend to want to return to the maternal abyss of nature (Jung, 2008).

This journey into the unconscious is never easy. Those who try to look into the unconscious, an unknown area surrounded by darkness, sometimes encounter hidden aspects of themselves that they do not want to face. That is why many people live their lives focused only on the superficial consciousness, the ego, without looking into the unconscious. Despite these difficulties, Jung asserts that only those who have the courage to face the inner self of the unconscious can achieve higher spiritual growth and self-realization. According to his understanding of the *Amitāyur-dhyāna Sūtra*, the appearance of Amitabha Buddha is the revelation of the practitioner's true self. The being that was located in the deepest part of the collective unconscious appeared in the form of the Buddha.

The mandala, a miniature representation of the universe in Buddhism, was often of interest to Jung as a symbol representing the unconscious. The concentric circles of the mandala, which spread out from the center, represent the principle of the circulation of the universe, and Jung viewed it as expressing the highest concentration in a state of meditation. He also understood the Buddha sitting on the lotus flower in the center as the true self (Jung, 2008). This understanding of Jung was applied not only to the mandala of Himalayan Buddhism, but also to the understanding of the Western Pure Land described in the *Amitāyur-dhyāna Sūtra*.

Carl Jung argues that modern Europeans should not be too focused on rational thinking and dismiss Indian spirituality as absurd errors or superstitions. He also criticizes Europeans for belittling areas they do not know or understand (Jung, 2008). In this way, he clearly recognized the limitations of Western rationalism. He criticized it as follows in his autobiography: “The more critical reason dominates; the more desolate life becomes. However, the more unconsciousness or myth is made conscious, the more life goes on the path of higher integration. When reason is overvalued, the individual becomes barren, just as in absolutist politics” (Jin, 2017, p. 347).

In order to see this Amitabha Buddha, the true self, the practitioner must feel disillusioned with all the false boundaries of the world, just like Queen *Vaidehi* did, and at the same time, continuously practice meditation by calling the name of Amitabha Buddha and contemplating his image. There are two different perspectives in Buddhism when it comes to interpreting this practice of Pure Land Buddhism. Furthermore, since Jung's analytical psychology is based on a different

research methodology from traditional Buddhist philosophy, it naturally leads to different conclusions.

Mind Only Pure Land and Jung's Self-Realization

In understanding the doctrine of Pure Land Buddhism, we need to recognize that there are two different views. First is the *Yogācāra* perspective of the Pure Land, and second is the *Tathāgatagarbha* understanding (Mind Only Pure Land theory). Let us first look at the *Yogācāra* theory. The *Yogācāras* elaborated the theory of the eight consciousness by adding two layers of deeper consciousness, *mānas-vijñāna* and *ālaya-vijñāna*, to the six consciousness of the Pali Buddhism. According to the *Yogācāra*, all karma committed by a human being becomes a seed (*bīja*), a kind of mental energy, that brings about good and bad results and is transplanted into the unconscious *ālaya-vijñāna* in the form of a behavioral tendency (*vāsanā*).

Eventually, based on the sense organs and external objects, it gives rise to good and bad actions and thoughts according to its nature. Therefore, the practice of Pure Land Buddhism, which calls on the name of Amitabha the Buddha and contemplates the image of Amitabha the Buddha and the Pure Land, is to plant good seeds and purify the unconscious realm, *ālaya-vijñāna*. By purifying the unconscious realm in this way, the practitioner can continuously accumulate good karma and, after death, be born in the Western Pure Land of Amitabha the Buddha, free from all suffering.

There are two commonalities between *Yogācāra*'s theory of mind and consciousness and Jung's theory. First, they seek the fundamental motivation of physical behavior and psychological cognitive processes in the subconscious, that is, the unconscious. Second, they explain mental phenomena as a structure of levels or layers. On the other hand, there are also differences. Regarding the mental structure of newborns, *Yogācāra* believes that newborns are born with the structure of the eight consciousnesses, while Jung's theory believes that the psyche of newborns is an undifferentiated state of instinctive energy that gradually goes through a process of differentiation and development to form a mental structure (Kim, 1998).

On the other hand, the *Tathāgatagarbha* understanding of the Pure Land, the Mind Only Pure Land theory, presents another perspective. According to this perspective, Buddha-nature is already inherent in the deep consciousness of all sentient beings. All Buddhas take the dharma realm as their body. Therefore, it is not that sentient beings engrave

Buddha in their minds through chanting, but rather that the mind that chants is, in itself, is Buddha. This Buddha-nature is a force that acts without substance, such as gravity. It is the possibility of Buddhahood that acts in the unconscious of all conscious sentient beings. Therefore, it is not something that is acquired through karmic result, but something that is inherently born with it.

In terms of this innateness, Jung's interpretation of *Amitāyur-dhyāna Sūtra*, which focuses on the collective unconscious as mentioned above, is closer to the *Tathāgatagarbha* interpretation and the Mind Only Pure Land interpretation than the *Yogācāra* interpretation. The fundamental psychological structure that all humans basically share is designed to pursue infinite light and eternal life. Buddhism calls it “enlightenment”, and Christianity calls it “salvation”. All the practices described in *Amitāyur-dhyāna Sūtra* are part of the process of finding this infinite possibility that is kept in the human unconscious.

Meanwhile, according to the Mind Only Pure Land theory, a practitioner who has manifested the Buddha-nature inherent in the true unconscious overcomes all dichotomies. For a practitioner who has reached this state, defilements and wisdom are one, and the earthly secular world and Pure Land are one. To such a practitioner, all the boundaries of the senses encountered in daily life are felt as incarnations of Amitabha Buddha. This very place where he breathes becomes the Pure Land.

In contrast, Jung's interpretation of the *Amitāyur-dhyāna Sūtra* concludes only with finding and dwelling in Amitabha the Buddha, the true self located at the center of the unconscious. This difference is due to the difference in research methodology. While practitioners of Pure Land Buddhism focus on direct experience of the unconscious through meditation practice, Jung's analytical psychology focuses on empirical and scientific analysis, such as observing children's scribbles and interpreting dreams.

Jung describes the goal of psychological development as individuation, a process through which consciousness and the unconscious are brought into balance and integration (Jung, 1953/1966, CW 7; Jung, 1951/1969b, CW 9ii). He further characterizes the unconscious as a creative dimension of the psyche structured by archetypes, at the center of which stands the Self as the organizing principle of psychic totality (Jung, 1951/1969b, CW 9ii; Jung, 1969a, CW 9i). At the same time, Jung emphasizes the fundamental limitation

of consciousness, arguing that it can never fully comprehend the unconscious, which remains a vast and autonomous dimension of the psyche (Jung, 1960, CW 8). Consequently, individuation remains an ongoing and never fully completed process.

In *Psychology of the East*, Jung argues that modern Western psychology has advanced as far as the Indian yoga tradition in scientifically revealing the deeper layers of the unconscious and its integration (Jung, 2008). As mentioned above, he saw the depths of the collective unconscious as having the form of concentric circles, symbolizing the highest level of concentration. The collective unconscious contains innumerable mythological and legendary archetypes, and they are arranged in concentric circles, like the structure of the Western Pure Land of Amitabha Buddha, and the mandala.

Jung also understood the difference between the Buddhist mandala and the Christian mandala, arguing that the Buddhist declaration “I am Buddha” and the confession “Christ lives in me” are fundamentally the same, but there is a huge difference in the way they are expressed. Christians achieve their goal of escaping from the world of ephemeral and ego-obsessed consciousness through Jesus Christ. Conversely, Buddhists overcome the ego through insight into their oneness with universal being and settle on the unchanging foundation of their own inner nature (Jung, 2008).

In order to achieve the goal of self-realization, Jung argued that we must become aware of the unconscious, or, in other words, make the unconscious conscious. Stated differently, Jungian psychoanalysis is a psychological investigation that seeks to uncover unconscious concerns that we ourselves refuse to acknowledge and repress so that they cannot enter the conscious realm. For example, Jung materialized unconscious fantasies by drawing them and then reflecting on them. Through this, he explored the mental structure that underlies each individual.

Moreover, through his study of the fantasies experienced by mental patients and the scribbles drawn by children, he discovered that these originated from archetypal images and collective symbols that had been handed down from ancient times. In this way, the archetypes of the collective unconscious are more clearly revealed in the irrational, superstitious, and magical mental world than in the rational, conscious realm. Furthermore, in order to approach the primordial unconscious, an intuitive understanding of mythical and symbolic images is required rather than rational and logical thinking. Therefore, in order to explore

the archetype of the unconscious, analytical psychology researchers need to be familiar with extensive background knowledge about myths and legends.

Based on this, Jung opposed the theory of *tabula rasa*, which states that humans are born as a blank slate, and he argued that there is an innate structure that human consciousness possesses at birth. The archetypes of the collective unconscious are almost indistinguishable from instinct, and instinct is a phenomenon that shares the same roots as the archetypes. Archetypes, like instincts, have a kind of tendency and impulsive force (Jin, 2017). Regarding this innate nature of the collective unconscious, Jung explained, “Individuals are born with a virtual image of the form of the world they will belong to” (Jung, 1972, p. 188).

Meanwhile, as mentioned above, Jung distinguished between the unconscious self and the conscious ego as completely separate personalities, although they are tied together as a single entity called the psyche. For this reason, efforts are needed to understand the self through dream research. Dreams provide clues that help the dreamer achieve personal maturity.

As we learn more about the unconscious, the symbols through which the unconscious reveals itself become more universal rather than individual. They appear in the form of myths or folktales. For this reason, Jung called myths “collective dreams of the nation” (Shin, 2012, p. 161). Through continuous and in-depth research into these symbols, all systems of the psyche are revealed, and becoming conscious of and realizing them leads to the balance between consciousness and the unconscious, which Jung called self-realization. He also expressed this as ‘individuation.’ In other words, it means realizing one’s true self and becoming the complete whole of oneself.

Paradoxically, this individuation soon leads to wholeness. Through insight into the collective unconscious and by becoming conscious of it, individuals can greatly expand their scope. In other words, they can develop to the point where they can make the unconscious of all beings, including their own, conscious. This is in line with the ideal of *bodhisattva* pursued by Mahayana Buddhism. Individuation is not about distinguishing oneself from others as individuals but rather being reborn as an ‘indivisible’ whole. This leads to the realization of a connected and integrated whole (Youn, 2023).

Conclusion

In conclusion, this paper critically reviewed the characteristics of Jung's analytical psychology and its application to the interpretation of *Amitāyur-dhyāna Sūtra*. From a philosophical perspective, Buddhism embodies the nature of religious philosophy, having developed a highly systematic and profound understanding of human consciousness. Whereas, Jung's analytical psychology approached the human unconscious through scientific and empirical analysis of individual phenomena, such as dreams or pictures drawn in unconscious states.

However, Buddhism can overcome some limitations of analytical psychology by directly experiencing the Buddha-nature of the unconscious realm through practice. Meanwhile, the empirical and scientific methodology of analytical psychology allowed Jung to establish theories capable of persuading even those not engaged in meditative practice, through careful observation of the true self. Through this approach, Jung was able to partially approach the Mahayana Buddhist ideal of the expansion of the self, though he revealed its limitations in contemplating the consciousness of an enlightened practitioner who transcends all dichotomies and constantly realizes Buddha-nature, as well as in constructing a vast and systematic philosophy of human consciousness and the unconscious.

Despite these limitations, the importance and significance of Jung's analytical psychology remain considerable. By understanding the unconscious and emphasizing that a life that balances conscious and the unconscious is the key to self-realization, Jung created an opportunity for dialogue between modern Western psychological traditions and the rich spiritual heritage of Indian religions, including Buddhism.

Analytical psychology can learn from Buddhist philosophy regarding the establishment of a deep philosophical system and the role of direct experience through meditation. On the other hand, Buddhist philosophy can benefit from an analytical psychology's emphasis on empirical evidence and scientific methodology. In conclusion, the dialogue between modern Western psychology and traditional Eastern religions holds the potential to generate synergy, fostering significant advancements in future academic explorations of the human unconscious.

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Buddhism, Mindfulness, and Mortality Salience

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Abstract

Objective: Both Buddhist philosophy and mindful contemplative practices provide methods to help reduce negative emotional reactions to stressful thoughts and experiences, including reminders of death. Although teachings on the mindfulness of death are seldom incorporated into Western approaches to meditation instruction, Buddhist philosophy, texts, and practices all highlight the importance of accepting one's own mortality. The purpose of this paper is to describe the consequences of mortality salience from the perspective of Western psychology and to contextualize it from both scientific and a Buddhist contemplative perspective. A large body of research in experimental social psychology considers the psychological consequences of reminders of death. Specifically, research indicates that reminders of personal mortality prompt anxiety and suggests that death-related thoughts are actively suppressed at a subconscious level. However, because such suppression is generally not successful, individuals then promote their own cultural worldviews and show bias against dissimilar others.

Method: This paper reviews research on mortality salience and then reviews the ways in which reminders of mortality have different implications for Buddhists, long-term meditators, those who have just finished meditating, and those higher in trait mindfulness. Finally, potential reasons for those differences are discussed.

Key result: Meditation and Buddhist beliefs may reduce the negative consequences of death reminders that are typically seen in published research. Indeed, practicing meditation, including death-related contemplative practices, should promote acceptance of the reality that human life is transient and that every person will eventually die. These factors can promote acceptance and reduce the negative consequences of mortality salience.

Conclusion: Meditation and Buddhist teachings can promote adaptive responses to thoughts of death, including generosity and compassion for others.

Buddhism, Mindfulness, and Mortality Salience

Although reminders that human lives are short and that death is certain may help to inspire action and compassion in Buddhist contexts, a large body of psychological research suggests that such reminders can also threaten how people see themselves and understand the world. This manuscript briefly describes research on terror management theory, including experimental research on the effects of mortality salience on worldview defense, interpersonal bias, and personal esteem. However, both philosophical and empirical research suggests that death reminders may have different consequences for Buddhists and for those who practice mindfulness in secular contexts.

The following quotes highlight two different ways of thinking about death and the impermanence of human existence. The first two quotes are from Patrul Rinpoche's (1994) *Words of my Perfect Teacher*. In this text, Rinpoche thoroughly discusses the impermanence of human life, and the necessity for humans to take positive actions in the face of that reality. He says:

Once born, every human in the world is sure to die. But how, why, when, and where we are going to die cannot be predicted. None of us can say for sure that our death will come about at a particular time or place, in a certain way, or as a result of this or that cause... There is no guarantee that death will not suddenly strike right now. (pp. 53-54)

Patrul Rinpoche goes on to quote Geshe Potowa as recommending that practitioners:

Think about death and impermanence for a long time. Once you are certain that you are going to die, you will no longer find it hard to put aside harmful actions, nor difficult to do what is right. After that, meditate for a long time on love and compassion. Once love fills your heart you will no longer find it hard to act for the benefit of others. (1994, p. 58)

Taking a contrasting perspective, American writer and civil rights advocate James Baldwin wrote in 1962 that

Life is tragic, simply because the earth turns and the sun inexorably rises and sets, and one day, for each of us, the sun will go down for the last, last time. Perhaps the whole root of our trouble, the human trouble, is that we will sacrifice all the beauty of our lives, will imprison ourselves in totems, taboos, crosses... armies, flags, nations, in order to deny the fact of death, which is the only fact we have. (Baldwin, 1962, p. 91)

Importantly, Baldwin does go on to argue that the reality of death should prompt love and action toward equity and social justice. Nevertheless, the argument that Americans and perhaps Western cultures in general attempt to avoid or deny the existence of death stands in sharp contrast to Buddhist conceptualizations of the value of being aware that each person has a precious human life.

Mortality Salience and Terror Management Theory

Nearly three decades of research in experimental social psychology and over 1000 experiments have tested the effects of reminders of human mortality on theoretically relevant social outcomes (Burke, Martens & Faucher, 2010; Greenberg et al., 1990; Schindler et al., 2023). This area of research uses the term *mortality salience* to describe brief reminders of personal mortality. These reminders are most frequently provided in an experimental design in which half of the participants are randomly assigned to write a couple of paragraphs describing what will happen to their bodies at the time of death and to consider the emotions they feel about that reality. The other group of participants writes about another topic (e.g., an unpleasant dental procedure). Participants usually then complete a questionnaire or an alternative task, and are then given opportunities to endorse values that are important to their

personal and cultural worldview. This research has typically reported that those completing the mortality salience task report more support and liking for people who are like themselves, as well as more disdain for those they see as unlike themselves (Burke, Martens & Faucher, 2010). This research is important because it suggests that reminders of personal mortality, which can occur naturally in everyday life (Leung, Chew, & Caltabiano, 2022), can increase bias and hatred.

Research on mortality salience has been used to test terror management theory, which is based on the arguments in Ernest Becker's (1973) *Denial of Death*. According to terror management theory, because of an instinct for self-preservation, the mere thought of death arouses substantial existential anxiety in humans (Greenberg et al., 1990). This anxiety prompts efforts to suppress death-related thoughts. However, suppression is generally not effective in the medium or long term. Two additional subconscious processes are then initiated to help combat this death-related anxiety. Specifically, those reminded of their own mortality attempt to affirm their personal values and the values supported by their own cultural perspective, often described as their cultural worldview. Such affirmations can help assure that personally important values will continue to exist after the person has died, as a type of legacy or symbolic immortality (for example, see Wade-Benzoni et al., 2012). In addition, those facing mortality salience work to assure themselves that they are meeting or exceeding their own value and worldview standards. Researchers usually discuss such efforts as attempts to boost personal self-esteem. Through these processes, mortality salience has been linked with intergroup conflict and prejudicial attitudes and behaviors (Burke, Martens, & Faucher, 2010).

However, research on terror management theory has received criticism, especially in recent years. For example, most of the studies mentioned above were conducted with American college students. This is especially problematic because the effects of mortality salience seem to be greatest for studies conducted in the United States and in Europe and are also larger for college students than for other groups (Burke et al., 2010). Further, in spite of the large amount of research on terror management theory, parts of the theory remain inadequately explored and tested. For example, Schindler et al. (2023) explored how mortality salience studies have conceptualized cultural worldviews. Schindler and colleagues conducted a meta-analysis of 61 studies that examined both mortality salience and the salience of social norms. In their

systematic review, the authors raised questions about how researchers chose which norms should be bolstered as part of cultural worldviews. They argued that terror management theory has not paid sufficient attention to what worldview defenses should look like in different social and cultural contexts. The current paper helps to address this issue by exploring the ways in which meditation and Buddhism may help explain differences in psychological responses to mortality salience. As mentioned above, Buddhist understandings of the value and consequences of considering death vary considerably from those outlined through terror management theory.

Meditation and Mindfulness Can Reduce Mortality Salience

Despite the large amount of research on mortality salience, it is not clear that reminders of death evoke the same anxiety for everyone. As suggested by the earlier quote from Patrul Rinpoche, reminders of death can be motivating or even inspiring. A few studies have considered the extent to which Buddhists and those who are more mindful respond to mortality salience. Specifically, mindfulness may reduce feelings of existential anxiety or defensiveness following reminders of mortality and therefore may reduce the need to suppress mortality-related thoughts and to bolster cultural worldviews.

In a set of seven different studies, Niemiec et al. (2010) showed that those higher in trait mindfulness were less responsive to reminders of personal mortality. These studies measured self-reports of mindfulness tendencies among American and British undergraduate students. Following mortality salience, those students reporting higher trait mindfulness did not defend their worldview (in Studies 1, 2 and 3) or attempt to boost personal self-esteem (Study 5). The authors instead found that more mindful students were more likely to process death-related thoughts through their writing during the mortality salience task (Study 6), and that this process helped to explain the extent to which mindful participants were less affected by mortality salience. Finally, the results of Niemiec et al.'s Study 7 suggest that more mindful American students showed initial elevations in the accessibility of concepts related to death immediately after mortality reminders. However, these thoughts decreased over time, suggesting that more mindful students refrained from suppressing and instead processed death-related thoughts and initial distress. This pattern is opposite to most of the research on mortality salience, which shows that

unsuccessful attempts at suppression lead to initially low accessibility of death-related thoughts, which are then elevated after a delay because suppression is generally not successful. Together, these studies provide compelling evidence that those higher in trait mindfulness may be buffered from the anxiety and cultural worldview defenses that would be hypothesized based on terror management theory.

A second important publication explored how Buddhists, as well as both experienced and inexperienced meditators, respond to mortality salience. Park and Pyszczynski's (2019) first study, conducted in Korea, compared the effects of mortality salience among adults with no meditation experience, meditators with an established daily meditation practice, Buddhists who were and were not meditators, and a group of Zen Buddhist monks and laypeople who reported meditating for at least three hours daily. Some of these participants were asked to meditate just prior to completing a mortality salience task. Half of the participants in each of these subgroups were randomly assigned to write about their own mortality while the other half wrote about a painful experience. Interestingly, the *only* group to show a defensive bias in favor of Korean identity (the measure of worldview defense) was the group of non-meditators who had not been asked to meditate prior to the study. This result suggests that mortality salience may operate differently for meditators with a daily practice, for Buddhists, and for those who have just meditated. Another of Park and Pyszczynski's (2019) studies was conducted with American students. The authors found that to the extent that death-related thoughts increased following mortality reminders, American students showed more worldview bolstering. However, this pattern did not emerge for students who had just received meditation practice instructions. Together, these studies provide compelling evidence that Buddhism, meditation, and mindfulness may eliminate the mortality salience effects found in previous research.

Buddhist Philosophy, Mindfulness, and Mortality Salience

Both research on meditation and Buddhist philosophy can help to explain why meditation practice and Buddhist beliefs can reduce or eliminate the emotional and attitudinal consequences of reminders of death. Specifically, centuries of Buddhist writings discuss the importance of actively approaching and meditating on one's own mortality. In addition, research on the effects of mindfulness meditation

on mental and emotional processes may help to explain why even inexperienced meditators can be buffered from the consequences of mortality salience after they have meditated. The final portion of this manuscript discusses research and explanations for why meditation and trait mindfulness predict less pronounced consequences of mortality salience.

Multiple sources suggest that meditation experience and mindfulness are associated with lower death anxiety. For example, meditation and other interventions can reduce self-reported death anxiety (Schultz & Arnau, 2019), and both death education (Caciatore et al., 2015) and near-death experiences (Bianco et al., 2019) are associated with greater mindfulness. Further, differences in trait mindfulness are correlated with less extreme self-reports of death anxiety (Askarizadeh, Poormirzaei, & Bagheri, 2022). Although none of these studies clarifies whether mindfulness causes reductions in death anxiety, or whether careful consideration of death promotes mindfulness, considerable evidence links the two concepts.

Research on the effects of meditation on health and well-being also highlights some reasons why those who meditate may experience less existential anxiety when confronted with mortality salience. Specifically, those who meditate typically experience more momentary mindfulness, less worry, less rumination (Gu et al., 2015), and less anxiety (Tanay, Lotan, & Bernstein, 2012). Some research also suggests that people are less likely to suppress thoughts and emotions after they have learned to meditate (Hepburn et al., 2009). Instead, research indicates that meditation promotes less identification with the contents of the mind, and a greater ability to step back (decenter) and analytically evaluate everyday situations (Lehman, Fogel, & Wiederaenders, 2025). Together, this research suggests that when meditators are confronted with thoughts of their own mortality, they should experience less alarm, anxiety, and suppression, and should instead be more able to consider the reality that death is part of life.

A wide variety of Buddhist writings discuss the importance of understanding the ways in which death is necessarily a part of life. Analayo et al. (2022) discuss writings from the *Ariyapariyesana-sutta* emphasizing that, through awakening, the Buddha became deathless, meaning that he had eliminated all fear of the death of his present body. Moon (2019) similarly discusses Buddhist writings on the mindfulness of death from the Pali Canon. Wallace (1993, p. 15) emphasizes the necessity of considering death by sharing the following Tibetan saying,

“It is better to fear death now and die fearlessly, than to avoid fear of death now and die with terror.”

Indeed, His Holiness the Dalai Lama describes meditating on death at least six times each day (Gyatso & Chodron, 2018). Such meditation makes it easier to recognize and accept the fact that all beings will die. As Nyima (2003, p. 168) said, “From the moment of birth right up until this present moment, your life has been inexorably decreasing. Even since yesterday, your life span has shortened.” Guidance from H.H. Deshung Rinpoche (Nyima, 2003) and from H.H. Dalai Lama (with Hopkins, 2002) emphasizes not only that death will happen, but also that it could happen at any moment. Both texts discuss the importance of thinking about death during routine activities (eating, getting dressed, relaxing) as well as when taking part in social activities.

Acceptance of death can help increase understanding of impermanence and reduce attachment to the people, events, and activities of this life, and can help people prioritize meaning and personal growth while living. In his discussion of the Buddhist Lojong teachings, Dilgo Khyentse Rinpoche (1993) describes the fundamental ignorance of attachment to one’s self, that is a cause of human suffering. Another benefit of focusing on death is to help reduce the existential anxiety described in terror management theory. Gyatso and Chodron (2018, p. 218) quote Milarepa as saying “In horror of death, I took to the mountains—again and again I meditated on the uncertainty of the hour of death. Capturing the fortress of the deathless unending nature of mind; now all fear of death is over and done.” It is clear that from a Buddhist philosophical perspective, the benefits of confronting death anxiety are innumerable.

When viewed from a Buddhist perspective, it seems especially important to address the implications of research on mortality salience. Both Moon (2019) and Analayo et al. (2022) have suggested that the practice of mindfulness of death should be broadly taught. Both authors have even developed pilot programs to provide such instruction. Moon (2019) further suggested that death meditation should be more widely popularized and adopted to help reduce death anxiety and to instead promote compassion and other prosocial outcomes. He argues that death meditation could be presented using similar methods to those used to popularize mindfulness meditation in the West.

Overall, research on terror management theory and on the consequences of mortality salience clearly has important practical implications. For example, although most research highlights the

consequences of mortality salience for negative outcomes such as hatred and bias, Niesta, Fritsche, and Jonas (2008) emphasize the fact that *prosocial* cultural worldviews can also be affirmed as a way to reduce death anxiety. Examining positive, rather than negative, approaches to reducing anxiety can also help foster connections and support peace rather than emphasizing interpersonal bias and social division. Likewise, human well-being could be improved if methods to reduce existential anxiety become widespread. Such understanding could promote an acceptance of the transience of human lives, help people to focus on present-moment activities, and even reduce the role of negative emotions in everyday interpersonal interactions. If widely adopted, practices emphasizing the importance of considering mortality could help build collective generosity and compassion and contribute to a more positive society.

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Vajrayāna and New Approaches to Mindfulness in British Social Work

Ellie Hunter

00Abstract

Since 2012, British academic literature has promoted mindfulness as a strategy to strengthen the emotional resilience of social workers operating in high-stress environments while supporting society's most vulnerable populations. Research on mindfulness-based interventions (MBIs) has demonstrated their effectiveness in reducing stress, enhancing self-reflection, and improving overall well-being among social workers. Through a critical analysis of existing literature, this paper examines the evolving role of mindfulness in British social work and discusses its potential future applications. It explores the influence of Buddhist teachings on the integration of mindfulness into British social work, which, to date, has focused primarily on understanding the mechanisms by which mindfulness practices facilitate stress reduction.

This paper discusses the limitations of existing literature. It argues that the role of mindfulness in British social work extends beyond stress management and building emotional resilience; mindfulness practice is a support for cultivating compassion, deepening human connection and alleviating suffering. Secular mindfulness has been criticised for being overly individualistic, commercialised and aligned with neoliberal agendas. In contrast, the Vajrayāna tradition views mindfulness as a practice dedicated to the liberation of all beings from suffering. Future research should consider not only the mechanics of Buddhist mindfulness but also its underlying ethical principles and their potential

benefits for British social work practice. The review concludes by emphasising the central role of relationships in social work and advocating for a mindfulness practice rooted in the intention to reduce suffering and strengthen human connection, benefiting both social workers and service users alike.

Introduction

Modern British social work has been shaped over hundreds of years, influenced by legislation, political and charitable movements, historical ties to the Christian faith and important social and historical events.²⁸ Given the wide scope of social work and the diverse roles it encompasses, perceptions of the field can vary significantly, whether there is an emphasis on practice, academia or policy. In their daily working lives, social workers collaborate with various professionals in a wide range of fields, including education, mental health, disabilities, adults and older people and children and families. Social work is a complex and highly skilled profession, dedicated to improving lives, alleviating suffering, and preventing harm. Woodcock Ross and Wright (2020) describe social work's conflicted history regarding the integration of religious and spiritual concerns, detailing how, in the process of securing its professional identity, in a post-Enlightenment, secular-liberal state, social work aligned itself with psychological and social scientific epistemologies. As such, social work can be described as a "secular-liberal-humanist" profession (Woodcock Ross & Wright, 2020, p. 3). This paper traces the influence of mindfulness within modern British social work to date and examines criticisms regarding the colonisation of mindfulness. Whilst recognising the challenges involved in drawing on a religious tradition within the context of a secular profession, this paper argues that developing an understanding of mindfulness practice within the ethical framework of Vajrayāna Buddhism could deepen and enrich its application in British social work, supporting its core aim of reducing suffering.

²⁸ Key moments in British social work history include the introduction of the Poor Law in 1535 and its later amendment in 1834; the Prevention of Cruelty to, and Protection of, Children Act (1889); the work of early charitable efforts, including the National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children (NSPCC) and the Settlement Movement; the introduction of the Welfare State; the Children Act (1989) and the Children Act (2004). See Koutsounia (2024) for a timeline of significant events in the last fifty years of British social work.

Definitions of Mindfulness: How is Mindfulness Understood in British Social Work?

Grant and Kinman (2012, p. 612) describe mindfulness as “moment-to-moment awareness or paying attention to the moment without judgement”. Rajan-Rankin (2013, p. 2429) discusses mindfulness more in terms of knowing oneself, referencing Lynn (2009), who states: “Awareness and mindfulness about one’s own values, beliefs and prejudices are central to professional development, but also personal well-being”. Maddock et al. (2024, p. 1321) cite Jon Kabat-Zinn’s (2003, p. 145) definition of mindfulness: “the awareness that emerges through paying attention, on purpose, in the present moment, and non-judgementally to the unfolding of experience moment by moment”. Western secular definitions often describe mindfulness in terms of awareness or attention.²⁹ Notably, these definitions focus on the process or mechanics of mindfulness, without capturing the ethical tone inherent in Buddhist mindfulness practice. As this paper explores, where mindfulness practice is understood to be ethically neutral—as a practice independent of others, used for individual gain—it is vulnerable to misuse.

The Introduction of Mindfulness to British Social Work (2012): A Tool to Manage Stress

Mindfulness first began to be discussed in British social work in 2012 as a tool to grow social workers’ emotional resilience and manage stress (Grant & Kinman, 2012; Rajan-Rankin, 2013). For over thirty years, studies in social work have shown stress and burnout to be a problem for practitioners dealing with issues such as high caseloads, limited government resources and the emotional impact of working with trauma and complex life situations (Jones et al., 1991; Collings & Murray, 1996; Coffey et al., 2004; Ravalier et al., 2020). Social workers are vulnerable to burnout (McFadden et al., 2014; McCusker, 2020), with stress impacting their well-being and ability to carry out work safely and efficiently. In response to serious social work failings, in particular the tragic deaths of Victoria Climbié and Peter Connelly, social workers were encouraged to develop resilience (Lord Laming,

²⁹ See also Brown & Ryan (2004); Jha, Krompinger, & Baime (2007); Shapiro & Carlson (2009).

2009; SWTF, 2009) and demonstrate ‘professional confidence’ (Munro, 2011, p. 5). As Hardy puts it:

Social work can be a challenging and stressful career. In order to survive for any length of time in the profession and not suffer burnout, social workers must be emotionally resilient, able to bounce back from setbacks and cope with stress (Hardy, 2017, para. 1)

Criticisms of Mindfulness and Resilience

The resilience rhetoric, however, has faced challenge and criticism, particularly for being aligned with neo-liberal agendas; placing the burden of managing work-related stress solely on the individual and emphasising personal emotional resilience while overlooking broader structural issues (Garret, 2016; McCusker, 2020). These criticisms run parallel with many critics of mindfulness, including Purser (2019), who argued that mindfulness is hostage to the neoliberal mindset. Cook (2016) discusses the academic analysis of popular secular mindfulness practice as a neoliberal tool, facilitating “an increasing emphasis on the ‘responsibility’ of subjects to self-manage at a time of increasing privatization, [enabling] governance at a distance by making people responsible for their own mental health” (p. 147). According to Purser and Loy:

There is a dissociation between one’s own personal transformation and the kind of social and organizational transformation that takes into account the causes and conditions of suffering in the broader environment. Such a colonization of mindfulness also has an instrumentalizing effect, reorienting the practice to the needs of the market, rather than to a critical reflection on the causes of our collective suffering, or *social dukkha*. (Purser & Loy, 2013, para. 11)

Social work is a demanding profession, characterised by high caseloads, emotionally intense and complex work, and high-stakes interventions that can significantly impact people’s lives. In outlining the neoliberal argument, Cook (2016, p. 148) states that “learning practices of emotional regulation and reflexive awareness ‘responsibilizes’ practitioners”. There is a concern that, without an

ethical grounding of mindfulness practice, motivated by a genuine desire to reduce suffering, mindfulness may be used as a tool to make social workers themselves responsible for coping and adapting to the stresses inherent in the role, rather than supporting workers with appropriate supervision and caseloads.

Discussions on Ethics in Secular Mindfulness (2014-2016)

As interest in the potential of mindfulness within social work began to grow, parallel explorations were underway into how mindfulness could be applied across other areas of the public sector. In 2014, the Mindfulness All-Party Parliamentary Group (MAPPG) was established to investigate the possibility of mindfulness-based interventions being included in public policy and explore the implementation of mindfulness in various fields. A key aim was to support professionals, particularly in the public sector, to “combat stress and improve organisational effectiveness” (MAPPG, 2015, p. 8). During these investigations, an ethical understanding of mindfulness practice was outlined, clearly distinguishing it from attention training:

The latter is ethically neutral and can thus be inflected towards unethical and anti-social ends [...] Kindness and an inclination towards compassion are essential features of mindfulness, as understood in traditional and contemporary formulations, such that it always inclines towards ethical and pro-social approaches. (MAPPG, 2015, p. 71)

In his foreword to the MAPPG report, Jon Kabat-Zinn explains that mindfulness is attention and awareness but also encompasses relationality and caring. He explains that mindfulness “has the potential to add value and new degrees of freedom to living life fully and wisely and, thus, to making wiser and healthier, more compassionate and altruistic choices” (MAPPG, 2015, p. 9).

In seeking to address the criticisms of mindfulness supporting a neoliberal agenda, Cook (2016) encourages a move away from the concept of neoliberalism as ‘a totalizing ideology’, to make room “to explore the practices of people who recognize collective and structural causes of suffering at the same time as seeking practices of subjectification for improving wellbeing” (p. 149). However, Cook’s characterisation of mindfulness as a ‘subjectification practice’ risks

understating the practice's ethical core and its relational and communal benefits. In the Buddhist traditions, through practising mindfulness meditation, one begins to let go of self-clinging and the concept of a solid, unchangeable self. As described in the *Four Noble Truths*, Buddhism encourages reflection upon suffering and describes mindfulness as part of the path out of suffering. The Vajrayāna teachings emphasise that mindfulness should be practised for collective benefit.³⁰ Cook (2016) argues that in practising self-governance, one may have different motivations. However, understanding mindfulness practice in this way is problematic – we reify the individual as an independent and autonomous agent, and this language is bound up with the neoliberal narrative. As discussed above, there is too much room for exploitation or misuse without a clear ethical grounding for mindfulness practice. As research into the benefits of mindfulness practice within British social work continues, tensions emerge as academics negotiate the secular identity of social work alongside the concerns of detaching mindfulness from its Buddhist roots.

Emerging Benefits and Tensions in the Study of Mindfulness in British Social Work (2014–2018)

In 2014, Grant and Kinman published their book ‘Developing Resilience for Social Work Practice’, in which they devote a chapter to exploring the potential benefits of mindfulness practice in social work. Alongside promoting mindfulness for stress reduction, they explore how mindfulness practice may enhance social work practice; supporting practitioners to be fully present with their service users; turning toward difficult emotions and events with open interest and without judgement; growing compassion towards self and others and working in an anti-discriminatory manner. In their exploration of mindfulness and the positive associations they have drawn, Grant and Kinman (2014) are careful to distance mindfulness from any religious practice, saying “Where mindfulness is associated with religious practices, there has been resistance to its use (McGarrigle & Walsh, 2011). As both MBSR and MBCT are entirely secular evidence-based programs, however, such concerns are misguided” (pp. 121-122), altogether dismissing the religious background of mindfulness and any potential exploration of its ethical foundations within Buddhism. In the

³⁰ See, for example, Gampopa (1998), Shantideva (2006)

first studies on mindfulness in British social work, similar distancing from the Buddhist context of mindfulness can be seen: Howie et al. (2016) describe mindfulness as “a generic skill [which] can be practised [...] in many situations. [...] It’s not a religion.” (pp. 92, 95). However, this detachment from religion and spirituality in the social work zeitgeist is not unequivocal and is marked by some underlying tensions. Roulston et al. (2018, p. 158), referencing Dylan and Coates (2016), state “Some concerns have been raised about the impact of developing mindfulness in a more secular way, separated from its Buddhist foundations, as it has become broad in its definition, scope and application”. Howie et al. (2016, p. 93) acknowledge that ‘mindfulness’ originates from the Pali word ‘sati’ and reference Bhikkhu Bodhi (2000) describing mindfulness as “a process where individuals cultivate awareness, attention and remembering”. There are a number of scholars who link this ‘remembering’ to an ethical intoning of mindfulness in Buddhism.³¹ The study also quotes Kabat-Zinn (1990, p. 97) describing how mindfulness “makes room for [...] perceiving the interconnectedness of things” (p. 96). Both studies explore the use of mindfulness as a stress-reduction tool for social work students, using an adapted version of Kabat-Zinn’s Mindfulness Based Stress Reduction (MBSR) programme, and have positive results in this regard. In addition, the studies bring up other important issues around the relationship-based nature of social work and how mindfulness can support social work practice in general: developing compassion and acceptance and the therapeutic skills that enable practitioners to be able to be present with a range of emotions (others’ and their own), whilst sitting with another’s “shattered self and brokenness” (Howie et al., 2016, p. 89). Howie et al. describe the need for social workers to “find a safe vantage point from where they can witness their thoughts and feelings as they arise, without getting caught in and carried off by them. It is this that protects and helps them to respond rather than react” (2016, pp. 91-92). Despite clear links in these studies to Buddhist themes (care, compassion, interdependence), the authors are unable to grapple with the concerns of removing mindfulness practice from its Buddhist foundation and revert to a narrow understanding of mindfulness as a practice of cultivating attention rather than turning to

³¹ See Lomas & Jnanavaca (2015); Peacock (2014); Rhys Davids & Rhys (1910); Stanley (2015).

Buddhist teachings to develop an ethical understanding of the practice and the potential benefits of this in British social work.

A Turn Towards Buddhism: The Clinically Modified Buddhist Psychological Model for Social Work Practice and Self-Care (2023)

Building on the success of early studies demonstrating the effectiveness of mindfulness in reducing stress among student social workers (Howie et al., 2016; Roulston et al., 2018), Maddock, McCusker, Blair and Roulston (2022) designed a mindfulness program specifically for social workers: The Mindfulness-Based Social Work and Self-Care Programme (MBSWSC). Several studies³² indicate that their program effectively reduces stress levels among student social workers and enhances their reflective practice. Maddock (2023) introduces the Clinically Modified Buddhist Psychological Model for Social Work Practice and Self-Care, upon which the MBSWSC is based. He describes how, through regular mindfulness practice, social workers can develop an increased ability to focus their attention and accept emotions as they arise, putting themselves in a better position to respond with greater acceptance and non-attachment. This is presented in Maddock's diagram below:

³² See Maddock, McCusker, Blair & Roulston (2022); Maddock, McGuigan, & McCusker (2023); Maddock, McGuigan, McCusker, & Kellock (2024); Maddock, McGuigan & McCusker (2024).




Figure 1. Vajrayāna and New Approaches to Mindfulness in British Social Work

The model is underpinned by Grabovac et al.'s (2011) Buddhist Psychological Model (BPM). The authors describe how, to explain how mindfulness-based interventions (MBIs) work “their physical, psychological, and emotional effects” (p. 154), they turned to Buddhist teachings, specifically the Abhidhamma Pitaka. They argue that whilst many of the techniques used in MBIs have been adapted from Buddhist contemplative traditions, “the psychological model that accompanies these techniques has not been explicitly incorporated into the theory or implementation [resulting] in an unnecessary loss of the context that explains how these techniques work and why they are used.” (pp. 154-155). At the core of the BPM are the Buddhist ‘three characteristics’: Impermanence, Suffering and Not-Self. Grabovac et al. (2011) describe how our habitual reaction is to pursue feelings that are pleasant and avoid those feelings that are unpleasant, using the Buddhist terminology of attachment and aversion. Not being aware of this process can lead to mental proliferation or rumination. Mindfulness can disrupt this. They recognise that through cultivating equanimity, there is less attachment to transient sense impressions and mental events and no reification of a sense of self. This understanding of the mechanism of mindfulness, as taken from the Abhidhamma Pitaka, is used in the design of the Mindfulness-based Social Work and Self-Care

programme. This reference to a Buddhist text is mechanistic only; a way of understanding the process and effects of mindfulness. It does not promote an understanding of the ethical foundation of Buddhism as described in its teachings and texts. However, it represents a significant shift toward greater acceptance within social work of learning from Buddhist teachings, raising the possibility of openness towards re-incorporating Buddhist ethical principles into mindfulness practice to further support and enhance social workers' relational skills. Ultimately, social work is a relationship-based practice, and within Vajrayāna Buddhism, mindfulness practice takes place in the context of relationship and benefiting all beings.

The Mindful Social Worker: Bringing Dharma to Social Work Practice

Starns (2022) describes “the mindful social work partnership” (p. 14), drawing parallels between social work values and qualities resulting from mindfulness practice. She states, “The positive gains to be found in mindfulness make it an obvious [...] adjunct tool for social work.” (p. 15). Starns describes how mindfulness can support social work practice, beyond managing stress and for self-reflection, to propose how it may support the social work relationship with service users. She introduces ‘six mindful support pillars for reflection’ (p. 45) around the themes of patience, non-judgement, trust, non-striving, acceptance and letting go (adapted from Kabat-Zinn, 1990). She describes these as ‘mindful principles to live a good life’ (p. 44). Starns refers to the Buddhist eight-fold path (p. 20) and references the teachings of Thich Naht Hanh (p. 155) and Ajahn Sucitto (p. 159), illustrating how reflecting on the ethical foundation of Buddhism can support social work practice. Chamberlayne (2007) describes how his Buddhist practice and understanding of teachings support his social work practice. He discusses Buddhist themes of interdependence, motivation and compassion and explains:

Awareness of my own suffering has facilitated [an] awareness of the suffering of others. It leads to a logical and emotional understanding that we do not live in isolation from others, that our happiness cannot exist in isolation from others and that focusing solely on our own happiness is essentially selfish. (Chamberlayne, 2007, p. 6)

Summary of Literature Review Findings

This paper has traced and examined the development of mindfulness in British social work since its emergence as a topic of interest in 2012. An analysis of the literature has found parallels between the mindfulness and resilience discourses in social work, illustrating how mindfulness has been used as a tool to manage social workers' stress and wellbeing and develop their resilience, and critiques that suggest both mindfulness and resilience frameworks may serve to reinforce neo-liberal agendas. These themes are consistently evident within both social work and the broader political context. As research into the use of mindfulness within social work practice has advanced, increasing attention has been given to its potential benefits for enhancing reflective practice and other social work skills. While early studies highlight tensions arising from social work's efforts to reconcile its secular identity with the incorporation of a practice rooted in a religious tradition, a review of the literature indicates that mindfulness practice within British social work is increasingly drawing upon Buddhist teachings to inform its theoretical and practical understanding., i.e. the mechanisms of mindfulness³³. This literature review has identified that, whilst there are individual social workers who have considered the benefits of Buddhist ethical principles in social work (Chamberlayne, 2007; Starns, 2022), there have been no studies that have considered how these could be widely applied, for example, within a mindfulness program (or MBI) for service users. This paper argues that there is value in further incorporating Buddhist teachings and ethical principles into British social work practice to benefit both social workers and service users and support their relationships.

Conclusion

Relationships and the wish to reduce harm are at the centre of British social work practice. To date, studies into the application of mindfulness in British social work have been overwhelmingly focused on managing individual practitioners' stress, raising concerns that the practice might, in fact, disconnect social workers from wider support

³³ See Howie et al. (2016); Maddock, McCusker, Blair & Roulston (2022); Maddock, McGuigan & McCusker (2023); Maddock, McGuigan, McCusker, & Kellock (2024); Maddock, McGuigan & McCusker (2024); Starns (2022).

systems, making them solely responsible for managing this burden. However, mindfulness is so much more than a simple stress-management tool. Within Vajrayāna Buddhist teachings, mindfulness is deeply connected to the ethical intention of alleviating suffering, aligning closely with the values and aims of social work. Beyond supporting individual well-being, mindfulness practice has the potential to grow compassion and strengthen human connection. Whilst due to its secular nature, British social work may never wholly accept Buddhist teachings into its practice, in practising mindfulness, there exists a greater potential to extend its benefits from the individual to the collective. The Dalai Lama (1999) says that

... even without a religious perspective, love and compassion are clearly of fundamental importance to us all [...] the basis of which is our innate capacity for empathy. And as we transform this capacity into love and compassion, [...] so our practice of ethics improves. This, we find, leads to happiness both for ourselves and others. (p. 77)

As research into mindfulness practice in British social work continues to grow, it is this author's sincere hope that these developments will be guided by ethical principles and intentions, the benefits dedicated to all beings and expressed within the relationships at the heart of social work practice.

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Transcendental Outcomes: Developing a Standards-Based Framework for Teaching Buddhist Contemplative Practices to Adolescents

Sasha Manu

Transcendental Outcomes: Developing a Standards-Based Framework for Teaching Buddhist Contemplative Practices to Adolescents

The young people of today are the inheritors of a world in transition. Humanity is facing existential risks from geopolitical instability, nuclear and bio warfare, to unaligned algorithms and climate change. In the face of rapid change, we have grown more polarized and reclusive, less in touch with our shared humanity. And yet, the future has the potential to contain untold wealth and prosperity for generations to come. We stand at a turning point: the next generation can be the harbingers of flourishing, with education holding the key to equipping students with the tools to make this positive future a reality. Education, however, is easy to criticize. Our world moves quickly, while this institution, most critical to our future, seems to ossify and adapt more slowly than ever. Evidence suggests that we are failing to meet the needs of the next generation of learners, as student mental health challenges are increasingly high (CDC, 2023), and repeated critiques point out that schooling remains misaligned with current psychological and neurobiological research on how young people learn best (Immordino-Yang et al., 2023).

Bridging the literacy and math gaps are foundational pursuits in education. Both literacy and numeracy are mutually reinforcing

foundational cognitive skills that directly transfer to the demands of real-world tasks. Gaps in these disciplines compound across a lifetime, widening inequities for already disadvantaged populations (Heckman, 2006). Addressing these gaps is essential - but it is not sufficient. In order to steward humanity through these unprecedented times, our young people require more than knowledge and technical skill - they also require tools of inner transformation. This paper explores a third gap: the wisdom gap. Famed Biologist E.O. Wilson warned that: “the real problem of humanity is the following: we have Paleolithic emotions, medieval institutions, and godlike technology” (Ratcliffe, 2016). Significant dimensions of the human experience are left unexplored during critical periods of human development, depriving young people of the embodied shifts in worldview necessary to meet the challenges of modernity. For millennia, the Buddhist path has offered powerful contemplative tools to transform worldviews and liberate beings from suffering. To face a turbulent world, there is no better antidote than to learn, at a young age, how to awaken a state of innate wellbeing and cultivate discernment. Global education systems have begun integrating these practices – but to do so at scale, and to take this aim as seriously as we do foundational disciplines, a set of clear learner standards must be established.

This paper develops a preliminary standards-based framework for teaching core Buddhist contemplative practices to adolescent learners. As the integration of contemplation into education seeks greater cohesion and clarity, articulating a transparent rationale for this pursuit is essential. Equally necessary is the creation of clear targets for learning and assessment as a precursor for broad scale integration. Working backwards from the outputs, this paper presents a set of contemplative standards, or targets for instruction, that are derived from a conceptual framework that is informed by a review of human development, Buddhist texts and commentaries, and pedagogical literature. Prior to presenting the standards I explore the necessity of outlining clear learning outcomes, drawing parallels to case studies in science education where nations, recognizing the seriousness of education reform, concluded that creating clear standards was the first step in achieving change at scale. In the same spirit, it is time to recognize the cultivation of wisdom as an educational imperative, requiring the same rigor, intentionality, and commitment that we bring to literacy and mathematics.

Methods and Goals

This paper is rooted in the belief that an interdisciplinary approach is essential for the integration of contemplative standards into education. The aim is to prepare young people to live meaningful lives and empower them to become agents of positive change in an increasingly complex world. Specifically, I focus on adolescent learners, as this developmental period, bridging birth and adulthood, forms the physical, psychological, and social foundations for later life (National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine, 2019). Yet, this practical aim is ultimately subordinate to a deeper goal: awakening adolescents to their capacity for innate wellbeing and connectedness. For millennia, the Buddhist path has guided individuals away from destructive and maladaptive ways of being, offering a framework deeply relevant to modern educational contexts. To authentically bring these teachings into education requires a shift - from focusing solely on the distant goal of *nirvana* to establishing a path-oriented process that fosters progressive transformation. In this way, the standards aim not only to alleviate adolescents' acute distress but also to create the conditions for a positive, fulfilling life by increasing learners' capacity to look inward and develop a personal, felt, and embodied understanding of the human condition. Achieving this alignment necessitates an analysis of Buddhist texts and traditions to extract shared concepts, practices, and concrete skills across different *yānas*. This is not an effort to impose a rigid framework onto Buddhist practices to make them legible to educational systems; rather, it is an extension of structures that already exist within the tradition. Buddhism is replete - from the *Sūtrayāna* to the *Vajrayāna* - with specific targets for meditation, detailed schemas of progress, and highly refined reflective practices. I draw from modern commentarial literature on the *Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta*, as well as from translations of the *Nikāyas* by Bhikkhu Bodhi and Thanissaro Bhikkhu. I also incorporate insights from modern Vipassana traditions, including the teachings of Ajahn Chah, S.N. Goenka, and Mahasi Sayadaw. In addition, I draw on translations of *Mahāyāna* and *Vajrayāna* texts, particularly from the *Sakya* tradition, along with the writings of Patrul Rinpoche and Tsongkhapa. Secondary scholarship by Georges Dreyfus and John Powers further informs the interpretation and integration of these sources.

On the human development side, it is essential to identify the unique challenges adolescents face and to draw on Buddhist contemplative solutions to address them. What behaviors are of primary concern during adolescence? What are their neurological foundations? And which contemplative practices can most effectively support their development? Zenner's (2014) systematic review and meta-analysis was the first to examine the effects of mindfulness-based training for children and adolescents, highlighting both benefits and the significant heterogeneity of implementation across programs. A more recent meta-analysis (Phan, 2022) emphasized the need to collect more rigorous data on the quality of training and duration of meditation interventions, even as clear benefits were again observed. In contrast, disciplines such as science and mathematics require instructor training to be rigorously standardized, often demanding advanced degrees and apprenticeship models, with clear, outcome-oriented goals. This suggests that contemplative education, too, must move toward similar professionalization and coherence. To create a set of effective educational standards for contemplative learning, I establish a framework of essential Buddhist elements that guide the development of contemplative capacities.

The concept of learning itself has multiple technical definitions, from optimizing reward functions (Dehaene, 2020) to adjusting mental models based on experience. At its core, learning involves forming an internal model of external reality. Operationally, the Common Ground Collaborative (CGC) defines learning as "the process that leads to a sustained and demonstrable consolidation or extension of conceptual understanding, competencies, or character" (CGC, 2023). Educational research suggests that all lessons and materials should be inferred logically from the outcomes we seek (Wiggins & McTighe, 2005). Thus, the central question becomes: What is worth learning? However, within this paper, the question shifts even more fundamentally: What is it worth becoming? The Buddhist path does not aim merely at the accumulation of knowledge, but at the transformation of the individual through deepening understanding. Georges Dreyfus, the first Westerner to receive the title of *Geshe*, notes in his analysis of the *Gelugpa* monastic system that the goal of monastic training is to make "knowledge immediately accessible rather than merely available" (Dreyfus, 2003, p. 92). This insight undergirds the framework: to work backward from a set of identified contemplative capacities - innate potentials which, when cultivated, enable meaningful progress along

Buddhist developmental maps. The development of the whole person lies at the center of many contemporary educational models. The CGC, for instance, identifies six human commonalities that give rise to core capacities, such as the ability to recognize "Patterns & Principles," which then manifest in higher-order skills like rational problem solving (CGC, 2023). Similarly, the International Baccalaureate places its Learner Profile at the heart of its educational philosophy, aiming to cultivate "internationally minded people" through the development of ten interwoven capacities (IBO, 2022). My own experience designing curricula aligned to both the CGC and International Baccalaureate models informs the conviction that capacity development must be placed at the center of education. Thus, after identifying the contemplative capacities, I proceed to map broad practice modalities within the Buddhist tradition that align with educational best practices. This paper forms the scaffolding that supports a twofold creation:

1. A Four-Dimensional Framework describing key areas of contemplative development.
2. An accompanying set of eighteen contemplative standards for instructional use.

This progression mirrors how educational disciplines like math and science, once identified as critical to national futures, invested first in coherent frameworks - and only then successfully built detailed standards to transform learning outcomes.

Standards and Coherence

International bodies and governments around the world have recognized the necessity of having clear targets for instructional efforts. This section explores the structural approaches taken by other educational groups - examining how they scaffolded standards development around key developmental stages and frameworks. A report by the National Governors Association (2008) emphasized the urgent need for the United States to compare its educational outcomes with those of other nations and re-evaluate its performance targets. Raising concerns that the U.S. was losing its competitive edge in educational attainment, the report called for the creation and adoption of a common set of internationally benchmarked standards for K-12 education in mathematics and language (National Governors

Association, 2008). The message was clear: to maintain educational leadership, clear instructional targets must be created, and progress toward those targets must be systematically measured. More concretely, the U.S. National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine released the *Framework for K-12 Science Education* in 2012 to enhance science education nationwide. This document outlined broad learning goals and expectations for students, laying the groundwork for the development of the Next Generation Science Standards (NGSS), which are now the international benchmark for high-quality science education. The framework itself was motivated by a national consensus on the need for greater coherence in science education (NGSS Framework, 2012, p. 10). The NGSS were created using a backwards design approach—beginning first with a conceptual framework before developing specific standards. The NGSS committee recommended that science education be built around three major dimensions (NGSS Framework, 2012, p. 2):

- Scientific and engineering practices
- Crosscutting concepts
- Core disciplinary ideas

Each performance expectation integrates all three dimensions. For example, the Middle School section on *Matter and Energy in Organisms and Ecosystems* includes Performance Expectation MS-LS1-2, which requires students to "develop and use a model to describe the function of a cell as a whole and ways the parts of cells contribute to the function." Here, students engage in the Science and Engineering Practice of Developing and Using Models, while applying Crosscutting Concepts such as Cause and Effect and Structure and Function. This multidimensional approach ensures that standards not only transmit knowledge but reinforce key concepts in an interconnected way. Similarly, a drive toward coherence can be seen in the widespread adoption of Social and Emotional Learning (SEL) frameworks. Spearheaded by the Collaborative for Academic, Social, and Emotional Learning (CASEL), these frameworks emphasize coordinated, integrated approaches, with key competencies - such as self-awareness, relationship skills, and responsible decision-making (CASEL, 2020).

The mechanics of writing effective standards is further supported by educational taxonomies that help map how students move from simple to complex understandings. Benjamin Bloom developed hierarchical models for the cognitive, affective, and psychomotor domains of learning, using verbs to denote increasing levels of mastery. These taxonomies clarify for both students and instructors what observable skills, attitudes, behaviors, and abilities are the real targets for instruction (Bloom et al., 1964).

- The cognitive domain involves intellectual skills (e.g., analyzing, evaluating).
- The affective domain involves emotional areas and attitudes (e.g., valuing, organizing).
- The psychomotor domain focuses on physical skills and increasing levels of physical mastery.

Across disciplines, the pattern is clear: when topics are deemed serious, standards are created. By establishing specific contemplative outcomes for adolescent learners, we can ensure that these practices are not only aligned with developmental needs but also serve as a foundational element in fostering individual well-being, resilience, and personal growth.

Adolescence as Disintegration

The necessity of standards is clear. The following section substantiates the view that adolescence is a period of heightened developmental significance and, as such, is a critical window for intervention. Maria Montessori (1967) described human development as unfolding through a series of "rebirths," with adolescence standing as one of the foremost of these transformations. It is a time marked by the disintegration of childhood stability and the gradual emergence of adult capacities. Importantly, this transition is biologically grounded, not merely a social or cultural phenomenon. One of the defining features of this period is puberty and its accompanying physical changes. The pituitary gland, located at the base of the brain, regulates the endocrine system and stimulates the rapid growth and development of body cells (Shaffer & Kipp, 2016). These hormonal surges trigger a comprehensive reorganization of the psychological, social, and physical realms of the adolescent. Thus, adolescence emerges as a uniquely sensitive stage

due to the convergence of rapid neurophysiological development, heightened environmental sensitivity, and evolving social behaviors. These changes can be exhilarating but also deeply disorienting, for individuals and their communities alike. This section provides the scientific foundation that informs the proposed contemplative standards-aiming to establish learners on a contemplative path while leveraging the opportunities presented by adolescent neurodevelopment. In particular, adolescence brings about three primary areas of "lack" that impact emotional, cognitive, and social well-being: lack of control, lack of connection, and lack of contentment.

Control

The adolescent quest for independence is fraught with obstacles. As the childhood self fades, young people strive for autonomy yet remain financially and physically dependent on their guardians. Their daily schedules are often dictated by school systems, and their peer groups are determined by classroom placement. Internally, they are confronted by new, puberty-laden thoughts and emotions. Thus, adolescents possess limited internal control and limited external agency. This lack of control serves an adaptive purpose, encouraging exploration of personal identity and self-efficacy. However, when independence and responsibility are imbalanced, it can foster frustration, confusion, and powerlessness. From a neurological perspective, significant changes occur in the brain, particularly in regions associated with impulse control, planning, and decision-making. The prefrontal cortex, responsible for these executive functions, continues to mature well into the mid-20s (Nelson & Bloom, 1997). This developmental delay explains the increased impulsivity and risk-taking behavior observed during adolescence (Spreen et al., 1995, p. 611).

While risk-taking behaviors serve adaptive purposes-mapping social boundaries, for instance - they can also lead to harmful outcomes, including substance abuse. Executive functions such as flexibility, working memory, and self-control remain underdeveloped during this stage (Meltzer, Dunstan-Brewer, & Krishnan, 2018; L. Faith, personal communication, 2022). Importantly, mindfulness-based interventions have been shown to improve executive functioning skills and reduce impulsivity in adolescents (Bigelow et al., 2021; Zenner et al., 2014; Zeidan et al., 2010). Given its behavioral, neurological, and

contemplative relevance, the development of self-regulation and stability is a primary target within the framework.

Connection

Adolescents become acutely aware of social dynamics but are often poorly equipped to navigate them. Peer acceptance and rejection become central experiences during this period (Cillessen & Rose, 2005; Peters et al., 2011; Sebastian et al., 2011). Neurological research shows that pubertal development correlates with increased activation in regions involved in face processing, peer rejection, and social cognition (Barendse & Pfeifer, 2016). This heightened reactivity to social environments makes adolescents more vulnerable to feelings of isolation and loneliness. Trust and reciprocity, which are essential to stable social relationships, must be developed over time (Burke et al., 2016). Contemplative practices such as loving-kindness meditation have been shown to increase feelings of social connection and positivity among adolescents (Hutcherson et al., 2008). Thus, collective contemplative practices that foster empathy and interconnectedness offer a direct counterbalance to this developmental vulnerability.

Contentment

Finally, adolescence is marked by a surge in the need for exploration and novelty-seeking. While historically adaptive, risk-takers were once necessary for the survival of the group, these tendencies can now foster discontentment in an environment where boundaries and risks are vastly different. Additionally, the psychological phenomenon known as the "imaginary audience," where adolescents believe others are as preoccupied with their behavior as they are themselves, exacerbates feelings of self-consciousness and alienation (Elkind, 1967). Recent research emphasizes the importance of "transcendent thinking" for fostering resilience. Transcendent thinking involves emotionally powerful, reflective, and abstract musings that allow adolescents to situate their experiences within broader life trajectories (Gotlieb et al., 2024). Over time, transcendent thinking supports both immediate well-being and long-term life satisfaction. Mindfulness practices have similarly been shown to enhance emotional regulation and reduce symptoms of stress, anxiety, and depression in adolescent populations (Zeidan et al., 2010). By targeting these three core developmental vulnerabilities - control, connection, and contentment - through contemplative education, we can create conditions that not only support

adolescent flourishing but also establish a foundation for lifelong wellbeing and wisdom. The next section turns to the Buddhist contemplative tradition to identify core capacities that can be systematically cultivated to address these needs.

The Noble Path

Gautama the Buddha discovered and put forward what he described as “the direct path for the disappearance of our pain and distress” (MN 10). He diagnosed the human predicament through the First Noble Truth (*ārya satya*): the truth of *dukkha*. With translations ranging from stress, suffering, discontent, to dissatisfaction, no single English word fully captures the breadth of *dukkha*. Nevertheless, what is conveyed is an acknowledgment of a perennial observation: life, in its ordinary mode, is a stressful experience. As previously discussed, adolescence imposes an additional layer of stress, expressed through three primary domains of deficiency: control, connection, and contentment. This section aims to demonstrate that from its inception, the Buddhist path has articulated concrete aims for practice, with developmental markers along the way - establishing precedent for the creation of standards in contemplative education.

Stages of Progression

The Buddhist tradition has always set specific aims for practice alongside clear developmental markers. As the Sangha grew more complex, the Buddha introduced conventions and standards of behavior to clarify the purpose of monastic life and keep *bhikkhus* and *bhikkhunīs* aligned with the path - codified most prominently in the *Vinaya Piṭaka*. In early Buddhist texts, such as the *Dīgha* and *Majjhima Nikāyas*, we encounter frameworks such as the Four Noble Truths and the Noble Eightfold Path, which map both the terrain of human suffering and the means for its cessation. The early Buddhist path is traditionally divided into preparatory and supramundane stages. The preparatory path, often referred to as the gradual path (*paṭipadā*), involves training in virtue (*sīla*), concentration (*samādhi*), and wisdom (*paññā*) - organized into the eight factors of the aforementioned Noble Eightfold Path: right view, right intention, right speech, right action, right livelihood, right effort, right mindfulness, and right concentration. As practice matures, practitioners enter the supramundane path, marked by the realization of four stages: stream-enterer (*sotāpanna*), once-

returner (*sakadāgāmi*), non-returner (*anāgāmi*), and arahant. Each stage is characterized by the progressive abandonment of the Ten Fetters (*saṃyojana*) (Bodhi, 1995). The first stage, stream-entry, is achieved by overcoming the wrong view of a permanent self, attachment to rituals, and doubt in the veracity of the path (Mahasi, 2016). Of course, this path works backwards (in proper pedagogical fashion) from the final goal of *Nirvāṇa*. Manuals such as the *Patisambhidāmagga*, *Vimuttimagga*, and *Visuddhimagga* further elaborate these stages of insight, offering detailed schemas for contemplative development. These works outline the Sixteen Stages of Insight and Eighteen Principal Insights (Ñānamoli, 2009), each delineating observable and experiential shifts that could serve as pedagogical reference points. The *Mahāyāna* tradition similarly presents progressive paths toward liberation, often articulated as the five paths: accumulation, preparation, seeing, meditation, and no more learning. These stages represent a continuum from ethical refinement to complete awakening (Powers, 1995, p. 91). The path of accumulation is particularly relevant for educational design, as it emphasizes the cultivation of merit and wisdom - capacities that align naturally with modern educational goals like character development and self-regulation.

Monastic Rigor

Tibetan monastic institutions provide further evidence of structured pedagogical models. Knowledge is expected to progress through three stages: listening (*śravaṇa*), reflecting (*cintanā*), and meditating (*bhāvanā*). Traditions such as the *Gelug* and *Nyingma* maintain canonical curricula, with the *Nyingma* focusing on the "thirteen great texts," the *Sakya* studying eighteen, and the *Kagyu* using a similar curriculum to the *Gelug*, incorporating both sutras and tantras (Dreyfus, 2003, p. 128). Advancement is tied to specific benchmarks, including memorization, debate, and comprehension, culminating in degrees such as the *Geshe* title. Despite their internal rigor and sophistication, monastic curricular frameworks have historically struggled to achieve recognition in secular academic settings. Integration into the Indian higher education landscape, for instance, often required significant adaptation, including shifts away from traditional pedagogical models (Hobhouse, 2024). This underscores a key point: the academic legitimacy and systemic integration of any instructional model - contemplative or otherwise - depends on clearly defined outcomes and

standards. In sum, the Buddhist tradition across its many lineages offers strong precedent for structured learning frameworks marked by developmental milestones and performance-based outcomes. It is the assertion of this paper that contemplative practices, if they are to be taken seriously in K–12 education, must similarly adopt a coherent and standardized framework. With this foundation laid, we now move to the construction of the framework itself, beginning from the observation that each of the three primary developmental challenges in adolescence - lack of control, lack of connection, and lack of contentment - has clear corollaries within Buddhist philosophy and practice.

The Four-Dimensional Framework

In previous sections, we made the case that when cohesion, clarity, and learner outcomes are prioritized in educational disciplines, from science to SEL, the natural outcome is the development of standards. We then turned to adolescent development, highlighting how this period, marked by significant neurocognitive shifts and the dissolution of earlier personality structures, constitutes a window of developmental openness. This disruption enables targeted interventions with long-term impact. Three domains of adolescent suffering were correlated with identifiable neurological processes. Finally, we showed that the Buddhist contemplative path offers a rich array of practice targets subordinate to its final aim of liberation - providing a precedent for concrete instructional design. This section introduces the Four-Dimensional Framework that underpins the contemplative standards proposed in this work. It first presents an overview of the framework, followed by a detailed exploration of each of its dimensions: Contemplative Capacities, Path Practices, Core Concepts, and Enumerated Elements.

The Logic

At the heart of the framework is a threefold developmental aim: to cultivate the contemplative capacities of Discernment, Virtue, and Stability. These mirror the threefold training of the Buddhist gradual path - wisdom (*prajñā*), ethics (*śīla*), and concentration (*samādhi*) - as seen across Buddhist traditions (AN 3.86). The operational logic of the framework is captured in the following phrase:

We develop the capacities by using the practices to explore the concepts through the elements.

The three contemplative capacities are cultivated through three modalities of practice, which engage five core conceptual insights, and are operationalized through enumerated elements - concrete techniques and schemas drawn from canonical texts. This layered approach allows learners to encounter the core teachings in embodied, multidimensional ways. The framework is outlined in Figure 1.

1. The Contemplative Capacities
1 Virtue
2 Stability
3 Discernment
2. The Path Practices
1 Reflective
2 Affective
3 Attentional
3. The Core Concepts
1 Dissatisfaction
2 Causation
3 Interbeing
4 Presence
4. The Enumerated Elements
1 Six Trainings
2 Five Hinderances
3 Four Foundations
4 Eight Factors
5 Four Abodes
6 Three Visions

Figure 2. Four-Dimensional Framework in List




Figure 3. Four-Dimensional Framework Diagram Form

The Contemplative Capacities

From the Buddha's first sermon at Sarnath to the *Mahāyāna* expansions in the *Prajñāpāramitā Sūtras*, the threefold training of *śīla*, *śamādhi*, and *prajñā* has been a unifying thread throughout Buddhist thought. Edward Conze (1975) notes that in the *Perfection of Wisdom in 8,000 Lines*, these trainings are preserved and reoriented to serve the bodhisattva ideal. Śāntideva's *Bodhicaryāvatāra* structures its chapters around the Bodhisattva trainings of the *pāramitās*. Likewise, R. Paul Williams (2000) affirms that in *Mahāyāna*, the threefold training is not discarded but deepened and applied universally. In the Tibetan scholastic tradition, Tsongkhapa writes about the foundational nature of the three trainings framework in his *Lam Rim Chen Mo* (2000, p. 342). Taken together, these references establish that the cultivation of these three core capacities, ethical integrity, mental stability, and discerning insight, are not only central to Buddhist contemplative development, but also enduring across diverse traditions. These were therefore adopted as the foundational aims of the contemplative standards proposed in this framework. These capacities are not only traditional but developmentally relevant. Each directly maps onto the key adolescent "lacks": Stability counters lack of control; virtue remediates disconnection; discernment transforms dissatisfaction into

meaningful engagement. These capacities thus serve as both contemplative aims and developmental responses.

The Path Practices

In developing this framework, one guiding question emerged: *What is worth learning about?* The Buddhist response, across traditions, is clear - ways of being that align with reality. To operationalize this, the framework identifies three core modes of contemplative engagement: Reflective, Affective, and Attentional practices. These modalities correspond to how one thinks, feels, and attends.

- Reflective practices are cognitive in nature. They involve philosophical inquiry, analytical meditation, and conceptual deconstruction - investigating impermanence, interdependence, and non-self. These include methods from the *Abhidharma*, *Madhyamaka* reasoning, and *Lojong*.
- Affective practices emphasize emotional and relational cultivation. Here, students generate transformative emotions such as compassion or equanimity through methods like *mettā bhāvanā*, *tonglen*, and the Sakya lineage's Three Visions. These practices shape ethical perception and interpersonal resonance.
- Attentional practices train bare awareness, non-distraction, and presence. These include foundational exercises such as *ānāpānasati* and the *satipaṭṭhāna* system. Bhikkhu Bodhi emphasizes that “no act of cognition is ever entirely devoid of factors imparting to it orientation and meaning,” (Bodhi, 2011) showing how attention shapes perception and how its transformation can have cascading effects on our way of interfacing with the world.

While interdependent, these modalities are distinguished here for pedagogical clarity. This tripartite division also aligns with Bloom's taxonomy: reflective = cognitive, affective = emotional/attitudinal, and attentional = psychomotor, particularly in terms of sensory refinement and discipline. Taken together, these three practice modes provide a holistic framework that spans contemplative theory, pedagogical best practice, and adolescent developmental needs. They offer a structured yet flexible scaffold for designing learning outcomes that reflect the depth and richness of Buddhist contemplative education.

The Core Concepts

These are concepts found throughout the Buddhist canon, transcending cultural context and hitting at the core of the teachings. In identifying these concepts, I have aggregated certain ideas together for the sake of brevity, clarity, and accessibility. There was an additional goal of making these concepts legible for secular audiences. I want to note that any schema of categories of course holds no ontological weight, however, drawing distinctions is necessary. Surrounding the core concepts are so-called constellation concepts – ones that resemble and are aggregated into the primary four. I avoided practical methods and stuck to overarching themes and, as such, omitted contemplative technologies such as mindfulness, equanimity and so on. The methods are found in the enumerated elements. The four core concepts are:

- **Dissatisfaction:** *dukkha, taṇhā, anicca*
- **Causation:** *pratītya-samutpāda, anattā, karma*
- **Interbeing:** *śūnyatā, bodhicitta, upāya*
- **Presence:** *tathatā, tathāgatagarbha, nibbāna*

Each of these concepts appears throughout early Buddhism, *Mahāyāna*, and *Vajrayāna* traditions. These are not merely theological assertions - they are transferrable understandings for making sense of human experience. As David Perkins of Harvard Project Zero notes, conceptual understanding requires recognizing how ideas function within a discipline (1993). In this case, that discipline is *life itself*, as directly encountered in mind, body, and relationship. Teaching these concepts supports deep learning because they provide lenses for interpreting the world.

The Enumerated Elements

The final dimension of the framework draws from a distinctive feature of Buddhist pedagogy: the enumerated elements. The *Aṅguttara Nikāya*, for example, organizes teachings by numerical structure - ones, twos, threes, and so on. The entire compendium contains thousands of collected discourses bearing no thematic resemblance and conforming simply in structure. This style of enumeration continued through *Mahāyāna* and *Vajrayāna* text, perhaps to aid in memorization, or perhaps to encourage brevity. These elements serve dual purposes: they concretize abstract insights and offer structured pathways for training.

While the list is vast, this framework prioritizes foundational sets aligned with developmental relevance and beginner accessibility.

- **The Five Hindrances** (*nīvaraṇā*) – directly addresses control and cultivates stability by training to recognize distraction, aversion, sloth, restlessness, doubt
- **The Four Foundations of Mindfulness** (*satipaṭṭhānas*) – establish the method and objects of attentional training
- **The Four Abodes** (*brahmavihāras*) – cultivate positive emotional states, directly supporting connection
- **The Six Perfections** (*pāramitā*) – represent the path toward the cultivation of Bodhicitta
- **The Eightfold Path** (*aṣṭasamyāṁmārga*) – outline ethical conduct, mental discipline, and discernment
- **The Three Visions** (*naṅg sum*) – guides contemplative reflection on opportunity, misfortune, and awakening

These elements were selected for their developmental appropriateness, particularly in adolescent contexts. More advanced lists, such as the *Jhāna* factors, were excluded given their prerequisite depth of stability. Together, these elements provide the *means* through which concepts are internalized and capacities developed - across cognitive, affective, and attentional dimensions. By integrating these layers, we ensure that each standard is both grounded and actionable. What follows is a set of contemplative learning standards designed to guide instruction, foster transformation, and support adolescent flourishing.

The Standards

The contemplative learning standards presented here are organized by Contemplative Capacity - Stability, Virtue, and Discernment. Each capacity contains six standards, two for each of the Path Practices: Reflective, Affective, and Attentional. These standards articulate what students should be able to do, but they do not prescribe a single pedagogical method. Instead, they offer a coherent set of learning objectives while leaving space for differentiation, contextual adaptation, and teacher agency. Often referred to as the father of psychology, William James writes that:

The faculty of voluntarily bringing back a wandering attention, over and over again, is the very root of judgment, character, and will... An education which should improve this faculty would be the education par excellence. (James, 1890, p. 463)

These standards aim to support precisely that kind of education. To ensure that this end is followed, Figure 3 illustrates how the Core Concepts and Enumerated Elements are embedded into each standard through a tagging system. Each standard is structured as a demonstrable learning objective, using an action verb drawn from Bloom’s taxonomy - cognitive, affective, and psychomotor, depending on the practice domain. For example, reflective standards may ask learners to “examine” or “investigate,” affective ones may ask them to “cultivate” or “value,” and attentional standards may employ verbs such as “stabilize,” or “generate.” Together, these domains represent a holistic pedagogy that integrates thinking, feeling, and attending. The standards also illustrate the synergistic relationship between practices: reflective inquiry helps identify the mental and emotional factors that either support or hinder affective and attentional training; affective practices catalyze value shifts that reinforce motivation and compassion; and attentional training builds the clarity needed to ground the other domains. By articulating learning targets across all three domains, this framework aims to correct the overemphasis in modern frameworks on attentional training alone, offering a more balanced model of contemplative education. Figure 2 lists the standards plainly using a system where each standard is accompanied by its corresponding capacity (S for Stability, V for Virtue, D for Discernment), practice type (RE for Reflective, AF for Affective, AT for Attentional), and numerical ordering (e.g., RE1, AF2).

Table 1. The Eighteen Contemplative Standards

S-RE1	Investigate the causal relationships between the external and internal factors that hinder and support mental health.
S-RE2	Develop strategies to prevent the arising of unskillful states, cultivate the arising of skillful states, abandon unskillful states that have arisen, and develop skillful states that have arisen.
S-AF1	Resolve to approach changing internal and external states with patience and persistence.

S-AF2	Internalize self-compassion towards the arising of unwelcomed mental and physical states.
S-AT1	Demonstrate reliable and repeated placement of awareness on sensory and bodily objects leading to sustained focus.
S-AT2	Calibrate levels of arousal through inner strategies requiring minimal external engagement.
V-RE1	Examine the advantages of the present physical, mental, material, and social condition and identify their dependencies on other conditions and beings.
V-RF2	Investigate the qualities, experiences, and motivations shared by all beings and develop a commitment to act in recognition of these similarities.
V-AF1	Cultivate the intention to respond with joy at the success and happiness of others and to recognize reactions of jealousy and pride.
V-AF2	Resolve to support other beings actualize their own insights and move beyond seeking personal pleasure and avoiding discomfort.
V-AT1	Develop strategies to extend kindness towards living beings at progressively greater distances and levels of connection.
V-AT2	Generate compassion for beings through recognition of shared vulnerability, impermanence, and generosity.
D-RE1	Investigate the causes and conditions for the arising, abiding, and cessation of phenomena and identify realistic points of agency within this process.
D-RE2	Examine the nature of the self through exploration of personal and collective motivations, and explore how perceptions of self and other obscure or illuminate the view that beings possess an innate potential for goodness.
D-AF1	Develop an equanimious attitude towards the arising of pleasant and unpleasant mental and physical phenomena.
D-AF2	Value how the immediate world, just as it appears, expresses fullness, and abide without seeking to grasp, reject, or conceptualize it.
D-AT1	Integrate interoceptive awareness of the impermanence of postures and mental states into daily activities.
D-AT2	Independently recognize the space between feelings and actions and increasingly abide there before responding to situations.

Table 2. Virtue Standards Matrix

Virtue			
Practice Tag	Reflective	Affective	Attentional
Standard Students who demonstrate understanding are able to:	Examine the advantages of your present physical, mental, and social condition and identify their dependencies on other conditions and beings.	Cultivate the intention to respond with joy at the success and happiness of others and to recognize and abandon feelings of jealousy, pride, and comparison that block such joy.	Develop strategies to extend kindness toward living beings at progressively greater distances, from close connections to beings everywhere.
Concept Tag	Interbeing; Causation	Interbeing; Causation; Dissatisfaction	Interbeing; Causation; Dissatisfaction
Element Tag	Three Visions	Four Abodes; Three Visions	Four Abodes; Three Visions
Standard Students who demonstrate understanding are able to:	Investigate the qualities, experiences, and motivations shared by all beings and develop a commitment to act in recognition of these similarities.	Resolve to help and support others, actualize their own insights, and move beyond seeking personal pleasure or avoiding discomfort.	Generate compassion for beings through recognition of shared vulnerability, impermanence, and generosity.
Concept Tag	Interbeing; Causation; Dissatisfaction	Interbeing; Causation; Dissatisfaction	Interbeing; Causation; Dissatisfaction
Element Tag	Eight Factors; Four Abodes	Eight Factors; Four Abodes; Three Visions	Eight Factors; Four Abodes; Six Trainings

Conclusion and Next Steps

The creation of standards marks only the beginning of a larger process of integration. The next phase involves the development of curricula designed to teach toward each standard with clarity and intentionality. This includes creating instructional sequences, suggested activities, and aligned assessments that measure progress through observable

performances of understanding. Each standard will require the articulation of developmental benchmarks, as well as sample performance indicators to guide evaluation in both formative and summative contexts. Pilot testing these standards in diverse educational settings will be essential. Feedback from students, teachers, and contemplative scholars will help refine the framework, ensuring that it is both pedagogically sound and experientially meaningful. Collaboration with educators across disciplines, especially those working in social-emotional learning, character education, and contemplative studies, will further enrich the model and support its adaptation for broader implementation. As contemplative education continues to mature, this work represents a foundational step toward creating scalable, standards-based systems for inner development in schools.

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Being in Brave Space: The Naropa Warrior Exam as Contemplative Assessment in Higher Education

Amelia Hall

Abstract

This article examines the "Warrior Exam," a contemplative oral examination practice developed at the Buddhist-inspired Naropa University in Boulder, CO. Drawing from Tibetan Buddhist debate traditions and Western oral examination methods, this assessment format creates "brave spaces" where students demonstrate embodied, personalized understanding through real-time dialogue. As higher education grapples with rising student anxiety and the challenges posed by artificial intelligence tools, the Warrior Exam offers a compelling model for assessing authentic human learning that integrates intellectual comprehension with personal experience and emotional resonance.

Keywords: contemplative education, assessment, oral examination, Buddhist pedagogy, authentic learning.

Introduction

What if the best learning happens not when students feel safe, but when they feel brave? This question challenges conventional approaches to educational assessment and opens pathways toward more authentic evaluation of human understanding. Consider this scene from a Naropa University classroom. Dale Asrael, Professor of Contemplative

Psychology at Naropa University and longtime practitioner of contemplative pedagogy, documents a powerful example of the Warrior Exam in action. Asrael, who holds expertise in both Buddhist psychology and innovative assessment methods, has been instrumental in developing and refining this practice over decades of teaching.³⁴ She describes the following exchange.

"What is fearlessness?" The question hangs in the air. Two students, one the Questioner and the other the Respondent, sit face-to-face, engaged in the most ancient form of inquiry: asking and answering questions.

Questioner: "What is fearlessness?"

Respondent: "In the book we studied, the author said, 'Fearlessness is knowing the nature of fear.' That means being willing to face fear and experience it directly. It doesn't mean not having any fear."

Questioner: "What is your own experience of fearlessness?"

The Respondent looks down: "I don't really know what fearlessness means in my own experience. I always retreat when I'm scared."

The Questioner regards her silently. After a few moments, the Respondent raises her eyes and meets the Questioner's gaze.

Questioner: "What are you experiencing right now?"

Respondent: "I'm afraid that I'm making a mess of this exam, like I always do when I get scared."

This exchange, documented by Asrael (2016), exemplifies the Warrior Exam's capacity to move students from intellectual understanding to embodied awareness in real-time. The practice is one of Naropa University's most innovative contributions to contemplative pedagogy, offering a model for assessment that validates "inner knowledge"—

³⁴ Dale Asrael is Professor of Contemplative Psychology at Naropa University, where she has taught for over two decades. Her work focuses on contemplative assessment methods and the integration of Buddhist psychology with higher education pedagogy.

understanding that has been personally verified through direct experience and integration, not merely memorized information.

The Contemporary Educational Crisis

Student anxiety has reached unprecedented levels across higher education institutions, yet traditional assessment methods often exacerbate rather than address this crisis.³⁵ The American College Health Association's Fall 2024 national survey of over 33,000 undergraduate students revealed that approximately 20% were experiencing serious psychological distress, with 78% reporting moderate to high stress levels within the past 30 days (American College Health Association, 2024; Best Colleges, 2025). More than one-third of students (35%) had been diagnosed with anxiety, representing a concerning escalation in mental health challenges. Simultaneously, the proliferation of artificial intelligence tools enables students to generate essays and assignments without meaningful engagement with course material, raising fundamental questions about the nature and assessment of authentic learning.³⁶

These converging challenges force educators to confront a critical question: How do we assess genuine human understanding in an age where surface-level performance can be easily automated? Traditional written examinations, while useful for measuring factual recall, often fail to evaluate the deeper forms of knowing that contemplative education seeks to cultivate—forms of understanding that integrate intellectual comprehension with personal experience, emotional resonance, and embodied wisdom.

Historical and Philosophical Foundations

The Warrior Exam draws from two rich intellectual traditions that share a commitment to assessing the quality of thinking rather than mere factual recall. First, it builds upon Tibetan Buddhist debate practices, where knowledge emerges through dynamic exchanges between students in monastery courtyards (Dreyfus, 2003). As Georges Dreyfus

³⁵ For historical background on Naropa University's founding and mission, see D. J. Haynes (2012).

³⁶ For discussion of AI's impact on academic integrity, see recent coverage in *Chronicle of Higher Education* and *Inside Higher Ed* throughout 2023–2024.

notes in *The Sound of Two Hands Clapping*, these debates represent "a dynamic, performative practice" where "knowledge emerges in the exchanges among equals—the students themselves" (p. 248).

The second tradition draws from Western oral examination and entrance practices, particularly those exemplified by Oxford University's All Souls College fellowship application, famous for questions with no definitive answers such as "How can words be beautiful?" or "How do apologies work?"³⁷ These assess candidates' capacity to engage meaningfully with complex ideas under pressure, evaluating intellectual agility and depth of thinking rather than memorized content. Both traditions recognize that genuine understanding cannot be fully captured through written assessment alone. The term "warrior" in Chogyam Trungpa Rinpoche's (1984) conception comes from the Tibetan word *pawo*, meaning "brave one," emphasizing the courage and compassion required to engage authentically with uncertainty and vulnerability.

The Warrior Exam Format

The Warrior Exam follows a ritual format designed to create what practitioners call a "brave space"—not a safe space where discomfort is avoided, but a supportive environment where students can take intellectual risks. Students sit in a circle with two chairs positioned at the center. Questions are provided in advance, but the students do not know which one they will get. The questions are deliberately crafted to be open-ended and encourage personal application rather than rote recitation.

Importantly, the Warrior Exam can effectively assess both factual knowledge and personal integration. For example, in a course on Buddhism, a student might be asked to identify and explain a key concept, then connect it to their own direct experience. This approach demonstrates that the practice need not sacrifice academic rigor for contemplative depth.

The examination process begins with a brief period of mindfulness practice, allowing participants to cultivate presence and grounding. There are variations in how the exam can proceed—sometimes between

³⁷ Information about All Souls College examination practices is maintained in the Oxford University archives and referenced in various historical accounts of Oxford academic traditions.

two students with one as questioner and one as respondent, at other times as an exchange between professor and student. The basic format follows a ritual structure: questioner and respondent bow to each other in mutual respect, acknowledging the sacred nature of the learning exchange. The respondent selects a question and reads it silently first, then the questioner reads it aloud for all witnesses. After a moment of reflection, the respondent offers their answer, speaking from both their academic learning and their personal understanding.

This dual-layer approach ensures rigorous assessment of both content mastery and experiential integration. For instance, in a course on Buddhism, students might be asked to "identify and explain the five aggregates, then explore how your understanding of one aggregate has shifted through direct observation in your own mindfulness practice." Similarly, in a physics course examining thermodynamics, a question might require students to "explain the second law of thermodynamics and describe a moment when you recognized this principle operating in your daily life." These carefully crafted questions first demand precise demonstration of factual knowledge—accurately naming and explaining the five *skandhas* (form, sensation, perception, mental formations, and consciousness) or articulating entropy and heat transfer principles—before inviting students to bridge that knowledge with lived experience.

The questioner may then pose follow-up questions—what Naropa faculty call "spontaneous sparks"—designed to push the respondent beyond rehearsed responses toward deeper understanding. These impromptu inquiries require respondents to access what they know "in the bones," demonstrating comprehension that has become integrated with lived experience. Students cannot simply recite memorized definitions nor retreat into purely subjective reflection without first establishing solid conceptual grounding. This integration mirrors the Buddhist educational ideal of unifying scholarly study with contemplative realization ensuring that knowledge becomes both intellectually precise and personally meaningful (Dreyfus, 2003). When satisfied that the respondent has engaged authentically with both dimensions of understanding, the questioner states, "I accept your answer," formally concluding the exchange.

Each interaction typically lasts between two and five minutes, with every participant present for the exchange. This reciprocity ensures that learning occurs not only through performing but through witnessing

peers navigate the process of articulating their understanding under gentle pressure.

Educational Benefits and Outcomes

Over thirty-five years or so of implementation, the Warrior Exam has demonstrated remarkable educational benefits that extend well beyond traditional assessment objectives. Students consistently reported discovering that they have understood course material more deeply than they initially realized, accessing forms of knowledge that had become integrated with their personal experience in ways that surprised them. The format's ability to assess both factual mastery and personal integration addresses a persistent challenge in contemplative education: how to maintain academic rigor while honoring subjective, experiential ways of knowing.

The dual-layer questioning approach ensures that students cannot simply recite information without understanding, nor can they rely on personal reflection without demonstrating solid conceptual knowledge. This integration mirrors the Buddhist educational ideal of unifying scholarly study with contemplative insight, creating graduates who possess both intellectual precision and embodied wisdom (Dreyfus, 2003). Perhaps most significantly, students develop what might be termed "intellectual courage"—the capacity to navigate uncertainty, to sit comfortably with moments of not knowing, and to trust their own thinking processes even under pressure. As one longtime Naropa instructor observed, "the best climbers are the ones who know about falling."³⁸ The Warrior Exam teaches students to work skillfully with fear and uncertainty rather than being paralyzed by them.

The practice also transforms assessment from an individual ordeal into a collective learning experience. Knowledge emerges not only from the respondent's performance but from the quality of attention and presence that all participants bring to the exchange. Students develop empathy and learn to support one another through moments of intellectual vulnerability, creating what Parker Palmer (2004) calls "communities of truth" where learning happens through relationship as well as individual effort.

³⁸ This quotation is from informal interviews conducted with Naropa faculty in 2023 as part of ongoing research into contemplative assessment practices.

Research conducted by a Naropa faculty suggests that students who participate in Warrior Exams demonstrate increased comfort with ambiguity, improved capacity for critical thinking, and enhanced ability to articulate complex ideas in their own voice.³⁹ These outcomes align with what contemplative education seeks to cultivate: learners who can engage thoughtfully with complexity while maintaining connection to their own authentic understanding.

Contemporary Relevance and AI Resistance

In our current educational landscape, the Warrior Exam offers a powerful countermeasure to both AI-generated academic work and surface-level engagement with course material. The format requires distinctly human forms of knowing that integrate intellectual comprehension with personal experience, emotional resonance, and embodied understanding. You simply cannot fake the hesitations, insights, and spontaneous connections that characterize this kind of learning.

The unpredictable nature of follow-up questions makes preparation through AI-generated content virtually impossible. Instead, the practice validates what it means to be a human being grappling with complex ideas and finding one's own voice in relationship to challenging material. The embodied presence required for authentic participation cannot be replicated by artificial intelligence, making the Warrior Exam inherently resistant to the academic dishonesty concerns that plague written assessments. Furthermore, the practice addresses what many educators identify as a crisis of engagement in contemporary higher education. Rather than encouraging students to consume and regurgitate information, the Warrior Exam invites them to make meaning from their learning in ways that connect with their lived experience and emerging understanding of themselves and their world.

Implementation Challenges and Considerations

Despite its benefits, implementing the Warrior Exam presents several practical challenges. The format requires careful framing, particularly

³⁹ Unpublished research data from Naropa University's Center for Contemplative Education, compiled 2020–2023.

for students who bring high levels of anxiety to academic performance. Instructors must cultivate skill in creating truly brave spaces that balance support with appropriate challenge, ensuring that students feel held while still being invited to take genuine intellectual risks. Scaling the practice to large classes and online learning modalities presents logistical difficulties, as the intimate, relational nature of the exchange becomes challenging to maintain with more than fifteen to twenty participants or online. Some instructors have experimented with modified formats that preserve the essential contemplative qualities while accommodating larger enrollments, and online formats, though these adaptations require ongoing refinement. Developing consistent assessment criteria for such a nuanced practice remains another challenge. Traditional rubrics may not capture the subtle qualities that distinguish authentic engagement from performative compliance. Faculty must cultivate what might be termed "contemplative assessment literacy"—the ability to recognize and evaluate the embodied qualities that the Warrior Exam seeks to cultivate.

Implications for Higher Education

The Warrior Exam demonstrates that higher education can create methods that honor both rigorous academic standards and the development of the whole person. In an educational landscape increasingly dominated by concerns about student mental health and questions about authentic learning outcomes, contemplative practices like the Warrior Exam provide valuable alternatives to conventional assessment approaches. By creating structured opportunities for students to demonstrate embodied knowledge, intellectual courage, and relational awareness, such practices contribute to education that transcends mere information transfer to foster wisdom. The cultivation of "inner knowing" that the Warrior Exam facilitates may prove particularly valuable in preparing students to navigate complex challenges that require not just technical competence but also deep personal insight and ethical awareness. As higher education grapples with questions about its fundamental purpose and value, practices that integrate contemplative wisdom with academic rigor offer promising pathways forward.

Conclusion

The Warrior Exam embodies a philosophy of education that honors the full humanity of learners while maintaining rigorous standards for intellectual development. By creating brave spaces where students can discover and articulate their authentic understanding, the practice models what higher education might become when it embraces both contemplative wisdom and academic excellence. As artificial intelligence continues to transform the educational landscape, examination methods that validate distinctly human forms of knowing become increasingly essential. The Warrior Exam offers one compelling answer to the question of how we might assess authentic learning in an age of technological disruption, pointing toward educational practices that cultivate not just knowledge but wisdom, not just competence but courage, and not just individual achievement but genuine community.

The question posed at the beginning—what if the best learning happens not when students feel safe, but when they feel brave? —finds its answer in the lived experience of thousands of students who have participated in this practice over five decades. Their testimony suggests that when we create truly brave spaces for learning, students discover capacities for understanding, courage, and authentic expression that they did not know they possessed. In our current moment of educational uncertainty, such discoveries may be exactly what higher education needs to remember its deepest purpose: the cultivation of human wisdom in service of a world that desperately needs it.

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Towards Mindful Development: Experiences of Wellbeing and Environmental Consciousness in African and Himalayan Cultural Contexts

Ritu Verma

Abstract

The relationship between mindfulness, and individual and collective wellbeing is profound. The relationship is central to indigenous knowledge in different parts of the world, where mindfulness is inseparable from ecological consciousness and spiritual-cultural beliefs that sustain environments, connections to nature and other sentient beings, and sense of cultural belonging. Ideas, concepts and experiences of mindfulness, in turn, are shaped by situated histories and socio-cultural values and norms that vary according to different contexts across Africa, Asia and other locales. This paper explores context-specific meanings of mindfulness and their relationship to environmental sustainability and cultural practices in the Highlands of Madagascar and Bhutan. By comparatively analyzing mindfulness concepts and practices in two emergent G-Zero carbon negative and neutral countries, it reflects on their role in enabling indigenous forms of holistic development, wellbeing and environmental sustainability. This is further contrasted to western notions of development that have increasingly made in-roads into indigenous locales. While some development approaches, models and institutions have begun to acknowledge the importance of wellbeing, they lag in mindfulness approaches, due in-part to heavy institutional mandates, bureaucratic

exigencies, narrow economic-growth models, and the fast-paced nature of projects, among other factors. Further, the expansion of tourism into remote highland communities has seen the rapid uptake, if not co-option, of wellbeing and mindfulness, thus becoming commodified, commercialized and therefore hallowed of important indigenous values and moral concepts. The paper considers these ethical dilemmas, and the role of culturally specific indigenous experiences and counter-efforts against these forces, in order to center mindfulness in enabling environmental consciousness, cultural practices and indigenous ways of life. It proposes recommendations on ways development could become reflexive and decolonize habitual patterns, therefore becoming mindful of its role, impacts, responsibilities towards indigenous communities, and ultimately, to opening new possibilities for mindfulness, compassion and kindness as an antidote to an increasingly fractured world.

Keywords: mindfulness, development, culture, environment, Bhutan, Madagascar

Introduction

The relationship between mindfulness, and individual and collective wellbeing is profound. This inter-connection is philosophically at the core of Vajrayāna Buddhism. Of interest to Buddhist scholars is that this relationship is also of central significance to indigenous knowledge in different parts of the world, where mindfulness is inseparable from ecological consciousness and spiritual-cultural beliefs that sustain environments, connections to nature and other sentient beings, and sense of cultural belonging. Ideas, concepts and experiences of mindfulness, in turn, are shaped by situated histories and socio-cultural values and norms that vary according to different contexts across the world. This paper explores and compares context-specific meanings of mindfulness and their relationship to environmental sustainability and cultural practices in the highlands of Madagascar and Bhutan⁴⁰. By

⁴⁰ Research in Madagascar was funded by the University of London Central Research Fund Grant, the SOAS Research Student Fellowship, and the UK Overseas Research Scholarship; in Bhutan, research was funded by the Wenner Gren Foundation and the International Development Research Center. I am grateful to Shri Yuvraj Krishan, whose dedication to and work on Buddhism

comparatively analyzing mindfulness concepts and practices in two emergent G-Zero carbon negative and carbon neutral countries, it reflects on their role in enabling indigenous forms of holistic development, wellbeing and environmental sustainability. This is further contrasted to western notions of development, tourism and neoliberal capitalism that have increasingly made in-roads into indigenous locales. The paper considers emergent ethical dilemmas, and the role of context-specific indigenous experiences and counter-efforts against these hegemonic forces, in order to center mindfulness in enabling environmental consciousness, cultural practices and indigenous ways of life. It concludes by proposing a way forward through recommendations for future environmentally conscious research, policymaking and mindful development practice.

Climate Change and the Emergence of G-Zero Countries

As the world faces an unprecedented climate emergency, several critical issues arise that are centered on the causes, impacts and actions of and in response to the climate crises. The leading international scientific body on climate change, the IPCC (Inter-governmental Panel on Climate Change), has determined beyond doubt that climate change is accelerating across the planet with a greater pace, intensity and severity than predicted (Inter-governmental Panel of Climate Change [IPCC], 2022). Put simply, it is predominantly caused by the release of greenhouse gases into the atmosphere, beyond the earth's capacity to absorb it, as well as breaching of earth's planetary boundaries. The climate emergency is primarily caused by human activity and by humans as the principal agent of change on the planet, thereby shifting the world out the relatively stable Holocene period into a new epoch called the Anthropocene (IPCC, 2021). We humans, or at least some humans more than others, are responsible for our collective suffering, as well as the suffering of other sentient beings.

Climate change moves across national borders and affects all beings on the planet. From a geopolitical perspective, much of the human activity responsible for climate change historically belongs to the global north in its insatiable desire to develop beyond the carrying capacity of the planet and its fair share of climate emissions. Much of

(1997, 1996), as acknowledged by His Holiness the Dalai Lama (2018), deeply influenced this paper.

its impacts are thus disproportionately borne by those living in the global south, who are often living far below their fair share of carbon emissions (Fanning & Hickel, 2023), and who did nothing to very little, depending on the case, to contribute to the climate emergency. Yet, the burning of fossil fuels and other negative activities continue unabated in the global north, almost as if climate emitters live in a bubble, oblivious, ignorant or negligent of its negative impacts on vulnerable people in the global south. Discussing mindfulness within the context of climate change brings to fore the lack of mindfulness and consideration paid to one's own actions on other beings, both human and those other than human. When we turn to the conditions that might bring about this rise of ignorance, we note that the lack of action is not only aided and abetted, but centrally directed by fossil fuel industries, trans-national corporations and billionaire elites who simultaneously control much of the mainstream media, including what is shared with the public, and what is not.

The world has held many conferences on climate change, but the voices and experiences from the global south in expressing the increasingly devastating impacts of climate change on their lives continue to be sidelined. In effect, the experiences and needs of the global south seem to continue to fall on deaf ears. The formation of the Loss and Damage initiative in 2022 at COP27 in Egypt, and the institution of the corresponding loss and damage fund in 2024 at COP29 in Azerbaijan was an important step forward. However, it was tainted by the lack of appropriate allocation of funding required to compensate countries of the global south for devastating and destructive climate change impacts generated by the global north, some of which threaten the very existence of some countries, such as small island developing states (SIDS) due to rising sea levels. There was, therefore, some degree of disillusionment at the conclusion of COP29, with many countries in the global north unwilling or not forthcoming in terms of contributing to and compensating for climate change they generated, as evidenced by the meagre yet tied aid commitments that came far short of expectations of climate loss and damage relief owed to the global south at COP29 in Baku.

With this background, the foundation was laid for the establishment of the groundbreaking G-Zero Forum of four climate negative and climate neutral countries including Bhutan, Madagascar, Suriname and Panama, all global south nations. In its first joint statement, the G-Zero Forum recognized shared common values and

commitments, encoded in their national policies “that limit greenhouse gas emissions and conserve and enhance vital carbon sinks such as forests, wetlands and other ecosystems” (Royal Government of Bhutan [RGoB], 2024, p.2). G-Zero countries aim to maintain momentum to protect and enhance carbon sinks and promote nature-positive pathways in ways that “safeguard biodiversity, support sustainable development and ensure resilience against the impacts of climate change” (RGoB, 2024, p.1). They ambitiously pledge to remain carbon neutral for all time, and call upon the world to deliver an ambitious means of implementation support to reduce emissions by 2035 in line with a 1.5°C change limit committed to in the Paris agreement in order to avert planetary crisis. Together, they “jointly express a strong, unified commitment to advancing global climate action, leveraging the unique voices, perspectives, and capabilities to foster a new era of global cooperation and innovation” (RGoB, 2024, p.1).

Of central importance to this paper, is that both Bhutan and Madagascar are part of this ground-breaking and forward-thinking collaboration. Additionally, of methodological significance to this paper, is that the Betsileo Central Highlands in The Great Red Island of Madagascar was my field site for more than two years of longitudinal ethnographic doctoral fieldwork 2001 to 2003 (Verma, 2009a, 2004), followed by almost three years of postdoctoral regional fieldwork from 2007 to 2010 respectively (Verma, 2010, 2009b). The Himalayan Kingdom of Bhutan continues to be the site of longitudinal ethnographic fieldwork that began almost a decade and half ago in 2011 (Verma, 2020b, 2017a; Verma & Ura 2020; Metz et al. 2015; Thin et al. 2013), with some fieldwork sites focused in the northwest highlands of the country (Verma, 2022, 2020a). My interest was genuinely piqued when these two nations, that are close to my heart, joined forces to form the innovative G-Zero forum.

Based on extended years of fieldwork, analysis and reflection, I posit that both countries have numerous socio-cultural, environmental and spiritual-ecological dimensions in common, and this paper represents a first attempt to bring them together under a common framework of cross-comparative analysis. Such a conceptual framework considers the everyday lived experiences of mindfulness, in the complex inter-relationships between people, their environments, sentient beings and a more-than-human, multi-being world. It takes an anthropological ethnographic lens in examining these inter-relationships in the everyday and overlapping practices of labour, social

relations, cultural practices and rituals, as well as indigenous spiritual-ecological values, beliefs and engagement with the environment. From this perspective, the environment is more than just a physical space, but is multi-layered with different, situated and context-specific socio-cultural, political-economic and spiritual-ecological understandings.

The Land of the Ancestors and the Land of the Thunder Dragon: Brief Socio-Economic Overviews

I now turn to setting the scene with an extremely brief overview of the Highlands of Madagascar and Bhutan, before engaging the cross-comparative analysis in the next section.

Madagascar is an island nation, surrounded by the waters of the Indian Ocean, except towards its East which lies on the Mozambique channel. It is the fourth largest island in the world, covering a land area of 581,800 sq km (Food Agriculture and Organization [FAO], 2023) and water area of 5,501 sq km (UCLA, 2015). It is located approximately 400 kilometers off the coast of the African continent, with Mozambique located directly across from its west coast, and with Mauritius and Reunion located more than 1 100 kilometers from its east coast, and the Comoros islands located just under 400 kilometers from its northwest coast. It is comprised of highland areas with its highest peak Maromokotro measuring at 2,876 meters above sea level. The great Big Red Island also has smaller islands, coastlines, wetlands, rich forests and arid desert areas. It is divided into six *faritany mizakatena* (autonomous provinces).

By comparison, Bhutan is part of the Himalayas, with the high-altitude mountain ridges of world's tallest mountain range running through the northern length of the country. It measures 38,394 sq km (National Statistics Bureau [NSB], 2025), and therefore, 6.6 percent the size of Madagascar. The majority of Bhutan's geography is made up of mountains, with its highest peak Gangkhar Puensum measuring 7,570 meters above sea level. It is an entirely land-locked nation, with India to its South and Tibet (occupied by China) to its North. It is also made up of rich forests, highlands, wetlands, as well as glaciers, glacial lakes and alpine tundra. It is divided into 20 *dzongkhags* (districts).

While Bhutan has the distinction of never being colonized, Madagascar was colonized by Great Britain and France, and is now part of Francophonie, a community of independent nation-states that were once former colonies of France. Malagasy (Malayo-Polynesian

macrolanguage) is Madagascar's national language, with French as its main spoken European language (and English to a lesser extent), and approximately a dozen other dialects spoken across the island. In Bhutan, Dzongkha (a Tibeto-Burman language) is its national language, with English as its main spoken European language given the influence of formal Indian-style educational system (and Nepali spoken to a lesser extent as a regional language), and approximately nineteen other regional dialects spoken across its mountain valley communities. Both countries remained somewhat isolated from the respective continents they are part of, but for different historical, political and cultural reasons in each case, which I will not go into here.

What is most striking is that Bhutan and Madagascar are both home to rich biodiversity and biodiversity hot spots, including primary and secondary forests. Unlike Bhutan, Madagascar broke away from its main continent, the African continent, approximately 160 million years ago. Also termed the island of evolution, approximately 90 percent of all its flora and fauna are endemic, that is, they can be found nowhere else on the planet. Although still the subject of lively academic debate, it is believed Madagascar was settled by humans approximately 11,000 years ago, with another major influx of people from Borneo just over 2000 years ago (Sliman, 2019). On the other hand, Bhutan, similar to Nepal and other Himalayan regions on the continent of Asia, is growing taller every year, with the Indian tectonic plate thrusting against the Tibetan range, thereby pushing the mountains higher ever so slightly. It is estimated that Bhutan was settled between 1500-2000 BCE, based on archeological findings (Aris, 1979), although human settlements by pre-historic people date further back based on the existence of pre-historic open-air rock art (Wangmo, 2014).

One thing both countries have in common is the existence of rich cultural and linguistic diversity. Similar to Madagascar, the small land-locked nation of Bhutan has a high diversity of languages, indigenous people, and a complex multiplicity of indigenous cultural, religious and social practices, albeit on a much smaller geographical space. Also similar in both countries is the existence of spiritual-ecological beliefs dating back centuries, with nature at their center. In Bhutan, this is referred to as the animistic Bon religion, and in Madagascar, it is referred to as indigenous or animistic beliefs, with different local names given in specific cultural contexts across the great big island. In both contexts, these beliefs continue to co-exist, if not inter-mix with the influx of larger organized religious traditions over time – Vajrayāna

Buddhism in Bhutan, and Christianity in Madagascar, with existence of a small minority of Hinduism in both countries, in addition to a small minority of Islam in Madagascar.

While stark contrasts exist in terms of absolute population numbers, both countries are characterized by a predominantly rural-based population. While the population of Bhutan was 784,043 people in 2025 (NSB, 2025), in contrast, the population of Madagascar was 25,674,196 in 2018 (Institut National de le Statistique [INSTAT], 2018) and approximated to be 31,195, 932 in 2023 (FAO, 2025), which means Bhutan's population is a mere 2.51 percent of that of Madagascar based on the most current data available. Madagascar's estimated rural population of 20,731,294 and urban population of 4 942 902, indicates that 19.3 percent of the population lives in urban areas and 80.7 percent lives in rural areas (INSTAT, 2018). Similarly in Bhutan, approximately 452,178 of people in live in rural areas and 274,967 people live in urban areas, indicating that 62.19 percent of the population lives in rural areas and 37.81 percent live in urban areas (NSB, 2025). Hence, both countries are characterized by a predominantly rural population, where agriculture and the management of natural resources is of central importance in terms of sustaining livelihoods.

According to the World Bank, GDP (Gross Domestic Product) is the recognized national indicator of economic health and progress, and according to this classification, Bhutan and Madagascar occupy different positions in conventionally imagined development trajectories. For Bhutan in 2023, it estimated that GDP was USD 3.02 billion, GDP per capita was USD 3,839.4 in 2023, and annual GDP growth was 4.9 percent (World Bank, 2025). For Madagascar in the same year, GDP was USD 17.42 billion, GDP per capita was USD 545, and annual GDP growth was 4.2 percent (World Bank, 2025). Put another way, the GDP per capita of Bhutan is 7.05 times more than that of Madagascar, which according to the IMF and the World Bank's classification, qualifies Bhutan as a lower middle-income country (MIC), and Madagascar as a least developed country (LDC). This is because Madagascar's GDP per capita is calculated as being less than 1,135 USD, and Bhutan's GDP per capita is more than this but below 4,495 USD, the thresholds determined by the IMF and World Bank. Further, those living under the poverty line of 3 USD per day in 2022 in Bhutan was 0.01 per cent, with an overall poverty rate of 12.4 percent, and in Madagascar 87.7 percent of the population lived under

the poverty line of 3 USD per day in 2022, with an overall poverty rate of 75.2 percent in 2024 (World Bank, 2024). However, as discussed below and elsewhere (Verma 2025, 2017), measures such as GDP and GDP per capita obscure and exclude other important understandings and indicators of wellbeing on the one hand, and environmental degradation and erosion of socio-cultural cohesion on the other.

Major livelihood practices in both nations center on rural agriculture, rice cultivation, livestock-rearing and non-formal and informal work. In both countries, formal economic industries include tourism, mining, hydro-electricity generation, agriculture, cement, alcohol beverages and handicrafts. In Madagascar, industries such as fishing, meat processing, seafood, automobile assembly, petroleum, soap, leather and glassware play an important role, and in Bhutan, wood products, processed fruits, calcium carbide, and tourism based on religious pilgrimage play an important role. A sector-wise composition shows that Bhutan's GDP in 2024 is estimated to comprise 15.0 percent from agriculture, 29.4 percent in industry and 52.8 percent in services whereas in Madagascar in 2024 it is estimated to be 22.5 percent in agriculture, 22.8 percent in industry and 47.7 percent in services (World Bank, 2024). While these macro-economic indicators paint a broad-brush comparative picture of Bhutan and Madagascar, they tell us very little about wellbeing, environmental sustainability, socio-cultural practices or mindfulness, a subject I now turn to, and further critically analyze in relation to international development in the conclusion.

Mindfulness, Wellbeing and Environmental Consciousness: A Comparative Analysis

Mindfulness plays a central role in bringing about environmental consciousness and wellbeing in the highlands of Madagascar and Bhutan. Mindfulness refers to a deeper level of awareness about the central importance of sustaining the environment, and the closely intertwined inter-relation between nature, humans, and more-than-humans in bringing about wellbeing.

Here, I focus on the inter-relation between mindfulness, wellbeing and environmental consciousness through three areas of enquiry: rice cultivation, spiritual-ecological landscapes and the inter-relationship between humans, sentient beings and more-than-humans. In future iterations of this cross-comparative study, I will expand on the exploration of intangible indigenous socio-cultural practices (i.e.,

rituals, kinship, gender and courtship practices, etc.) and tangible socio-cultural forms (architecture, cuisine, environmental and agricultural practices) in relation to wellbeing, climate impacts and political-ecological dimensions.

Rice Cultivation

One striking similarity in both Bhutan and Madagascar are the highland rice terraces painstakingly carved into the sides of its mountains and carpeted across mountain valleys. Similarly vibrant colors are splashed through the seasons across the landscape, from the silver blue sky reflected in the water-inundated rice terraces, to the neon green of newly planted rice seedlings, the deep green of the young rice stalks, the golden beige of mature rice, and the deep brown soil in the rice beds that await planting in between seasons.

In both contexts, there exists deep localized indigenous knowledge regarding the environment, and by extension, the management of natural resources. Both countries engage in rice cultivation, including highly nutritious red rice, where rice plays a central role in the national cuisine, and interestingly, as do chillis. A meal without rice is not a meal, and it is often eaten three times a day, and shared amongst family members, visitors, colleagues and friends. In remote and high-altitude highland mountain locales in Bhutan, where rice is not produced but rather traded or bought, it has increasingly become integrated into socio-cultural practices of everyday life. The eating and sharing of rice is not merely an act of consuming rice as food, but strengthens social bonds and relations, and increases mindfulness towards one another in the shared act of eating communally.

The physical landscape of highland rice terracing, painstakingly carved into the mountainside follows its geographical curves and that of low-lying valleys, is strikingly similar in both countries. Rice fields are deeply valued, as a natural, livelihood and cultural resource, although climate change is impacting rice cultivation in both contexts due to erratic weather and water availability, as well as climate shocks such as hailstorms, windstorms, excessive frost, droughts and rainstorms that destroy crops. Added to this are issues of increased pests, diseases and human-wild life conflict, all of which make rice cultivation more unpredictable than ever. Before the effects of climate change, annual patterns of rice cultivation, whether one or two harvests per year, were based on traditional rice cultivation practices that closely followed the seasons and rainfall patterns. Over time and increasingly,

counter-season vegetables grown on or adjacent to rice fields, became part of rice cultivation practices.

Rice cultivation relies on collective and reciprocal labour arrangements and draught animal power to plough the fields, where the gender division of labour is similar in both contexts in terms of transplantation, weeding, harvesting, threshing, storage and processing of rice. The intense care and labour involved in rice cultivation requires careful monitoring, tending, knowledge and intimate connection to the rice fields, as a living life force. No one rice field is similar to another, and intimate localized knowledge is critical for rice cultivation, whereby soil conditions, slopes and micro-conditions exist between rice fields, and even within the same bed or terrace. This connection between humans and their environments, requires a form of mindfulness, and of environmental consciousness based on indigenous knowledge, and of care. Rice is not merely a staple crop, or a mere productive, capitalist commodity to be traded and sold – although increasingly it is also seen as such by certain institutions - it is simultaneously at the heart of cultural practices and ritual practices, where rice is offered as a sacred grain in Buddhist altars and rituals in Bhutan, and in sacred rituals aimed at honoring, respecting and recalling the ancestors in Madagascar. In some contexts, rice continues to be accepted as a form of barter, thus building and maintaining social relations, and averting the increasingly capitalist trend that diminishes and narrows such complex and seminal social relations to that of mere cash. Thus, in both contexts, rice cultivation is not merely a matter of “production”, land is not merely a “commodity”, and nature cannot be reduced solely as the object of “extractivism”. Rather, they are at the heart of mindfulness and wellbeing.

Spiritual-Ecological Landscapes and More Than Human Relationships

What is perhaps most striking are the similarities of the effects of spiritual-ecological beliefs on conserving and protecting of environmental locales. In the Central Highlands of Madagascar, it is believed that the spirits of the ancestors reside in certain locales and niches in the natural environment. Some spirits are benevolent, some are malicious, and yet others may become angry because traditions, or *fady*, are not followed or respected as they have been instructed by the ancestors. By comparison, in Bhutan, elements of the physical environment, such as rivers, streams, springs, lakes, trees, forests, mountains, rocks and other natural spaces are inhabited by spirits, or

deities, who similarly, are either benevolent or malicious. While the specific cosmological beliefs and attributing factors vary across the two nations, the end effect is somewhat similar in that environmental spaces are either avoided and thus protected and conserved, or they are intended to be used with great care and deference in order to ensure that human engagement of the environment remains closely interconnected, respectful and sustainable.

In both cases, the existence of spirits or deities is a critical reminder to the living that they are neither alone, nor at the center of the universe. Their interactions, thus, are interdependent and have effects on the natural environment and on other sentient beings. It is also a reminder of the critical human-environment relationship plays in sustaining the planet, one which includes not just human beings, but also sentient beings and more-than-humans. Viewed from this perspective, the spirits and deities are intended to play a key role in invoking mindfulness in humans, and highlighting the connection humans have with the natural environment. In other words, they bring about environmental consciousness.

More-than-humans play other critical roles. Madagascar, often referred to as the land of the ancestors, illustrates this point. This is because the ancestors, that is, the spirits of the ancestors, shape life for the living in a multiplicity of ways. Nothing, absolutely nothing, is carried out in the present day without consulting the ancestors. Here, a short vignette from my fieldwork illustrates the powerful sway of the ancestors in shaping everyday life and decision-making.

During one of my many participant observation visits with Edouard, a 50-year-old farmer, I noticed he was using a very old, worn and well-used Betsileo hoe, or *jembe*. When I asked him about it, he proudly held up the *jembe*, and with a sweeping gesture of his hand indicating the stunning backdrop of the multi-terraced rice fields abundant with rice cultivated in the “traditional Betsileo way” behind him, explained, “see this *jembe*, it once belonged to my grandfather. See these rice fields, they once belonged to him as well”. Rice cultivation implements such as the *jembe* and the rice fields themselves were passed down from his ancestors, and have been in his family for several generations. They are cultivated in the same manner and using the same knowledge of his ancestors. This is a point of immense pride. This pride is symbolic of the honour and respect that Edouard gives to his ancestors. It recognizes their lives and accomplishments, even though they are no longer living. Such *fomba* [the Betsileo way of doing

things], centres on inheritance, the engagement of land, tools, practices and knowledge about rice cultivation in the same way as his ancestors, also challenges our assumptions about the logic and pace of modern change. (Verma, 2009, pp. 115-116).

Betsileo life, livelihood practices and management of the natural resources are full of many customs, norms and “the Betsileo way of doing things” (*fomba*), as well as many taboos, rules and regulations (*fady*) that inform and direct daily action, practice and its inter-relation to rice cultivation, nature and the environment. The connection between the present and the past is mediated through the ancestors, who have put into place many *fomba* and *fady* for the living to follow as a symbolic gesture of respect towards them, to the acknowledgement of their continued presence in everyday life, and as a modality of continued indigenous practices that are in balance with nature. Ancestors who are forgotten become angry and retaliate in many ways. More-than-humans, thus, are present in beliefs, decisions, interactions and practices in very real ways, which literally shape the environment (Verma, 2009). In similar ways, in Bhutan, deities who live in the natural environment, such as in rocks, rivers, trees or corners of an agricultural field or rice terrace, communicate regularly with the living. They demonstrate their wrath and anger when they are ignored or their wishes are transgressed, and show their happiness and gratification when they are supplicated and pacified through rituals that commemorate and observe their important existence, which are performed regularly throughout the year.

Inter-Relationship Between Humans and Sentient Beings

Mindfulness and environmental consciousness in relationship to nature and sentient beings (animals, plants, insects, birds, trees, etc.) is critical for the sustainability of our planet, to combat climate change, and in terms of our ability and opportunity to practice compassion, kindness and wisdom.

Bhutan is known as the Land of the Thunder Dragon. Its very name evokes images and concepts of powerful spiritual forces, and of enlightened beings. Sentient beings hold a special place in Bhutan in terms of social and cultural values, spiritual beliefs, as well as policymaking at the national level which in turn influences conservation, biodiversity, natural resource management, and climate change adaptation. The Constitution of Bhutan stipulates that 60 percent of its surface area must remain under forest cover in perpetuity

(RGoB, 2008), and the government reports achieving higher rates, with estimates of 72 percent of the country under forest cover (National Environment Commission [NEC], 2015). Additionally, the country has allocated several national parks, reserves and biodiversity corridors to enable the movement of wildlife and biodiversity to allow for natural patterns of migration of multiple species across its landscape. Environmental policy efforts have recently been expanded on the international stage to now include the new G-Zero climate mitigation commitment initiative discussed earlier.

Bhutan's landscape is also inhabited by human beings, some of whom are sedentary and practice agriculture, some who are semi-nomadic highland pastoralists, while others live in the ever-expanding urban sprawl of its capital Thimphu and smaller cities such as Paro, Punakha, Puntsholing, Bumthang and other towns. The acceleration of the impacts of climate change has exacerbated the negative effects of development, sedentarization and urbanization, leading to ever-increasing human-wildlife conflicts. This is where mindfulness becomes critical. Human reactions to human-wildlife conflicts vary in nature, intensity, and in terms of environmental consciousness. They range from reactionary impulses that enact anger, violence or attack animals who did not play a hand in bringing about the climate crises or the enclosure of the commons, but whose migratory patterns, habitats and food sources are shifting and becoming scarce with the onslaught of climate change and expanding human settlements, urban sprawl and fencing - to more compassionate, kind and benevolent responses based on the understanding that natural spaces are mutually shared between humans and other sentient beings. If we extend mindfulness and compassion towards ignorance in terms of the Buddhist definition of the words, we might contextualize such compulsion in terms of the human impetus to protect their homes, crops and pastures, and to avoid suffering. However, when reactions translate to the senseless slaughter, violence and harm to innocent animals who are equally trying to survive and avoid suffering in an unpredictable climate and environmental context, but which is nonetheless brought on by destructive human activity, they take on negative karmic meaning and consequences for human beings in particular. In places such as Bhutan and Madagascar, which are experiencing and suffering from harmful, damaging human activity predominantly and disproportionately generated by the global north (with the "global north" understood as both a geographical space, as well as a socio-economic space occupied

by elites in the global north as well as the global south), far beyond its fair share of carbon emissions, we are also reminded about the lop-sided nature of the responsibility for climate change.

Humans also generate harm to sentient beings in other ways. While The Je Khenpo, Bhutan's highest ranking religious leader, issued a *kasho* (edict) banning the sacrifice of animals in religious rituals, the consumption of meat continues to generate much debate, discussion and introspection. Buddhist values, ethics and moral concepts come into contradiction if not in conflict with such practices, further illustrating negative elements of desire, grasping and the direct generation the suffering of those more-than-human. This is a well-articulated field of enquiry, reflection and analysis in both scholarly and Buddhist literature, as overviewed by Miyamoto et al. (2021). The practice of eating meat is varied in Bhutan, with estimates that 59.1 percent of rural households produce meat (NSB, 2022), and 58.2% of households in Bhutan consume beef in particular (Dawa, 2014). To avoid the negative karma of slaughtering animals for meat consumption is "circumvented" (at best) or "off-loaded" (at worst) through a loophole that attributes the negative karma of killing animals to those people working in the Indian and Australian slaughter meat industries. However, from a mindfulness perspective, these contradictions are less likely smoothed out, given that Bhutan, unlike a few decades ago, both produces and imports a wide range and quantity of vegetables that could potentially avoid the necessity of killing and consumption of animals.

In contrast, in Madagascar, the slaughter of cattle (*zebu*) for meat consumption is common and appears less morally contentious. The sacrifice of *zebu* continues in the Central Highlands, especially during important social events and rituals, such as funerals, weddings and other significant cultural events. There is less of a moral "contradiction", as the sacrifice and consumption of *zebu*, according to oral history and cultural understanding, was meant to replace "eating of the dead" of the deceased person's mortal remains by members of their family (a custom that avoided their decomposition, waste or co-option of mortal remains for witchcraft) with eating the flesh of *zebu* (Verma, 2009, p. 138). The consumption of beef, thus, is central feature of cultural and culinary practices in the highlands of Madagascar, with no limiting moral dilemma from a local spiritual-cultural perspective.

Human-wildlife interaction is a subject that has garnered a great deal of published scholarly research and crucial policy-relevant research that forefront policy-responses, compensation mechanisms

and legal framings of the rights of nature. It is also a rich area of research for mindfulness studies, in relation to environment consciousness and the central role of sentient beings in sustaining nature, and thus enabling life on earth for humans. Recent scientific research has pushed the boundaries of what is meant by “sentience”, and therefore helped to nuance if not resolve a long-standing debate within Buddhism itself. Western scientific methods, for instance, suggest that trees and plants could be considered sentient, as they communicate with one another through underground networks of roots and aerial transmissions, thus helping to sustain one another or warn each other of pending danger. Such scientific studies are just now catching up with what indigenous people around the world have already known for millennia: that nature speaks, if we care to listen. It is intimately inter-connected and enables the survival of natural resources and sentient beings on which human beings in turn depend for their very survival.

The central question to which I now turn, centers on why have we, as human beings, stopped listening to nature, to other sentient beings, and those beyond the human? Why do we continue to ignore multi-species and inter-species relations and privilege the rights, cravings and desires of certain humans over others, and the rights of humans in general over the rights of other sentient beings - ironically, to our own peril as a species, and as a planet?

Battlegrounds of Development Knowledge

It has long been argued that at the interface of theory of practice in international development, there exist many conundrums, or battlefields of knowledge (Long & Long, 1992). International development is deeply contested, often because it has privileged western capitalist modes of knowledge that are skewed towards individualism, competition and “winner-takes-all” approaches. Most important to this paper, is the way it enables environmental exploitation, extraction and destruction, in the name of ‘development’. This is important to both the case of Bhutan and Madagascar.

When we take an alternative path away from the mainstream and analyze development from the lens of mindfulness – and of compassion, kindness and wisdom – it becomes possible to see that such critical elements are often missing, and entirely outside the framing of conventional development approaches. For instance, they

are missing from the sustainable development goals (SDGs), IPCC reports, and from the majority of development reports, policies and projects (Verma 2017b). In the rush to achieve the bottom line of GDP growth-at-all-costs, a great deal has been left on the wayside, including our collective conscience as human beings with genuine concerns and commitments towards the wellbeing of the environment, and those more-than-human.

While some development approaches, models and institutions have slowly but finally begun to acknowledge the importance of wellbeing in the lives and for the people they are meant to serve, that is, the “end beneficiaries” of development, they continue to lag behind in mindfulness approaches. This is likely due to heavy institutional mandates, bureaucratic exigencies, narrow economic-growth models, the short time periods and fast-paced nature of projects, and the technical, technocentric and human-centric methods that strip away the inclusion of any and all references to culture, spirituality, subjective wellbeing, mindfulness and the rights of nature. This is despite repeated calls by indigenous communities and global south nations for their inclusion, and the central importance of sentient beings and more-than-humans in indigenous and global south cosmological understanding of the environment, the planet and the universe.

The case of Madagascar illustrates that over many years of narrow development approaches based on narrow measures of GDP and technocentric methods, indigenous knowledge and mindful beliefs and values based on fundamental links to the ancestors have been forced to go “underground”. They are often hidden by local communities from outsiders for fear of condescending judgement by agents of development, whether foreign and urban elite. Indeed, from the colonial period onwards, such indigenous beliefs were described in belittling, colonial terms, invoking discourses of “backwardness”, “ignorance” and “primitive” (Verma, 2009). In the contemporary period, rapid field mission visits of projects by development experts often omit, neglect or mis-interpret socio-cultural and spiritual relations and realities based on hurried interaction and shallow quantitative survey methods (Verma, 2009). In contrast, deep ethnographic methods have demonstrated that such indigenous beliefs and values continue to thrive, and orient everyday decision-making and policies.

The case of Bhutan demonstrates the emergence of a different and unique situation, critically associated with its history of averting formal colonization by European powers. Thus, unburdened and unbridled by

the baggage of formal European colonial imposition, discourses and interventions of most other nation states in the global south, Bhutan has been at the forefront of championing wellbeing and happiness approaches in its articulation and conceptualization of a development alternative, most famously captured by Gross National Happiness (GNH). As I have argued elsewhere, GNH is many things at once, ranging from a moral concept, guiding principles, conceptual framework for alternative development and an index of measurement, to the manifestation of policy-making, individual practice, international influence, and the secularization of Buddhist concepts (Verma, 2020b). However, the engagement of GNH in Bhutan has also been debated, contested and sometimes discounted, depending on differing perspectives over time. This itself represents thriving ground for academic research, scholarship and critique. That Bhutan simultaneously measures the narrow measure of GDP as well as the holistic measure of GNH, itself represents the co-existence of two very different sets of concepts, beliefs and values often at odds with one another. The social contract between the state and its citizens, as conceptually underlying in the notion of GNH, requires a deep sense of mindfulness, compassion, kindness and wisdom. As Bhutan negotiates the forces of GDP-centric capitalism, its alternative path of GNH simultaneously struggles against concepts that reduce ‘development’ to a technical operation, represented by the hallow, and narrow economic measure of GDP. In this way, GDP is fundamentally at odds with the notion of wellbeing (in the deeper sense of the word), and correspondingly, with mindfulness. It is human-centric in its conceptualization, and even so, only in service, benefit and to the advantage of a small, narrow group of humans (mostly elite, men, urban, and global north).

It is also worth noting that GDP rests on the assumption of sedentary and agricultural societies, and has no way to account for nomadic, pastoralist or indigenous communities. Nor does it have room for qualitative and ethnographic methods, ethical dimensions, or accounting for the widening socio-economic inequalities and assaults on nature that result in the blind pursuit of GDP-centric capitalism. GDP statistics do not capture informal or nonformal livelihoods and forms of trade which many rural, economically poor and women-headed households in particular rely on. Nor do they account for the unpaid care work mostly performed by women and girls. Most importantly, neither do statistics contained within GDP shed light on

critically important elements of life, often subjective, that bring about wellbeing, socio-cultural cohesion, or environmental sustainability and consciousness involving complex multi-being relations between humans and more-than-humans.

The case of Madagascar and Bhutan remind us that while the forces of GDP-centric capitalism that strip all environmental, cultural, social, spiritual and sentience from its narrow measurement, there is hope. These two pathbreaking G-Zero nations remind us that some places and people continue to resist the forces of globalization and development through the important values placed on beliefs and practices that value nature, environmental consciousness and inter-species relations – the stuff of spirituality and indigenous knowledge, and of critical important, the stuff of mindfulness, compassion, kindness and wisdom.

It would be remiss of me not to mention that both Bhutan and Madagascar, besides being critical biodiversity and cultural hot spots, are known as nations of kind, generous and warm-hearted people. These unique attributes attract visitors, tourists, students, researchers, and practitioners from around the world. This is the case in many of my own interactions in both countries, but as with all human interaction, with some exceptions. Some patterns I observed that deep social relations, connections to nature, the environment and other sentient beings, and everyday practices of mindfulness and by extension kindness, empathy and compassion, seem to have an inverse relationship to increasing urbanism, capitalism, neoliberalism, a narrow cash-based economies, and the capture of wealth and resources by elites. Indeed, my research also documented instances of where the lack of mindfulness led some individuals, development institutions and civil society organizations to act unethically and immorally, in direct contradiction to tenets of compassion, kindness and wisdom.

One example of where the lack of mindfulness serves negative emotions and actions, is the case of tourism. Both Bhutan and Madagascar are rife with examples of where foreign and national tourists who travel to remote indigenous communities demonstrate a lack of mindfulness, and therefore respect and care, towards those communities and their fragile environments. This ranges from the generation of trash (an increasing problem as tourists importunately use and leave behind plastic bottles, wrappers, packaging and other waste), polluting tourism that continues to use fossil fuel vehicles that generate carbon emissions, unbridled and unchecked environmentally

destructive construction of tourist infrastructure, to disrespecting tourists that show disdain or lack of respect towards local cultural practices, sacred sites, customs and local people themselves. Unfortunately, the expansion of certain types of tourism into remote highland communities has seen the rapid uptake, if not the co-option of wellbeing and mindfulness, thus becoming commodified, commercialized and therefore hallowed of important indigenous values and moral concepts.

Towards Mindful Development

Human activity everywhere is hastening to destroy key elements of the natural ecosystems all living beings depend on. These threatening developments are drastic and shocking. It is hard to imagine all this actually happening in our lifetime, and in the lives of our children. We must deal with the prospect of global suffering and environmental degradation unlike anything in human history. If we can begin to act with genuine compassion for all, we still have a window of opportunity to protect each other and our natural environment. This will be far easier than having to adapt to the severe and unimaginable environmental conditions projected for a “hothouse” climate. On close examination, the human mind, the human heart, and the human environment are inseparably linked together. We must recognize we have brought about a climate emergency in order to generate the understanding and higher purpose we need now. On this basis we can create a viable future — sustainable, lasting, peaceful co-existence. (His Holiness the Dalai Lama, 2009, p. 21)

Mindfulness has long been at the heart of Buddhist concepts and practice. It is key to enlightenment, as well as the central but everyday Buddhist practices of mindful awareness, compassion, kindness and wisdom. Yet, mindfulness is not yet in the lexicon of international development. When it appears, as it sometimes does in the private or corporate sector, it is often used as an empty term, tied to opportunistically serve the need for greater “productivity”, “profit” and “adoption” of interventions designed and conceptualized in capitals of the global north that are often ill-suited for indigenous and spiritually-oriented global south communities. And yet there is a great deal for the global north can learn from the global south regarding mindfulness as it relates to holistic development and environmental consciousness, not just in service to humans, but all sentient beings and those more than

human that provide the cosmological logic for sustaining nature. In order to achieve this, the north-south relationship must be respectful, mutually beneficial and on equal terms, and work equally in both directions. Here, the global south, as noted earlier, refers to geographical space as well as a socio-economic space, whereby both occupy the periphery of relations of power; and the global north refers to spaces of geopolitical and elite privilege.

The interface between environmental consciousness and development is an unfolding space of reflection, with great potential for future research, policymaking and practice in relation to holistic development, mindfulness and environmental consciousness. Here, I reflect on potential avenues for these domains, which are by no means an exhaustive list.

Research is critical for expanding our understanding of environmental consciousness in different contexts. This comparative study, for instance, represented the first time I brought analysis of fieldwork in Bhutan with that of Madagascar. In doing so, cross-country comparative analysis allowed for analysis and emergence of issues that would not have emerged if the analysis remained focused on one country alone. Comparative analysis, or research in contexts we are not familiar with, as anthropologists have long known, helps to shift and expand our minds from known and familiar contexts, to unknown and unfamiliar ones. In doing so, our potential capacity for observation, reflexivity and mindfulness of new contexts grows, as does our potential to reflexively observe, analyze and reflect on our own context and circumstances. More generally, in terms of future research, potential subjects could include: exploring the way discourses of mindfulness vary from practice, including the way they are co-opted and represent “empty”, “selfish” or profit-seeking actions; the emerging field of sentience studies that expand our understanding of what/who is sentient (i.e. trees, plants, etc.) and the critical role they play in sustaining the earth; documenting inter-generational risks of loss of biodiversity, environmental landscapes, ecosystems, cultural practices and indigenous cosmological knowledge in the global south developed over generations that have helped to conserve the environment, and a balanced interconnection between humans, sentient beings and more-than-humans; and strengthening ethnographic methods that further our understanding of human-sentient and human-environmental relations, as well as rigorous research that centers mindfulness as both knowledge and as method.

There are important considerations for policy as well. For instance this could include: considering that just as science can learn from Buddhism notions of compassion, kindness, mindfulness and wisdom, so can development similarly learn from indigenous knowledge; policy-making that centers the inclusion of indigenous values, concepts and practices of mindfulness in development, climate change, environmental sustainability and climate loss and damage policies, would help to increase awareness about the destructive and climate emitting impacts of human activities and actions on sentient beings and the environment; and considering that legal recognition of the rights of nature, of sentient beings, and sacred landscapes, through statutory legal frameworks, will help to protect them and give them a legal standing to push back against hegemonic forces, actors and institutions that work against environmental consciousness and sustainability.

Without a change of mindset that leads to individual and collective practice, it will be difficult to bring about change. I have earlier mentioned how mindfulness, compassion, kindness and deep-rooted wisdom is often missing from development. In order to address this gap, it will be important to consider: training and changing organizational practices and behavioral change that centers mindfulness in development projects, initiatives and strategies, including the importance of ethics, respect, compassion and kindness; strengthening linkages to the global moving beyond growth and degrowth movement, in terms of breaking from narrow GDP-centric capitalist and neoliberal framings, concepts, policies and modes of measuring 'progress'; and at every turn, reinforcing the notion that human thriving and planetary flourishing already exist within indigenous knowledge and moral concepts that centrally stress interconnectedness, harmony and balance with our planet and those more-than-human. This requires not only a sense of recognition of such pre-existing knowledge, but also ethics, respect, as well as kindness, compassion, mindfulness, and most of all, wisdom and good intention.

The efforts of the G-Zero nations also remind us of the importance of shifting from an individual focus of development, towards collective wellbeing approaches, and of the importance of working collaboratively through collective action. The efforts of Bhutan and Madagascar, as G-Zero countries, echo their commitment to collectively joining forces with other countries to remain carbon negative and carbon neutral, as a pathway towards combatting climate change and remaining committed to environmental sustainability and

consciousness. Moving forward, it will be important for development organizations, institutions, actors and policies to explore ways development could become more reflexive and mindful. It will be vital to decolonize habitual patterns, therefore allowing development actors to become more mindful of their roles, impacts (those that are intended, as well as those that are unintended), responsibilities towards indigenous communities, and ultimately, to opening new possibilities for mindfulness, compassion and kindness as an antidote to an increasingly fractured world.

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གསང་སྤྲུག་ལམ་སྐོར་འཇུག་བྱེད་དཔྱད་པ་མུ་ཉིག་འཕྲེང་བ།

ཕུན་ཚོགས་ཚུལ་འཛིན།⁴¹

སྐོན་འགྲོ།

ཚན་རིག་གི་འཕེལ་ཁ་རབ་ཏུ་རྒྱས་པའི་ ཏུས་རབས་གསར་པའི་མི་བྱ་རྒྱུས་ རྣམ་དཔྱོད་གི་མི་ལྟེ་འབར་བཞིན་པའི་
སྐབས་འདིར་མི་རིགས་འདྲ་མིན་དབར་ཁ་ཐག་ཇི་ཉེར་ཕྱིན་པ་ནི་མངོན་མཐོང་ལག་ཟེན་རེད།དེ་འདྲ་ཡིན་ཅིང་འཛམ་གླིང་
ཤར་ཏུབ་ཀྱི་མི་རྒྱུས་གདེང་ཆ་གཅིག་ཏུ་འཛོམས་ནས། བྱོན་པ་ཕན་ཚུན་བསམ་སློབ་ཤིང་ཤིང་དང་། ལྷན་པ་མཐའ་ནང་
ཕན་ཚུན་དང་། ལྷ་སྐབ་ནང་ཕན་ཚུན་དཔྱད་བསྟུར་གྱི་ཞིབ་འཇུག་བསྐྱོད་མེད་ཀྱི་སྐབས་སུ་ཞིབ་འཇུག་བཟང་པོ་ཞིག་དང་
ཀྱན་སྐྱོང་བཟང་པོ་ཞིག་གི་ཐོག་ནས་ བྱ་གཞག་གསར་སྐྱོན་བྱས་པ་ཡིན་ན་འབྲས་བུ་བཟང་པོ་ཞིག་འབྱུང་ངེས་རེད་ཞེས་
སློབ་གཤེན་ལ་དགོས། བོད་གངས་ཅན་ལྗོངས་ཀྱི་རིག་གནས་ཀྱི་བརྒྱུད་རིམ་ཐད་ལ་བཤད་ན་གཡུང་རྩུང་བོན་གྱི་ལོ་རྒྱུས་
ནི་མེད་དུ་མི་རུང་བ་ཞིག་ཡིན་པ་ནི་ མཁའ་ཡུངས་རྣམས་ལ་ཁྱེ་མ་དགོས་པ་རེད་བོད་རང་གི་རིག་གནས་ཀྱི་རོ་བོ་དང་
རྒྱབ་ལྗོངས་ལ་གཞིགས་ན་བོན་གྱི་ལྷ་སྐབ་དང་རིག་གནས་དག་ཚོས་ལུགས་བྱེ་བྲག་པ་གཅིག་གི་རིག་གནས་ཅིམ་མིན་
པ་ཁ་བ་རི་པའི་ཐུན་མོང་གི་མེས་པོའི་ཤེས་རིག་ལ་ངོས་འཛིན་བྱེད་ཐུབ་པ་ཡིན་ན་ རང་གཞན་གཉིས་ཕན་རེད་འདུག་
སྟུང་། གཡུང་རྩུང་བོན་གྱི་ཚོས་རིག་ནི་རྒྱ་དཀར་ནག་གི་རིག་གནས་ཀྱི་ཆ་ཤས་ཡིན་སྐོར་སྐབས་བདེའི་འབྲེལ་བཤད་
ཅིམ་མིན་པ། འདིའི་ལོ་རྒྱུས་ཐོག་གི་མི་སྣ་དང་དེབ་ཐེར་ལ་དབྱེ་ཞིབ་ནན་པོ་བྱེད་ཐུབ་ན་བོད་རང་ཡུལ་གྱི་རིག་གནས་
གསོན་པོའི་རོ་གདོང་ངོས་གསལ་བྱུག་ལྷག་པར་དུ་ནང་པའི་ཚོས་སླུ་བ་ཡོངས་ཀྱིས་དབྱེ་ཞིབ་ཚགས་ཚུད་བྱ་རྒྱུ་ནི་དང་
ད་ལྟོ་ཐུག་ཏུ་བབས་པའི་འགན་འཁུ་སྤྱི་མོ་ཞིག་ཆགས་ཡོད་དེ་འདྲ་ཡིན་ཅིམ་ ད་ལན་གུས་མའི་བོན་གྱི་ལུགས་ལ་
སྤྲུག་བྱོན་པ་ནས་བཤད་སྐད་སྐད་ཀྱི་ཡོད་མེད་སྐོར་ཅུང་ཟད་སྐྱོད་ཀྱི་ལུ་ཡིན།

⁴¹ ཁ་ཆ་མཐོ་སྐྱོབ་ཀྱི་དགོ་རྒྱུན་

ནང་དོན་གནད་བསྟུལ།

དེ་ཡང་སྤྱིར་གསལ་སྤྲུགས་ཞེས་པའི་ཚིག་འབྲི་གཉིས་ལ་འབྲེལ་བཤད་རྒྱག་སྤངས་མ་འདྲ་བ་ཡོད་ལ། སྤྲུགས་ཞེས་པའི་ཚིག་འདི་ལ་འང་གོ་ས་མང་པོ་ཡོད། དང་པོ། གསལ་སྤྲུགས་ཞེས་པའི་དོན་ནི་ “མ་གོ་ལོག་ལྟ་རྣམས་ལ་གསལ་ལས་ཅན་དོན་མི་གཏོང་ལ་བསྟུགས། གསལ་སྤྲུགས་ཞེས་སྤྲུགས་པ་ཡིན།” ཞེས་གསུངས་པ་དང་། ཡང་གཞུང་དེ་ཉིད་ལས་ “དེས་ཚིག་ལོག་གེས་ཅན་ལ་གསལ་། ཐབས་རྒྱུད་གེས་རབ་དམན་ལ་གསལ་། དང་ལྷན་དབང་པོ་རྣེ་ལ་བསྟུགས།” ཞེས་གསུངས། གསལ་སྤྲུགས་ཀྱི་དོན་མི་གོ་བའི་སྤྱོད་པོ་འགའ་ཐབས་ཆེན་ལ་སྤྱོད་པར་གེས་རབ་དམན་པས་གསལ་དགོས་པར་བཤད་ གཉིས་པ་སྤྲུགས་ཀྱི་དེས་ཚིག་ནི། “འགྲོ་བའི་དོན་ལ་བསྟུགས་པའི་སྤྲུགས། །བྱང་རྒྱལ་སྤྱིར་བར་བསྟུགས་པས་སྤྲུགས། །ཕྱིན་ལས་འགྲུབ་པར་བསྟུགས་པས་སྤྲུགས།” ཞེས་གསུངས།

མདོ་སྤྲུགས་སེམས་གསུམ་བསྟན་པའི་སྐབས་ཀྱི་སྤྲུགས་དང་། རྒྱས་བརྗོད་ཀྱི་སྤྲུགས་ལ་སོགས་པ་ལ་གོ་བ་ཡོད་པས། ཀུན་འདུས་རིན་ཆེན་རྩ་རྒྱུད་ཀྱི་འབྲེལ་བ་ཉི་ཐེར་དྲ་བ་ལས། “སྤྲུགས་ཞེས་པ་ལ་གསུམ་སྟེ། སྤྲུགས་ཀྱི་རོ་བོ་དང་། དེས་ཚིག་དང་། དབྱེ་བའོ། རོ་བོ་ནི་དོན་སྤྱུབ་པའི་རྒྱས་བརྗོད་དོ།” ཞེས་གསུངས། མཚན་ཉིད་འདི་ལྷན་གྱི་སྤྲུགས་ནི། “རྒྱུ་མ་འོར་བ་རྩ་བའི་སྤྲུགས་དང་། བསྐྱེད་པ་ཁྱེན་གྱི་རྩ་བའི་སྤྲུགས་དང་། བརྒྱས་པ་ལས་ཀྱི་སྤྲུགས་དང་། བྱུང་མཐོང་མ་ཡིན་པ་རྩ་བའི་སྤྲུགས་སོ། དེ་ལ་རྒྱུ་མ་འོར་ནི་ལྟ་རྣམས་བསྐྱེད་པའི་རྒྱུ་རྩ་བའི་ཡིག་འབྲུའོ། སྟིང་པོའི་ལྟ་བསྐྱེད་པ་རྣམས་ལ་བསྐྱེད་པ་ཁྱེན་གྱི་སྤྲུགས་སོ། བརྒྱས་པ་ལས་ཀྱི་སྤྲུགས་ནི་འཛོལ་དང་སྟིང་པོའོ།” ཞེས་གསུངས་པས། སྐབས་འདི་བསྟན་གྱི་སྤྲུགས་ནི་ཡི་དམ་ཕྱི་ནང་གསལ་གསུམ་གྱི་བསྟེན་འཛོལ་དང་ཆོ་གཟུངས་འོར་གཟུངས་སོགས་ལ་གོ་བར་སེམས། ཡི་དམ་སོ་སའི་སྤྲུགས་ལ་རྣམ་པ་དང་བྱེད་ལས་མ་འདྲ་ཡོད་པའི་རྒྱུ་མཚན་གྱིས་མིང་འདོགས་ཚུལ་ཡང་མ་འདྲ་བ་ཡོད། དཔེར་ན་བསྟངས་སྤྲུགས་དང་རྫོགས་སྤྲུགས་ལྟ་བུའོ། གཞུང་ལུགས་དང་ཉམས་ལེན་གྱི་སྐབས་སུ་གོ་ཚུལ་ནི། “ཡང་དག་པའི་དོན་ཀུན་གཤིབ་རྒྱལ་གྱི་སེམས་ཀྱིས་དུག་ལྡ་ཡེ་ཤེས་སུ་བསྐྱར་བ་ལ་བྱ་སྟེ། ད་ཐོབ་གསལ་སྤྲུགས་ཀྱི་རྒྱུད་སྟེ་འདིས། དུག་ལྡ་ཡེ་ཤེས་སུ་བསྐྱར་བ་སྟོན་ལ། ཞོར་ལ་སྤྲུགས་ཀྱི་རིགས་གཞན་ཐམས་ཅད་ཀྱང་འདིའི་ཡོན་ཏན་དུ་ཆང་པར་སྟོན་པའོ།” ཞེས་དང་། གསལ་ཞེས་པ་ལ་བཞི་སྟེ། “རོ་བོ་གང་གསལ་། ལུལ་གང་ལ་གསལ་། ཚུལ་རི་ལྟར་གསལ་། གཏན་ཆོགས་ཅིའི་ཕྱིར་གསལ་དོ། དེ་ལ་རོ་བོ་ནི། གསལ་སྤྲུགས་ཀྱི་བཀའ་རྒྱུད་རྣམས་གསལ་།” ཞེས་གསུངས་པའི་ཕྱིར།

བསྟན་པའི་དགོས་པ།

འབྲས་བུ་སྤྲུགས་ཀྱི་ཐེག་པ་ལ་གནས་པའི་གང་ཟག་གི་མཚན་ཉིད་ནི། གང་ཟག་གང་ཞིག་ལྟ་སྤྱོད་ཡང་དག་གིས་གཙོ་བོར་ཐོབ་བྱའི་འབྲས་བུ་རྣམ་པ་ལམ་དུ་བྱེད་པའི་ཐེག་པ་ལ་གནས་པའོ། འབྲས་བུ་སྤྲུགས་ཞེས་བརྗོད་པའི་རྒྱུ་མཚན་ནི། ཐེག་རིས་ལས། “འབྲས་བུ་འཛོག་པའི་རྒྱུ་མཚན་རྣམ་པ་བཞི། །སྤྱར་དུ་ཐོབ་བྱེད་རྣམ་པ་གཡང་ལམ་བྱེད། །མ་ཡིན་བཏགས་ནས་བསྐྱོམ་དང་དེ་ཉིད་རང་ལ་སྤྱོད། །དེ་ཕྱིར་འབྲས་བུའི་ཐེག་པ་ཞེས་བྱའོ།” ཞེས་གསུངས་པ་དང་། “འབྲས་

བུ་ཐོབ་པ་ཅིས་དུ་འདྲ་ཡང་འདིས་ནི་འབྲས་བུ་མུར་དུ་ཐོབ་པར་བྱེད་དེ། ཆོག་ཅིག་ཁོ་ན་ལ་སངས་རྒྱས་ཀྱི་ཆེ་བ་སྒྲུབ་དོར་
མེད་པའི་སྐུ་གཡུང་རྒྱུ་བུ་ཐོབ་པའོ། །རྒྱ་ཡི་ཐེག་པ་བས་བསྐལ་པ་བྲངས་མེད་པ་ལྟ་འམ་བདུན་ལས་འབྲས་བུ་མི་ཐོབ་
སྟེ། འབྲས་བུ་ཉིད་ལ་ཉེ་རིང་དང་མཐོ་དམན་ཡོད་པས་འབྲས་བུའི་ཐེག་པ་ཞེས་བྱའོ།” ཞེས་གསུངས་། །སྤྱིར་དལ་
འབྱོར་མི་ལུས་ཐོབ་པ་འདི་ཡང་། ལས་དང་རྒྱུད་རྟ་རྒྱགས་ནས་ཐོབ་པ་མ་ཡིན་ཏེ། ཆོ་སྤྲོད་བསྐྱེད་ནམས་ཆ་མཐུན་གྱི་དགེ་
ཅུ་མང་པོར་སྐྱབ་ནས་ཐོབ་པ་ཡིན་པས། འདི་ཉིད་རྒྱུད་ཐོས་སུ་མི་འགོ་བའི་ཆེད་དུ་སྦྱོར་བ་ཕྱི་མ་རྒྱུགས་པའི་བྱང་རྒྱུབ་
ཐབས་ཀྱི་འཇུག་སྒོ་གྲངས་མང་ན་ཡང་། ཐབས་ཆེ་ལ་སྒོ་ཡངས་པ་དང་། ལམ་བཟོད་མུར་བའམ་ཉེ་བ། སྦྱོར་བ་གཅིག་
གིས་བྱང་རྒྱུབ་པའི་ཐབས་བྱུང་པར་ཅན་ཐེག་པ་ཆེན་པོ་གསལ་སྒྲུགས་ཀྱི་གཞུང་འདི་ཉིད་ཡིན་པས། འདི་ཉིད་ཀྱི་
བསྐྱེད་བཅོས་དེན་རྒྱ་ཆེ་ལ་གཏིང་ཟབ་པས་བརྗོད་པར་དཀའ་ན་འད་གནད་འགག་ཆེ་བས་རང་རྒྱས་གང་ལྟོགས་འབད་
བཅོན་བྱེད་གྱི་ཡིན།

གཞུང་དོན་དོ་མ།

བསྐྱེད་རིམ་དང་རྒྱུགས་རིམ་གྱི་ས་མཆོམས། བསྐྱེད་རིམ་སྒོམ་རྒྱུ། བསྐྱེད་རྒྱུགས་གཉིས་ཀྱི་མཆོན་ཉིད་བསྐྱེད་པ། དབྱེ་
བ་བསྐྱེད་པ། གསལ་སྒྲུགས་འདི་ཡི་ལུགས་ཀྱི་དོན་དམ། སྒྲུགས་ཀྱི་དམ་ཆོག་བསྐྱེད་བའི་ཡོན་ཏན། སྒྲུགས་ཀྱི་དམ་ཆོག་
ཉམས་པའི་རྒྱ། ལུས་ངག་གི་དམ་ཆོག་ཉམས་པའི་རྒྱུན། གསལ་སྒྲུགས་ཀྱི་རྒྱུད་སྤྱོད་ཐེ་མེ་མེའི་དོ་བོ་དོས་བཟུང་བ།

དང་པོ།

“ཡང་གསལ་མ་རྒྱུད་འདིའི་བཞེད་ཀྱིས། ཆོགས་ལམ་ཆོགས་ཀྱིས་བསགས། སྤྱིར་ལམ་བསྐྱེད་རིམ་གྱིས་བཟོད། མཐོང་
ལམ་སྒྲུགས་དང་ཡེ་ཤེས་བཞི་སྤྱིར་གྱིས་བཟོད། བསྐྱེད་ལམ་ལ་གསུམ་སྟེ། ལམ་དུག་ཐབས་ཀྱིས་བཟོད། ཐར་ལམ་
རྟེན་འབྲེལ་གྱིས་བཅད། སྤྱིན་ལམ་དམ་ཆོག་གིས་བྱེད། གྲོལ་ལམ་སྒོམ་པས་ཐོབ་པ་དང་། ཐར་སྤྱིན་གྲོལ་གསུམ་གྱིས་
དག་པའི་ས་གསུམ་ནོན་པར་བྱེད་པའོ།” ཞེས་གསུངས་། བསྐྱེད་རིམ་ནི་ལམ་ལྟ་ལི་ནང་ནས་སྤྱིར་ལམ་ནས་

གཉིས་པ། བསྐྱེད་རིམ་སྒོམ་རྒྱུ་ནི།

“དེ་བཞིན་ཉིད་ཀྱི་ཏིང་འཛིན་དང་། ཀུན་ཏུ་སྤྱིར་གཏིང་འཛིན་དང་། རྒྱ་ཡི་ཏིང་འཛིན་དང་གསུམ། དང་པོ། གནས་ལུགས་
མ་བཅོས་རང་ལུགས་སུ་བཞག་པ་ལ་གོམས་པར་བྱ་བ་དང་། གནས་ལུགས་དེའི་རྒྱུ་སྤར་ལྟ་བུའི་སྐབས་སུ་བཤད་པ་
དེ་བཞིན་ནོ། གཉིས་པ་ཀུན་ཏུ་སྤྱིར་ནི། གནས་ལུགས་དེ་ལྟར་མ་རྟོགས་ནས་ཁམས་གསུམ་དུ་འཁོར། སྒྲུག་བསྐྱེད་ཀྱིས་
མནར་བའི་འགོ་བ་རྒྱུམ་ལ་དམིགས་ཏེ། དེ་རྒྱུམ་ཀྱི་སྒྲུག་བསྐྱེད་དང་བུལ་བའི་བ་དང་ལྷན་ན་ཡིད་སྦྱོར་བའི་རང་བཞིན་
དུ་འབྱུར་སྐྱམས་པའི་དགའ་བ་དང་། དེ་ལྟ་བུའི་རྒྱུ་དེ་བདག་གཞན་གྱིས་ཕྱོགས་མི་འབྱེད་པ་འགྲོ་བ་ཡོངས་ལ་སྦྱོམས་
པར་བྱུང་ན་སྐྱམས་པའི་བཏང་སྦྱོམས་དང་བཞི་པོ་རེ་རེ་ནས་སྒོ་ཡིས་བྱུན་ཅོམ་དང་། ཡིད་ལུལ་དུ་བྱས་ཅོམ་མ་ཡིན་པ་ཡིད་

འཁུལ་བའམ་སྤྱིང་བ་ཐོན་པར་བྱ། དེ་ནས་ཇི་ལྟར་བསྐྱོམ་པའི་དེ་བཞིན་ཉིད་དང་སྤྱིང་ཇི་དེ་ནས་པ་གཉིས་པོའི་རིག་པས་
ཚུགས་མ་ཤོར་བའི་དང་ནས་བདག་མདུན་གཉིས་རིམ་པས་བསྐྱོམ་སྟེ། ཞེས་གསུངས།

གསུམ་པ། བསྐྱེད་ཚྲོགས་གཉིས་ཀྱི་མཚན་ཉིད་བསྟན་པ།

“སྤྱི་ཤི་བར་དོ་གསུམ་ཅི་རིགས་སྤྱིང་བྱེད་དུ་བོན་མཐུན་བྱེད་པར་ཅན་གྱི་སྤྱོད་ནས་ ལམ་གྱི་དངོས་གཞི་བྱེད་པ་གང་ཞིག་
ཡི་དམ་ཚྲོགས་བྱེད་དང་མཉམ་པར་བྱེད་པ་གཉིས་ལས་ བྱི་མའི་མིང་ཅན་གྱི་རྣལ་འབྱོར་དེ་བསྐྱེད་རིམ་གྱི་མཚན་ཉིད།
ཟུར་ལུ་མས་རྒྱུད་ལྷེ་འོག་མའི་མིང་ཅན་གྱི་རྣལ་འབྱོར་དང་ཚྲོགས་བསམ་གསལ་སོགས་ཀྱི་སྤྱིར་བ་གཙོད། བྱི་མས་ཚྲོགས་
རིམ་གྱི་རྣལ་འབྱོར་གཙོད།” ཞེས་གསུངས། ཀྱུ་མཁུཅན་ཤར་ཇུ་པས། “འདི་ལྟར་སྤྱིང་བ་ཐམས་ཅད་ཟག་མེད་ཡེ་ཤེས་
ཀྱི་རོལ་པ་ཡེ་ནས་ཡིན་པ་ལ་ཡིན་པར་གསལ་གདག་ནས་སྤྱི་དང་ཞིང་ཁམས་ཀྱི་སྤྱིང་བ་འབའ་ཞིག་ཏུ་ལྟ་བ་སྟེ། བྱི་སྤྱིང་
ལྟའི་ཞིང་ཁམས་ནང་བཅུད་ལྟ་དང་ལྟ་མོ། ཁམས་དང་སྤྱི་མཆེད་སྤྱི་དང་ཡེ་ཤེས་ཀྱི་རོལ་པ་ཆེན་པོ་ཉིད་དུ་ལམ་ཏུ་བྱེད་
བ།” ཞེས་གསུངས། “ཚྲོགས་པ་ཆེན་པོའི་རྒྱུད་ལ་བསྐྱེད་ཚུལ་ལོ། དང་པོ་ལ་འདི་ལྟར་སྤྱིང་བ་ཐམས་ཅད་ཟག་མེད་ཡེ་
ཤེས་ཀྱི་རོལ་བར་བསྐྱུར་ནས་ལྟ་བ་སྟེ། དེ་ཡང་བྱི་སྤྱིང་ལྟ་ཡི་གཞལ་ཡས། ནང་བཅུད་ལྟ་དང་ལྟ་མོ་དང་ཕུང་པོའི་ཁམས་
དང་སྤྱི་མཆེད་སྤྱི་དང་ཡེ་ཤེས་ཀྱི་རོལ་པ་སྟེ། འོག་འཁུལ་རྟོག་པ་སྤྱི་ཚྲོགས་ཅིར་སྤྱིང་ཡང་། ཟབ་མོའི་དགོངས་པས་ལྟ་
དང་ལྟ་མོར་བསྐྱུར།” ཞེས་གསུངས།

བཞི་པ་དབྱེ་བ་བསྟན་པ་ལ་གཉིས།

དང་པོ་བསྐྱེད་རིམ་གྱི་དབྱེ་བ་ནི། བརྟན་པ་ལྟ་བསྐྱེད་པ་ལ་གསུམ་སྟེ། “ལྟ་བསྐྱེད་པའི་ཆོག་ །ལྟ་བསྐྱེད་པའི་རང་བཞིན།
དེའི་དག་པ་དན་པའོ། །དང་པོ་ལ་སྤྱིར་བདག་སྤྱོད་གཞན་སྤྱོད་ཀྱི་སྤྱོད་ནས་བསྐྱེད་པ། མདོན་བྱང་ལྟའི་སྤྱོད་ནས་བསྐྱེད་པ།
ཆོག་བཞིའི་སྤྱོད་ནས་བསྐྱེད་པ། ཆོག་གསུམ་གྱི་སྤྱོད་ནས་བསྐྱེད་ ས་བོན་དང་བསྐྱེད་སྤྱོད་ཅམ་གྱིས་བསྐྱེད་པ། དན་པ་
ཅམ་གྱིས་བསྐྱེད་པ་སྟེ། བསྐྱེད་ཆོག་མི་འདྲ་བ་བཞི་འམ་ལྟ་ཅམ་དུ་ཡོད་པ་ལས།” ཞེས་གསུངས།

གཉིས་པ་ཚྲོགས་རིམ་གྱི་མཚན་ཉིད་ནི། “འོན་ཏེ་དང་གི་ཚྲོགས་རིམ་གྱི་དོན་ཇི་ལྟར་འདོད་ཅེན། རང་རྒྱུད་བསྐྱེད་རིམ་
སྤྱིན་ཆོད་ཀྱི་ལམ་ཚྲོགས་ཇེས་སུ་བྱུང་བའི་མ་བཅོས་ཐབས་གྱིས་བསྐྱེད་པའི་ཡི་དམ་ཚྲོགས་བྱེད་ཀྱི་རིམ་པ་དེའི་དོན་
ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།” ཞེས་གསུངས་པས་སོ། དེ་ལྟར་ཚྲོགས་རིམ་གྱི་དབྱེ་བ་ནི། “ཉིང་འཛིན་གསུམ་གྱི་ཚྲོགས་རིམ་དང་།
བསྐྱེན་བསྐྱེད་ཡན་ལག་བཞིའི་ཚྲོགས་རིམ་དང་། རིམ་པ་ལྟ་ཡི་ཚྲོགས་རིམ་དང་གསུམ་མོ།” ཞེས་གསུངས་པས། དང་
པོ་གཉིས་བསྐྱེད་རིམ་དང་ཚྲོགས་རིམ་གཉིས་ཀ་ལ་ཡོད། གསུང་གི་བསྐྱེད་པའི་སྤྱོད་སྤྱིང་པ་དང་། ཐུགས་ཀྱི་བྱིང་སྤྱོད་
སྤྱིང་པ་དང་། སྤྱོད་དང་བུལ་བའི་སྤྱོད་གསུང་ཐུགས་དང་སྤྱོད་དང་ཕྱག་རྒྱ་བཅས་ཀྱི་ཚྲོགས་རིམ་བསྟན་པར་སེམས།

ལྟ་པ། གསུང་སྤྱོད་འདིའི་ལུགས་ཀྱི་དོན་དམ།

གསང་ལྔ་གསུམ་ལམ་སྐོར་འཇུག་ཕྱིན་པ་ལྟ་བུ་འཕྲེལ།

“སེམས་ཉིད་རང་བཞིན་མ་བཅོས་པའི་ཅིར་ཡང་མ་གྲུབ་མི་སྤང་བ་མ་ཡིན། ཅི་ཡང་མ་ཡིན་པ་ཉིད་བོན་ཉིད་ཐབས་ཅད་
ཀྱི་རོལ་ཉིད་དུ་རང་སྤང་། དཔེར་ན་ཉིམ་ལས་ཉིམ་འི་འོད་ཟེར་འབྱུང་བ་བཞིན་ནོ། དེའི་ཆ་ནས་དཀོར་བདུན་ལྷན་གྱིས་
གྲུབ་པ་ཉིད་དོ།” ཞེས་གསུངས།

དུག་པ། སྒྲགས་ཀྱི་དམ་ཚིག་བསྐྱེད་བའི་ཡོན་ཏན།

“དམ་ཅན་འདུལ་ཤིང་མཐུ་ཙམ་ཆེ། བྱིན་རྒྱལ་ཆེ་ཤིང་རིག་པ་ཆགས། ཅི་འདོད་འབྱུང་ཞིང་འདོད་པ་འབྱུབ། མང་པོས་
བཀྱར་ཞིང་གྲགས་པ་ཐོབ། བསྐྱར་པ་འཕེལ་ཞིང་ཀྱན་ལ་སྦྱོང་། ཉམས་བདེ་ཆེ་རིང་སྤྲུག་བསྐྱེད་པ་བྲལ། གསུང་གི་དམ་
ཚིག་བསྐྱེད་བའི་ཡོན་ཏན་ནི། ལྷ་འཕོ་བགྲགས་ལུལ་ཁྱེན་རྣམས་བསྐྱོད་ག སྒྲགས་ཀྱི་དམ་ཚིག་བསྐྱེད་བའི་ཡོན་ཏན་ནི།
བསམ་པ་འབྱུབ་ཅིང་བྱིན་རྒྱལ་ཆེ།” ཞེས་གསུངས། དམ་ཚིག་རྩལ་བཞིན་བསྐྱེད་ན་ལུས་དག་ཡིད་གསུམ་ལ་ཕན་
ཐོག་ཏུ་ཅང་ཆེན་པོ་ཡོད་པ་དང་།

བདུན་པ། སྒྲགས་ཀྱི་དམ་ཚིག་ཉམས་པའི་རྒྱ།

ལྷ་དང་མི་ལ་སོགས་ཐེག་པ་དམན་པའི་གྲོགས་དང་། གསང་སྒྲགས་རྒྱུད་ལ་མ་སྦྱིས་པའི་གྲོགས་དང་། གཡུང་རུང་སྤྱན་
གྲོགས་གོང་མར་འབྲུགས་བྱེད་པ་ལ་སོགས་སྒྲགས་ཀྱི་དམ་ཚིག་ཉམས་པའི་རྒྱའོ།

བརྒྱད་པ། ལུས་དག་གི་དམ་ཚིག་ཉམས་པའི་རྒྱུན།

ལུས་ཀྱི་དམ་ཚིག་ཉམས་ན། དན་སྤང་ལ་སོགས་དུ་སྦྱེ་བ་དང་། དག་གི་དམ་ཚིག་ཉམས་ན། སྒྲགས་ལ་ལུས་པ་མེད་པ་
དང་། དག་མི་བཅུན་པ་ལ་སོགས་དང་། ཡིད་ཀྱི་དམ་ཚིག་ཉམས་ན། ལྷོས་ཤིང་དྲན་པ་ཉམས་པ་དང་། བསམ་པ་ལ་བར་
ཆད་མང་པོ་འབྱུང་བའོ།

དགུ་པ། གསང་སྒྲགས་ཀྱི་རྒྱུད་སྤེལ་བཞི་པོ་སོ་སོའི་རོ་བོ་ངོས་བསྐྱེད་བ།

ཆབ་དཀར་སྒྲགས་ལ་རྒྱུད་སྤེལ་བཞི་སྟེ། དེ་གང་ཞེས་ན་ བྱ་བའི་རྒྱུད་དང་སྦྱོང་པའི་རྒྱུད། ཡེ་གཤེན་རྒྱུད་དང་སྤྲེལ་བའི་རྒྱུད་
བཅས་སོ། “བྱ་བའི་རྒྱུད་ཀྱི་གོ་བ་ནི། ཕྱི་རོལ་དུ་ལུས་དག་བྱ་བ་གཙོ་བོ་བྱེད་ལ། རང་སེམས་ཀྱི་སྦྱོར་པ་ཞོར་ལ་བྱེད་པའོ།
ལྷ་བ་ནི་དམ་ཚིག་སེམས་དཔལ་དང་ཡེ་ཤེས་སེམས་དཔལ་གཉིས། རྗེ་དང་འབངས་ཀྱི་རྩལ་དུ་འདོད་པའོ། རྒྱུད་ནི་བྱ་བ་
སྦྱིའི་རྒྱུད་དང་། བྱེ་བྲག་གི་རྒྱུད་ལ་སོགས་པའོ། སྦྱོང་པའི་རྒྱུད་ཀྱི་གོ་བ་ནི། ཕྱི་རོལ་ལུས་དག་ཡིད་གསུམ་ཀྱི་བྱ་བ་དང་།
རང་སེམས་ཀྱི་ཡེ་གཤེན་གཉིས། ལྷ་ཆེ་རྒྱུད་མེད་པར་ཆ་མཉམ་དུ་སྦྱོང་། དམ་ཚིག་སེམས་དཔལ་ཡེ་གཤེན་སེམས་དཔལ་
གཉིས། སྤྱན་དང་གྲོགས་པོའི་རྩལ་དུ་འདོད་པའོ། རྒྱུད་ནི་རྩལ་བའི་རྒྱུད་དང་བཤད་པའི་རྒྱུད་ལ་སོགས་ཡེ་གཤེན་རྒྱུད་དང་
སྤྲེལ་བའི་པལ། ཡེ་གཤེན་རྒྱུད་ཀྱི་གོ་བ་ནི། རང་སེམས་ཀྱིས་སྦྱོར་པ་གཙོ་བོ་བྱེད་ལ། ཕྱི་ལུས་དག་གིས་བྱ་བ་ཞོར་ལ་
བྱེད། སེམས་དཔལ་གཉིས་པོ་དེ་ཐམ་དང་པར་འདོད། རྒྱུད་ནི་སངས་རྒྱུས་མཉམ་སྦྱོར་ཀྱི་རྒྱུད་ལ་སོགས་པའོ། ཡེ་
གཤེན་སྤྲེལ་བའི་རྒྱུད་ཀྱི་གོ་བ་ནི། ཕྱི་རོལ་དུ་ལུས་དག་གི་དགོ་སྦྱོར་ལ་མི་ལྟོས་པར། རང་སེམས་ཀྱི་སྦྱོར་པ་ལ་གཙོ་

རུབྱེད་པ་འོ། སེམས་ལས་ལོག་པ་འི་སེམས་དཔའ་གཉིས་ཀྱང་མི་འདོད། ཕྱིན་གྱིས་རྒྱབས་བྱ་སྒྲོབས་བྱེད་གཉིས་སུ་མི་
 འདོད། ལྷ་ཡང་བཏགས་པ་ཅམ། བདག་ཀྱང་བཏགས་པ་ཅམ། བསྐྱོམ་པ་དང་མི་སྐྱོམ་པ་ཡང་བཏགས་པ་ཅམ།
 བཏགས་པ་ཅམ་གང་ཡིན་པ་དེ་ནི། སྒྲོས་བྱས་པའི་བོན། ཡང་དག་པའི་བོན་ཉིད་ནི། མིང་མེད་བརྗོད་བྲལ། ཤེས་བརྗོད་གྱི་
 ཡུལ་ལས་འདས་པ་འོ། རྒྱུད་ནི་ཐུགས་རྗེ་ཉི་མ་ལ་སོགས་པ་འོ། དམན་པ་རྣམས་ལ་བྱ་བའི་རྒྱུད་ཅས་པས། སྒྲོ་རྒྱུད་བ་ལ་
 ལྷས་དང་གཙང་སྤྲེལ་སྤྲོ་ནས་ཞུགས་ནས། ལུས་ཀྱི་བྱ་བ་གཙོ་བོ་འདོན་པ་ཡིན། བྱ་མེད་ཡི་གཤེན་ཏེ་རྟགས་ལ་ཞེས་པས།
 སྒྲོ་འབྲིང་པོ་ལ་རེས་བྱ་བ་ལ་དགོ་སྦྱར་བྱེད། རེས་རྣམ་པར་མི་རྟོག་པ་སྒྲོམ། དེ་ལྟར་གཉིས་ལ་བརྟེན་ནས་སྤྱིབ་གཉིས་
 སྤང་པས། བྱང་རྒྱབ་ཐོབ་པར་འདོད་པ་འོ། སྒྲོ་རབ་ལ་ཡི་གཤེན་རྒྱུད་དུ་བསྟན། ཞེས་པས། རྣང་གི་སྒྲོམ་པ་ཁོ་ན་ལ་གཙོ་
 རུབྱེད་པ་ལས། ཕྱི་རོལ་གྱི་བྱ་ཆ་ནི་སྦྱུ་མའི་རང་བཞིན་དུ་འདོད། ཡང་རབ་ཡི་གཤེན་སྒྲ་མེད་ཅས་པས། དབང་པོ་རབ་གྱི་
 ཡང་རབ་ཏུ་བྱུང་པ་དེ། གཞན་འཇུག་པའི་ཡན་ལག་དུ། དགོ་སྦྱར་ལྟར་སྤང་བ་ལས། རང་གི་གནས་ལུགས་ཁོང་དུ་རྒྱུད་
 རས་ཡིད་ལ་བྱ་རྒྱུ་ལམ་སྒྲོམ་རྒྱ་བམས་ཅད་ནི་རྟོག་པ་ཡིན། གནས་ལུགས་དེ་ལ་དགོ་བ་བྱས་པས་མན་མ་བཏགས། མ་
 བྱས་པས་གཙོད་པ་མ་སྒྲུལ། བཅས་སྤང་བྲལ་བའི་རང་བྱུང་གི་ཡི་ཤེས་དེ། དུས་གསུམ་སངས་རྒྱས་ཀྱི་དགོངས་པ་ཡིན།
 བོན་བྱེད་པ་ལ་སྤྱིང་རུས་མེད་པས་དཀའ་ཐུབ་མི་ཡོང། རྣང་སེམས་ཀྱི་སྒྲོམ་པ་གཙོ་བོ་རུབྱེད་པ་ལ་སྤྱིང་རུས་དགོས། དེས་
 ར་སྤྱིང་རུས་ཅན་དེ་ལ་ཡི་གཤེན་གྱི་རྒྱུད་འབྲེད་པ་ཡིན།” ཞེས་གསུངས། “དང་པོ་ལ་ཡི་ཤེས་སེམས་དཔའ་རྗེ་བོར་ལྷ་
 བ་བྱ་བ་གཙང་སྦྱོད་གྱི་ཐེག་ཆེན་པ་དང་། དེ་ཉིད་ཐོགས་པའི་རྒྱུ་བ་རྣམ་པ་ཀུན་ལྟན་གྱི་ཐེག་ཆེན་པ་གཉིས་སུ་
 ཡོད། གཉིས་པ་ལ་གཙོ་བོར་བསྐྱེད་རིམ་ལམ་དུ་བྱེད་པའི་ཐེག་པ་ལ་གནས་པ། དངོས་བསྐྱེད་ཐུགས་རྗེ་རོལ་པའི་ཐེག་
 ཆེན་པ་དང་། གཙོ་བོར་རྗོགས་རིམ་ལམ་དུ་བྱེད་པའི་ཐེག་པ་ལ་གནས་པ་ཤིན་ཏུ་དོན་ལྡན་ཀུན་རྗོགས་ཀྱི་ཐེག་ཆེན་པ་
 དང་། སྦྱོད་པ་དགག་སྒྲུབ་དང་བལ་ཞིང་སྒྲོམ་མེད་ཚོལ་བལ་ལམ་དུ་བྱེད་པའི་རྗོགས་པ་ཆེན་པོ་ཡང་ཅེས་མེད་གྱི་ཐེག་པ་
 ལ་གནས་པའི་གང་ཟག་དང་གསུམ་མོ།” ཞེས་གསུངས།

ལྷ་ཆ་དབུས་བོད་ཀྱི་གཙུག་ལག་སྤྱོད་གཉེར་ཁང་གི་སྤྱོད་དཔོན་དག་བཤེས་ཡོན་ཏན་ཐུན་ཚོགས་རྒྱུ་འཛིན་ནས། ཕྱི་ལོ་
 2024/03/10/ཉིན་སུལ་བ་དགོལ།

ལོ་གསུམ་ཕྱོགས་གསུམ་གྱི་དུས་ཚོགས་ངེས་ཚུལ་ལ་དབྱེད་པ་ལོ་གསུམ་སྐྱ་གསུམ་ བྱིས་པའི་དག་སྟེང་།

བྱམས་པ་ཚོས་འཕེལ།⁴²

༄༅། ། ཨོ་སྤྱི། །ཕྱི་དུ་ཀུན་གསལ་ངོས་སུ་མཐུག་རིངས་གསལ། །
ནང་དུ་རྒྱ་རྒྱུ་བ་དབྱེ་མའི་རྒྱུང་། །
གཞན་དུ་དཀྱིལ་འཁོར་དང་འབྲེལ་རྣམས་འབྱོར་ལམ། །
སྟོན་མཁས་བཅོམ་ལྡན་དུས་འཁོར་ལ་ཕྱག་འཚལ། །
ལོ་བརྒྱའི་ཡེ་རྒྱུང་འབའ་ཞིག་བསགས་པ་ལས། །
མཉམ་བུས་དུས་ཀྱི་རང་བཞིན་བསྟུས་པ་རྣམས། །
དུ་བས་འཁྲིག་སྟེ་སྟུན་པ་སྟུག་པོར་འབྱིང་། །
ཉི་མའི་ལོ་གསུམ་ཕྱོགས་གསུམ་དུས་གསལ་བྱ། །

ཞེས་མཆོད་བརྗོད་དང་བརྩམ་པར་དམ་བཅའ་བ་སྟོན་དུ་བཏང་ནས་འདྲིར་སྐྱར་ཅིས་ཀྱི་གཞུང་ལུགས་དག་ལས་ སྐྱ་
གཅན་གྱི་སྤྱལ་པ་ཕྱི་ལྟར་དུ་ལྟས་དང་འབྲེལ་བ་ཡོད་པའི་གཟའ་བཞི་ལ་སོགས་པ་གསུངས་པ་ནི། རིགས་ལྡན་སྤྱིར་ཐིག་
ལས།

སྐྱ་གཅན་གྱིས་ནི་སྤྱལ་པ་ཡི། །
ལྟས་ངན་གཟའ་བཞི་ཞེས་གྲགས་པ། །
ཤར་ན་དུ་བ་མཐུག་རིངས་དང་། །
སྟོན་སྟག་མགོ་མེ་འབར་དང་། །
འབར་ན་གཡག་མགོ་རྒྱུང་འཕྲོབ་སྟེ། །

⁴² ལྷན་གཙུག་ལག་སློབ་ཁང་གི་ཅིས་དགེ་

བྱང་ན་ཚུན་གྱི་གསུང་པོ་དང་། །
 གཞན་ཡང་ལྷ་མོ་འཆར་བ་མེད་པས། །
 མི་དགའི་ལྷ་ས་སུ་འཆར་ཞེས་ཟེར། །
 མཚུགས་པ་མ་གཏོགས་གཞན་རྣམས་ནི། །
 རི་མོའི་ལམ་ནས་རྟོགས་མི་འགྲུང་།⁴³ །

ཞེས་འཛིག་རྟེན་ཁམས་ལ་མི་དགའ་བ་ཇི་སྟེད་ཅིག་བྱུང་བའི་སྤྲ་ལྷ་ས་མམ་རྟགས་སུ་ཕྱི་རི་བཀོད་པ་བར་སྤང་སྟེད་དུ་དུས་སྐབས་སོ་སོར་དེ་ལྟར་མཐོང་བར་གསུངས། དེ་དག་ལས་དུ་བ་མཚུགས་པ་མི་དུས་ཀྱི་འཁོར་ལོའི་ནང་དུ་རྣལ་འབྱོར་པ་རྣམས་ལ་ལུས་ཀྱི་རྩ་རླུང་འབྱུར་འགྲོས་དང་བསྐྱེད་རྣམས་ཕྱི་ནང་གཞན་གསུམ་སྦྱར་རྒྱུ་ལ་ཤིན་ཏུ་རྒྱས་པ་གསུངས་ཡོད། དེ་མི་ན་ལྷ་ག་འགྲོས་གསུམ་པོ་དུས་ཚིགས་ནས་ཀྱི་ཆོ་འབྱུང་དམ་ཞེན་དེས་གཏན་མེད་པར་གསུངས། ཡིན་ནའང་བདག་གི་དགའ་བའི་བཤེས་གཉེན་ཆེན་པོ་ཞིང་གཤེགས་གོ་འཛོལ་དབང་རྣམ་རྒྱལ་མཆོག་གི་ཉེར་མཁོ་ཟ་མ་ཏོག་ཏུ་མི་ལོ་བདུན་ཅུ་དོན་བརྒྱད་དང་རྩ་བ་བཞི་ཙམ་མཆོམས་ལ་གཡག་མགོ་རླུང་འཕྲུབ་དེ་རེ་རེར་འཆར་བ་གསུངས་པ་དེ་ནི་དེ་སྤྱོད་ཀྱི་སྐར་ཕྱིས་གཞུང་ལུགས་གང་ལའང་མེད་པ་བཤེས་གཉེན་མཆོག་གི་མྱོང་བྱང་འབའ་ཞིག་ཡིན། དེ་ཉིད་ལས། །དེ་བཞིན་སྒྲ་གཅན་གྱིས་སྤུལ་པའི། །ལྷས་དན་གཟའ་བཞིར་གྲགས་པ་ཡི། །ནང་ཚན་གཡག་མགོ་རླུང་འཕྲུབ་ཀྱང་། །ལོ་མང་མྱོང་བྱང་བཤད་ལྟར་ན། །ཆོས་རྒྱ་ཐིག་རྒྱ་སྤྱིན་པོའི་[༧༨༠]གངས། །ཡས་མས་མཐའ་རུ་རེ་འཆར་ཞིང་། །སྐབས་འགར་དེ་ལས་ཅུང་སྤྲ་བསྐྱར། །སྐབས་འགར་དེ་ལས་རྩེས་བུལ་བའི། །མཐར་འཆར་སྐབས་འགར་དེ་ལྟོག་པའི། །ལོ་རྒྱ་དེས་གཏན་ལ་འཆར་དང་། །དེས་མེད་སྤྱ་ཚོགས་དང་འཆར་ཕྱིར། །རྒྱུད་ལས་རྟག་མིན་འགྲོས་ཅན་བཞེད།⁴⁴ ཅེས་གསུངས།

དེད་དུས་ཚན་རིག་སྐར་ཕྱིས་པ་རྣམས་ཀྱིས་ཉེ་ལེ་ཞེས་པ་སྐར་མ་དུ་བ་མཚུགས་པ་ཁོངས་གཏོགས་ཞིག་ལ་དོས་འཛིན་གནང་སྟེ་ལོ་ཡོད་མོད། ཚན་རིག་གིས་དུ་བ་མཚུགས་པ་ཀྱི་རྣམ་གྲངས་ཤིན་ཏུ་མང་པོར་གསུངས་པ་ལྟར་ན་རང་མེད་ལྷས་ཀྱི་དབང་གི་གོང་དུ་གཟའ་དང་ལྷ་མོ་འཆར་བ་མེད་པས་གསུངས་པ་དང་དགོངས་པ་མཐུན། རང་ལེ་རྣམས་ཀྱིས་ལྷ་ས་སུ་བརྟག་པའི་མཆོན་གཞི་གཙོ་བོ་དེ་དུ་བ་མཚུགས་པ་ཀྱི་འགྲོས་དང་བསྐྱེད་རྣམས་ཉམས་ལེན་པ་རྣམས་ལ་སྒྲོམ་སྒྲུབ་མཛད་པའི་དུས་ཚིགས་གཤམ་ཆེ་ཞིག་ལ་དོས་འཛིན་པ་མ་ཟད། སྐར་ཕྱིས་རིག་པ་དང་དབྱུངས་འཆར་གཉིས་ཀའི་ནང་དུ་གཤམ་ཆེད་ཕྱིས་ཐབས་ཞིག་ཀྱང་ཡིན། ཚན་རིག་པ་རྣམས་ཀྱིས་མཚུགས་པ་འདི་ནི་བར་སྤང་སྟེད་གི་བྱུང་བ་ཙམ་ལ་དོས་འཛིན་བྱས་པ་ལས་གང་ཡང་མེད།

1 གངས་མྱོངས་རིག་བཅུད་སྟིང་བཅུད་ཆེན་མོ། རྒྱུགས་བམ་གཉིས་པ། བཅོམ་སྒྲོས་གར། རབ་བྱུང་བཅུ་བཞི་པའི་རིགས་ལྔ་ན་སྟིང་ཐིག་ལུ་བདུན་པ་དུ་བ་མཚུགས་པས། ཤོག 1247 གྲང་ 2 མི་རིགས་དཔེ་སྐྱེད་ཁང་། 2006
 2 ཕྱིས་ཀྱི་ལག་ལེན་གསལ་བར་བྱེད་པའི་ལྷུ་མིག་ཉེར་མཁོའི་ཟ་མ་ཏོག་གི་མན་དག་རྒྱུད་དོན་སྟིང་པོ་ལེགས་པར་བསྐྱེད་པའི་རྒྱ་ཟེར། 1992 ཤོག 44 གྲང་ 70 བོད་གཞུང་སྒྲན་ཕྱིས་ཁང་།

མདོར་ན་ལོ་དྲུག་ཅུམ་དུ་དུ་བ་མཚུག་རིངས་ཉི་ཤེས་སྐབས་འགར་ལྷན་ཅིག་སྦྱོད་པ་དང་། སྐབས་འགར་ཅུང་ཟད་བར་
ཟུང་སྦྱོད་དེ་རང་མེད་མིག་གིས་མཐོང་ལམ་དུ་མི་འགྱུར་ཞིང་། དེ་ནས་ཕྱི་གསུམ་གཉིས་སམ་ཁྲ་བ་ཕྱི་ལ་པོ་གཅིག་གི་དུས་
ཡུན་ལ་རང་མེད་མིག་ལམ་དུ་སྐར་མའི་རྣམ་པར་མཐོང་ལ། དེ་ནས་ཕྱི་གསུམ་གཅིག་གི་དུས་ལ་དུ་བ་དང་བཅས་པའི་སྐར་
མའི་རྣམ་པ་མཐོང་བ་ཡིན་ནོ། །སྤྱིར་སྤངས་ཕྱི་དུ་བ་མཚུག་རིངས་དེ་སྤྱིར་གཅན་གྱི་སྤྱུལ་པ་ལྟས་རན་གྱི་གཟའི་རིགས་
ཞིག་ཡིན་གཤིས། དུས་ཀྱི་འཁོར་ལོའི་ལུགས་སུ་སྐར་ཕྱིས་ཀྱི་རིས་མོས་གཏན་ལ་འབབས་བྱལ་པ་དང་རྩམ་པའི་གཟའ་
ནི་དུ་བ་མཚུག་རིངས་འདི་ཉིད་ཅུམ་ཡིན་པར་གསུངས། དུས་འཁོར་ནང་དུ་སྤྱིར་འོག་བར་གསུམ་ཆ་ཚང་ལ་བྱེད་པའི་ཕྱིས་
ལ་གཞི་འཛིན་ཏེ་བྱ་དགོས་པ་ཡང་ཡང་གསུངས་པ་མ་ཟད་དུས་འཁོར་ནང་དུ་བྱལ་མཐའི་ཕྱིས་ལ་བྱར་ཟའང་དུ་མ་མཛད་
ཡོད་སྐབས་དུ་བ་མཚུག་རིངས་ཀྱི་ཕྱིས་ཐབས་ཀྱང་བྱེད་པའི་སྐྱོད་གཤིས་ལ་གཞི་འཛིན་ཏེ་བྱ་དགོས་པ་ཡིན།

དུས་འཁོར་དུ་ཉིན་ཞག་གཅིག་ལ་དབུགས་ཀྱི་རྒྱ་བ་དང་། དུས་སྦྱར་འཕོ་བ། གཟའ་རྣམས་སྦྱང་པ་ལ་འཇུག་ཚུལ། ཉི་
ཁྲར་སྤྱི་གཅན་འཇུག་ཚུལ། ཆོས་གྲངས་ཆད་ལྷག་སོགས་དང་ཕན་ཚུན་སྦྱར་ནས་བསྟན་ཡོད། ཉིན་རེའི་དབུགས་ཉི་ཁྲི་
ཆིག་སྦྱང་དུག་བརྒྱ་དབང་དུ་བཏང་ན། [༡༧༠༠ ÷ ༣༡ = ༥༤༥] ཉིན་རེ་དབུགས་གྲངས་སུ་མ་ཅུ་ཙམ་གཉིས་ཀྱི་མཚམས་
སུ་ཡེ་རྒྱུང་རེ་དང་། དེ་ཡང་ལག་འཁོར་རྒྱ་ཚོད་དང་སྦྱོར་ན། སྐར་ཆ་བརྒྱ་ཉེར་བརྒྱད་དམ་སྐར་མ་གཉིས་དང་སྐར་ཆ་
བརྒྱད་ཀྱི་མཚམས་སུ་ཡེ་ཤེས་ཀྱི་རྒྱུང་རེ་རྒྱ་བ་ཡིན། དེ་མིན་དབུགས་ཀྱི་རྒྱ་བ་ཆ་ཚང་ལས་རྒྱུང་འབའ་ཞིག་ཡིན་པར་
བཞེད། དེ་ཡང་ཡེ་ཤེས་རྒྱུང་དེ་སྐར་ཆ་དེ་དག་གི་བར་མཚམས་དེ་ཉིད་དུ་རྒྱ་བ་མིན་པར་ཆོ་ལོ་བརྒྱ་པའི་དབང་དུ་རགས་
ཕྱིས་སུ་བཞག་པར་མཛད་ཡོད། དུས་ཀྱི་འཁོར་ལོའི་གཞུང་དུ་སྤྱི་བོ་ཆོ་ལོ་བརྒྱ་པ་དང་། དབྱངས་འཆར་གྱི་སྐབས་སུ་རང་
ཆོ་ལོ་དེ་དང་མཐུན་པར་གསུངས་པ་ནི་གཙོ་བོ་འཛིག་རྟེན་ལམས་ཀྱི་བྱེད་པོ་ལྷ་ཆངས་པའི་ཆོ་ཚད་ཀྱང་ཆངས་པའི་ལོ་
བརྒྱ་ཐམ་པ་བཞེད་ཡོད། དེ་བཞིན་ཕྱི་རོལ་པའི་བྲལ་མཐའི་ཕྱིས་ཀྱི་ནང་དུ་རང་མེས་པོ་ཆངས་པའི་ཆོ་ཚད་ལོ་བརྒྱ་ཐམ་པ་
བཞག་འདུག དེར་བརྟེན་བར་སྤྱང་དུ་མཐོང་བའི་དུ་བའང་སྤྱི་ཕྱི་ཅུང་ཟད་ཟུང་པར་དང་ལྷན་པ་བྱུང་བའི་རྒྱ་རྒྱུན་ཡང་གཙོ་
བོ་དེ་ཉིད་ཡིན་པར་སྟུམ། ལར་ནས་འདི་དག་རྒྱུན་དུ་བྱན་དུག་ལ་སོགས་སྟོམ་སྟུབ་ཡམ་འབྲལ་བར་གནས་པའི་རྣལ་
འབྱོར་པ་རྣམས་ཀྱིས་རང་གི་དབུགས་ཀྱི་རྒྱ་བ་ལ་བརྟག་པ་མཛད་པ་ལས་དཔྱིས་ཕྱིན་རྟོགས་པ་མ་གཏོགས་སོ་སྟེ་ཐ་
ཤལ་བདག་འདུས་སྐར་ཕྱིས་ཀྱི་རི་མོ་ཅུམ་ལ་བརྟེན་པའི་འབྲལ་ཅུམ་ལས་དངོས་སུ་སྦྱར་བའི་གོ་སྐབས་ཡེ་ནས་རིང་དུ་
དོར་རོ།

དུས་འཁོར་བསྐྱུས་འགྲེལ་གྱི་དགོངས་པ་བཅུད་དུ་བསྒྲིལ་ཏེ་ཕྱག་མཛོད་གསུང་རབ་ཀྱིས་མཛོད་པའི་རབ་བྱུང་བཅུ་བཞིའི་
རིགས་ལྷན་སྦྱིང་ཐིག་དུ།

དུ་བའི་ལོངས་སྦྱོད་ཕྱི་ནང་གཞན་གསུམ་ལ།
སྦྱར་ན་ནང་དུ་ཉིན་ཞག་རེ་རེ་བཞིན།
གཞི་དུས་ཉི་ཁྲི་ཆིག་སྦྱང་དུག་བརྒྱའི་ (༢༧༠༠) རྒྱུད་།

རྒྱ་ཞིང་དེ་ལས་སུམ་ཅུ་ཙམ་གཉིས་ (༣༢) རེའི།
 མཚམས་སུ་ཡེ་ཤེས་རྒྱུ་རེ་རྒྱ་ཏྲིར་རྒྱ།
 དེ་བསགས་ཉིན་ཞག་གཅིག་ཡེ་ཡེ་ཤེས་རྒྱུ་།
 རྒྱག་བརྒྱ་དོན་ལྔ་ (༦༧) རྒྱ་ཏྲི་རི་ནང་དུ་རྒྱ།
 དེ་ཉིད་རྒྱ་གཅིག་ (༢༠༢༥༠) བསགས་པ་དབུ་མའི་རྒྱུ། [༦༧x༣༠ = ༢༠༢༥༠]*⁴⁵
 སྤྱར་ཡང་བརྒྱ་གཉིས་གྲངས་སུ་བསགས་པ་ན། [༢༠༢༥༠x༡༢ = ༢༤༣༠༠༠]
 ལོ་ཡེ་ཡེ་ཤེས་རྒྱུ་ཡིན་དེ་ཉིད་ཀྱང་།
 བརྒྱ་ཡིས་བསྐྱར་བ་[༢༤༣༠༠༠x༡༠༠ = ༢༤༣༠༠༠༠༠] ལོ་བརྒྱའི་དབུ་མའི་རྒྱུ་།
 དེ་ཉིད་དུས་ (༦) དང་མཁའ་རོ་ (༦༠) མཁའ་རོ་ (༦༠) ཡིས།
 ཉིན་ཞག་ (༡༡༢༥) སར་བསྐྱེལ་དེ་ཡང་སུམ་ཅུ་ (༣༠) ཡིས།
 རྒྱ་བར་རིལ་ཞིང་ (༣༧༡༥) དེ་ཡང་ལོར་རིལ་ན།
 ལོ་གསུམ་རྒྱ་བ་གཅིག་དང་རྒྱ་ཕྱེད་གཅིག།
 རྒྱུ་བར་ལོ་གསུམ་ཕྱོགས་གསུམ་ཞེས་སུ་གྲགས།
 དེ་ཡང་རྒྱ་བ་སུམ་ཅུ་ཙམ་དུན་པོ།
 ཕྱེད་མར་བས་པར་རྒྱ་ཕྱེད་དོན་བཞི་བྱུང་།
 དེའི་སྟེང་སྤར་གྱི་རྒྱ་ཕྱེད་གཅིག་བསྐྱར་པས།
 དབང་རི་ (༧༥) འབྱུང་བ་དུ་བའི་དགྲིལ་འཁོར་ཡིན།
 དེ་ལྟར་ཕྱི་རུ་མཚུགས་རིངས་ལོངས་སྤྱིད་ཉིད།
 ཅན་དུ་རྒྱ་ཏྲིར་རྒྱ་བའི་ཡེ་ཤེས་རྒྱུ་།
 གཞན་དུ་རིམ་གཉིས་མན་ངག་དང་ཕྲད་ན།
 རྒྱལ་འབྱོར་པ་ལ་མཚོག་གི་བདེ་བ་སྟེར།⁴⁶

ཞེས་གསུངས་སོ། །དེ་བཞིན་རབ་བརྒྱ་དུག་གི་རིགས་ལྔ་ན་སྤྱིང་ཐིག་དང་བརྒྱ་བདུན་གྱི་རིགས་ལྔ་ན་འཇུག་པའི་འོད་ཟེར་
 གཙོས་སྤར་ཅིས་གཞུང་ལུགས་ཐམས་ཅད་ལ་གཅིག་མཚུངས་ལུང་འདྲན་མཛད་སྟབས་དེ་དག་བསྐྱར་རྒྱུ་མི་བྱའོ། དེ་
 ཡང་གཙོ་བོ་དུས་འཁོར་བསྐྱེད་རྒྱུ་ལམས་ལེན།

༣* འགྲུག་རྟགས་ལྷ་ཅན་རྣམས་དཔྱད་རྩོམ་འབྲི་མཁན་གྱི་མཚན་བུ་ཡིན།

༤ གངས་ལྗོངས་རིག་བརྒྱའི་སྤྱིང་བརྒྱད་ཆེན་མོ། རྟེན་གསུམ་བཅས་གཉིས་པ། བཟོ་ཅིས་རྒྱོས་གསུམ་། རབ་བྱུང་བརྒྱ་བཞི་པའི་རིགས་ལྔ་ན་སྤྱིང་
 ཐིག་ལེའུ་བདུན་པ་དུ་བ་མཚུགས་རིངས། ཤོག ༡༢༥༢ གྲང་ ༩ མི་རིགས་དཔེ་སྐྱེད་ཁང་། ༢༠༠༦

སུམ་ཅུ་ཙུ་བདུན་ལག་པས་བསྐྱར་བའི་རྒྱ་པ་རྣམས་ཀྱིས་མཆུག་རིང་དག་ནི་སྐྱར་དང་འཁྱོག་པོར་འབྱུར། །གང་དག་
སུ་ཞིག་ཉི་མའི་ལོངས་སྤྱོད་ལ་ནི་རབ་ཞུགས་གཟའ་དེ་དག་ཀྱང་ངེས་པར་རུབ་པར་འབྱུར། །ཉི་མ་བཏང་ནས་འཆར་
བར་འབྱུར་ཏེ་དེ་ཡི་ལམ་ཡང་བསྐོད་པ་འགོ་བའི་རྣམ་པར་དབྱེ་བས་སོ།⁴⁷

ཞེས་པའི་འགྲེལ་པར། འདིར་ཤར་ནས་རིམ་པར་བསྐོད་པ་ལ་ཕྱིད་སྤྱི་མའི་བར་དུ་ལོར་འཕེལ་ལོ། །དེ་ནས་ཕྱིད་ཕྱི་མ་ལ་
འཁོར་ལོ་ཕྱིད་ཀྱི་བར་དུ་ལོར་འགྲིབ་པོ། །དེ་ནས་འཁོར་ལོ་ཕྱིད་ཡོངས་སུ་དོར་ནས་རིམ་པ་མིན་པས་ཕྱིད་སྤྱི་མ་ལ་བུ་ལོན་
འཕེལ་ལོ། །ཕྱིད་ཕྱི་མ་ལ་ཉི་མའི་རྒྱ་སྐར་ལ་རབ་ཏུ་ཞུགས་ཀྱི་བར་དུ་བུ་ལོན་འགྲིབ་པོ། །དེ་ནས་རུབ་སྟེ་སྐྱར་ཡང་འཆར་
པ་ནི་རིམ་པ་དེ་ཉིད་ཀྱིས་རིག་པར་བྱའོ། །ཞེས་པ་འདིར་མཆུག་རིངས་མདོར་བསྟན།⁴⁸ །ཡང་འགྲེལ་ཆེན་ལས། ཉི་མའི་
ལོངས་སྤྱོད་དེ་ལ་སྐྱར་བར་བྱ་སྟེ་སྐྱར་པའི་ལྷག་མ་ནི་ཀར་པར་འབྱུར་རོ། །མཆུག་རིངས་ཉི་མ་དག་དང་ལྷན་ཅིག་རྣམ་
པར་རྒྱ་སྟེ་སྐྱར་བར་རྒྱ་བ་ལ་མདུན་ནས་རིམ་པ་དང་འཁྱོག་པོར་རྒྱ་བ་ལ་རྒྱབ་ནས་རིམ་པ་མིན་པས་ཀར་པ་སྤྱོད་དོ། །རྒྱ་
བར་རྒྱ་སྐྱར་ཕྱིད་བཅས་གཉིས་སྤྱོད་ཉིན་དང་ཉིན་ལ་ཉི་མའི་ལོངས་སྤྱོད་དག་ལ་རིམ་པས་སམ་རིམ་པ་མིན་པས་སོ། །རང་
གི་རྒྱ་བ་སུམ་ཅུ་དུག་གིས་དེ་རྒྱ་རྒྱ་ཆོད་དག་ཀྱང་འཇིག་རྟེན་གྱིས་ནི་ཆོས་གངས་བསྐྱར། །གསུམ་གྱིས་བཅ་སྤྱི་བསྐྱར་བ་
ནི་བཞི་བཅུ་ཙུ་ལོ། །ཕྱིད་བཅས་རྒྱ་བར་རྒྱ་ཆོད་གཉིས་ནི་ཉིན་ཞག་སོ་སོར་འཆར་ཏེ་ལོ་གསུམ་གྱི་མཐར་རྒྱ་སྐྱར་གི་
ལོངས་སྤྱོད་རྣམས་ཡོངས་སུ་བཏང་ནས་ཕྱོགས་གསུམ་གྱི་བར་དུ་ཉིན་ཞག་སོ་སོར་རྒྱ་ཆོད་གཉིས་ལོངས་སྤྱོད་དེ་སྐྱར་བ་
ལ་མདུན་དང་འཁྱོག་པོ་ལ་རྒྱབ་ཏུ་ལོ། །དེ་ལྟར་ཕྱིད་བཅས་རྒྱ་བའི་བར་དུ་དེ་འཆར་ཏེ་འོན་ཀྱང་རྒྱ་བ་གཅིག་ནི་དུ་བ་མེད་
བའོ། །དེ་ནས་མཐའི་ཕྱོགས་གཅིག་དུ་བ་དང་བཅས་པའོ། །དེས་ན་སེམས་ཅན་རྣམས་ལ་དུ་བ་མཆུག་རིངས་རབ་ཏུ་
གསལ་ཏེ་འགོ་བ་དང་འོང་བའི་དབྱེ་བས་རྒྱ་བ་གཅིག་ཏུ་འབྱུར་རོ། །དུ་བ་བཏང་ནས་སྐར་མ་བཞིན་རབ་ཏུ་སྐྱར་བར་
འབྱུར་རོ། །སྐར་ཡང་དཔལ་དུས་ཀྱི་འཁོར་ལོར་ལོ་གསུམ་གྱི་ལོངས་སྤྱོད་ལ་རབ་འཆུག་དེ་ནི་གང་ཆོ་ལོ་ལོ་ལོངས་སྤྱོད་
ལ་ཞུགས་པ་དེའི་ཆོ་མཐོང་བ་མིན་པར་འབྱུར་རོ། །དེ་ཡི་འཆར་བའི་ཆ་དག་ཤེས་པར་གྱུར་ན་སྟེ་དེ་ལྟར་མཆུག་རིངས་
དེའི་འཆར་བའི་ཆ་དག་ཤེས་པར་གྱུར་ན་དེ་ཡི་འཆར་བ་མཐའ་ཡས་པའི་དུས་ཀྱང་ཤེས་པར་འབྱུར་རོ།⁴⁹ ཞེས་པ་སྟེ། ཉི་
མའི་དཀྱིལ་འཁོར་གྱི་འོད་ཟེར་གྱིས་མི་མཐོང་བའི་ཕྱིར་རུབ་པར་གྱུར་པ་ཞེས་བརྗོད་ཀྱི་གཟའ་རྣམས་པ་ཐམས་ཅད་དུ་མེད་
པ་ནི་མ་ཡིན་ནོ། །ཉི་མ་བཏང་ནས་འཆར་བར་འབྱུར་ཏེ་ཞེས་པ་ནི་རུབ་པར་གྱུར་པའི་གཟའ་དེ་ཉིད་ཀྱིས་རང་གི་རྒྱ་བའི་
དབང་གིས་ཉི་མ་བཏང་བར་གྱུར་པ་ན་འཆར་བར་འབྱུར་ཏེ་ཉི་མའི་འོད་ཟེར་གྱིས་ཡོངས་སུ་བཏང་བའི་ཕྱིར་རོ། །ཉི་མ་
ལས་རིང་དུ་སོང་སྟེ་སྐར་ཁྱོད་གཉིས་ལྷག་ཅོམ་མམ་ཁྱིམ་གཅིག་ཅོམ་གྱི་མཚོམས་ལ་ཉི་མ་ལས་བཏང་སྟེ་ཞེས་རང་ཅག་
རྣམས་ཀྱིས་མིག་ལམ་དུ་མཛོད་ནོ། །

ལ སྟེ། བསྟན། རྒྱུད། དུས་འཁོར་བསྐྱར་རྒྱུད། ཁམས་ལེ། ཤོག ༦ བ ༦

༦ སྟེ། བསྟན། རྒྱུད། དཔལ་དུས་ཀྱི་འཁོར་ལོ་འགྲེལ་ཆེན་རྩི་མེད་འོད། ཤོག ༡༥༧ བ སྟེང་ ༥

༧ སྟེ། བསྟན། རྒྱུད། དཔལ་དུས་ཀྱི་འཁོར་ལོ་འགྲེལ་ཆེན་རྩི་མེད་འོད། ཤོག ༢༠༠ བ སྟེང་ ༥

དེ་བཞིན་སྒྲུབ་ཡང་ཁམས་ལེ་ལས།

སྔོང་ཕྱག་ཉི་ཤུ་ཙུག་ཅིག་འོ་བརྒྱ[༢༡༦༠༠]ལྟན་པ་དག་ལས་སོ[༣༢]ཡི་ཆ་ཡིས་ངེས་པར་ཕྱུང་[÷]གྱུར་
པ། །ལུས་ལ་དབུགས་ལྷག་གང་དག་ཉིན་ཞག་སོ་སོའི་དུས་སུ་འབྱུང་བ་རི་དང་དུས་[༤༢༥]ནམས་དག་གི་
གངས། །སྔོང་ཕྱག་སྤུ་ཙུག་དུག་[༢༤༠༠༠]གང་གི་བསྐྱར་བ་ནམས་ཀྱང་ལོ་བརྒྱའི་ཆད་དུ་རབ་ཏུ་གྲགས་པ་
སྟེ། །སྔོང་དུས་སོ[÷ ༢༤༠]ཡིས་རབ་ཏུ་ཕྱེ་བ་དག་ནི་ཆུ་ཚོད་དུ་འགྱུར་དུག་ཅིན་[༤༠]ཆ་ཡིས་ཉིན་ཞག་ཀྱང་།
༤༤ །སྒྲིབ་འཛིན་ཕྱོགས་(༡༥)ཏེ་ཉི་མའི་བཟོད་པ་དག་དང་ས་སྐྱེས་[མིག་དམར་]སྒྲིབ་དབུ་ནམས་དག་གིས་
མཚན་མོའོ། །སྒྲིབ་འཛིན་[ཕྱར་བུ་]འབྱུར་པ་སངས་ཀྱི་ཡང་བཟོད་པར་འབྱུར་ཏེ་སྒྲིབ་སྐྱེས་[ལྷག་པ་]ཀྱི་ཡང་
བཟོད་པའོ། །ཆོས་ཞེས་བྱ་བའི་ལོ་ནི་ཉི་སྐྱེས་[སྟེན་པ་]ཀྱིས་ཏེ་དེ་བཞིན་སྒྲིབ་ཅན་ཅན་[སྒྲིབ་ཅན་]ཀྱི་དབུ་བྱུ་ལ་པོ་
མཐུག་འོང་། །དུ་བ་མཐུག་འོང་། །ཏེ་དག་མམས་ཅད་གཅིག་ཏུ་བསྐྱེས་པ་ནོར་གྱིས་བསྐྱར་བའི་དུས་[ལྷ་
ག་]ཀྱི་ལོ་དང་ཕྱིད་བཅས་སྒྲིབ་གསུམ། ༤༥ །ཕྱིད་དང་བཅས་པའི་ཉིན་ཞག་གངས་དག་ལས་ཀྱང་ལོ་བརྒྱར་འགྱུར་
ཏེ་དུས་ཀྱི་འཁོར་ལོས་དམར་[÷]ཞོ་འདྲི། །སྟོན་ནི་སྤྱིང་སྟོབས་ལ་འབབ་ལུལ་གྱི་བར་དང་སྒྲིབ་པ་ལ་ཡང་ལུས་
ལག་མེས་ཀྱི་དབྱེ་བས་སོ། །ལྷ་མི་ལག་འགྲོ་ནམས་ནི་དེ་ནས་ལྷ་པ་ཉིད་འབྱུར་སྒྲིབ་ཕྱིད་བཅས་མཚན་མོ་དག་
གིས་ཀྱང་། །གངས་ནི་ཤིན་ཏུ་ངེས་པ་འདི་དག་དུས་ཀྱི་འཁོར་ལོར་རབ་ཏུ་གྲགས་པ་ཡིན་ནོ་མི་ཡི་དབང་། ༤༦ །མ་
བཅད་དུས་ཀྱི་འཁོར་ལོའི་བཟོད་པ་དག་ལ་བུ་ལོན་དག་ནི་བསྐྱེས་པར་གྱུར་པ་མཐའ་དག་ནམས་50། །ཞེས་ལོ་
གསུམ་ཕྱོགས་གསུམ་པོ་གསུངས་པ་དེ་ལ་དུས་ཀྱི་འཁོར་ལོའི་ལོ་ཞེས་ངོས་འཛིན་མཛད་དོ། །

གོང་གི་འགྲེལ་པར། །ལུས་ལ་དབུ་མའི་ལོ་བརྒྱའི་ཉིན་ཞག་དང་དབུགས་ལ་སོགས་པ་གསུངས་པ་སྔོང་ཕྱག་ཉི་ཤུ་ཙུག་
གཅིག་ཅེས་པ་ལ་སོགས་པ་སྟེ། །སྔོང་ཕྱག་ཉི་ཤུ་ཙུག་གཅིག་ནི་སྔོང་ཕྱག་གཅིག་ལྷག་པའི་ཁྱི་ཕྱག་གཉིས་ (༢༡༠༠༠)
སོ། །རོ་བརྒྱ་ལྟན་པ་དག་ཅེས་པ་ནི་དུག་བརྒྱ་(༤༠༠) དང་ལྟན་པའོ། (༢༡༤༠༠) །སོ་(༣༢) ཡི་ཆ་ཡིས་ངེས་པར་
ཕྱུང་གྱུར་པ་ཞེས་པ་ནི་ཕྱུང་པོ་དེ་ལས་སུ་མ་ཙུ་ཙུག་ཉིས་ཀྱི་ཆ་དག་གིས་ངེས་པར་ཕྱུང་བའོ། །ལུས་ལ་ནི་ལུས་ལ་སྟེ་
དབུགས་ལྷག་གང་དག་ཉིན་ཞག་སོ་སོའི་དུས་དུས་སྐྱེར་གྱི་འཕོ་བ་བཅུ་གཉིས་ཀྱི་དུས་སུ་འབྱུང་བ་(༥) རི་(༢) དང་
དུས་(༤) ནམས་དག་གི་གངས་བདུན་ཙུ་ཙུག་ལའི་དུག་བརྒྱའི་གངས་སོ། (༤༢༥) །སྔོང་ཕྱག་སྤུ་ཙུག་
(༢༤༠༠༠) དག་གིས་བསྐྱར་བ་ནམས་ཀྱང་(ལོ་བརྒྱའི་དབུགས་ཀྱི་) 51 ཆད་དུ་རབ་ཏུ་གྲགས་པ་
སྟེ། (༢༤༠༠༠x ༤༢༥= ༢༤ ༢༠༠༠༠༠) དབུགས་དེ་དག་ལོ་བརྒྱའི་ཉིན་ཞག་སྔོང་ཕྱག་སྤུ་ཙུག་གིས་བསྐྱར་
བ་དེ་དག་ནི་ལོ་བརྒྱའི་དབུགས་ཀྱི་ཆད་དུ་འགྱུར་འོ། །འདིར་ཉིན་ཞག་སོ་སོ་ལ་ཙུག་སུམ་(དབུ་རོ་རྒྱུད་གསུམ་)གྱི་
དབུགས་བརྒྱ་ཕྱག་བཅུ་དུག་ལྷག་པའི་ཁྱི་ཕྱག་གཉིས་(༢༡༤༠༠) ཀྱི་གངས་ལ་ལོ་བརྒྱའི་ཉིན་ཞག་གིས་བསྐྱར་བ་ནི་
འབུམ་ཕྱག་བདུན་ཙུ་ཙུག་ལྷག་པའི་བྱེ་བ་ཕྱག་བདུན་ཙུ་ཙུག་དུ་འགྱུར་འོ། (༢༡༢༤༠༠༠༠༠) །དེ་དག་ལས་

༤ ཟླ། བཟླ་༡། ལྷན། དུས་འཁོར་བསྐྱེས་ལྷན། ཁམས་ལེ། ཤོག་ ༣༤ ན་ཕྱིད། ༤
༩ ལྷན་དཔེར་བཞུག་ཤ་ཏ་ཕྱོགས་སྒྲིབ་མཚན།

སུམ་ཅུ་ཙུག་ཉིས་ (32) གྱི་ཆས་ཐོབ་པ་འབུམ་ཕྱག་བཞི་བཅུ་ཙུག་སུམ་ལྷག་པའི་བྱེ་བ་ཕྱག་གཉིས་ (2000000) གྱི་གྲངས་ནི་དབུ་མ་ཙ་བ་རྒྱ་རྒྱུ་རྒྱུ་དེ་དབུགས་སུ་འབྱུང་རོ། (2000000-2000000=2000000) །
ལྷག་མ་འབུམ་ཕྱག་སུམ་ཅུ་ཙུག་སུམ་ལྷག་པའི་བྱེ་བ་ཕྱག་བདུན་ཅུ་ཙུ་ (2000000) ནི་ལ་ལ་རྒྱ་དང་ར་ས་རྒྱ་
དག་གི་དཀྱིལ་འཁོར་ལྷ་ལས་འབབ་སྟེ་ཆ་མཉམ་པར་བྱུང་པ་ལས་གཡོན་དང་གཡམས་ནས་ཕྱེད་ལ་ལ་རྒྱ་ནས་འབབ་
ཅིང་ཕྱེད་ར་ས་རྒྱ་ནས་འབབ་སྟེ་ལོ་བརྒྱའི་མཚམས་གྱི་ལོ། རྟོང་དུས་མེ་ (360) ཡིས་རབ་ཏུ་བྱེ་བ་དག་ནི་རྒྱ་ཆོད་དུ་
འབྱུང་ཞེས་པ་ནི་དབུགས་གྱི་ཕུང་པོ་དེ་ལས་སུམ་བརྒྱ་དུག་ཅུས་རབ་ཏུ་བྱེ་བའི་རྒྱ་ཆོད་ཀྱི་ཕུང་པོར་འབྱུང་རོ།
(2000000 ÷ 360 = 5555555) (5555555 ÷ 360 = 154321) (20000 ÷ 360 = 55555) (36000 ÷ 32 = 1125) །
དུག་ཅུའི་ཆ་ཡིས་ཉིན་ཞག་ཀྱང་ཞེས་པ་ནི་རྒྱ་ཆོད་ཀྱི་ཕུང་པོ་དེ་ལས་དུག་ཅུའི་ཆས་ཐོབ་
པ་ནི་ཉིན་ཞག་གི་ཚོགས་སུ་འབྱུང་རྟེ། རྟོང་ཕྱག་སུམ་ཅུ་ཙུག་ལས་དབུ་མའི་ཉི་ཤུ་ཙུ་ལྷག་པའི་བརྒྱ་ཕྱག་བཅུ་
གཅིག་གི་གྲངས་སོ། (36000-1125=34875) །ལྷག་མའི་ཉིན་ཞག་གི་ཚོགས་བརྒྱ་ཕྱག་བཞི་བཅུ་ཙུ་བརྒྱད་
དང་བདུན་ཅུ་ཙུ་ལྷག་པའི་ཁྱི་ཕྱག་གསུམ་ནི་ལ་ལ་རྒྱ་དང་ར་ས་རྒྱ་དག་གི་ལོ་བརྒྱའི་མཚམས་གྱི་ཡིན་པར་རིག་པར་
བྱུ་ལོ། 52 །ཞེས་རྟོང་འབྲུག་དང་འབྲེལ་ཏེ་ཕྱིས་ཐབས་རྣམས་ཤིན་ཏུ་གསལ་ལ་བར་གསུངས་པ་སྐར་ཕྱིས་པ་རྣམས་ལ་
རྟོགས་བདེ་ཞིང་། གཞན་དང་ནང་གཉིས་ལས་སྐར་ཕྱིས་ལ་གོམ་འདྲིས་མེད་པ་རྣམས་ལ་ཅུང་ཟད་དཀའ་བར་སེམས་
སོ། །

ཡང་གཟའ་ལྷའི་དཀྱིལ་འཁོར་དང་སྐར་ཏེ་ཕྱིས་ཐབས་འབྲེལ་ཆེན་དུ། ད་ནི་དུས་ཀྱི་འཁོར་ལོ་ལོ་གསུམ་གྱི་ཉིན་ཞག་
[7000]དེ་ཉིད་ཉི་ཤུ་ཙུ་ལས་[X25]བསྐྱར་ཞིང་བཟོད་པའི་ཉིན་ཞག་[-700]གིས་དམན་པ་ལ་དགུ་[+9]
བསྐྱེས་པ་རྣམས་གཟའ་རྣམས་[2629]ཀྱི་དཀྱིལ་འཁོར་དུ་གསུངས་པ། ལོ་ཡི་ཉིན་ཞག་ཅེས་པ་ལ་སོགས་པ་སྟེ།
ལོ་ཡི་ཉིན་ཞག་ནི་རྟོང་ཕྱག་གཅིག་དང་བརྒྱད་ཅུ་ལོ། [7000] །དེ་ཉིད་ལྷ་[7000X5=4000]ཡིས་བསྐྱར་ཏེ་
སྐར་ཡང་མདའ་ཞེས་པ་ལྷས་[4000X5=20000]བསྐྱར་པ་ནི་བསྐྱར་ཞེས་པའི་དོན་ཏོ། །དེ་ལྷར་དུས་བྱར་
བསྐྱར་བ་ནི་ཉི་ཤུ་ཙུ་ལས་[5X5=25]བསྐྱར་བར་འབྱུང་རོ། །བཟོད་པའི་ཉིན་ཞག་ནི་བརྒྱ་བརྒྱད་ཅུ་[-700]སྟེ་
དེས་དམན་པ་ལོ། །བཟོད་པ་གཅིག་ལ་གཟའ་རྣམས་ལོངས་སྟོན་པའི་དབང་གིས་བཟོད་པ་གཅིག་གི་ཉིན་ཞག་རྣམས་
གྱིས་དམན་པར་འབྱུང་རོ། །བྲག་པ་བསྐྱེས་པ་རྣམས་ནི་བྲག་པ་ཞེས་པ་དགུ་[+9]སྟེ་དེ་དག་གིས་བསྐྱེས་པ་རྣམས་ནི་
རང་རང་གི་བཟོད་པའི་དབང་གིས་གཟའ་ལྷ་པོ་རྣམས་ཀྱི་ཉིན་ཞག་གི་དཀྱིལ་འཁོར་དུ་འབྱུང་རོ། །གཅིག་ཏུ་བསྐྱེས་པ་
ལས་དུག་རྟོང་བརྒྱད་བརྒྱ་ཉི་ཤུ་ཙུ་དག་པའི་ཁྱི་ཕྱག་གཉིས་[2629]ཏོ། །དེ་ལས་ས་སྐྱེས་ལ་ནི་རི་སྐྱེ་དུག་
[62]ཅེས་པ་དུག་བརྒྱ་བརྒྱད་ཅུ་ཙུ་བདུན་གྱི་ཉིན་ཞག་གི་ཚོགས་སུ་འབྱུང་རོ། །རི་བྲག་རི་སྐྱེ་[2629]སྟེ་སྐྱེ་སྐྱེ་
ལ་རྟོང་ཕྱག་བརྒྱད་དང་བདུན་བརྒྱ་དག་བཅུ་ཙུ་བདུན་དུ་འབྱུང་རོ། །ལྷའི་སྐྱེ་མ་དག་ལ་སོ་མེ་རིག་བྱེད་[2332]དེ་

70 ཟླ། བསྟན། ལྷ། དཔལ་དུས་ཀྱི་འཁོར་ལོ་འབྲེལ་ཆེན་དུ་མེད་འོད། ཤོག 70 ན་ཤིང་། 7

བཞི་སྟོང་ལྷུ་མ་བརྒྱ་ལྷུ་མ་ཅུ་ཙུ་གཉིས་སུ་འབྱུང་རོ། །པ་སངས་ལ་ནི་རི་དང་རྒྱལ་བ་མིག་[2202]ཅེས་པ་གིས་སྟོང་
 ཉིས་བརྒྱ་བཞི་བརྒྱ་ཙུ་བདུན་དུ་འབྱུང་རོ། །ཉི་མའི་བྱ་ལ་རྒྱག་རྒྱག་རི་དང་ནམ་མཁའ་གཅིག་[70206]ཅེས་པ་མི་
 སྤག་གཅིག་དང་བདུན་བརྒྱ་ཙུ་ཙུ་གཉིས་ཀྱི་ཉིན་ཞག་གི་ཚོགས་ནི་དཀྱིལ་འཁོར་དུ་འབྱུང་རོ།⁵³ །ཤོད་གི་གཟུང་ལྷ་
 རོ་སོ་སོའི་ཉིན་ཞག་དཀྱིལ་འཁོར་བསྡུས་པའི་ཞག་གངས།

642 + 642 + 642 + 642 + 642 + 642 = 3852 འདི་བྱུང་བ་ཡིན།

ཡང་གཟུང་ལྷའི་སྤྱར་བྱེད་ལྷ་པོའི་སྤྱོད་གངས་དང་སྤྱར་བའང་དེ་ཉིད་ལས། ད་ནི་དབྱུ་མ་ཨ་བ་རྒྱ་ཉི་རྒྱག་ཅུའི་ཆའི་རྒྱ་
 ཚོད་རྣམས་གཟུང་ལྷ་རྒྱ་སྤྱར་ལ་འཆར་བའི་རྒྱ་དང་པོའི་རྒྱ་ཚོད་ཀྱི་ཚོགས་སུ་གསུངས་པ་མ་བཅད་ཅེས་པ་ལ་སོགས་པ་སྟེ།
 མ་བཅད་དུས་ཀྱི་འཁོར་ལོ་ནི་ལོ་གསུམ་དང་ཕྱོགས་གསུམ་[22171]གྱི་ཉིན་ཞག་མ་བཅད་པ་སྟེ། ཉི་ཤུ་ཙུ་ལྷག་
 པའི་བརྒྱ་སྤག་བརྒྱ་གཅིག་[724] གི་བཟོད་པ་དག་ལ། བྱ་ལོན་དག་[+6]ནི་མངལ་གྱི་རྒྱ་བ་དབྱའི་བྱ་ལོན་རྒྱ་
 ཚོད་དག་ནི་བསྐྱེད་པར་གྱུར་པ་མཐའ་དག་རྣམས་ཏེ་རྒྱ་ཚོད་ཀྱི་ཚོགས་སུ་ཙུ་ཙུ་བཞི་ལྷག་པའི་བརྒྱ་སྤག་བརྒྱ་གཅིག་
 [725]གི་གངས་རྣམས་ནི་བཀྲ་ཤིས་ལ་སོགས་གཟུང་ནི་ལྷ་པོ་རྣམས་ཀྱི་སྤྱར་བའི་ལས་ཏེ། སྤྱར་མའི་ལས་དག་ལ་
 ཡང་རྒྱ་དང་པོའི་རྒྱ་ཚོད་དུ་འབྱུང་རོ།⁵⁴ ཞེས་གང་ཟག་ཞིག་གི་ཆོ་ཆོད་ལོ་བརྒྱ་ཡི་དུས་སུ་ལས་རྒྱུད་དང་ཡི་རྒྱུད་གཉིས་
 ལས་ཡི་རྒྱུད་འབའ་ཞིག་བསགས་ཏེ་ལོ་བརྒྱ་ཡི་རིང་ལ་ཞག་གངས་སྟོང་དང་ཉི་ཤུ་ཙུ་ལྷག་པའི་བརྒྱ་སྤག་གཅིག་གྱུར་
 ཚུལ་གསལ་བར་གསུངས། ཞག་གངས་དེ་དག་རྒྱ་བ་དང་ལོར་བསྐྱེད་ན་ལོ་གསུམ་དང་ཕྱོགས་གསུམ་གྱུར་བ་ཡིན་
 མོ། །དེ་ནས་གཟུང་ལྷའི་ནང་ནས་གཟུང་མིག་དམར་གྱི་རྒྱ་དང་པོ་ལྷ་བྱུར་མཚོན་ན། དུས་འཁོར་བསྡུས་རྒྱུད་ལས།

ས་སྤྱེས་ལ་ནི་རིག་བྱེད་དུས་མེར་[262]རབ་འབྱུར་མིད་[72]པའི་གནས་རྣམས་དག་ལ་རྒྱ་བའི་དབྱེ་བ་
 ཡིས། །སྤྱི་ཕྱི་ཕྱིད་ལ་མ་རྒྱུད་པར་བྱ་ལོན་ཞོར་གྱི་བཟོད་པ་དག་ལས་གནས་ཀྱི་དབྱེ་བས་དེས་པར་སྤྱར།
 64 །དང་པོར་རྒྱལ་དབང་ [22] གངས་ཀྱི་རྒྱ་ཚོད་དག་སྟེ་མེ་དང་མིག་[22]ནི་རྣམ་གསུམ་དག་ཏུ་
 འབྱུར། །གནས་གཉིས་དག་ལ་གཅིག་དང་མིག་[27]སྟེ་བཅོ་བརྒྱད་[74]ཚོས་[74]དང་དག་པོ་[77]མེ་
 [2]དང་ཙུ་བར་དག་པོ་[77]དང་། །སུ་ཙུ་ཙུ་བརྒྱད་[24]བརྒྱད་ཙུ་[20]དག་དང་བརྟན་པ་སྤིང་པའི་
 གནས་ལ་འདིར་ནི་གསུམ་བཅས་ལྷ་བརྒྱའོ་[42]། །དེ་ཡིས་ཉི་མ་རྣམ་དག་གྱུར་ལ་བྱ་ལོན་དག་དང་ཞོར་ཡང་
 རིམ་པ་མིན་དང་རིམ་པས་སོ། །⁵⁵

ཞེས་པ་འགྲེལ་ཆེན་དུ་མེད་འོད་ལས། བཀྲ་ཤིས་ལ་སོགས་གཟུང་ནི་ལྷ་པོ་རྣམས་ཀྱིས་སྤྱར་བའི་ལས་དག་ལ་ཡང་རྒྱ་དང་
 པའི་རྒྱ་ཚོད་དེ། དང་པོར་རྒྱལ་དབང་གངས་ཏེ། རྒྱ་སྤྱར་དང་པོ་སྤྱད་པའི་གནས་ལ་ཉི་ཤུ་ཙུ་བཞི་ལོ། །མེ་དང་མིག་ནི་རྣམ་

77 གྲུ་ བསྟན། རྒྱུད། དཔལ་དུས་ཀྱི་འཁོར་ལོ་འགྲེལ་ཆེན་དུ་མེད་འོད། ཤོག 207 ན གྲེང་ 2
 78 གྲུ་ བསྟན། རྒྱུད། དཔལ་དུས་ཀྱི་འཁོར་ལོ་འགྲེལ་ཆེན་དུ་མེད་འོད། ཤོག 76 ན གྲེང་ 7
 79 གྲུ་ བསྟན། རྒྱུད། དུས་འཁོར་བསྡུས་རྒྱུད། ལམས་ལོ། ཤོག 6 བ གྲེང་ 2

གསུམ་དག་རྩ་བ་རྩ་འགྲུམ། དང་པོའི་གནས་ནས་གཉིས་པ་དང་། གསུམ་པ་དང་། བཞི་པ་ལ་ཉི་ཤུ་ཙུག་གསུམ་དུ་འགྲུར་
 ཏེ། རྣམ་གསུམ་ཞེས་སོ། །གནས་གཉིས་དག་ལ་གཅིག་དང་མིག་(༢༡)སྟེ། གནས་བཞི་པ་དེ་ནས་ལྷ་པ་དང་རྩལ་པའི་
 གནས་ལ་ཉི་ཤུ་ཙུག་གཅིག་སྟེ། གནས་གཉིས་ཞེས་སོ། །བརྩ་བརྒྱད་(༡༤)ཆོས་(༡༥)དང་དག་པོ་(༡༦)གནས་རྩལ་པ་
 དེ་ནས་བརྩན་པ་དང་། བརྒྱད་པ་དང་། དགུ་པའི་གནས་རྣམས་ལ་གྲངས་བཞིན་དུ་བརྩ་བརྒྱད་དང་། ཆོས་ཞེས་པ་བརྩ་ལྷ་
 དང་དག་པོ་ཞེས་པ་བརྩ་གཅིག་གོ། །མེ་(༣)དང་རྩ་བར་དག་པོ་དང་། གནས་དགུ་པ་དེ་ནས་གནས་བརྩ་པ་ལ་མེ་ཞེས་
 པ་རྒྱང་པ་གསུམ་སོ། །དེ་ནས་རྩ་བར་ཕྱེད་ཕྱི་མ་སྟེ། ཕྱེད་ཕྱི་མ་གནས་བརྩ་གཅིག་པར་དག་པོ་(༡༧)སྟེ་བརྩ་གཅིག་
 གོ། །སྤུ་རྩ་རྩ་བརྒྱད་(༣༤)བརྒྱད་རྩ་(༤༠)དག་དང་། བརྩ་གཉིས་པ་ལ་སྤུ་རྩ་རྩ་བརྒྱད་དོ། །བརྩ་གསུམ་པ་ལ་
 བརྒྱད་རྩ་འོ། །བརྩན་པ་སྤིང་པའི་གནས་ཞེས་པ་གནས་བརྩ་བཞི་པ་ལ་འདིར་ནི་གསུམ་བཅས་ལྷ་བརྩ་འོ་(༥༣)ཞེས་པ་
 ལ་གསུམ་དང་བཅས་པའི་ལྷ་བརྩ་ནི་གསུམ་བཅས་ལྷ་བརྩ་སྟེ། ལྷ་བརྩ་རྩ་གསུམ་ནི་གནས་བརྩ་བཞི་པ་འདི་ལ་འཇུག་
 པ་འོ། །རྒྱ་སྐར་གྱི་འཁོར་ལོ་ཕྱེད་པོ་དེ་ཡིས་ཉི་མ་རྣམ་དག་གྲུར་པའི་རྩེས་ལ་འཇུག་པ་མིན་པས་བྱ་ལོན་དུ་འགྲུར་འོ། །འཇུག་
 པས་ནོར་དུ་འགྲུར་འོ། །མིག་དམར་ལ་མོགས་པའི་སྐར་མའི་ལོངས་སྤྱོད་ལ་བྱ་ལོན་དོར་བར་བྱ་ཞིང་ནོར་སྤྱོན་པར་
 བྱའོ།⁵⁶ ལྷ་འདིའི་གོ་དོན་གོ་བདེ་བར་བྱེད་ན་རེའུ་མིག་འདི་ལྟ་བུ་ཞིག་ཡིན། སྐབས་འདིར་གཟུང་མིག་དམར་ཅོམ་གྱི་
 སྐར་བྱེད་འགོད་པ་ལས་གཟུང་གཞན་རྣམས་འདིར་བཀོད་མེད། ཡིན་ནའང་ཉམས་བཞེས་པ་རྣམས་ཀྱི་སྤྱོད་དུ་གཟུང་ལྷ་
 ཆ་ཆར་གྱི་རེའུ་མིག་འདིར་བཀོད་ཡོད། འདི་ནི་དུས་ཤེས་པ་རྣམས་ཀྱི་གཟུང་ལྷ་འདི་ལྟར་རྒྱ་མཚོ་སྐབས་མེད་ཐབས་མེད་
 པའི་རེའུ་མིག་ཞིག་ཡིན།

གཟུང་མིག་དམར་གྱི་སྐར་རེའུ་མིག་དཀྱིལ་འཁོར། ༥-༥༦

བྱ་ར།	རྒྱ་འཛིན།	རྒྱ་ཕྱོམ།	སྐར་བྱེད།	རྒྱ་ཕྱོམ།	རྒྱ་འཛིན།
སྤྱ་རྒྱ་འཛིན།	༡	༢༤	༢༤	༠	༠
	༢	༤༦	༢༩	༢༤	༡༩
	༣	༧༠	༣༩	༤༦	༡༢
	༤	༩༩	༤༩	༧༠	༡༡
	༥	༡༢༤	༥༧	༩༩	༡༠
	༦	༡༥༥	༥༧	༡༢༤	༩
	༧	༡༨༩	༦༤	༡༥༥	༨
	༨	༢༢༤	༧༥	༡༨༩	༧
	༩	༢༦༩	༨༦	༢༢༤	༦
	༡༠	༣༡༤	༩༧	༢༦༩	༥
ཕྱི་རྒྱ་འཛིན།	༡༡	༣༦༡	༡༡	༣༡༤	༤
	༡༢	༣༩༩	༢༤	༣༦༡	༣
	༡༣	༤༤༩	༤༠	༣༩༩	༢
	༠	༠	༥༩	༤༤༩	༡

དབུས་ཀྱི་སྐར་བྱེད་རྣམས་ཕྱོམ།

༢༤༤

གཟའ་ལྷག་པའི་སྐུར་ཀར་རེ་ལྷ་མིག་དཀྱིལ་འཁོར། ༥༦༩༦

བྱ་ར།	ཀར་འཛིན།	ཀར་སྡོམ།	སྐུར་བྱེད།	ཀར་སྡོམ།	ཀར་འཛིན།
སྐུ་ཀར།	༡	༡༤	༡༤	༠	༠
	༢	༢༣	༡༤	༡༤	༡༣
	༣	༤༦	༡༥	༢༣	༡༢
	༤	༤༡	༡༤	༤༦	༡༡
	༥	༦༤	༡༣	༤༡	༡༠
	༦	༩༥	༡༡	༦༤	༩
	༧	༩༢	༦	༩༥	༨
	༨	༩༦	༥	༩༢	༧
	༩	༩༦	༠	༩༦	༦
ཕྱི་ཀར།	༡༠	༩༣	༤	༩༦	༥
	༡༡	༩༢	༡༡	༩༣	༤
	༡༢	༤༢	༢༠	༩༢	༣
	༡༣	༣༤	༢༩	༤༢	༢
	༠	༠	༣༤	༣༤	༡

དབུས་ཀྱི་སྐུར་བྱེད་རྣམས་སྡོམ།

༡༩༤

གཟའ་ལྷག་པའི་སྐུར་ཀར་རེ་ལྷ་མིག་དཀྱིལ་འཁོར། ༤༩༩༢

བྱ་ར།	ཀར་འཛིན།	ཀར་སྡོམ།	སྐུར་བྱེད།	ཀར་སྡོམ།	ཀར་འཛིན།
སྐུ་ཀར།	༡	༡༠	༡༠	༠	༠
	༢	༢༠	༡༠	༡༠	༡༩
	༣	༣༩	༩	༢༠	༡༨
	༤	༣༦	༨	༣༩	༡༧
	༥	༤༩	༤	༣༦	༡༠
	༦	༤༩	༤	༤༩	༩
	༧	༥༡	༣	༤༩	༨
	༨	༥༢	༡	༥༡	༧
ཕྱི་ཀར།	༩	༤༩	༢	༥༢	༦
	༡༠	༤༩	༤	༤༩	༥
	༡༡	༣༤	༩	༤༩	༤
	༡༢	༢༣	༡༡	༣༤	༣
	༡༣	༦	༡༤	༢༣	༢
	༠	༠	༦	༦	༡

དབུས་ཀྱི་སྐུར་བྱེད་རྣམས་སྡོམ།

༡༠༤

གཟའ་ལ་མངས་ཀྱི་སྐུར་ཀར་རེ་ལྷ་མིག་དཀྱིལ་འཁོར། ༢༩༤༦

བྱ་ར།	ཀར་འཛིན།	ཀར་སྡོམ།	སྐུར་བྱེད།	ཀར་སྡོམ།	ཀར་འཛིན།
སྐུ་ཀར།	༡	༢༥	༢༥	༠	༠
	༢	༥༠	༢༥	༢༥	༡༩
	༣	༧༥	༢༥	༥༠	༡༨
	༤	༩༩	༢༤	༧༥	༡༧
	༥	༡༢༣	༢༤	༩༩	༡༠
	༦	༡༤༥	༢༣	༡༢༣	༩

དུ་བྱེད་པ་ནི་སྐར་ཕྱིས་ཀྱི་རིམ་ལོགས་པར་རྟོགས་དགོས་པ་གནད་ཀྱི་དམ་པ་སྤང་དོ། །སྤྱིར་སྤངས་གསང་སྤྱགས་དོན་
ཐོག་པའི་གཟབ་གནད་རྣམས་ཡོངས་སུ་རྟོགས་པར་དབང་ལུང་མན་ངག་དབྱིས་བྱིན་པ་མོབ་སྟེ་རང་རང་ཕྱག་བཞེད་ལྟར་
ཉམས་སུ་སྤང་དགོས་པ་ཡིན་སྟབས་རྣལ་འབྱོར་ཉམས་ལེན་པ་རྣམས་ཡི་དམ་གང་ལ་བསྐྱོམ་ཡང་ཉམས་བཞེས་པ་ཆ་
ཚང་ལ་གཅིག་དུ་མཇུག་པའི་ངེས་པ་མེད་པ་ལྟར་ལོ་གསུམ་ཕྱོགས་གསུམ་ཕྱིས་ཐབས་མང་ཡང་དུས་ཀྱི་འཁོར་ལོའི་
ཕྱིས་ཐབས་འདི་ལས་སྤྱོས་ཏེ་གཞན་རྣམས་ལ་སྐར་ཕྱིས་རིག་པའི་ཕྱིས་ཐབས་ཀྱི་ཆ་རྒྱུན་མེད་པ་ཡིན་ནོ། །ཕྱིས་ཐབས་
འདི་ནི་དེད་དུས་ཨང་ཕྱིས་པ་རྣམས་ཀྱིས་ཀྱང་ངོས་ལེན་དང་སྦྱོར་ཐབས་མཐུན་པར་བཞེད་དོ། །

དེ་བཞིན་འགྲེལ་ཆེན་ལས་ལོ་གསུམ་དང་ཕྱོགས་གསུམ་ངོས་འཛིན་ཡོ་རྒྱུད་གི་གངས་དང་སྤྱར་བ། འདིར་སྤྱོས་པ་དང་།
བྱུང་མེད་རྣམས་ཀྱི་ལུས་ལ་སྦྱིང་སྟོབས་དང་། རུལ་དང་། རུན་པའི་དབྱེ་བས་སྟོག་རབ་དུ་རྒྱ་སྟེ། བྱེད་དང་བཅས་པའི་རྒྱ་
བ་བཅུ་ལྷག་པའི་ལོ་དྲག་བཅུ་ཙ་དྲག་(༧༦་༡༠་༡༥)གི་བར་དུ་གཡོན་དང་གཡས་ལ་དཀྱིལ་འཁོར་ལྷ་འབབ་ལོ། །ལོ་
གསུམ་དང་ཕྱོགས་(༣་༡་༡༥)གསུམ་གྱི་བར་ནི་དབྱུ་མའི་དུས་ཏེ་ཆོ་ལོ་བརྒྱ་པའི་མི་རྣམས་ཀྱི་ངེས་པའོ། །དེ་ལ་གཡོན་
པ་དང་། གཡས་པ་དང་། དབྱུ་མའི་ཙ་གསུམ་གྱི་སྦྱིང་སྟོབས་དང་། རུལ་དང་རུན་པའི་རང་བཞིན་ཅན་ཏེ། འདི་རྣམས་
ལས་འཆི་བ་ནི་མུན་པའི་ཙ་ལ་རྒྱ་བའི་གངས་སྟོག་དང་བྱར་སེལ་གྱི་རང་བཞིན་གྱིས་བཟུང་ནས་གཡོན་པ་དང་གཡས་པ་
ལ་མི་མཉམ་པ་དང་མཉམ་པའི་ཉིན་ཞག་གིས་རྒྱ་སྟེ་དུས་ཀྱི་ལོ་སྟེ་ལོ་གསུམ་དང་། ཕྱོགས་གསུམ་གྱི་བར་དུ་ཉིན་ཞག་
བཟོད་པའི་དབང་གིས་ཞེས་པ་ལ། ཉིན་ཞག་ནི་ཉི་ཤུ་ཙ་ལྷག་པའི་བརྒྱ་ལྷག་བཅུ་གཅིག་(༡༡༢༥)སྟེ། དེ་དག་གི་
བཟོད་པའི་དབང་གིས་རི་སྒྲིབ་སྟོག་ཟད་པར་འབྱུར་བ་དེ་སྒྲིབ་དུ་འཕོ་ཞིང་རྒྱ་བར་བྱེད་པ་སྟེ། རྒྱ་བཞེས་བྱ་སྟེ་གཡོན་པའི་
ལམ་དང་ཉི་མའི་ལམ་གཡས་པ་ལ་མི་མཉམ་མཉམ་པའི་ཉིན་ཞག་རེ་རེ་འཕེལ་བས་རིམ་པས་སོ་ཞེས་པ་ནི་གལ་ཏེ་
ལུག་ལ་སོགས་པ་མི་མཉམ་པའི་དུས་སྤྱིར་ལ་སྤྱོད་པར་གྱུར་གཡོན་པའི་ཙ་ལ་ཉིན་ཞག་གཅིག་རྒྱུའོ། །གལ་ཏེ་སྤང་ལ་
སོགས་པ་མཉམ་པའི་དུས་སྤྱིར་ལ་སྤྱོད་པར་གྱུར་ན་གཡས་པ་ལ་ཉིན་ཞག་གཉིས་རྒྱུའོ། །དེ་ནས་སྤྱིར་ཡང་འཕོ་བའི་དབྱེ་
བ་ནི་མི་མཉམ་མཉམ་པའི་ཉིན་ཞག་རྣམས་ཀྱིས་གཡོན་པ་ལ་རྒྱ་བའི་མཐུག་དང་། གཡས་པ་ལ་རྒྱ་བའི་མཐུག་དུ་རྒྱ་
བའི་ཉིན་ཞག་གི་ཆེད་ཀྱིས་བྱེད་པ་ནི་བཅུ་གཉིས་ཕྱིབས་ཀྱི་ཁྱིམ་གྱི་འཁོར་ལོ་ལ་རིམ་པས་དཀྱིལ་འཁོར་ལྷ་ཡོངས་སུ་
དོར་བའི་སྤྲད་དུ་སྟེ། གཡོན་གྱི་ཙ་ལ་ནས་མཇུག་ལ་སོགས་པའི་དཀྱིལ་འཁོར་ཟད་པའི་དོན་དུ་འཕོ་བར་བྱེད་ཅིང་གཡས་
ཀྱི་ཙ་ལ་ས་ལ་སོགས་པའི་དཀྱིལ་འཁོར་ཟད་པའི་དོན་དུ་འཕོ་བར་བྱེད་དོ། །⁵⁷ །ཞེས་པ་སྟེ་རྟོག་ལྡན་ཆོ་ལོ་བརྒྱ་པའི་
དབང་དུ་བཏང་ནས་སྤྱོས་པ་དང་བྱུང་མེད་ལ་ཕྱི་རོལ་པ་རྗེས་སུ་བཟུང་བའི་དོན་དུ་རུལ་སྤྱིང་སྟོབས་གསུམ། ཕྱི་དུས་
ཀྱི་འཁོར་ལ་སྤྱིར་བ་ཉི་ལྔ་སྟེ་གཅན་གསུམ་གྱི་རང་བཞིན་གཡས་གཡོན་དུ་ལོ་དྲག་བཅུ་ཙ་དྲག་དང་རྒྱ་བ་བཅུ་དང་བྱེད་
ཀྱི་རིང་ལ་ལས་རྒྱུད་ཡང་དག་པར་རྒྱ་བར་བྱེད་ཅིང་། དེ་འཕྲོས་ལོ་གསུམ་དང་ཕྱོགས་གསུམ་སྟེ་ཞག་གངས་ཞེ་ལྟའི་རིང་
ལ་ལེ་ཤེས་ཀྱི་རྒྱུད་འབབ་ཞིག་རྒྱ་བ་ཡིན། འདི་ནི་ཕྱིས་ཀྱི་འབྲས་བུ་སྟོན་པའི་གཞུང་ལུགས་དབྱངས་འཆར་དང་བསྟན་ན།

༡༥ སྟེ། བསྟན། རྒྱུད། དཔལ་དུས་ཀྱི་འཁོར་ལོ་འགྲེལ་ཆེན་དུ་མེད་འོད། ཤོག ༢༥༢ ན་ཐོང་། ༥

ལས་རྒྱ་རྒྱ་བའི་དུས་ཚོད་ཟིལ་གྱིས་དེའི་གངས་གོ་རྒྱལ་དང་རྒྱ་བཅུད་དང་བཅུ་གཅིག་པོ་ཚོད་ལྷན་ཆོ་ལོ་བརྒྱ་
པའི་ཆོ་ཆད་དང་། ལོ་རྒྱ་རྒྱ་བའི་དུས་ཚོད་དེ་འཆི་བསྐྱའི་ལོ་ཡི་ཆད་དུ་བཞག་སྟེ་ཆོ་ཆད་ལོ་བརྒྱ་ཐམས་པ་དེས་པ་ཡིན། དེ་
ལས་སྤྱོད་ཏེ་སྐར་ཅིས་ཀྱི་ཡ་གྲུལ་ཆོས་གངས་ཆད་ལྷག་དང་སྦྱར་ཏེ་འགྲེལ་ཚུལ་སོགས་རྒྱས་པར་ཡོད་མོད། སྐབས་
འདིར་མི་སྣོ་བར་གཞན་དུ་བྱ་བ་དེར་གཞིགས་པར་བྱ།

སྐར་ཡང་འགྲེལ་ཆེན་ལས། །དེ་ནི་དུས་ཀྱི་ལོ་ཞེས་པ་ལ་སོགས་པས་དབུ་མའི་ཕྱོགས་གསུམ་དང་ལོ་གསུམ་གྱི་དབྱེ་བ་
དག་གིས་རིགས་གསུམ་ལ་སོགས་པས་འདུས་པ་ལ་སོགས་པ་གསུངས་ཏེ་འདིར་དུས་ཀྱི་ལོ་ནི་རྩ་དབུ་མའི་ལོ་འོ། །མེ་
གངས་ནི་ལོ་གསུམ་གྱི་གངས་སོ། །ལོ་ཡི་ཉིན་ཞག་ཚོགས་ཀྱིས་བསྐྱར་བ་ནི་ཉིན་ཞག་སུམ་བརྒྱ་དུག་ཅུས་བསྐྱར་བར་
འགྱུར་བ་སྟེ་ཉིན་ཞག་གི་ཚོགས་(༢X༢༤༠=༧༢༠) སྟོར་བརྒྱད་ཅུར་འགྱུར་རོ། །ལོ་གསུམ་པོ་དེ་ཉིད་རིགས་གསུམ་
སྟེ་སྐྱ་དང་གསུང་དང་ཐུགས་ཀྱི་རིགས་སོ། །ལོ་འདི་དབྱེ་བས་སྟོང་སྟོང་བས་དང་རྩལ་དང་སྟན་པའི་རང་བཞིན་ནོ། །ཉིན་ཞག་
གི་ཚོགས་དེ་ལས་(༧༢༠÷༧༢=༡༠) བཟོད་པའི་དབྱེ་བ་བརྒྱ་བརྒྱད་ཅུའི་ཆས་ཐོབ་པ་ནི་རིགས་དུག་ཏུ་འགྱུར་
རོ། །སྐར་ཡང་ཉིན་ཞག་གི་ཚོགས་དེ་ལས་རྒྱ་བའི་དབྱེ་བས་ཏེ་སུམ་ཅུའི་ཆས་ཐོབ་པ་ནི་རིགས་(༧༢༠÷༢༠=༣༦)
སུམ་ཅུ་རྩ་དུག་ཏུ་འགྱུར་ཏེ། རོ་ཡིས་བསྐྱར་བའི་རོ་ཞེས་པ་དུག་གིས་བསྐྱར་བའི་དུག་ནི། སུམ་ཅུ་རྩ་དུག་སྟེ། རྩལ་འབྱོར་
མ་རྩམས་ཀྱི་རིགས་སོ། །དེ་བཞིན་དུ། ཐབས་རྩལ་འབྱོར་པ་རྩམས་ཀྱི་འོ། །ཉིན་ཞག་གི་ཚོགས་སྟོང་བརྒྱད་ཅུ་པོ་དེ་ལས་
(༧༢༠÷༢=༣༦༠) གཟུང་ཡིས་བཅད་པས་ཐོབ་པ་ནི་རབ་གསལ་ལ་དེས་པར་དུས་ཀྱི་འཁོར་ལོ་འདི་དཀྱིལ་འཁོར་
བའི་ལྷ་རྩམས་ཏེ་ལྷ་བཅུ་རྩ་བཞི་ལྷག་པའི་བརྒྱ་ལྷག་གཅིག་གོ། །ལྷག་མ་ཤེས་རབ་དང་ཐབས་རྩུང་ཞིག་སྟེ་དེ་ལྷར་ན་ལྷ་
བཅུ་རྩ་དུག་ལྷག་པའི་བརྒྱ་ལྷག་གཅིག་ནི་དུས་ཀྱི་འཁོར་ལོ་སྟེ་བདུན་གྱི་ཆའི་ལྷག་མ་ནི་རིགས་ལྷན་གྱི་གནས་ཀྱི་ལྷག་
པའི་ལྷ་འོ། །ལྷ་དང་ལྷ་མོའི་འཁོར་ལོ་དང་རིགས་ལྷན་གྱི་མཆོན་ཉིད་དོ། །སྐར་ཡང་སྐར་གྱི་ཉིན་ཞག་གི་ཚོགས་སྟོང་
བརྒྱད་ཅུ་པོ་(༧༢༠÷༧༢=༡༠) དེ་ལས་ཕྱོགས་ཀྱིས་བཅད་པ་མངོན་པར་བཟོད་པ་ཞེས་པ་ནི་བཅུ་ལྷའི་ཆས་ཐོབ་པ་
ནི་ལྷ་དང་ལྷ་མོ་རྩམས་ཀྱིས་མངོན་པར་བཟོད་པར་འགྱུར་ཏེ། དུས་ཀྱི་འཁོར་ལོ་འདི་བདག་པོ་རྩུང་དང་ལྷ་རྩུང་ཅིག་བདུན་ཅུ་རྩ་
གཉིས་ནི་ལྷ་དང་ལྷ་མོའི་མཆོན་ཉིད་དོ་ཞེས་པ་ནི་ལོ་གསུམ་གྱི་དབྱེ་བས་རྩལ་འབྱོར་མའི་རྒྱུད་ཀྱི་དེས་པའོ།⁵⁸

དེ་ལྷར་ལོ་གསུམ་གྱི་དུས་ཡུན་དེ་ཕྱི་དང་ནང་། གཞན་དུས་ཀྱི་འཁོར་ལོ་འདི་དཀྱིལ་འཁོར་ལ་སོགས་དུ་མ་ལ་སྦྱར་བ་དེ་
དག་ཐམས་ཅད་དགོས་པ་སྐར་མེད་པ་ཡོད་པ་ནི་དུས་ཀྱི་འཁོར་ལོ་འདི་དཀྱིལ་འཁོར་གྱི་ལྷ་དང་ལྷ་མོ་ལ་སོགས་པའི་
མངོན་རྟོགས་དང་མཆོན་རྟོན་མཐའ་དག་མཇུག་བཞུགས་པ་ན་སྟེ་བདག་ཉིད་ལྷ་སུས་ཀྱང་འགྲེལ་བ་དམ་ཟབ་ཡོད་པ་གཏོན་ནི་
ཟ་བར་དེས་པ་བརྟེན་དོ།

དེ་ཡང་གཙོ་བོ་དུས་འཁོར་བསྐྱས་རྒྱུད་ཁམས་ལེར།

དཔལ་ལྷན་སྤྱོད་པ་གཞོན་མེད་ལ་སོགས་སུ་མ་འགྱུར་གང་དེ་རྣམས་ཀྱང་སྤྱོད་གཅན་གྱི་ནི་དུས་སྤྱོད་གསུམ།
༩༠།འབྱུང་བ་ཉི་མ་རྒྱ་བའི་(༡༣༣)གངས་ནི་མི་ཡི་བདག་པོ་ཕྱིད་བཅས་རྒྱ་བ་(༣༡༧)དག་དང་ལོ་
གསུམ་མོ། ཕྱིད་དང་བཅས་པའི་རྒྱ་བ་དོར་ནས་ཐུབ་མཆོག་རྣམས་ཀྱིས་བཅད་པ་དག་ནི་དུས་ཀྱི་འཁོར་ལོར་
འབྱུང།⁵⁹

ཞེས་འགྲེལ་ཆེན་ལས། དཔལ་ལྷན་སྤྱོད་པ་གཞོན་མེད་ལ་སོགས་ལྟ་པོ་གང་ཡིན་པ་དེ་དག་སྤྱིད་སྤྱོད་བས་དང་རྩལ་དང་
ལྷན་པའི་དབྱེ་བས་སང་པ་དང་མི་ལས་དང་གིན་ཏུ་གཉིད་ལོག་པའི་རང་བཞིན་གྱིས་དེ་དག་ནི་སྤྱོད་གཅན་ཏེ་སྟོག་གི་རྒྱུ་
གི་དུས་སྤྱོད་གསུམ་དུ་འབྱུང་རོ་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་ནི་རེས་པའོ། འབྱུང་བ་ཉི་མ་རྒྱ་བའི་(༡༣༣)གངས་ནི་སྤྱོད་ཡང་ལོ་གསུམ་
དང་ཕྱོགས་གསུམ་གྱི་ཉིན་ཞག་སྟེ་ཉི་ཤུ་ལྟ་བུ་ལྷན་པའི་བརྒྱ་ཕྱག་བཅུ་གཅིག་ཏུ་འབྱུང་རོ། གྲེ་མིའི་བདག་པོ་ཞེས་པ་སྟེ་
ཕྱིད་བཅས་རྒྱ་བ་(༡༧)ཞེས་པ་ནི་ཕྱོགས་གསུམ་མོ། ཕྱིད་དང་བཅས་པའི་རྒྱ་བ་དོར་ནས་ཞེས་པ་ནི་དེ་ལས་ཕྱིད་དང་
བཅས་པའི་རྒྱ་བ་དོར་བས་གཞན་ནི་སྤྱོད་བརྒྱད་ཅུར་(༡༠༤༠)འབྱུང་རོ།(༡༣༣-༤=༡༠༤)

ཡེ་ལེ། གཙོ་བོའི་དབྱུགས་ལ་གཟའ་ཡི་ཆོགས་ཀྱི་རྒྱུ་པ་མཐའ་དག་དུས་ཀྱི་སྤྱོད་བདག་གིས་ཐིམ་གྱུར་ཏེ། དབྱུགས་
ནི་མཁའ་མཁའ་ནམ་མཁའ་མཁའ་མིག་མེ་དང་རྒྱ་གཏེར་ (༤༣༢༠༠༠) སོང་ན་ཐམས་ཅད་སྤྱོད་པར་སྤྱུལ་བར་
བྱེད། ཁོ་འདི་རྣམས་ཀྱིས་ཕྱི་རོལ་ཏུ་ནི་མཆོག་གི་བྱུང་བདག་རྒྱུ་དང་སྤྱད་པའི་རོ་བོ་ལ། རང་རང་ཆད་ཀྱིས་
རྒྱལ་བའི་བདག་པོའི་རྒྱུ་པ་དབྱུགས་ཀྱི་དབྱུགས་སུ་འགྲོ་དང་གནས་པ་ཤེས་པར་བྱ།⁶⁰ ཞེས་གོང་གི་གཟའ་རྣམས་སྤྱོད་
པར་འབྱུག་ཚུལ་དང་ཡང་སྤྱད་བར་མཛད། སྤྱད་ཡང་ལོ་བརྒྱ་ཐམས་པ་དེ་འཆི་བ་དང་སྤྱད་བ་འགྲེལ་ཆེན་ལས། དེ་ནི་སུ་མ་
ཅུ་དུག་ཅེས་པ་ལ་སོགས་པས་རྒྱ་བ་དང་ཉི་མའི་རྒྱ་བ་ཟད་པས་དུས་འཁོར་བ་གསུངས་ཏེ། ལོ་བརྒྱ་ལ་

(༡༠༠X༣༦༠=༣༦༠༠)ཉིན་ཞག་གི་ཆོགས་བྱས་ན་ཉིན་ཞག་སྤྱོད་ཕྱག་སུམ་ཅུ་ཆུག་ཏུ་འབྱུང་ཏེ་རྒྱ་ཞེས་པ་ནི་
ལོའི་མིང་རོ། སུམ་ཅུ་དུག་གི་སྤྱོད་ཕྱག་རྒྱ་བརྒྱའི་ཉིན་ཞག་ཆོགས་དེ་རྣམས་དག་གིས་དུས་ཀྱི་ཅན་རྒྱ་བ་སྟེ་ཞེས་པ་ཅན་
རྣམས་ལ་འཆི་བ་འབྱུག་སྟེ་སྤྱོད་ཕྱག་བདུན་ཅུ་ཅན་ཉིས་པོ་རྣམས་ལ་འཆི་བའི་རྒྱུ་འབྱུག་གོ། དཀྱིལ་འཁོར་ལྟའི་རྒྱུ་
གིས་དུག་ཅུའི་ཆ་ཤས་དེར་བཀོད་ནས་རིམ་པ་ལས་རྒྱ་བར་བྱེད་དོ། དུས་ཀྱི་ཅན་དང་རྒྱུ་པ་གང་རྒྱ་ཞེན། ཉིན་མཆོན་དུས་
ལ་ཉི་མ་རྒྱ་བས་རང་རང་རྒྱ་བ་དག་གིས་གང་གང་རྟོགས་པར་མི་རུས་པ་སྟེ། རྒྱ་རྒྱར་གྱི་རྒྱ་བ་ཉི་མས་མི་རུས་པ་དང་
ཆོས་ཀྱི་རྒྱ་བ་རྒྱ་བས་མི་རུས་པའོ།⁶¹ ཞེས་ཡེ་ལས་ཀྱི་རྒྱུ་པ་ཉིས་པོའི་རྣམ་གཞག་དང་། ལྷག་པར་གཞན་དཀྱིལ་
འཁོར་དང་སྤྱོད་ཏེ་འགྲེལ་ཚུལ་མཐའ་ཡས་པ་ཞིག་ཡོད་མོད། གྱི་ན་བ་བདག་ནི་ནད་དང་གཞན་དུས་ཀྱི་འཁོར་ལོའི་
དགོངས་པ་རིང་དུ་བཞག་ལ་དེ་གཉིས་རྟོགས་པའི་མུང་གཞི་ཕྱིའི་ཡན་ལག་ཀྱང་ཚུལ་བཞིན་མ་རྟོགས་པས་དེ་དག་པན་

༡༥ ཟླ། བཟླ། རྒྱུ། དུས་འཁོར་བཟུས་རྒྱུ། ལམས་ལེ། ཤོག ༡༡ ན བྲང་ ༡
༡༦ ཟླ། བཟླ། རྒྱུ། དུས་འཁོར་བཟུས་རྒྱུ། ལམས་ལེ། ཤོག ༩༥ བ བྲང་ ༣
༡༧ ཟླ། བཟླ། རྒྱུ། དཔལ་དུས་ཀྱི་འཁོར་ལོ་འགྲེལ་ཆེན་དེ་མེད་འོད། ཤོག ༢༤༡ ན བྲང་ ༥

ཚུན་འབྲེལ་བར་མི་ལུས་སོ། །དེས་ན་ནང་དང་གཞན་ལ་ཉམས་བཞེས་མཛད་བཞིན་པའི་སྐྱེས་བུ་དམ་པ་རྣམས་ཀྱིས་སྤྱོད་
ཡུལ་དུ་འབྱུང་པའོ།།

དེ་བཞིན་ཉི་མར་སྐྱ་གཅན་འཇུག་པ་དང་སྐྱར་བ་འབྲེལ་ཆེན་ལས། ད་ནི་མཆོད་པའི་དཀྱིལ་འཁོར་ལ་སྐྱ་གཅན་འཇུག་པའི་
མཚན་ཉིད་གསུངས་པ་ཆོག་པ་མཚམས་ཞེས་པ་ལ་སོགས་པ་སྟེ་ཆོག་པ་མཚམས་ནི་ཉིད་མཐའ་འམ་གནམ་སྟོང་གི་
མཐའ་རོ། །དེ་བོད་ཅན་གྱི་དཀྱིལ་འཁོར་དག་ལ་སྐྱ་གཅན་རབ་རྒྱ་འཇུག་སྟེ་དཀྱིལ་འཁོར་ཡང་། དཀྱིལ་འཁོར་གྱི་སྐྱེས་ནི་
འདིར་ཚུ་ཆོད་དུག་ཅུའི་བདག་ཉིད་རྒྱ་སྐར་གཅིག་གི་འོངས་སྤྱོད་དེ་དེ་ཡང་ཐམས་ཅད་འཛིན་པའི་དབང་གིས་བྱིས་བཅུ་
གཉིས་ཀྱི་བདག་ཉིད་དང་ཆ་བཅུ་དུག་གི་བདག་ཉིད་དུ་རིག་པར་བྱའོ། །རྣམ་དག་གྲུར་ན་ཐམས་ཅད་འཛིན་ཏོག་ལ་ཏི་སྐྱ་
གཅན་གྱི་འོངས་སྤྱོད་ཀྱིས་ཆེན་བའི་འོངས་སྤྱོད་ཡོངས་སུ་དག་ན་དེའི་ཆོ་ཚུ་ཆོད་དུག་ཅུའི་མཐའ་ཐུག་པར་ཐམས་ཅད་
འཛིན་ནོ། །འོངས་སྤྱོད་བྱེད་དག་པར་གྲུར་ན་བྱེད་འཛིན་ནོ། །དེ་བོད་ཅན་གྱི་རྒྱ་བའི་དབང་གིས་དཀྱིལ་འཁོར་ཆོད་དུག་
ཅུ་སྟེ་ཆེན་བའི་ཆ་བཅུ་དུག་གི་བདག་ཉིད་དོ།⁶² །ཞེས་སྐབས་འདིར་གཟའ་འཛིན་གསུང་པའི་སྐབས་ཡིན་ཡང་། ལུང་འདི་
ཅིས་ཕྱིར་འདིར་བྲངས་ཞེ་ན། ཉི་མ་གཉིས་དཀར་ནག་གི་ཆོག་པ་མཚམས་སུ་སྐྱ་གཅན་གྱིས་གྲིབ་པ་དང་། སྐབས་འདིར་
དུ་མཐོང་བའི་དུས་ལ་སྐྱར་བ་ཡིན་སྐབས་དགོས་པའི་དབང་གིས་འགོད་པའོ།།

ཡང་དེ་ཉིད་ལས་གཟའ་རྣམས་སྟོང་པར་འཇུག་པ་དང་སྐྱར་བ། ད་ནི་གཟའ་བརྒྱད་ཀྱི་ལོ་བརྒྱའི་ཆོད་འཁོར་ལོ་བྱེད་དང་
བཅས་པ་ལ་འོངས་སྤྱོད་པའི་ཕྱིར་གཅིག་རྒྱ་བསྐྱས་པ་ཉིད་ཀྱིས་དུས་ཀྱི་འཁོར་ལོ་དང་བལ་བ་གསུངས་པ་སྐྱ་བའི་ཕྱིགས་
ཞེས་པ་ལ་སོགས་པ་སྟེ། ཆེན་བའི་ཕྱིགས་ཏེ་ཞེས་པ་ནི་ཆེན་བའི་ཕྱིགས་གཅིག་དབྱུག་གུ་སྐྱེས་ཅུའི་[༢༠÷༢=༡༥]
[༠/༠/༡༥]བདག་ཉིད་ཀྱི་མཚན་མོར་འབྱུར་ཏེ་བྱིས་ཀྱི་འཁོར་ལོ་བྱེད་ལ་ཉེ་བར་འོངས་སྤྱོད་པའི་ཕྱིར་རོ། །ཉི་མའི་
བཟོད་པ་ཞེས་པ་ནི་ཉི་མའི་བཟོད་པ་ཉིད་ཉིན་མཚན་བྱེད་དུ་འབྱུར་ཏེ་འཁོར་ལོ་བྱེད་[༡༢.༥=༠/༦] ལ་ཉེ་བར་འོངས་
སྤྱོད་པའི་ཕྱིར་རོ། །ལ་སྐྱེས་ཆེན་བ་དགུ་[༠/༩]རྣམས་དག་གི་མཚན་མོའི་ཞེས་པ་ནི་བྱེད་པ་བཛྲོད་པར་འདོད་པས་སོ། །དེ་
བཞིན་དུ་ཆེན་མའི་ལོ་དུག་[༦/༠]དུ་འབྱུར་རོ། །ཉི་མའི་ཇི་ལྟ་བ་དེ་བཞིན་དུ་པ་སངས་ཀྱི་ཡང་བཟོད་པ་[༡༢.༥=༠/༦]
སྟེ་ཆེན་སྐྱེས་གཟའ་ལག་[༡༢.༥=༠/༦] གི་ཡང་བཟོད་པའོ། །ཆོས་[༡༥/༠] ཞེས་བྱ་བའི་ལོ་ནི་སྟེ་ལོ་བཅུ་ལྔ་ནི་སྟེན་
པའི་ལོ། །ལུན་ཅན་སྐྱ་གཅན་གྱི་ནི་ལོ་དགུ་[༩/༠] ཉིན་མཚན་བྱེད་དུ་འབྱུར་ཏེ་རྒྱ་སྐར་བྱེད་ཀྱི་འཁོར་ལོ་ཉེ་བར་འོངས་
སྤྱོད་པའི་ཕྱིར་རོ། །དེ་དག་ཐམས་ཅད་གཅིག་རྒྱ་བསྐྱས་པ་ནི་ནོར་[༤] ཀྱིས་བསྐྱར་བའི་དུས་ཀྱི་ལོ་ཞེས་པ། ལོ་སྐྱེས་ཅུ་
ཙམ་གཉིས་དང་བྱེད་བཅས་ཆེན་བ་གསུམ་དུ་འབྱུར་ཏེ་མེམས་ཅན་རྣམས་ཀྱི་སྤྱིང་སྤྱོད་ཀྱི་ཡོན་ཏན་གྱི་དབྱེ་བས་
སོ།⁶³ །ཁོང་གི་གཟའ་རྣམས་ཀྱི་ལོ་གངས་ཆ་ཆོང་དུ་ལྷན་། ལས་རྒྱུད་འབད་ཞིག་བསགས་པ་ལས་ལོ་སྐྱེས་ཅུ་ཙམ་གཉིས་
དང་བྱེད་དེ་ལུས་དག་ཡིད་གསུམ་མམ་རྩལ་སྐྱེད་སྤྱོད་གསུམ་གྱིས་བསྐྱར་བ་ལས་ལོ་དགུ་བཅུ་ཙམ་དང་ཆེན་བ་

༢༠ གྲེ། བསྟན། རྒྱུ། དཔལ་དུས་ཀྱི་འཁོར་ལོ་འབྲེལ་ཆེན་དེ་མེད་འོད། ཤོག ༢༠༢ ན བྲང་ ༥
༢༡ གྲེ། བསྟན། རྒྱུ། དཔལ་དུས་ཀྱི་འཁོར་ལོ་འབྲེལ་ཆེན་དེ་མེད་འོད། ཤོག ༡༩༦ བ བྲང་ ༥

བཅུ་དང་ཞག་བཅོ་ལྔ་བྱུང་། དེའི་སྟེང་དུ་ཡེ་ལྷུང་འབའ་ཞིག་བསགས་པའི་དུས་ཡུན་ལོ་གསུམ་དང་རྒྱ་བ་ཉིལ་པོ་གཅིག་
དང་བྱེད། ཡང་ན་ཕྱོགས་གསུམ་ཞེས་ཞག་གངས་ཞེ་ལྔ་ལ་གོ་དགོས་པ་ཡིན། འདི་གཉིས་བསྐྱར་པ་ལས་ལོ་བརྒྱ་ཐམས་པ་
ཞེས་ཅིང་ལྔ་ཆེ་ལོ་བརྒྱ་པ་མེས་པ་ཅན་ཆ་ཆོད་གི་ཆེ་ཆོད་དང་། ཕྱི་རོལ་པ་ལ་མོས་པ་རྣམས་ལ་ལྷ་ཆོངས་པའི་ལོ་བརྒྱ་
ཐམས་པ། ཡང་ན་དེད་གི་ཆོན་རིག་པ་ལ་མོས་པ་རྣམས་ལ་ཉི་མའི་ཆོ་ཆོད་དེ་འཛིག་རྟེན་ཁམས་འདི་གྲུབ་ནས་ཉི་མའི་ཆོ་
ཆོད་བྱེད་ཅམ་ཟེན་པ་བཤད་པ་དང་སྤྱར་ནའང་ཤིན་ཏུ་འཆམས་པ་འོ། །དེས་ན་ཕྱི་ནང་གཞན་གསུམ་ཅམ་མེན་པ་ཆོན་རིག་
ལ་སྤྱར་ནའང་སྤྱར་ཆོག་པ་ཤིན་ཏུ་ནས་ངོ་མཆོང་ཆེ་བ་འོ། །

$$0/0/74+0/6+6/0+6+0/6+0/6+740/+60/=32|374X3=66/70/74$$

ལོ་བརྒྱ་ཐམས་པ་ལས་ལོ་གསུམ་ཕྱོགས་གསུམ་ལས་འདི་དག་གིས་འཕྲིན་ལོ་གསུམ་དང་རྒྱ་བ་ཉིལ་པོ་གཅིག་དང་ཞག་
བཅོ་ལྔ་ལས་རྒྱ་བ་བྱེད་པ་གཅིག་བྱུང་བ་ཡིན་ནོ། ། 3/7/74

$$\begin{aligned} 700-3/7/74 &= 66/70/74 \\ 27600 \div 32 &= 862.5 \\ 862.5 \times 32 &= 27600 \\ 27600 \times 32 &= 883200 \\ 883200 \times 32 &= 28262400 \\ 28262400 \times 32 &= 904396800 \\ 904396800 \times 32 &= 28940697600 \\ 28940697600 \times 32 &= 926102323200 \end{aligned}$$

དབུགས་གཅིག་ལ་ལག་པའི་རྒྱ་ཆོད་ཀྱི་སྐར་མ་གཉིས་དང་སྐར་ཆ་བརྒྱད་ཡོད་དོ།

$$\begin{aligned} &\text{དུས་འཁོར་སྐར་ཅིས་ལུགས་སུ་ཉིན་ཞག་གཅིག་ལ་རྒྱ་ཆོད་ 60} \\ &\text{རྒྱ་ཆོད་གཅིག་ལ་རྒྱ་སྐར་ 60} \\ &\text{རྒྱ་སྐར་གཅིག་ལ་དབུགས་ 6} \\ &60 \times 60 = 3600 \times 6 = 21600 \end{aligned}$$

དེར་ལྟར་བརྟེན་ཏེ་ཉིན་ཞག་གཅིག་ལ་དབུགས་ 21600 བྱུང་བ་ཡིན།

$$\begin{aligned} &\text{དེ་ལག་འཁོར་རྒྱ་ཆོད་དང་བསྐྱར་ན་ཉིན་ཞག་གཅིག་ལ་རྒྱ་ཆོད་ 28} \\ &\text{རྒྱ་ཆོད་གཅིག་ལ་སྐར་མ་ 60} \\ &\text{སྐར་མ་གཅིག་ལ་སྐར་ཆ་ 60} \\ &28 \times 60 = 1680 \times 60 = 100800 \end{aligned}$$

ལོ་གསུམ་ཕྱོགས་གསུམ་གྱི་དུས་ཚོགས་ཤེས་ཚུལ་ལ་དྲུད་པ།

དེར་ལྟར་བཅུས་ཏེ་ཉིན་ཞག་གཅིག་ལ་སྐར་ཆ་ ༤༤༠༠ ཟུང་བ་ཡིན་ནོ།

མདོར་བསྟན་ན་དབུགས་ ༢༡༤༠༠དང་། སྐར་ཆ་ ༤༤༠༠གཉིས་ཨང་གི་མང་ཉུང་ཅམ་ལས་དོན་དུ་བྱུང་པར་རྩ་བ་ནས་
མེད། འདི་གཉིས་ཀྱི་བར་བྱ་དབུགས་གཅིག་ལ་སྐར་ཆ་བཞི་ཡོད།

མི་གཅིག་གི་མི་ཚེ་འོ་ནང་ལོ་བརྒྱ་ལ་རྒྱུད་གི་རྒྱ་བ་ཆ་ཆར་བསྐྱེམས་ན་དབུགས་ཀྱི་གྲངས་ ༢༢༢༤༠༠༠༠༠ མཐ་པ་
གཏོང་གི་ཡོད།

དེ་ནས་མི་དེའི་ཆོ་རྒྱུགས་པར་བཞེད། དེར་བརྟེན་སྤྱོད་པོ་འགའ་ཞིག་གིས་དབུགས་བཀག་ན་ཆོ་རིང་བ་བྱུང་བར་བཤད་
པའི་གནད་ཀྱང་འདི་ཡིན་ནོ།

$$222400000 \div 22 = 222200000 \div 6 = 37000000 \div 60 = 6166666$$

$$6166666 \div 60 = 102777.7 \div 30 = 3425.9$$

$$3425.9 = 3426$$

ཙོད་ལྷན་ཆོ་ལོ་བརྒྱ་པ་ལས་ལེ་རྒྱུད་འབའ་ཞིག་གི་ལོ་གསུམ་དང་ཕྱོགས་གསུམ་གྱི་དུས་ཡུན་འཕྲིན། ལས་རྒྱུད་གི་ལོ་
ལོ་སོགས་པ་རྣམས་བྱུང་།

$$\text{ལོ། } 700 - 3 = 697$$

$$\text{ཟླ། } 0 - 7 = 93$$

$$\text{ཞག } 0 - 77 = 77$$

ཡང་། ཙོད་ལྷན་ཆོ་ལོ་བརྒྱ་པ་ལས་ལེ་རྒྱུད་འབའ་ཞིག་གི་སོ་བྱུག་དང་ཟླ་བ་བྱེད་དང་བཅུ་གཅིག་འཕྲིན། ལེ་རྒྱུད་གི་
ལོ་ལོ་སོགས་པ་རྣམས་བྱུང་།

$$\text{ལོ། } 700 - 697 = 3$$

$$\text{ཟླ། } 0 - 93 = 7$$

$$\text{ཞག } 0 - 77 = 77$$

དུས་འཁོར་འགྲེལ་ཆེན་ལས། བྱེད་དང་བཅས་པའི་ཉིན་ཞག་གྲངས་དག་ལས་བྱེད་དང་བཅས་པའི་རྒྱ་སྐར་གྱི་འཁོར་ལོ་
ལ་ཉེ་བར་ལོངས་སྤྱོད་པའི་བྱིར་སྤྱོད་སྟོབས་དང་རྩལ་དང་ལྷན་པའི་དབྱེ་བས་ལོ་བརྒྱར་འགྱུར་ཏེ། དུས་ཀྱི་འཁོར་ལོ་[-]
དམན་ནོ་ཞེས་པ་ནི་ལོ་གསུམ་དང་ཕྱོགས་གསུམ་[3/7/77] གྱིས་དམན་པ་སྟེ་གཟའ་བརྒྱད་པོ་རྣམས་ཀྱི་གཅིག་ཏུ་
བསྟུས་པ་ལས་བྱེད་དང་བཅས་པའི་ཟླ་བ་བཅུ་ལྷག་པའི་ལོ་དག་བཅུ་ཙུག་གི་ཆོགས་སུ་འགྱུར་པོ། འདིར་སོག་ནི་སྤྱི་
སྟོབས་ལ་འབབ་ཅས་པ་ནི་བྱེད་དང་བཅས་པའི་ཟླ་བ་གསུམ་ལྷག་པའི་ལོ་སུམ་ཙུ་རྩ་གཉིས་[32/3/77]ཀྱི་བར་དུ་
སེམས་ཅན་རྣམས་ཀྱི་སོག་ནི་སྟོབས་ལ་སྟེ་སྤྱོད་སྟོབས་ཀྱི་ཡོན་ཏན་གྱི་འབབ་པོ། འདིའི་ལོ་གྲུ་རྩལ་གྱི་བར་དུ་ཆད་དེ་ཉིད་

གྲིས་སོ། །དེའི་འོག་དུ་སྟན་པ་ལ་ཡང་རིམ་པ་དེ་ཉིད་གྲིས་སོ། །ལྷ་མི་ལག་འགྲོ་རྣམས་ཀྱི་རང་རང་གི་ལོ་བརྒྱའི་ཚད་
ལས་སྤྱིང་སྟོབས་དང་རྩལ་དང་སྟན་པ་རྣམས་ཀྱི་མཐའི་མཚམས་དེ་ནས་ལྷ་པ་ཉིད་དུ་འབྱུང་རོ། །ཁྲི་བ་བྱེད་བཅས་མཚན་
མོ་དག་གིས་ཞེས་པ་ནི་དུས་ཀྱི་འཁོར་ལོའི་ཕྱོགས་གསུམ་གྱིས་ཏེ་ཀྲང་ཞེས་པ་སྤར་གྱི་ལོ་གསུམ་གྱིས་སོ། །འདིར་
འཁོར་བ་པ་རྣམས་ལྷ་པ་ཉིད་འཛི་བར་འབྱུང་ཏེ། སྤྱིས་བུ་ཚོ་ལོ་བརྒྱ་པ་དབང་པོ་བརྒྱ་པ་ཞེས་པའི་ཚིག་འཛིག་རྟེན་པའི་
ཐ་སྟངས་ལས་སོ། །དོན་དམ་པའི་རིགས་པས་ནི་ངེས་པ་མེད་དེ་སེམས་ཅན་རྣམས་ཀྱི་རང་རང་གི་ལས་ཀྱི་དབང་གིས་སྤྱི་
བ་དང་འགག་པར་སངས་རྒྱས་པ་རྣམས་ཀྱིས་རྟོགས་པར་བྱའོ། །སྤྱིས་བུ་ཚོ་ལོ་བརྒྱ་པ་དབང་པོ་བརྒྱ་པ་ཞེས་པ་ནི་
དགོངས་པའི་སྐད་དེ་སྤྱིས་བུ་ནི་ཕྱི་རོལ་དུ་དུས་བཞིའི་བདག་ཉིད་གྱི་ལོ་ཁྲི་སྟག་གཉིས་ལྷག་པའི་དབུས་སྟག་བཞི་བརྒྱ་ཅུ་
གསུམ་[༤ ༢༠༠༠༠]གྱི་དབུགས་ཀྱི་མཚན་ཉིད་དོ། །ནད་དུ་ནི་དབུགས་ཀྱི་ཚད་དེ་ཉིད་གྱིས་དུས་བཞིའི་བདག་ཉིད་དེ་
གང་གི་དུས་སྟུགས་ཐམས་ཅད་ཀྱི་རྒྱ་བ་སྟོང་པ་ལ་འཇུག་པར་འབྱུང་བའོ་ཞེས་པ་ནི་དོན་དམ་པའི་རིགས་
པའོ། །སེམས་ཅན་རྣམས་ཀྱི་དགེ་བ་དང་མི་དགེ་བའི་དབང་གིས་ཀྲང་ཚོ་དམན་པ་དང་། ལྷག་པར་འབྱུང་ཞིང་ཚོ་ལོ་བརྒྱ་
པ་ཞེས་བྱ་བའི་ངེས་པ་མེད་དེ། དེ་བཞིན་གཤམས་པའི་གསུང་གི་ཕྱིར་རོ། །གྲངས་ནི་ལྷན་ཏུ་ངེས་པ་འདི་དག་རྒྱུད་ཀྱི་
རྒྱལ་པོ་དུས་ཀྱི་འཁོར་ལོར་རབ་དུ་གྲགས་པ་ཡིན་ནོ། །མི་ཡི་དབང་ཞེས་པ་ནི་ཕྱག་ན་འོ་རྩེ་རྒྱ་བ་བཟང་པོ་ལ་བོད་
པའོ།⁶⁴ །སྐར་ཕྱིས་ཀྱི་སྐབས་སྟུགས་ཐམས་ཅད་ཀྱི་འགྲོས་མཚམས་སྟོང་པ་འཇུག་ཚུལ་ལ་སྤར་ནས་ཀྲང་གསུངས། འདི་
ཡང་སྐར་ཕྱིས་པ་རྣམས་ལ་ཤིན་ཏུ་ནས་གལ་ཆེ་བའི་གནད་ཅིག་ཡིན་ནོ།།

དུས་སྟོར་བརྒྱ་གཉིས་དང་སྟོར་ཏེ་འགྲེལ་ཚུལ་ནི་འགྲེལ་ཆེན་ལས། ད་ནི་སྟོག་ཅེས་པ་ལ་སོགས་པས་ཉིན་ཞག་སོ་སོར་
དབུགས་ཀྱི་དབྱེ་བས་རྒྱ་བ་གསུངས་ཏེ། འདིར་རྒྱག་བརྒྱ་ལྷག་པའི་སྟོང་སྟག་ཉི་ཤུ་ཅུ་གཅིག་གི་ནང་ནས་གང་ཞིག་ཡེ་
ཤེས་ཀྱི་དཀྱིལ་འཁོར་འབབ་པར་འབྱུང་བ་དེ་ནི་ལུས་ལ་ལྷག་པའི་དབུགས་ཞེས་བརྗོད་དོ། །རབ་གསལ་མཚམས་སྟུ་སྟེ་
དུས་སྟོར་གཉིས་ཀའི་དབུས་སྟུ་རིག་བྱེད་ཀྲང་ཆད་གྱིས་དམན་རྒྱག་ཅུ་ཞེས་པ་ཀྲང་པ་དང་བཅས་པའི་ལྷ་བརྒྱ་ཅུ་རྒྱག་
(༥༤: ༢༥)གོ། །འཕོ་བ་བརྒྱ་གཉིས་ཀྱི་དབྱེ་བ་དག་གིས་དེ་དག་ཐམས་ཅད་བདུན་ཅུ་ཅུ་ལྷས་ལྷག་པའི་རྒྱག་བརྒྱར་
(༥༤: ༢༥ X ༡༢ = ༦༥༥)གྱུར་ནས་ཉིན་ཞག་སོ་སོའི་དུས་སྟུ་ཅུ་ནི་རྒྱང་དག་ངེས་པར་འཛུམས་ཞེས་པ་ནི་ལུང་གི་ཚིག་
སྟེ་འཛུམས་སོ་ཞེས་པ་ནི་རང་བཞིན་ནོ། །རྩ་བུར་འདི་རྣམས་ནི་གཡོན་པ་དང་གཡས་པ་ལ་སྟེ་རྩ་སྟོང་སྟག་བདུན་ཅུ་ཅུ་
གཉིས་(༧༢༠༠༠)གྱི་ནད་ནས་རྩ་བུར་(༢)ཞིག་འཛུམས་ཤིང་དཀྱིལ་འཁོར་ལྷ་རྒྱུད་ཡང་དག་པར་རྒྱ་བ་རྣམས་པར་
ཉམས་པར་འབྱུང་རོ། །ལྷག་མ་དབུགས་བཞི་བརྒྱ་ཅུ་ལྷས་གནས་སོ། །ཡང་དང་ཡང་དུ་ལོ་ཡི་དབུས་སྟུ་སྟེ་དེ་ལྷར་ཉིན་
ཞག་སོ་སོར་རྩ་བུར་དག་འཛུམས་པར་བྱེད་པས་ལོའི་ནད་དུ་ལོའི་ཉིན་ཞག་སུམ་བརྒྱ་རྒྱག་ཅུ་སྟེ་རྒྱ་བ་དག་ལས་ཏེ་
གཡས་པ་དང་གཡོན་པའི་དཀྱིལ་འཁོར་ཡང་དག་པར་རྒྱ་བ་ལས་སྟོང་པ་མིག་དང་རིའི་(༧༢༠)གྲངས་ཞེས་པ་ནི་ལྷ་
ལྷག་པའི་བདུན་བརྒྱའོ།⁶⁵ །ཞེས་ཉིན་ཞག་གཅིག་ལ་ལུས་ལ་རྩ་གཉིས་རེ་སྟེ་ཉིན་ལ་གཅིག་དང་མཚན་ལ་གཅིག་རེ་

22 གྲེ། བསྟན། རྒྱུད། དཔལ་དུས་ཀྱི་འཁོར་ལོ་འགྲེལ་ཆེན་དུ་མེད་འོད། ཤོག 182 ན གྲེང་། 7
23 གྲེ། བསྟན། རྒྱུད། དཔལ་དུས་ཀྱི་འཁོར་ལོ་འགྲེལ་ཆེན་དུ་མེད་འོད། ཤོག 262 ན གྲེང་། 3

ལོ་གསུམ་ཁྱོགས་གསུམ་གྱི་དུས་ཚོགས་ཡེས་ཚུལ་ལ་དཔྱད་པ།

འཕེལ་ཞིང་། ལོ་གཅིག་ལ་ཙུ ༡༩༠X2=220 ལོ་བརྒྱ་ཐམ་པ་ལ་ཙུ་ཐུན་22000 གྲང་དེ་ལྟར་བྱུང་བ་གསུངས།
དེ་བཞིན་རྒྱ་ཆོད་ ༥༩་2༥ ཀླང་བཅས་ཞེས་པ་ཉིན་ཞག་གཅིག་ལ་དུས་སྤྱིར་བཙུག་ཉིས་རེ་འཕོ་ཞིང་དུས་སྤྱིར་གྱི་འཕོ་
མཚམས་བཙུག་ཉིས་ལ་ཡི་རྒྱུད་ ༩2༥ བྱུང་བ་ཡིན་ནོ། ཕྱིས་ཐབས་འདི་དག་དང་གི་ཨང་ཕྱིས་པ་ཞིག་གིས་ཕྱིས་ཀྱང་
ཕན་ཚུན་མཐུན་སྦྱོར་བྱེད་པ་ལ་མོས་མཐུན་བྱ་རྒྱ་གདོན་མི་ཟེེ།

དུས་འཁོར་འགྲེལ་ཆེན་ལས། །དཔའ་བེའི་རིམ་པ་བདག་བྱིན་བརྒྱབ་པ་ཡི། །རིམ་པ་དག་ཀྱང་ཐར་པའི་ལམ་མ་
ཡིན། །ཤིན་ཏུ་རྣམ་དག་རིམ་པ་གཅིག་བུ་ནི། །ཐར་པའི་སྤྱད་དུ་སངས་རྒྱས་རྣམས་ཀྱིས་བསྟན།⁶⁶ །ཞེས་པའི་འགྲེལ་
པར་མི་ཕམ་རིན་པོ་ཆེས། །དེ་ལྟར་ཞུས་པའི་དོན་མདོར་བསྟུས་ན་ཕྱི་ནང་གཞན་གསུམ་གྱི་བདག་ཉིད་ཅན་དུས་ཀྱི་འཁོར་
ལོའི་རྒྱུད་ཞུས་པར་འདུ་སྟེ། ཕྱི་ནི་ཕྱི་རོལ་དུ་ཇི་ལྟར་སྤྱང་བ་འཇིག་རྟེན་གསུམ་གྱི་ཁམས་ཀྱི་གོང་པ་བསྟན་པ་ནི་ཕྱི་དུས་
ཀྱི་འཁོར་ལོ་ཡིན་ལ། ཕྱི་རོལ་གྱི་སྤྱང་བ་ཐམས་ཅད་ནང་གི་ལུས་ཀྱི་ཁམས་ཀྱི་འདུ་འཕྲོད་ལས་སྤྱང་བའི་ཕྱིར་ནང་རྟེ་
ལུས་ཀྱི་ཚད་དང་རྩ་རྒྱུད་ཐིག་ལའི་གོང་པ་བསྟན་པ་ནི་ནང་དུས་ཀྱི་འཁོར་ལོ་ཞེས་བྱ་སྟེ། རྒྱུད་གཞན་ལས་ཀྱང་། ཇི་
ལྟར་ཕྱི་རོལ་དེ་བཞིན་ནང་། །ཞེས་གསུངས་ཤིང་། དུས་ཀྱི་འཁོར་ལོའི་རྩ་བའི་རྒྱུད་ལས། ཇི་ལྟར་ཕྱི་རོལ་དེ་བཞིན་
ལུས། །ཇི་ལྟར་ལུས་ལ་དེ་བཞིན་གཞན། །ཞེས་གསུངས་པ་བཞིན་ནོ། །དེ་ལྟར་སྤྱིབ་པ་དང་བཅས་པའི་ཕྱི་རོལ་དང་ནང་གི་
རྣམ་པར་སྤྱང་བ་དེ་དག་སྤྱིབ་པ་དང་བལ་བའི་ཆོད་ག་པ་ཡི་ཤེས་ཀྱི་དཀྱིལ་འཁོར་དུ་སྤྱང་བ་ནི་གཞན་དུས་ཀྱི་འཁོར་ལོ་
ཞེས་བྱ་སྟེ། སྤྱིབ་པ་དང་བཅས་པའི་ཕྱི་དང་ནང་གི་སྤྱང་བ་རྣམས་ལས་གནས་གཞན་དུ་བྱུང་པ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར་རོ་⁶⁷ ཞེས་
ཕྱི་ནང་གཞན་གསུམ་ཕན་ཚུན་དག་པ་མཉམ་སྦྱོར་གྱི་གནད་རྣམས་གསུངས་སོ། ། ཡང་ཁོང་གིས་མཁས་འཇུག་སྟེམ་
བྱང་དུ།

དུས་ལ་མཁས་པར་འགྱུར་བ་ཡིས།
དངོས་ཀྱན་མི་རྟག་གཡོ་བར་ཤེས།
བདག་ལ་རྟག་འཛིན་རང་ལོག་ནས།
དོན་དང་ཐ་སྙད་ཀྱན་ཤེས་འགྱུར།⁶⁸

ཞེས་དུས་ཀྱི་རྣམ་གཞག་རྣམས་ལེགས་པར་ཁོང་དུ་རྒྱབ་པ་རྣམས་ཀྱིས་ཕྱིའི་གཟའ་སྐར་གྱི་འཁོར་འགོས་ཅམ་རྟོགས་པ་
མིན་པར་དངོས་པོ་ཀྱན་གྱི་རང་བཞིན་སྐད་ཅིག་སྐད་ཅིག་ལ་འགྱུར་བའི་ཆོས་ཉིད་ཀྱི་རང་བཞིན་མི་རྟག་པ་ཉིད་ལེགས་
པར་རྟོགས་པ་དང་། དེ་ལ་བརྟེན་ནས་རྟག་པར་འཛིན་པའི་སྟོ་དེ་ཡོངས་སུ་དོར་ནས་ཀྱན་ལ་ཕན་སེམས་སམ་བྱང་རྒྱབ་གྱི་

2༥ ཟླ། བསྟན། རྒྱུད། དཔལ་དུས་ཀྱི་འཁོར་ལོ་འགྲེལ་ཆེན་ནི་མེད་འོད། ཤོག 111 ན བྱང་། 2

26 འཇུ་མི་ཕམ། ཟླ། དཔལ་དུས་ཀྱི་འཁོར་ལོའི་རྒྱུད་ཀྱི་ཆོག་དོན་རབ་ཏུ་གསལ་བྱེད་རྟོ་རྟེ་མའི་སྤང་བ། ཤོག 12 ན བྱང་། 1

27 འཇུ་མི་ཕམ། མཁས་འཇུག་སྟེམ་བྱང་། ཤོག་ 2 ན བྱང་། 2

སེམས་ཅིན་པོ་ཆེན་ཁྱད་ཆོས་ཡོངས་སུ་ཚྱོགས་པ་ཟུབ་ཅིང་། མདོར་ན་ཐབས་ཤེས་བྱུང་འཇུག་གི་སྟོང་པ་ཉིད་དེ་ཁོ་ན་དང་
བྱང་ཟུབ་ཀྱི་སེམས་གཉིས་ཀྱི་དོན་ཕྱིན་ཅི་མ་ལོག་པ་རྟོགས་ཏེ་དོན་ཐམས་ཅད་ཁོང་དུ་ཟུབ་ཏེ་ཕན་ཡོན་གིན་ཏུ་ཆེ་བའོ།།

དུས་འཁོར་རྒྱུད་འབྲེལ་གཏིང་དཔག་དཀའ་བའི་གཞུང་།
ལོ་གསུམ་རྣལ་འབྱོར་སྒྲུབ་པའི་བྱེད་འཕགས་ཀྱིས།
རྟོགས་པར་རུས་ལ་བདག་འདྲ་ག་ལ་རུས།
འོན་ཏང་ལོ་གསུམ་ཕྱོགས་གསུམ་དབུ་མའི་རྒྱུད་།
ཕན་ཚུན་སྦྱར་ཐབས་རྒྱུད་མའི་གཞུང་ལུགས་མང་།
དུས་འཁོར་སྐར་ཕྱིས་གཞུང་དང་སྦྱར་བ་ནི།
མཆོག་ཏུ་བདག་ལ་མཐོང་ཞིང་མཁས་པའི་མདུན།
རྒྱན་སྒྲར་འབྲུལ་ལ་རྟོངས་པར་མཐོང་ལོ་བཤགས།
འདི་བྱས་དག་བའི་ཆ་ཕུན་མཆིས་སོ་ཅོག།
ཀུན་ཀྱང་དུ་བའི་རྒྱ་བ་རབ་རྟོགས་ཏེ།
ལོ་གསུམ་ཕྱོགས་གསུམ་ནང་དུ་དུས་འཁོར་སྒྲུ།
མདོན་དུ་བྱེད་པའི་རྒྱ་དུ་ཐུང་བར་ཤོག།།
སངས་རྒྱལ་ལ་ཤ།


ཐོག་མར་དུས་ཀྱི་འཁོར་ལོའི་ལུགས་ཀྱི་དུས་ཚོད་ཕྱིས་སྐབས་གཤམ་འཁོད་ཕྱིས་ཐབས་འདི་དག་སྒོ་ལ་ངེས་པར་དུ་
མཁྱེན་དགོས། ཉིན་ཞག་གཅིག་ལ་རྒྱ་ཚོད་དུག་ཅུ་ཐམ་པ་ཡོད། དེ་ལག་འཁོར་དུ་གསེལ་ན་ལག་འཁོར་རྒྱ་ཚོད་རྒྱ་ཚོད་
ཉི་ཤུ་ཅུ་བཞི་ཡོད།

ཉི་མ་གཅིག་




ལོ་གསུམ་ཕྱི་གསུམ་གསུམ་གྱི་རྩིས་ཚོགས་པེ་ཆུ་ལ་ལྟ་ཡུན་ལ།

སྐར་ཕྱིས་ཀྱི་བཅི་གཞི་ལག་ལའོར་རྒྱུ་ཚོད་ལྟར་བཀོད་སྒྲིག་ཞུས་པ་གཤམ་གསལ།




ཐིག་ནག་དེ་ལག་ལའོར་རྒྱུ་ཚོད་མཚོན་དོན་དང་ཐིག་དམར་དེ་སྐར་ཕྱིས་ཀྱི་ཕྱིས་ཐབས་རྒྱུ་ཚོད་ཆུ་སྤང་དབུགས་བཅས་
ཀྱི་མཚོན་དོན།



ཐིག་མདའ་ནག་པོ་རྣམས་ལག་འཁོར་རྒྱུ་ཆོད་དང་། ཐིག་མདའ་དམར་པོ་རྣམས་དུས་འཁོར་སྐར་ཕྱིས་ཀྱི་ཕྱིས་ཐབས་
མཚན་དོན་ཡིན། དཔེ་རིས་འདི་སྐར་ཕྱིས་མི་མཁུན་པ་རྣམས་ཀྱིས་གོ་དོན་བདེ་ཆོག་དུ་རྟོགས་ཆེད་ཡོངས་གྲགས་ལག་
འཁོར་རྒྱུ་ཆོད་ཀྱི་བཟོ་བཀོད་ལྟར་བསྒྲིགས་པ་ཡིན། དེར་སྐབས་ཨ་རིའི་ཤོ་ལར་གཅིག་ལ་རང་སེའི་ཡུལ་གྱའི་དདུལ་གྱི་
འཛོལ་ཐང་གཞལ་བ་ལ་དཀའ་ངལ་མེད། སྐར་ཕྱིས་དེ་ཡང་འཛོལ་ཐང་དང་གཅིག་འགྱུར་ཡིན། དཔེར་ན་དེར་སྐབས་ཨ་
སྒོར་གཅིག་ལ་ Belarus, Europe ཡུ་ཤོབ་བེ་ལ་རུས་ཞེས་པའི་ Belarusian ruble བེ་ལ་རུ་སེན། རུ་བལ་
གྱི་སྒོར་མོ་ཕྱེད་དང་གསུམ་དང་གཅིག་མཚུངས་ཡིན།

གཤམ་འཁོད་དཔེ་རིས་འདི་ནི་དུ་བ་མཇུག་རིངས་ཀྱི་ཕྱིས་ཐབས་དཔེ་རིས་ཅོམ་དང་། ལོ་གསུམ་དང་ཚྱོགས་གསུམ་ཕྱིས་
ཚུལ་ཞག་གྲངས་དང་བཅས་པ་བསྟན་པ་ཡིན་ནོ།



དུ་བ་མཇུག་རིངས་མཐོང་མིན་བརྟག་པ་སྐར་ཕྱིས་ཀྱི་དཔེ་རིས།

གླིང་སྤྱང་དུ་མཛོན་པའི་གོ་སར་དང་འབྲེལ་བའི་སྒོམ་སྤྱབ་སྒྲོར་ལ་ཐོག་མར་དཔྱད་པ།

ཀུན་བྱམས་དཔལ་བཟང་།⁶⁹

དཔྱད་ཚུལ་སྤྱིར་བཏགས།

གླིང་སྤྱང་ནི་རྒྱ་གར་གྱི་རྒྱ་ལྷ་ཡ་ཏ་དང་མ་རྒྱ་ར་ཏ། གླིང་འུ་སི་རྒྱལ་ཁབ་ཀྱི་ཨི་ལི་ཡ་ཏ་དང་ཨོ་ཏི་ཤེ་སེ་སོགས་དང་འདྲ་བར་དུས་རབས་བཅུ་གཅིག་ཙམ་ནས་ཐོད་ཁུལ་ནས་དར་བའི་གླིང་རྩེ་གོ་སར་རྒྱལ་པོའི་དཔའ་བོའི་བྱང་རབས་བརྗོད་པའི་ལོ་རྒྱུས་གསལ་ཙམ་དང་མོ་ཞིག་སྟེ། དེར་སང་འཛམ་གླིང་གི་གནའ་རབས་བྱང་བརྗོད་སྟུན་དག་དེང་ཤོས་ལྷ་འདུས་པ་ལས་ཀྱང་ཆེས་དེང་བའི་དཔའ་བོའི་བྱང་བརྗོད་སྟུན་དག་དེང་ཤོས་ལ་དོས་འཛིན་ཐོབ་ཡོད་ (རྒྱང་འཁོར་ཆོ་བརྟན།, 2027)། གླིང་རྩེ་གོ་སར་རྒྱལ་པོའི་དཔའ་བོའི་ལོ་རྒྱུས་དང་མོ་འདི་ནི་ཐོད་ཁུལ་གྱི་བློན་མོང་མ་ཡིན་པའི་བྱང་བརྗོད་སྟུན་དག་ཅིག་ཡིན་ (Schmidt, 1839) པར་བསྐྱབས་ཡོད། འོན་ཀྱང་ཡོངས་གྲགས་སུ་ཐོད་ཁུལ་ནས་གླིང་རྩེ་གོ་སར་རྒྱལ་པོ་ནི་ལོ་རྒྱུས་མི་སྣ་ཞིག་པར་ཏེ་ལམ་ཐེ་ཆོས་མི་ཟྱེད་ (Samuel, 1993) ཅེས་བཤད། ཡང་མཁས་པ་དུ་མས་གླིང་སྤྱང་ནི་རྟོར་སོག་དང་རྒྱ་གར། ཨུ་རུ་སྟེ། རྒྱ་ནག་ དེ་བཞིན་རྟི་མ་ལ་ཡའི་ས་ཁུལ་སྤུལ་གྱི་སི་ཐན་དང་། ལ་དུགས། རྟི་མ་ཅལ། འབྲས་ལྗོངས། ཨུ་རུ་ན་ཅལ། འབྲུག་ཡུལ། བལ་ཡུལ། གཞན་ཡང་འཛེང་སོགས་ཐོད་འབར་སྐད་རིགས་དང་གཞན་ཡང་གྲུ་གྲུ་སྐད་ཡིག⁷⁰སྟོད་མཁན་ཁག་དུ་འད་དར་སྲོལ་ཡོད་པར་ (Lauri, 1996)⁷¹ བརྗོད།

གླིང་སྤྱང་ནི་ཐོད་ཀྱི་སྐད་ཡིག་ལས་འཕེལ་རྒྱས་བྱུང་ཞིང་། དུས་རབས་བཙེ་བརྒྱད་པའི་དཀྱིལ་ཙམ་ལ་གཞི་ནས་བཟུང་སྐད་རིགས་གཞན་དག་དུ་བསྐྱར་འགོ་བཙུམས་པས། རྒྱལ་ཕྱི་ནང་གི་མཁས་པས་རྟོག་དཔྱད་ཞིབ་འཇུག་བྱས་པའི་

⁶⁹ རྒྱལ་རྒྱ་གཙུག་ལག་སློབ་ཆེན་གྱི་ཞིབ་འཇུག་པ་

⁷⁰ གྲུ་གྲུའི་སྐད་ཡིག་ཅེས་པ་ནི་དབྱིན་སྐད་དུ་ Turkic Language ལ་གོ།

⁷¹ ལོ་ཁྱི་རྟ་འཕྲ་ལ་གྱི་མཆོག་ (Herrmann 1990:485; Nekljudov 1984:145; Stein 1959:59-60)

བཙས་ཀྱི་མཁས་པ་དུ་མའི་ཡུང་དོན་བསྐྱས་ནས་བརྗོད་འདུག

བརྒྱུད་ནས་འདིང་འཛུགས་ཆད་མཐོན་པོ་ཐོབ་ཡོད། ད་ལྟ་གཤམ་རིག་པ་⁷² ཞེས་རྒྱལ་སྤྱིའི་རང་བཞིན་ལྡན་པའི་རིག་གནས་ཚན་ཁག་ཅིག་གི་དོ་མོར་སྒྲུབ་ (ལྷ་མཚོག་རྒྱལ་། ༢༠༠༤)ཡོད་ལ། ཆོས་ལུགས་དང་། རིག་གནས་། དམག་དོན། རྒྱལ་ཁྲིམས་། རྩེད་རིགས་། ཆབ་སྲིད། མི་ཆོས་རིང་ལུགས་སོགས་ནས་ཞིབ་འཇུག་བགྲིས་པ་མང་། དེ་ལྟར་ན་འདྲ་གླིང་སྤྱང་དང་གཤམ་རིག་ལྟ་ཚུལ་གྱི་སྤྱིའི་སློམ་གཞི་ལ་འབྱུང་བ་འགྲོ་བྱུང་མེད་པ་སྟེ། གླིང་སྤྱང་ནི་དམག་འབྲུག་དང་གཡུལ་འབྲེད་ལོན་ལྟ་བུ་ཞིག་དང་གཤམ་རིག་ཆོ་དམག་ལ་ཟད་སོང་བའི་ལྟ་ཚུལ་ཞིག་ལྟར་ཡོད། ལྟ་ཚུལ་དེའི་ཕྱོགས་ནས་སློམ་སྒྲུབ་ནི་གཤམ་རིག་གསལ་གླིང་པ་རྣམས་ཀྱི་ཕུགས་བསམ་དང་བྱ་གཞག་གཏོ་བོ་དེ་ཡིན་ཞིང་དེའི་སློང་ལ་རིག་གནས་ཀྱང་ཕུན་སུམ་ཚོགས་པ་ཞིག་ཡོད་པ་དངོས་ཀྱི་ཕུགས་བརྒྱུད་གསུམ་ནས་གསལ་ཡང་། གླིང་སྤྱང་དུ་མཛོན་པའི་སློམ་སྒྲུབ་ཀྱི་སློང་ལ་རྟོག་ཞིབ་བྱས་པའི་དཔུད་ཚུལ་གཅིག་ཀྱང་མཛུལ་རྒྱ་དཀོན་པོར་འདུག་པས། དེའི་གནད་དོན་གཏོ་བོ་གང་ཡིན་གསལ་ཆ་མེད་པ་ཡང་ལྟ་ཚུལ་གོལ་སོང་བ་མིན་ནམ། ཡང་ན་གླིང་སྤྱང་ནང་གི་སློམ་སྒྲུབ་སློང་ལ་དཔུད་འདྲིམ་མེད་ན་མ་གཏོགས་དཔུད་རིན་མེད་པ་ལྟ་བུ་ཞིག་ཡིན་ནམ་ཞེས་བྲིས་ན་དེ་ལྟར་ཡང་མི་ཤིད་པ་ཞིག་སྟེ། གླིང་སྤྱང་དུ་གླིང་གཤམ་རིག་གཏོ་བོར་བྱུང་པའི་གླིང་པ་རྣམས་ལ་མཚོན་ན་སློམ་ཉམས་ལེན་དང་མཚོམས་བསྟེན་སྒྲུབ་སོགས་ནི་ལ་ཐལ་ཐབས་མེད་པའི་འཛོམ་བའི་ཆ་ཤས་གཤམ་ཆེན་ཞིག་ཡིན་པ་གསལ་བ་དང་། རྩེད་པར་དུ་སྐབས་དེའི་ཡུལ་དུས་ཀྱི་སྤྱི་ཚོགས་འཛོམ་བའི་ནད་དུ་ཐར་པ་དང་ཐམས་ཅད་མཁྱེད་པར་དམིགས་པའི་སློམ་ཐབས་དང་། དན་སྒྲགས་ཀྱི་ལམ་ནས་རང་རྒྱལ་གཞན་པམ་ལ་དམིགས་པའི་སློམ་ཐབས་དང་། གཞན་ཡང་རྩལ་དུག་⁷³ལ་དབང་འབྱུང་ཐབས་ལ་དམིགས་པའི་སློམ་ཐབས་སོགས་སློམ་སྒྲུབ་ཀྱི་རིག་གནས་ནི་རྩ་ཅད་རྒྱག་པ་མ་ཟད། ཆོས་དང་འཛིག་རྟེན་ཏེ་ལུགས་ཆེན་པོ་གཉིས་ལས་འཛིག་རྟེན་ལུགས་ཀྱི་སློམ་སྒྲུབ་ཀྱི་རིག་གནས་ལྟ་གཤམ་པར་ཕུན་སུམ་ཚོགས་པ་གླིང་གི་སྤྱང་དཔེ་ཀྱང་ཀྱི་ནད་དུ་གསལ་ལ། དེས་ན་སྐབས་དོན་དཔུད་ཚུལ་འདིར་གླིང་སྤྱང་ནང་སློམ་གྱི་སློང་ཆིམ་དོན་སྤྱེས་མཚོག་གཤམ་རིག་ཀྱི་རྣམ་ཐར་ནོར་བུའི་མཛོད་དང་། འཁྱུངས་གླིང་མེ་རྟོག་རྩ་བ་དང་། དཔུལ་གླིང་རྩོགས་པ་ཆེན་པོ་གསུམ་ལ་གཏོ་བོར་གཞི་བཅོལ་ནས་ཐོག་མར་རགས་ཅའི་དཔུད་ནས་སྤོང་ཆ་དེ་ཉིད་བསློང་ཐབས་ལ་འབད་ཡོད།

གནས་ཚིག་མིང་གྲུབ། བོམ་གྲུབ། མིང་གེ་སར། ལུང་བརྟོན་སྟོན་ངག་

[illegible][illegible]

དངོས་སྒྲིབ་དྲན་པ་ཡི་ཤེས་གྲགས་སོགས་སྒྲིབ་མར་བསྟེན་ནས་བྱུང་པའི་མངའ་བཞེས་ཏེ་ཁམས་གསུམ་ཚོས་ལ་བཀོད་
ཅིང་གདུལ་བྱའི་མཐའ་བསྐྱས་པས། མཐའ་གླིང་གི་རྒྱལ་ཁམས་ཀྱང་རིམ་པས་དུས་རབས་བཅུ་གཅིག་གི་སྤྱད་ཅིམ་ལ་
མཐུག་བསྒྲིལ་པ་ནི་གླིང་གི་ལོ་རྒྱུས་དངོས་སོ།།

འོན་ཀྱང་སྤྱད་ཅིམ་རྒྱུང་བ་རེད་ཅེས་ན་མདོ་ཅིམ་གླེང་བར་བྱ་སྟེ། ཚོས་རྒྱལ་ནམ་མཁའ་ནོར་བུས་སྤྱད་ནི་ཤོད་སྒྲིབ་གྱི་
བདེ་སྤྱོད་པའི་གྲས་ཤིག་སྟེ་ཆོག་དེ་བཤད་སྤྱོད་གྱི་དོན་ནི། གནའ་བོའི་དུས་ཀྱི་ལོ་རྒྱུས་ཡིད་ཆེས་གྱི་གནས་སུ་བྱེད་འོས་པའི་
གྲས་གང་ཞིག་ལ་རབ་བཏགས་མས། མཛེས་འཚོས་གྱི་ཆོག་དོན་དུ་མས་བྱུག་པར་བྱས་པའི་རིགས། དཔེར་ན། གླིང་རྩེ་
གོ་སར་རྒྱལ་པོའི་སྤྱད་ཅིམ་དེ་ཞེས་པ་ལྟར། གླིང་སྤྱད་ནི་གླིང་ཕྱི་རབས་པ་རྣམས་ཀྱིས་རྒྱལ་མཚོག་གོ་སར་རམ་
གྲམ་མ་རྩེ་རྩེ་ཆོ་རྒྱལ་མཚོག་དང་འཁོར་དཔའ་རྒྱལ་གྲུབ་ཐོབ་དང་དྲངས་སྤྱོད་མཁའ་འགྲོ་སོགས་ཀྱི་འགྲོ་དོན་མཐའ་རུ་
ཕྱིན་ཏེ། སྒོ་སྤྱད་ཡང་དག་པར་གནང་པས་རིམ་བཞིན་རབས་རྣམས་གྲུབ་ཐོབ་དང་རྟོགས་ལྡན། ཐམ་རྣམས་ཚོས་པར་
བྱུར་ནས་རྒྱལ་ཁབ་སྤྱོད་མཁན་མེད་པར་ཆགས། ཕྱོགས་མཚམས་ཀྱན་ཏུ་རྩིས་རབས་པ་དག་ཀྱང་ཚོས་པ་དང་ཡོན་
བདག་ཏུ་བྱུར་ནས་ཁོང་ཚོའི་མཛད་པ་རྣམས་ཐར་དང་བྱུར་རབས་ལོ་རྒྱུས། དེ་ལས་འཕྲོས་པའི་རྩིས་དྲན་བསྟོད་བསྐྱེད་སོགས་
སོགས་གཏམ་རྒྱུད་ཀྱི་ལམ་ནས་བཤད་སྟོལ་བྱུང་བར་གླིང་སྤྱད་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་བྱུང་། གླིང་སྤྱད་བཤད་མཁན་ལ་སྤྱད་པ་འམ་
སྤྱད་མཁན་78 ཞེས་བྱ་ལ། སྤྱད་མཁན་རིགས་79 ཚད་ལྡན་གྲགས་ཅན་འགའ་རེས་སྤྱད་ཚན་ནམ་སྤྱད་དཔེ་ ༡༢༠
དང་། ༢༦༠ ཡན་ཤོད་ཐུབ་མཁན་ཡིད། (འཆི་མེད་རྩི་མེ།, ༢༠༢༠)

གླིང་སྤྱད་གི་བམ་ཚད་ལ་མཚོན་ན་ཡང་།

གླིང་དཀར་པོའི་ལོ་རྒྱུས་ཚོགས་མཐའ་མེད། ལྷ་ཨ་ལའི་དབྱངས་ལ་མཛད་མཐའ་མེད། །

ཅེས་པ་ལྟར་ཏག་ཏག་མ་ཤེས་ཀྱང་། ཏི་མ་ལ་ཡའི་རིག་མཛད་ཁང་གིས་བསྐྱུང་བྱ་བཅུ་ལྷག་ལྷག་འཚོལ་སྤྱད་དང་ཅོ་མ་
སྤྱིག་བྱས་པའི་གླིང་སྤྱད་ཀྱན་འདུས་ཆེན་མོ་ཞེས་པ་ལ་ཤོད་ ༣༠༠ ཡོད་ཅིང་། ཤོད་དེ་དག་གི་ནང་ཡིག་གྲངས་
༡༣༠༠༠༠༠༠༠ ཡོད་པས་ད་ལྟའི་བར་ཆོད་ཤོས་ཀྱི་གོ་སར་སྤྱད་ཡིག་ཡིན་ (ཆོ་རིང་རྩི་མེ།, ༢༠༡༩)པ་དང་། གླིང་
གོ་སར་གྱི་སྤྱད་ཆོད་ཕྱོགས་བསྐྱེད་རིན་བྲལ་ནོར་བུའི་ཤེང་བ་ཞེས་པའི་སྤྱད་ཆོད་མི་འདྲ་བ་ ༣༠༠ ཐམ་པ་ཤོད་ ༡༡༩ ཀྱི་
ནང་དུ་སྤྱད་སྤྱིག་གིས་དཔེ་བསྐྱུར་གནང་བའི་ནང་སྤྱད་ཡིག་ ༣༠ སྟེན་ཆད་དཔེ་སྐྱུར་བྱ་ཆོད་མེད་པ་འབའ་ཞིག་ཡིན་པར་

78 སྤྱད་མཁན་ནི་སྤྱད་པ་དང་དོན་གཅིག་མིང་གི་རྣམ་གྲངས་ཡིན་ལ། སྤྱད་མཁན་དང་། བབས་སྤྱད་མཁན་དང་། གཏིར་སྤྱད་མཁན་རྣམས་ཀྱང་
གནན་དང་མ་འདྲ་བར་ཉམས་ལེན་ཁོ་རྟོག་བརྟེན་ནས་བྱུང་བ་ཤིང་སྟེན་ཡིན།

79 གླིང་སྤྱད་བཤད་མཁན་ལ་སྤྱད་མཁན་དང་སྤྱད་པ་ཐེར་ཞིང་སྤྱད་མཁན་རིགས་སོ་སོར་རང་རང་གི་ཁྱད་ཚོས་མི་འདྲ་བ་ལྡན་པ་དང་། སྤྱད་རིགས་ལ་
འབབ་སྤྱད་། སྤྱད་ཀྱང་། སྤྱད་སྤྱད་། གཏིར་སྤྱད་། ཐོས་སྤྱད་། ཐང་སྤྱད་སོགས་ཡོད་ལ། སྤྱད་མཁན་རིགས་ལ་ཡང་འབབ་སྤྱད་མཁན་དང་། སྤྱད་མཁན།
སྤྱད་སྤྱད་མཁན། གཏིར་སྤྱད་མཁན། ཐོས་སྤྱད་མཁན་སོགས་ཐེར།

མོང་པོ། རབ་གསལ་མཁུན་པའི་གཟི་བྱིན་འབར། ལུང་བསྟན་སྟོག་གི་མེད་བཤར། རྟོན་བཟང་སྤང་བས་བརྒྱན་
ཏི་བྱུང་།

ཁེས་དང། དེའི་ལན་དུ་འདན་བཟའ་མས་84་ཁྱོ་སྤང་ལ་སྤངས་པའི་སྤྱུ་ལས།

མར་ཉལ་ཏིང་འཛིན་མེད་པ་ལ། ཁྲི་ལམ་ལུང་བསྟན་ཅི་གོ་རོ། ལམ་ལངས་སྤྲུགས་དམ་མེད་པ་ལ། ཡི་དམ་ཞལ་
གཟིགས་ཅི་ལ་འོང་། (ཨྲཱར་ལུ་ནི་ཤ་ས།, 7020)

ཞེས་གསུང་སྤྱིང་གནད་པ་ལྟ་བུ་ཉ་ཅང་མང་དུ་མཆིས།

གཞན་ཡང་ལྷོ་ཤུ་བྲག་ནག་ལུང་མ་དོར་ཞང་ཞུང་བོན་གྱི་མཐུ་པ་ཨ་ཁྱོ་སྤྱུ་པ་ར་ཇ་ཟེར་བ་དེས་བསྟོམ་སྤྱབ་མཐུ་ལ་བྱས་
པས་སྟོན་པ་གཤེན་རབ་ཀྱི་བཀའ་འགལ་བ། པ་སྤྱི་ཆོས་ལ་ལོག་པར་བལྟ་བ། བསྐྱེད་རིམ་ཨ་ཁྱོ་སྤྱུ་པ་སྤྲུགས་སྤྱོད་གསུམ་གྱི་ལ་ལྟས་ནག་
ཕྱོགས་སྤེ་བརྒྱད་ཡོངས་ཀྱིས་གོགས་བྱེད་དེ། ཉིན་མོར་ཆོས་བྱེད་བན་བོན་རྣམས་ཀྱིས་སྟོག་ཕྱ་མཐུས་གཅོད་པ། མཚན་
མོར་མ་མོ་དང་བསྐྱོངས་ཏི་སྤྱི་འགྲེའི་སྤྱུ་ལ་ཀྱུ་བ་ཞིག་ཡོད་པ་ (ཨྲཱར་ལུ་ནི་ཤ་ས།, 7020) ཞེས་འབྱུངས་སྤྱིང་མེ་
ཏྲག་རུ་བ་རུ་གསལ་ལ། དེ་ལས་སྤྲུགས་དེའི་དུས་བན་བོན་གྱི་སྟོམ་སྤྱུ་པ་ཀྱུ་སྟོམ་སྤྱིང་གསུམ་གྱི་ལ་ལྟས་ནག་མཐུ་ནག་ལ་
ཞུགས་ནས་ལོག་སྟོམ་གྱིས་སྤྱབ་པ་ཐོབ་པའི་སྤྱི་བོ་རིགས་ཀྱང་ཡོད་ཚུལ་བསྟན། གང་ལྟར་བན་བོན་གཉིས་སམ་ཕྱི་རང་
གཉིས་ཀ་ནས་སྟོམ་གྱི་རིག་གནས་ཉ་ཅང་ཕུན་སུམ་ཆོགས་པ་མཆིས་ཀྱང་། སྤྲུགས་འབྲེལ་དབྱེད་བྱ་གཏོ་བོ་ནི་སྤྱིང་ཇི་གོ་
སར་དང་འབྲེལ་བའི་སྟོམ་གྱི་སྟོར་ཡིན་པས་རེ་ཞིག་དེ་ཅོམ་གྱིས་འབྲུས་པར་བྱའོ།

སྤྱིང་སྤྱང་དུ་མཛོན་པའི་གོ་སར་མ་བྱོན་སྟེན་གྱི་སྟོམ་ཐབས་དམིགས་བསལ་ཅན་ཞིག

སྤྱིང་སྤྱང་དུ་མཛོན་པའི་གོ་སར་མ་བྱོན་སྟེན་གྱི་སྟོམ་ཐབས་དམིགས་བསལ་ཅན་མང་དུ་ཡོད་སྤྱིང་ཀྱང་གཏོ་བོ་གཅིག་ནི།
སྤྱིང་གི་དཔའ་རྒྱལ་ཤར་རབས་རྣམས་ཀྱིས་སྤྱོད་བྱུན་མིན་གསུང་སྤྲུགས་ཀྱི་སྟོམ་སྤྱུ་པ་ཀྱུ་ལུགས་དང་བསྟན་པའི་སྟོ་
ནས་ཕྱི་ནང་གི་བཀའ་བྱ་དང་གཞོད་ཀྱིན་ 85 སྤྱོ་ཆོགས་ཀྱི་ཁོད་ནས་ཞི་ལྷག་གི་སྟོམ་ཕྱལ་གྱི་སྤྱིང་པོ་རྣམས་ཉམས་སྤྱུ་
སྤངས་ཏེ། སྟོམ་ཐབས་དྲག་ཕྱལ་དང་སྤྱར་ནས་སྤྱང་སྟོལ་བྱུང་ཡོད་པ་ཞིག་གསལ།

དེ་ཡང་དང་པོ་ནི། སྤྱིང་པ་རྣམས་ཀྱིས་ཕྱི་ལྷོ་ལ་མངའ་གྱི་མདུང་གསུམ་ལ་སོགས་དཔའ་བོའི་རིག་ཕྱལ་རྣམས་
འཛིག་རྟེན་མཐུན་སྤྱང་དང་འཆོམས་པར་སྤྱངས་ནས་བྱང་རྒྱབ་པ་གནད་གི་ཡོད་པའི་རྣམ་པ་གསལ་ཡང་། ནང་ལྟར་ན་
སྤྱས་པའི་རྒྱལ་ལམ་ཕྱིར་མི་མཛོན་པའི་སྟོམ་ཐབས་ཀྱི་ལམ་ནས་ཐ་མལ་དཔའ་རྟོན་གྱི་སྤྱིང་པ་མ་དོར་བར་བྱུབ་པའི་རང་

84 འདན་བཟའ་ས་ནི་ཨ་ཁྱོ་སྤྱུ་ཀྱུ་པའི་ལྷུ་མ་ཡིན་ཡང་བོན་པོ་མ་ཡིན་པར་ནང་པའི་ཉམས་ལེན་པ་ཞིག་ཡིན།
85 མོད་ལ་འབངས་ཀྱིན་ལོག་དང་ཟིན་འབྲུག་བྱུང་ནས་བོད་སྤྱི་ལ་དབང་པའི་རྒྱལ་པོ་མེད་པར་ཆགས་ཏེ། རྒྱལ་ཁབ་སེལ་བྱུང་གཏོར་དང་འཛོར་བཞིན་
ཡིན་སྤྱང་ཡིན་པས་ཆབ་སྤྱིང་དང་སྤྱི་ཆོགས་ཁྲིམས་མེད་ལུགས་མེད་དུ་བྱུང་ནས་གཅིག་ལོག་གཅིག་འདུག་མེད་པར། གཏོར་འཕྲོག་བཅོམ་གསུམ་དང་
ཀྱུ་ཐག་ཁམ་གསུམ་ལ་ཞུགས་ཏེ་དམར་གསོད་ཁག་གི་འཁོར་ལོ་སྟོར་བཞིན་གདུག་རྒྱབ་དང་དྲག་སྤྱིང་སྤྱོ་ཆོགས་པའི་དབང་དུ་དུས་འདའ་བར་བྱེད་པས་
སྟོམ་སྤྱུ་པ་བསྐྱལ་བ་མེད་འོ།

མྱིང་སྐྱུང་ཁྱེད་ཀྱི་མཛུགས་པ་དང་འབྲེལ་བའི་སྐྱོམ་སྐྱུབ་སྐོར།

ཕྱལ་ཐོན་པར་མཛད་པའམ་ཡང་དག་པའི་ལྷ་སྐྱོམ་ཉམས་སྲུག་ར་ཐུབ་པ་མཛད་པ་མང་དུ་མངོན་ཞིང་། དཔེར་ན། དཔའ་
ཚེ་ལ་འདན་མ་བྱང་ཁ་དང་། འབྲེལ་སྐྱེ་ཆོས་སྦྱང་བེར་ནག་དཔའ་ཡ་མེད་མེད་སྟག་ཨ་དོམ། དཔའ་མོ་ཨ་སྟག་ཁྱུ་མོ་
སོགས་དཔའ་བོ་དཔའ་མོ་རྣམས་ཀྱིས་རང་རང་གི་ཕྱལ་ཆེན་རབ་རྒྱུ་རྟེན་གསལ་པར་བྱང་བར་བྱས་པས། དཔའ་རྒྱལ་86་ཕ་
རྒྱུ་སྐུ་བཅུ། ཡང་ཐུལ་87དམ་པའི་མི་བདུན། དཔའ་ཕྱལ་རྒྱལ་ལ་རང་ཐོབ་པའི་ཞེ་སྐུལ་88ཨ་སྟག་སྐྱུང་གསུམ། མྱིང་
གི་དྲུས་སྐྱུང་བཅུ་གསུམ་སོགས་ཀྱི་གོ་གནས་ཐོབ་པར་བྱས། དཔའ་རྒྱལ་རྣམས་ཀྱིས་དེ་ལྟར་སྐྱོམ་སྐྱུབ་དང་དྲག་ཕྱལ་
བྱང་འཇུག་མཛད་དགོས་དོན་གཙོ་བོ་གཅིག་ནི་རང་སྐྱུང་དང་གཞན་སྐྱོབས་ཀྱི་ཆེད་དུ་ཡིན་པ་མངོན། སྐྱོམ་ཐབས་དེ་ལ་
ཕྱལ་སྐྱོམ་ཞེས་བརྗོད་ཆོག དེ་ནི་སྐྱེ་སྟོང་རྗེ་འབངས་ཉེར་ལྔ་ནས་བརྒྱད་པའི་རྩོགས་ཆེན་གྱི་ལྷ་སྐྱུང་སྐྱོམ་གསུམ་ལས་བྱང་
བ་ཞིག་ཡིན་ཡང་། ཕྱིས་སྐྱུང་ན་པ་ཡེ་ཤེས་གསལ་པ་སྐྱིད་ལ་གཏན་དྲངས་རྗེས་ཕྱག་ཆེན་དར་སྐྱབས་དུས་བདེ་ཞོད་
འཇགས་གང་འཚམས་ལྟར་ཟེར་པས་ཕྱལ་སྐྱོམ་གནང་མཁན་དེ་ཙམ་མེད་པ་སྐྱིད་ཕྱག་བཅུ་གསུམ་གྱི་གྲུང་ཕྱལ་དང་
རིག་ཕྱལ་ལ་དབྱེད་པས་རྩོགས་སྐྱབ།

ཡང་སྐྱིད་སྐྱིད་ལ་སྐྱེ་སྟོང་དེ་ལྟར་ཅིའི་ཕྱིར་སྐྱས་པའི་ཚུལ་གྱིས་ཕྱལ་སྐྱོམ་ལ་ཉམས་ལེན་བྱེད་སྟོལ་བྱུང་ཡོད་དམ་ཞེ་ན།
འབྲེལ་ཕྱག་གི་དགོས་དམིགས་གཉིས་མཆིས་ཏེ། འབྲེལ་སེལ་མཛད་པའི་དཔའ་ཕྱལ་ལ་བསྐྱབས་ཏེ་རང་གཞན་གྱི་
བདེ་སྐྱེད་སྐྱབ་ཐབས་དང་། མཐར་ཐུག་སྐྱབ་པ་ཐོབ་སྐྱིད་ཆེད་དུ་ཡིན། འོན་ཏེ་ལྟར་སྐྱས་པའི་ཚུལ་གྱི་ཕྱལ་སྐྱོམ་གྱི་སྐྱོམ་
སྐྱབ་བྱེད་སྟོལ་ཇི་ལྟར་བྱུང་ཞེ་ན། ཚུལ་དུ་མ་ཡོད་པ་ལས་གཙོ་བོ་ནི་དེའི་ཆོ་དཔེ་དུས་ཀྱི་གནས་སྐྱངས་ལ་བསྐྱར་པ་ཡིན་
ཏེ། སྐྱབས་དེར་བོད་བཅོན་པའི་སྐྱིད་དབང་འཐོར་རྗེས་འབངས་ཀྱི་ལོག་བྱུང་ནས་བོད་ཁམས་སེལ་བྱུང་འཐོར་བཞིན་
པའི་སྐྱང་ཡིན་ལ། བོད་ཡུལ་སྟོང་སྐྱེད་བར་གསུམ་ཆོང་མར་གནས་སྐྱངས་ཏ་ཅང་ཇོ་དྲག་རྒྱ་མུང་ཡོད་པ་སྟེ།

རྒྱལ་ཁྲིམས་གསེར་གྱི་གཏམ་ཤིང་ཆག ཁྲིམས་ཁྲིམས་དར་གྱི་མདུད་པ་གྲོལ། འབངས་ཁྲིམས་སོག་མའི་ཐོན་ཐག་
ཆད། །

ཅེས་པ་ལྟར་བོད་ཀྱི་ཆབ་སྲིད་དང་སྤྱི་ཚོགས་མགོ་དྲིལ་བསྐྱོགས་ནས་རྒྱལ་ཕྱན་དང་། ཚོ་ལག་བན་པོན་སོགས་པན་ཚུན་
པར་རྒྱལ་མེས་དང་འཐབ་རྩོད་བྱེད་མེས་ཀྱིས་གདུག་ཕྱབ་དང་དྲག་སྐྱོད་སྤྱི་ཚོགས་ཀྱི་གཞན་དབང་དུ་བྱུར་ནས་ཞི་བདེ་
སྐྱིད་འཇགས་མེད་པས་སྐྱིད་ཡུལ་དུ་ཡང་ཤུགས་རྒྱུན་དེ་མཚུངས་སྐྱེལ་བཞིན་ཡོད་པས། ཁ་མོ་སྐྱིད་གི་གཏམ་རྒྱུད་ལས།

86 མྱིང་གི་དཔའ་བོ་རྣམས་ཀྱིས་རང་རང་གི་དྲག་ཕྱལ་དང་སྐྱོམ་ཐབས་སྐྱུར་ནས་དཔའ་ཕྱལ་སྐྱིད་སྐྱོབས་ལ་སྐྱོ་སྐྱུངས་ཤིང་དཔའ་སྐྱིད་བཏུལ་ནས་སྐུལ་
པའི་དཔའ་བོ་ཡིན་པས་ན་དཔའ་ཕྱལ་ལས་དཔའ་རྒྱལ་ཞེས་ཟེར། དེ་ནི་གང་ཟག་ཅིག་ལ་མི་གོ་བར་སྐྱིད་གི་དཔའ་བོའི་གནས་རིམ་མས་གོ་གནས་ཤིག་ལ་
གོ་བ་ཡིན།

87 དྲག་ཕྱལ་དང་སྐྱོམ་ཐབས་སྐྱུར་ནས་དཔའ་སྐྱིད་སྐྱོབས་ལ་སྐྱོ་སྐྱུངས་ནས་དཔའ་སྐྱིད་བཏུལ་ནས་སྐུལ་བ་ཙམ་མ་ཟད་ཕྱལ་རྒྱལ་ལ་རང་དབང་ཐོབ་
པའི་དཔའ་བོ་ཡིན་པས་ན་ཡང་སྐུལ་ཞེས་ཟེར།

88 དྲག་ཕྱལ་དང་སྐྱོམ་ཐབས་སྐྱུར་ནས་དཔའ་སྐྱིད་སྐྱོབས་ལ་སྐྱོ་སྐྱུངས་ནས་དཔའ་སྐྱིད་བཏུལ་ནས་སྐུལ་བ་དང་། ཕྱལ་རྒྱལ་ལ་རང་དབང་ཐོབ་པ་ཙམ་
མ་ཟད། རང་སེམས་ཡོངས་སུ་བཏུལ་ནས་བདག་འཛིན་གྱི་འཇིགས་སྐྱག་ལས་གྲོལ་བའི་དཔའ་བོ་ཡིན་པས་ཞེ་སྐུལ་ཞེས་ཟེར།

བཅན་པོའི་རྒྱལ་འབས་འཛེབ་བས་ན། སྤྲིང་གིས་རྒྱལ་ཁབ་གསར་པ་བཙུགས། ། (ཆབ་མདོ་ཤེས་རབ།, 2074)

ཞེས་པ་ལྟར་སྤྲིང་གི་ཡུལ་སྡེ་རྣམས་ཀྱི་བོད་ཆོས་རྒྱལ་ཡབ་མེས་མེས་ཤུལ་བསྟེགས་ཏེ་དཀར་ཕྱོགས་ཀྱི་བསྟན་པ་འཛིན་
ཐབས་ངང་ནས་ཁྲིམས་འགོ་ངང་བཅན་གྱི་རྒྱལ་ཁབ་ཅིག་མི་འཛུགས་ཀ་མེད་དུ་ཁྱུར་ནས་ཕྱི་ནང་གི་གདུག་རྩལ་དག་
སྤྱོད་ལ་ཐབས་ཤེས་ཡོད་རྒྱས་འགོག་སྤུང་89ཁྱེད་ལྟས་ཡིན་པ་དང་། གཞན་ཡང་སྐབས་དེའི་འབྲུག་རྩོད་ཀྱི་ཁྲོད་ནས་
ལྷ་བཙུན་མིག་གི་མཐོང་སར་མེད་ཅིང་། ཆོས་པ་དང་མཚམས་པ་སྟོན་ཆེན་སོགས་བོས་བྱོལ་ལ་འགོ་ལྟས་ཡིན་པའི་དུས་
ཤིག་ཡིན་པས། བསྟན་དབྱའི་མདུན་དུ་ཞི་བའི་ངང་སྟོན་པའི་སྐབས་དང་བསྐལ་པ་མེད་པས། སྤྲིང་པ་རྣམས་ཀྱིས་སངས་
རྒྱལ་གྱི་དམ་ཆོས་སྒྲུབ་པའི་ལམ་གྱི་སྤྲོད་པོ་སྟེ། སྟོན་སྒྲུབ་ཉམས་ལེན་བྱེད་ཐབས་གསར་པ་ཞིག་མི་བཅོལ་ཀ་མེད་དུ་
ཁྱུར་ཡོད་པའི་ཕྱིར། སྟོན་དོན་དག་ཙམ་དང་སྒྲུར་ནས་ཉམས་ལེན་བྱེད་པའི་ཙམ་སྟོན་གྱི་ཐབས་ལམ་གསར་དུ་ཆེད།
འོན་ཀྱང་སྤྲིང་མེ་གེ་སར་རྒྱལ་ཁྲིར་མངའ་གསོལ་ནས་སྤྲིང་གི་རྒྱལ་ཁབ་བཙུགས་ནས་བཟུང་སྤྲིང་ལ་ཏྲོག་ཅམ་ཞི་བདེ་
ལྷིང་འཇགས་ཆགས་ཏེ་སྟོན་ཐབས་གྱི་རྣམ་པ་སྤྱར་སྟོལ་ལྟར་སྤྱར་གསོ་བྱལ་བ་བྱུང་བས། ཙམ་སྟོན་ལ་བརྟེན་ནས་བྱུང་
བའི་དཔལ་འདུལ་ལྟ་བུ་སྤྲིང་གི་མི་རབས་མེས་མའ་དེ་ཅམ་བྱུང་བྱལ་མེད་དོན་ཡང་དེའོ་སྟམ་མོ།

སྤྲིང་སྤྱང་སྒྲུ་རྣམས་འགག་མེད་དོ་མེད་གསུང་སྟེ་སྟོན་སྒྲུའོ།

སྤྲིང་སྤྱང་དུ་པན་ཚུལ་སྐྱད་ཆ་བཤད་པའི་སྐབས་སྒྲུ་དག་གི་ལམ་ནས་བདེ་སྤྱོད་པའི་སྟོལ་ཞིག་ཡོད་པ་དང་། སྟོལ་དེ་ཐད་
ཀར་སྟོན་དང་འབྲེལ་ནས་བྱུང་ཞིང་། སྟོན་བྱུང་གི་ཉམས་རྟོགས་ལ་བརྟེན་ནས་སྐྱད་ཆ་རྣམས་འགག་མེད་དག་ནས་ཐོན་
ཞིང་། དེ་དག་པལ་ཆེ་བ་དམ་པ་གསུམ་གྱི་བཅིས་ཟིན་པའི་མགུར་སྒྲུ་ལྟ་བུར་དོས་འཛིན་ཆོག དཔེར་ན། གེ་སར་ཁྲོམ་
ཆེན་ཟེན་གཞོན་གྱི་སྒྲུ། འབྲུག་མོའི་དགུ་མེད་དུག་འབྱུར་གྱི་སྒྲུ། འབྲུག་མོའི་ཇ་ཆང་མཚར་སྒྲུ། ལྷ་ཆ་དཀར་མོ་དུག་
འབྱུར་གྱི་སྒྲུ། བེའུ་ཆུང་སྟོ་ག་དུག་འབྱུར་ལྷན་པའི་སྒྲུ། སྤྱི་དཔོན་དལ་བ་རིང་མོའི་སྒྲུ། འདན་མའི་ཐ་ལ་དུག་འབྱུར་གྱི་སྒྲུ་
སོགས་ཏེ་ཅང་། དེ་དག་ལ་དོ་མེད་སྒྲུ་ཞེས་འབོད་སྟོལ་ཡང་འདུག་ཅིང་། དེ་ལ་ནང་དོན་གྱི་ཆ་རྣམས་སྟོན་སྒྲུ་ཞེས་ཀྱང་
བཟོད་ཆོག་སྟམ།

དེ་ཡང་དཔལ་སྤྲིང་རྟོགས་པ་ཆེན་པོ་ལས།

ཨོ་མ་ཁི་བ་སྤྱི་རྩེ་སྒྲུ་ཐ་ལ་ལ་མོ་ཐ་ལ་ལེན། ཐ་ལ་སྒྲུ་ཡི་ལེན་ལུགས་རེད། ཤལ་དག་གི་འཁུགས་ལུགས་རེད། །
རྒྱབ་རྟེན་རྒྱལ་བ་རི་ཀྲུམ་མཛོད། མདུན་སྤྱང་རིག་འཛིན་པོ་མོ་མཁུཅན། ཁ་འགགས་སངས་རྒྱལ་སྤྱང་གིས་འཛོམས། །
མགུར་སྒྲུ་མ་དང་མཁའ་འགྲོས་རྒྱུང་ས། །

89 བོད་ཀྱི་རྒྱལ་ཁྲིམས་ཞིག་ནས་བསྟན་པ་བསྟུབས། རབ་བྱུང་ཆོས་གཞི་འཛིན་པ་མང་པོ་ཕྱི་ཕྱོགས་སུ་བོས་བྱོལ་དུ་ཐེབས་བཞིན་ཡོད་ཅེས་ལོ་རྒྱུས་སུ་
གསལ་ལ། སྤྲིང་པ་རྣམས་ཀྱིས་ཆོས་ལ་དཀར་བའི་དཔལ་འོ་རྣམས་བསྟུས་ཏེ་སངས་རྒྱལ་གྱི་བསྟན་པ་སྤྱང་བར་མཛོད་པས་ཁམས་ཕྱོགས་སུ་བསྟན་པ་
ཉམས་པ་དང་གསོས་པའི་ལོ་རྒྱུས་མེད་དོན་དེ་ནས་བྱུང་སྟམ།

མྱི་སྐྱེ་ཕྱུ་མཛོན་པའི་གེས་དང་འབྲེལ་བའི་སྐྱོམ་སྐྱབ་སྐོར།

ཞེས་པ་ལྟ་བུ་ཐོག་མར་དག་སྤྱད་བསྐྱོམས་ནས་རང་གི་ཡི་དམ་དང་སྐྱེ་ལྟ་དག་སྐྱོམ་སྐྱབ་སྐོར་གསུམ་དམིགས་པ་ལ་གསལ་བཏབ་ནས་གསལ་འདེབས་སྐོ་སེམས་ཅེ་གཅིག་ཏུ་བྱེད་ཅིང་། བར་དུ་བཟློག་དོན་གང་ཞིག་སེམས་ཡིངས་མེད་དབྱངས་རྟ་ལ་བྱངས་ནས་ཡང་གསལ་བར་བཟློག་ཅིང་། མཐའ་མ་སྐྱེ་གང་དེ་མཐུག་ཏུ་བསྐྱོན་བྱས་ཏེ་ལེན་གྱི་ཡོད།

བར་དུ་བཟློག་དོན་བཤད་པའི་སྐབས་སུ་ཡང་རང་ལུགས་ཀྱི་སྐབས་ཡུལ་དང་། རང་ཉིད་ཀྱི་ཡོངས་ཡོང་བྱངས་དང་། ལྟ་སྐྱོམ་སྐྱོད་གསུམ་སོགས་ཞིབ་རྒྱས་དོ་སྐྱོད་བྱེད་ཅིང་། མ་ཟུང་བ་ཚར་གཅད་ནས་བདེ་ལ་བཞོན་ཐབས་དང་བཟང་པོར་གོས་བཏབ་ནས་དགེ་སྤྲིན་སྤངས་སྤངས། མྱོངས་པའི་སེམས་ཅན་ལ་ལམ་བསྐྱར་ནས་ཐར་ལམ་ལ་འབྱེད་པ་སོགས་ལུགས་ཟུང་དཔའ་རྩལ་གྱུ་ཐོབ་ཐོབ་ཀྱི་སྐྱོད་ཚུལ་ཡང་དག་པར་སྟོན་པར་བྱེད། དཔེ་ཆ་ཞིག་བཞག་ན། རྒྱལ་མཆོག་གི་སར་རྩོུ་ཆོ་རྒྱལ་90་གིས་དག་སྤྱད་བསྐྱོམས་ནས་དབྱལ་ཁམས་སུ་ཕེབས་ནས་དབྱལ་བར་ལྷང་བའི་སེམས་ཅན་དག་ཞིང་དུ་འབྱེད་པའི་རྩོུ་ཆོ་རྒྱལ་སྤྱད་སྤྱད་པར་དོན།

ང་དང་ང་འོས་ཤེས་ན། རྒྱིང་གི་སྐྱེ་མ་རྒྱལ་མཆོག་མེ། །དང་པོ་དམག་དཔོན་གིས་ར་ཟེར། །
བར་དུ་སྐྱེ་མ་རྒྱལ་མཆོག་ཟེར། །ཐ་མ་སངས་རྒྱལ་གདོད་མའི་མགོན། །ད་ལྟ་སྐྱུལ་སྐྱེ་འཇམ་དཔལ་གར་། །
སྐྱེ་འདི་སྐྱེ་འོས་ཤེས་ན། །ཁམས་གསུམ་ཆོས་ལ་བསྐྱལ་སྐྱུ་ཡིན། །དེ་ནས་འཇམ་རྒྱིང་ཁོས་ཆོགས་རྣམས། །
སྟན་མ་ཡིངས་རང་ལ་ལེགས་པར་ཉོན། །དག་པ་གསུམ་གྱིས་ཐོག་བྱང་དགོས། །ཡུལ་འདི་ཐ་མལ་མ་ཡིན་པར། །
རྩལ་སྐྱུལ་པའི་ཞིང་ཁམས་སྟོམས། །སྐྱེ་མ་ཐ་མལ་མ་ཡིན་པར། །སངས་རྒྱལ་དངོས་ཀྱི་འདུ་ཤེས་དགོས། །
འཁོར་ཆོགས་ཐ་མལ་ མ་ཡིན་པར། །སྐྱུལ་པའི་རིག་འཛིན་པོ་མོར་སྟོམས། །དམ་པ་གསུམ་གྱིས་ཕྱིས་ཟེན་དགོས། །
ཁམས་གསུམ་འཁོར་བའི་སེམས་ཅན་རྣམས། །པ་མ་དག་གཉེན་མ་གྱུར་མེད། །པ་མའི་དྲིན་ལན་བཟོ་བའི་ཕྱིར། །
སངས་རྒྱལ་འབྲུབ་པའི་སེམས་བསྐྱེད་དགོས། །ཉེན་བཟང་དྲིན་ལན་མི་སྟོང་ན། །ཐེས་སུ་དྲིན་ལན་རྒྱུད་རེ་ཟ། །
བར་དུ་རང་སེམས་ཉམས་ལེན་དགོས། །བཟང་དན་ཅི་བྱུང་ལམ་ཁྱེར་གྱིས། །དངོས་གཞི་ཉིང་འཛིན་བསྐྱོམ་པར་བྱ། །
ཐ་མ་རྒྱལ་བའི་བྱུ་རྩེ་དང་། །རང་གི་དུས་གསུམ་དགོངས་པ་དེ། །ཐ་མ་སངས་རྒྱལ་ཐོབ་ཕྱིར་བསྐྱོ། །
ཀྱན་བཟང་སྤྱི་མའི་བྱགས་བསྐྱེད་བཞིན། །སངས་རྒྱལ་འབྲུབ་པའི་སྟོན་ལམ་ཐོབ། །

ཅེས་པ་ལྟ་བུ་དང་། ལྟ་མཛུགས་ཏུ།

སྐྱོག་ན་རྣམས་འདུད་ཅི་དང་། མ་གོ་ན་ལས་ཀྱི་འབྲེལ་བ་མེད་པ་ཡིན། ཞེས་དང་།
སྐྱེ་སྤངས་ཆད་ཆོས་ལ་འབྱུར་བར་ཤོག དག་ཐོས་ཆད་བདེ་འགོ་ཐོབ་པར་ཤོག ཅེས་པ་ལྟ་བུ་དང་།
སྐྱེ་འབྲེལ་བ་བྱུང་ན་གཟོད་པར་གསལ། །དག་འབྲེལ་བ་བྱུང་ན་མཐོལ་ལོ་གཤགས། །

⁹⁰ གི་སར་རྩོུ་ཆོ་རྒྱལ་ནི་གི་སར་གྱི་ཆོས་མེད་ངམ་ཆོས་མཆོན་ཡིན་ཞིང་། མཆོན་ལ་སྐྱེ་མ་རྩོུ་ཆོ་རྒྱལ་ཞེས་ཟེར།

ཞེས་ཐོག་མཐའ་བར་གསུམ་དུ་བརྟེན་བྱའི་ནང་དོན་གང་ཞིག་ངག་འབྲུལ་དང་མ་འདྲེས་པར་འགག་མེད་དོན་རྒྱ་ངག་གི་རྣམ་པ་འཕམ་སྒོམ་སྒྲུའམ། མགུར་སྒྲུ་ཡི་ལམ་ནས་དེ་བོ་འགག་མེད་དོན་རྒྱུ་དང་། བྱེད་ལས་ལས་ཅན་དམ་པའི་ཆོས་ལ་བཀོད་པ་དང་བདུད་རིགས་དམ་ལ་འདོགས་པ་སོགས་ཀྱི་ཁྱད་ཆོས་ལྡན་ཡོད་དོ།

བྱེད་ཀྱི་གསར་གྱི་མི་ཆེད་ནང་སྒོམ་སྒྲུབ་ཀྱི་སྒོར།

སྤྱིར་སྤྱིར་གཤམ་རྒྱལ་པོ་ལ་རྒྱུ་མངའ་དམན་པ་སྐྱེ་བོ་རྣམས་ཀྱིས་གཤམ་ནི་དྲག་པོའི་དམག་དང་གཡུལ་འབྱེད་ཐོག་མི་ཆེ་ཟད་པའི་མི་སྣ་ཞིག་དང་། ཡང་ན་རྟོག་བཏགས་ཀྱིས་བཅུམས་པའི་སྒྲུང་གི་མི་སྣ་ལྟ་བུ་ཞིག་ཡིན་པ་སོགས་དཔོན་པོ་ཀྱི་ཡོད་ཀྱང་། དེ་ལྟར་མཐའ་གཅིག་དུ་ཡིན་པའི་ངེས་པ་མེད་ཀྱང་། དེ་ལ་ཡང་རྒྱ་མཚན་ཡི་ནས་མེད་པ་ཡང་མ་ཡིན་ཏེ། སྤྱིར་གཤམ་ཁོང་ཉིད་ཀྱིས་ཀྱང་།

དག་དེ་རེ་ལྟལ་དུ་མེད། །ང་གཤམ་དག་ལ་ལྟལ་དུ་མེད། །

ཅེས་དང་། སངས་རྒྱལ་བ་སྤྲན་པའི་སྤྱི་དག་མ་གཏོགས་ང་གཤམ་སྤྱིར་ལ་སྤྱིར་དག་མེད། ཅེས་གསུང་པ་བཞིན་ནོ། །
འོན་སྤྱིར་གཤམ་ནི་འཐབ་འབྲུག་དང་གཡུལ་འབྱེད་ཀྱིས་མི་ཆེ་ཆོག་པའོད་པས་སྒོམ་ལ་འབྲེལ་བ་ཅི་ཞིག་ཡོད་དམ་ཞེ་ན། དེ་ལྟར་མ་ཡིན་ཏེ། གཤམ་རྒྱལ་པོའི་བྱི་ནང་གསང་གསུམ་གྱི་རྣམ་ཐར་ཡང་སྤྱིར་གསེར་གྱི་ཞུན་མ་ཡོན་ཏན་མོར་བྱའི་མཛོད་ཅེས་པ་ལས།

ཐོག་མར་ཞིང་ཁམས་ནས་བདུད་རིགས་དམ་ལ་འདོགས་པའི་བྲགས་བསྐྱེད་དམ་བཅའ་མཛད་ཅིང་བསམ་བཞིན་གྱིད་པ་བཟུང་བར་ཆས་ཞེས་དང་། ཡང་འབྲུངས་སྤྱིར་ལས། ཡུམ་གྱི་ལྷུ་མས་སྒྲ་རྒྱ་བ་དགུ་ཞག་བརྒྱད་རིང་ཏིང་ལེ་འཛོན་ལ་གནས་ཞེས་དང་། ཡང་དེ་ཉིད་དུ། སྤྱི་འབྲུངས་པའི་སྐབས་སུ་ཡང་མཁའ་འགོ་རྣམས་ཀྱི་བྲུས་མཛད་ཅིང་། གུ་རུ་པ་རྒྱས་མཚན་གསོལ། བྱིས་པ་སྐྱབས་ནས་བདུད་དུ་མ་བཏུལ་ཞེས་པ་ལས་ཀྱང་ཐོག་མ་ཉིད་ནས་སངས་རྒྱལ་ཟེན་པ་རྟོགས་སྒྲུབ་ལ། བར་དུ་དགུ་ལོ་བཅུ་ཅམ་ནས་སྒོམ་ཆེན་ཨ་ཁྱེ་ར་ཆ་བཏུལ་ནས་དམ་ལ་བཏགས། ཡི་དམ་དང་མཁའ་འགོ་སོགས་ཞལ་གཟིགས་ནས་ལུང་བསྟན་ཡང་ཡང་ཐོབ་པ་མ་ཟད། གང་ཉིད་ཀྱིས་སྤྱོད་དང་སྒྲུབ་པ་མཉམ་པར་མཛད་ནས་སྒྲུབ་པའི་མངའ་བརྟེས།

ཆེ་སྟོད་དམག་དཔོན་གཤམ་ཡིན། ཆེ་སྟོད་དོན་ཆེ་རྒྱལ་ཡིན། ཞེས་དང་།

ཆེ་སྟོད་བདུད་ཁམས་ཆོས་ལ་བསྐྱེད། །འཛམ་བུ་སྤྱིར་གཤམ་ཆོས་སྒྲུབ། །ཆེ་སྟོད་རང་གཞན་སྒྲུབ་ལ་བསྐྱེད། །
མཐོང་ཐོས་དྲན་རེག་ས་ལམ་བསྐྱེད། །ང་ནི་སྒྲུ་མ་སེང་ཆེན་ཡིན། །མཚོ་སྐྱེས་རྒྱལ་བའི་རྒྱུད་པ་ཡིན། །ཞེས་གསལ།

ཅེས་གསལ་བ་དང་།

བྱང་ཆུབ་མཆོག་ཏུ་བྱགས་བསྐྱེད་ནས་ཐོག་མར་བྱང་ཆུབ་སེམས་མཆོག་གི་གཏོང་ལེན་ལོ་བདུན་བསྐྱོམས་པར་མཛད་
ཚུལ་ནི།

བྱང་ཆུབ་སེམས་དཔའི་བསྐྱབ་པ་ལ། །དད་ཅིང་གུས་པ་ཆེན་པོ་ཡིས། །བྱང་སེམས་གསལ་ན་མ་ཐག་ཏུ་ནི། །
དབྱ་གཉིན་མེད་ཅིང་བྱམས་པའི་ངང་། །ལོ་བདུན་སྤྱིང་ཐུངས་བཏང་ལེན་དང་། །བྱམས་སེམས་ལོ་ནས་བདུན་ཡུལ་
བསྐྱངས། །

གེ་སར་སྐྱ་གཞོན་ཏུ་བྱས་ནས་བྱང་ཆུབ་མཆོག་ཏུ་བྱགས་བསྐྱེད་ནས་བྱང་སེམས་མཆོག་གི་གཏོང་ལེན་བསྐྱོམས་ཚུལ་
ནམ་ཐར་ཡོན་ཏན་ནོར་བུའི་མཛོད་དུ་གསལ།

ལྷག་པར་གེ་སར་ཉིད་ཀྱིས་མཆོན་ལྷན་སྒྲ་མ་དཔལ་རྒྱ་རོལ་འཛིན་སྐྱོབ་བྱན་པ་ཡི་ཤེས་གྲགས་
(Smṛtijnanakīrti) སྤྱིང་ཡུལ་དུ་གདན་བྱངས་ཏེ་སྒྲ་མར་བསྐྱེན་ཞིང་། ཆོས་དངོས་གཞི་ལས་ཀྱང་སྤྱོན་འགྲོ་ཟབ་
ཅེས་པ་ལྟར་སྤྱོན་འགྲོ་ཆར་བཅུ་ཆ་བསྐྱལ་མཛད་པ་དང་། བེམ་འཛིན་ལུགས་ཀྱི་ཕྱག་རྒྱ་ཆེན་པོའི་གདུམ་མོ་སྤྲུགས་ཏེ་
ལོ་དགུ་རིང་བཀའ་བ་སྤྱད་སྟོར། ནམ་ཐར་བུ་ནོར་བུ་མཛོད་དུ།

ཆོས་ཀྱི་གཞི་མ་ཆེ་འདོན་ཕྱིར། །བཀའ་རྒྱུད་སྤྱོན་འགྲོ་ཆ་བཅུ་བསྐྱལ། བེམ་འཛིན་ལུགས་ཀྱི་གདུམ་མོའི་ཁྲིད། ⁹³
བདེ་ཚོད་རང་འབར་གནད་དུ་བསྐྱུན། དཀའ་སྤྱད་དག་སྤྱང་མི་ལོ་དགུ། །

ཞེས་ཕྱག་རྒྱུགས་ཀྱི་སྤྱོན་འགྲོ་བཅུ་ཅུ་བསྐྱལ་བ་དང་གདུམ་མོ་ལོ་དགུ་ཅུ་ཉམས་ལེན་གནད་ཡོད་པ་གསལ།

མི་ལོ་གསུམ་ལ་ཏིང་འཛིན་བསྐྱོམས། །གཡེང་མེད་བསྐྱོམས་བྱ་བསྐྱོམས་བྱེད་བྲལ། །

ཞེས་བབྱང་བྱ་གསུམ་གྱི་རིང་ལ་གཡེང་བ་མེད་པར་སྐྱ་མཆོམས་ལ་བཞུགས་ཏེ་ཏིང་འཛིན་བསྐྱོམས་ཚུལ་གསལ།

གེ་སར་ཉིད་ཀྱི་ཞལ་ཆོད་མའི་རྩོམ་གསུང་མགུར་ལས་ཀྱང་།

བཅུ་གསུམ་གྲངས་བརྒྱད་འཕོ་ཆེན་བརྟེས། །གནས་འདི་རོ་མཆོར་མི་ཆེ་འམ། །ངས་ཀྱང་གནས་འདིར་སྐྱབ་པ་བྱས། །
ཆོས་རྣམས་སེམས་སུ་གོ་ཐག་ཆོད། །ཀུན་ཏུ་བཟང་དང་དབྱེར་མེད་རྟོགས། །

⁹³ ཕྱག་ཆེན་གྱི་གདུམ་མོ་མར་པའི་བརྒྱད་ནས་བོད་ལ་དར་བ་ཡོངས་གྲགས་ཡིན་ཞིང་། མདོ་ཁམས་སྤྱིང་གི་ཡུལ་ལ་ཐེ་མི་ལས་ངས་པའི་སྐྱོབ་མའི་
སྐབས་ནས་མ་གཏོགས་པལ་ཆེ་དར་མེད་ཀྱང་། སྤྱིང་གི་སྒྲ་མ་བྱན་པ་ཡི་ཤེས་གྲགས་བོད་སྤྱོད་ལུ་ཏུ་ལོ་མང་ལུག་རྒྱ་གནད་ནས་བཞུགས་པས་རྟེན་
འབྲེལ་གི་དབང་གིས་ཐུགས་སུ་མདོ་ཁམས་ཕྱོགས་སུ་ཡེགས། སྤྱིང་སྤྱང་དུ་ཁོང་འདན་མའི་ཡུལ་ལ་གདན་བྱངས་ནས་སྤྱིང་གི་སྒྲ་མར་བསྐྱེན་ཚུལ་
གསལ་བ་དང་། ཁོང་གི་དགོན་པ་དེང་ཡང་དངོས་སུ་མཇལ་རྒྱ་ཡོད་སྟེ།

མྱིང་སྒྲིལ་བུ་མཛོན་པའི་གཉིས་པ་དང་འབྲེལ་བའི་སྒྲིལ་སྒྲིབ་སྒྲོང་།

ཞེས་གནས་འདི་ཞེས་པ་ནི་ཆ་ཤེལ་རི་བྲག་ལྷག་ལ་གོ་ཞིང་། གནས་དེ་གཅིག་པོར་ལོ་བརྒྱ་གསུམ་རིང་ཙམ་ལ་སྒྲིལ་སྒྲིབ་
མཛོན་དེ་འཕོ་ཆེན་ཐོབ་ནས་ཀྱན་རྒྱ་བཟང་གི་གོ་འཕང་བརྟེན་པའི་རྒྱལ་རྒྱལ་ཐར་དུ་གསུངས་སོ།།

མྱིང་ཨེ་གེ་སར་སྒྲིལ་བྱུང་ལས་སྒྲིབ་རྟགས་ཐོན་རྒྱལ།

དེ་ཡང་རྒྱལ་ཐར་ཡོན་ཏན་ནོར་བུ་མཛོན་ལས།

སྒྲུང་བ་མེ་ལ་མེ་ཉིད་ཟུ། རྒྱ་ཉིད་མེ་ལ་ས་ཉིད་ལྷགས། །སྒྲུང་རོ་ཁོ་ནས་འབངས་དུ་རྒྱུ། །རིག་པ་བསྟན་པ་ཐོབ་པའི་
དུས། །

དཔལ་ལྷན་སྒྲིལ་རིག་འཛིན་རྒྱུ། །འཇམ་དཔལ་པ་ལོ་ལྟོ་ལ་འཇོམས་དང་། །གཤེན་རྒྱུ་དེ་དཀྱིལ་འཁོར་ཞལ་བྱེ་
ནས། །

རྒྱུད་རྒྱག་མེམས་ཅན་མ་ལུས་པ། །མ་བསྐྱལ་བ་ནི་བསྐྱལ་བར་བྱ། །མ་གྲོལ་བར་ནི་གྲོལ་བར་བྱ། །

ཁོ་མའི་དབང་བསྐྱར་སྒྲིལ་བར་བྱ། །གསུངས་ནས་མཁའ་ལ་ལྷིང་མཛུབ་མཛོན། །ཁོ་མ་གཤེན་རྒྱུ་དེ་ལྷ་ཚོགས་
རྒྱལས། །

རྟེན་གྱི་སྒྲིལ་བུ་བཞིན་དུ་བྱོན། །མཚོ་ལ་ཁ་བ་བབས་པ་བཞིན། །དབྱ་ལྷའི་བུ་⁹⁴ལ་དབང་བསྐྱར་མཛོན། །

ལག་རྒྱ་བསྐྱལ་བའི་མཚོན་ཆ་གཏད། །ཁམས་གསུམ་བསྐྱལ་བའི་དབང་ཡང་བསྐྱར། །མཁའ་ལ་གུར་དྲག་འཁོར་
ཚོགས་བྱོན། །

སྟོབས་རྩལ་གཟི་བྱིན་དབང་ཡང་བསྐྱར། །

ཞེས་དཔལ་ལྷན་སྒྲིལ་རིག་འཛིན་རྒྱུ་ 95 ཡི་མྱིང་ཨེ་གེ་སར་ལ་དབང་བསྐྱར་མཛོན་པའི་སྐབས། །ཁོར་གིས་ཡི་དམ་ལྷ་
ཚོགས་རྒྱལ་ཞལ་གཟིགས་ཤིང་དབང་ཡང་ཇི་ལྟར་བསྐྱར་བ་བཞིན་ཐོབ་རྒྱལ་སོགས་གསལ་བ་དང་། །བྱུང་པར་དུ་གེ་
སར་རང་ཉིད་ཀྱི་ཕོ་བྲང་དུ་སྐྱེ་མཚམས་བཞུགས་པའི་སྐབས་སུ་སྒྲུང་སྟིང་ལྷ་འདྲེ་རྒྱལས་ཀྱང་འཁོར་དུ་འདུས་ཏེ་མཛོན་
པར་དང་པའི་རྒྱལ་རྒྱལ་ཐར་དེ་ཉིད་ལས།

ར་ཉིད་སེང་ལྷག་སྟག་རྒྱུ་རྒྱུ་རྒྱུ་ །རྟིང་འཛིན་མཚམས་རྒྱ་དམ་པོར་བསྐྱུམས། །གཡེང་བ་མེད་པར་སྐྱབ་ལ་བརྟེན། །

སྒྲུང་སྟིང་ལྷ་འདྲེ་མ་ལུས་པ། །དཀར་པོའི་ཕྱོགས་ལ་མཛོན་དགའ་རྒྱལས། །མེ་བཞིན་འདུ་ནས་མཛོན་པར་དང་། །ཅེས་
གསལ།

94 དབྱ་སྒྲའི་བུ་ཞེས་པ་ནི་མྱིང་ཨེ་གེ་སར་རྒྱལ་པོར་གོ་དགོས།

95 ལྷིང་རིག་འཛིན་རྒྱུ་དེ་གི་གུ་རུ་ལྷ་འབྱུང་གནས་ལ་གོ་ཡང་། །སྐབས་དེར་གེ་སར་གྱི་སྒྲིལ་རྒྱལ་གསུམ་ནས་སྐབས་འདྲིར་རྒྱངས་ཨ་བྱེས་བྱང་རྒྱལ་འདྲེ་
བཞོལ་མཚོགས་ལ་གོ།

དེ་ལྟར་གླིང་ཐེག་སར་གཙོ་བོར་གྱུར་པའི་གླིང་གི་དཔལ་འཛུལ་དང་དྲུང་སྐྱོན་རྣམས་ཀྱང་རྒྱུན་གཏན་ཐུན་རིང་ཐུང་ལ་མ་
བཟོས་པར་ག་སར་མཉམ་མཉམ་དུ་སྐྱེ་མཚམས་ལ་ཡང་ཡང་བཞུགས་སྡོལ་ཡོད། དཔེར་ན་སྐྱེས་མཚལ་གི་སར་གྱི་
རྣམ་ཐར་ཡང་སྤྱིང་གསེར་གྱི་ལྷན་མ་ཡོན་ཏན་ནོར་བུའི་མཛོད་ལས།

དེ་ཆོ་རིང་འཛིན་ངང་ལ་གནས། །དུས་བབ་ལྟ་ཡི་ལུང་བསྟན་ནས། །སྟག་གཟིག་ནོར་རྩེ་འབབ་དུ་སོང་། །

ཞེས་ལྟ་ཡི་ལུང་བསྟན་ལ་བརྟེན་ནས་བདུད་འདུལ་བར་ཐེབས་དགོས་འབྱུང་གི་ཡོད་ལ། སྐབས་འདིར་སྟག་གཟིག་ཡུལ་
དུ་གཡུལ་འབྱེད་དུ་མ་ཐེབས་སྟེན་ལ་ཟབ་མའི་སྤྱང་བ་རྒྱུང་པའི་ཆོ་རིང་འཛིན་ངང་ལ་སྐྱེ་མཚམས་སུ་བཞུགས་ཡོད་པ་གསལ། སྐྱེ་
མཚམས་ལ་བཞུགས་པ་རྒྱུན་གཏན་ཞིག་ཡིན་པ་རྣམ་ཐར་ལས་ཀྱང་།

མཚམས་རེ་སྐབ་པའི་མཚམས་རྒྱ་བསྟུངས། །བསྐྱེད་རྫོགས་ལྟ་བུའི་རྒྱུང་འཛིན་བསྟོནས། །སྐབས་རེ་དག་པའི་ཞིང་
ཁམས་ཉུལ། །

རིག་འཛིན་རྣམས་དང་བཟོ་སྒྲེང་བྱེད། །ས་ལམ་གོགས་དང་གོལ་ས་བསལ། །སྐབས་རེ་གཞན་དོན་བཏང་ལེན་
གྱིས། །

ཟས་གོས་འདུན་བོར་དཀའ་སྤྱད་བྱས། །(དམངས་ཁྲོད།, ༡༩༤༥)ཞེས་དང་།

གཡུལ་འབྱེད་རེ་རེ་ཆར་ཐེས་ཡུལ་ལུང་ལ་ཞི་བདེ་གླིང་འཇགས་ནས་ཡོད་ལ་སྐྱོམ་སྐབ་མཛོད་དེ་གཡུལ་སར་གྲོངས་
པའི་གི་བོ་རྣམས་ཀྱི་ཆེད་དུ་སྐྱེ་མཚམས་སྟེན་གྱི་ཡོད་པ་སྟེ། རྣམ་ཐར་ལས།

དེ་ནས་རྒྱལ་སྐོན་སྤར་བཞིན་དུ། །དགེ་བར་སྦྱོང་ཅིང་རྒྱུང་འཛིན་བསྟོནས། ཞེས་དང་།

མཛོན་སྦྱོང་དག་པོས་གཞན་དོན་སྦྱོང། །འཛོངས་བ་གསུམ་ལྟན་རྣལ་འབྱོར་སྦྱིད། །ལས་ངན་རྒྱུན་བཅད་དག་པོ་
འཛོངས། །

ཆོ་བསྙེད་བདག་བསྐྱེས་རྣལ་འབྱོར་འཛོངས། །ཤ་ཁྲག་ལྟ་མཛོད་ལྟ་རྫོགས་འཛོངས། །

སྟགས་སྐྱེ་རྫོགས་ཀྱི་ཉམས་ལེན་ལ་ཆད་མ་ལོན་ན་ཞིང་བཅུ་ཆོང་བའི་དགྲ་བགོགས་རྣམས་ཐོག་མར་ཆར་བཅད་ནས་
བསྐྱུལ། བར་དུ་སྤང་པོ་ཐམས་ཅད་ཡེ་ཤེས་པའི་ལྟ་ལ་མཛོད་སྟུལ། བར་རྣམ་ཤེས་བདེ་གཤེགས་ཀྱི་སྤུས་སུ་སྤར་མི་བྱུབ་
(མཁན་པོ་ནོར་བུ་ཆོ་རིང་།, ༢༠༢༥)པར་སྟགས་སྐྱེ་རྫོགས་ཀྱི་གཞུང་ 96 དག་ནས་གསུང་པ་ལྟར་ན་གླིང་གི་སར་
གྱིས་མཛོད་སྦྱོང་དག་པོས་གཡུལ་འབྱེད་སོ་སོར་དགྲ་བགོགས་བསྐྱུལ་བ་དག་འཛོངས་བ་གསུམ་ལྟན་གྱི་ལམ་ནས་
ཞིང་ཁམས་སུ་འབྱེད་པར་མཛོད་ཀྱི་ཡོད་ཅིང་། དེ་དག་ཀྱང་ཐམས་ཅད་གཞན་དོན་འབའ་ཞིག་སྟེ་སེམས་ཅན་གྱི་དོན་དུ་
ཆོ་སྤྱོད་བྱགས་བསྐྱེད་སྟོན་ལམ་བཞིན་ཞི་རྒྱས་དབང་གིས་མཛོད་མིན་བསྐྱུངས་པའི་ཆ་ཤས་ལས་མ་འདས་སོ་སྟུམ།

96 སྐྱེ་རིམ་དང་རྫོགས་རིམ་གྱི་གཞུང་དག་དུ་རྫོགས་མཛོད་ཀྱི་སྐབས་སུ་བསྐྱུལ་བའི་སྐབས་འཛོངས་བ་གསུམ་ལྟན་གྱི་དམིགས་རིམ་གྱི་གཤེགས་གནད་
སྐོར་ལ་གསུང་རྟིང་མའི་གཞུང་དག་དུ་གསལ།

མིང་སྐུ་ཕུ་མཛོན་པའི་གཏམ་དང་འབྲེལ་བའི་སྐོམ་སྒྲུབ་སྟོན།

དེ་བཞིན་གཤམ་གྱི་རྣམ་ཐར་ལས་གང་ཉིད་ཀྱིས་སྤྱོད་པའི་ལྷན་དང་ས་ལས་གྱི་ཡོན་ཏན་རྣམས་སྤྱད་ལ་ཚད་མཐོ་
པོར་འབྱུངས་ནས་ལྷ་བ་ཉམས་སྤྱོད་ཀྱི་རྒྱུ་ལྟེན་གྱི་དོན་མཁུངས་མཁུངས་ལས།

ཆོས་དང་ཆོས་དང་འགྲེལ་པའི་དབང་། འཛམ་གླིང་དབང་ལ་བསྐྱུས་པ་དང་། སྤྱན་གྲགས་སྤངས་པ་བོད་ལ་ཁྱབ། །
ཆོས་དང་འགྲོ་འདྲེན་སྒྲུབ་ཡིས། སྤྱི་བཞེད་གཏན་ནས་དག་པ་ཡིན། ལྷ་ཡི་ལུང་བསྐྱེད་དགོས་པ་མེད། །
མཛོན་པར་མཁུངས་པ་ས་ལེར་གསལ། ། འབྱུང་བ་ལྷ་ལ་རང་དབང་བསྐྱུར། ལྷ་མིའི་དབང་གྲགས་དགོས་པ་མེད། །
ཅུ་རྒྱུ་སེམས་ཉིད་རྟ་བཞེན་པས། འཛིག་རྟེན་རྟ་ལ་ཡིད་སྤྲོད་མེད། རང་སེམས་ལོར་བྱ་བ་བྱུང་གིས་འཛོད་ས། །
སྤྱོད་པའི་ཆོས་གྲགས་འདོད་ཡོན་ལོར། ཐལ་བ་བཞིན་བོར་ཡིད་སྤྲོད་མེད། ཡར་གྱི་ལྷ་ཞེས་མི་རེ། །
མར་གྱི་འདྲེ་ཞེས་མི་དོགས་པ། འཛམ་པའི་དོན་ཆེད་ཞེས་བཤད། ཞེས་གོ་བཤད་བོར་གསལ།

དེ་བཞིན་གླིང་གཤམ་གྱི་སྤོར་འཁོར་དཔལ་འཁྱུ་སོགས་ཀྱང་གཡུལ་འབྱུང་དང་འབྱུག་ཟིང་ཁོང་སྐོམ་སྒྲུབ་ལ་ཞུགས་ཏེ་
མཐར་ཐུག་པ་ཐོབ་པ་དུ་མ་བྱུང་།

དཔལ་འཁྱུ་ཕུ་རུ་སྐྱེས་སྤྱད་འདི། རྒྱ་གར་གྱུ་ཆེན་མི་ཡི་ཚུལ་ཆོས་དང་འདུལ་གཉེན་སྤྱོད་མཁུངས། །
སྤངས་པ་བོད་ལ་གྲགས་པ་ཁྱབ། དབྱུ་ནག་བོད་ཀྱི་སྤྱོད་ཆོས་སྒྲུབ། ཆོས་སྤྱོད་མཛམས་དང་སྤྱོད་པ་མཛེད། །
གྲུབ་པ་ཐོབ་པ་གཏུག་ལས། བསྐྱེད་བཀྱུར་ཕུན་སུམ་ཆོག་པ་བྱུང་། །

ཞེས་གསལ་བས་སྐོམ་ལ་མ་བརྟེན་པར་གྲུབ་པ་ཐོབ་ཐབས་མེད་པས་སྐོམ་སྒྲུབ་རིག་གནས་ཀྱི་གནས་བབས་རྟོགས་ཐུབ་
པོ།

གླིང་གཤམ་ཆོས་དང་མཛོན་སྐྱེས་ཀྱི་སྐོམ་སྤྱོད་དཔལ་མཛོད་སྟོན།

དེ་ཡང་རྒྱལ་མཆོག་ཡིད་ལོར་བྱ་གླིང་རྩེ་གཤམ་རྒྱལ་པོའི་རྣམ་ཐར་དཔལ་གླིང་རྩོགས་པ་ཆེན་པོ་མཐོང་བ་རང་གོལ་དན་
མོང་ཆོས་ཀྱི་བསྐྱུལ་སྤྱོད་ཞེས་པ་ལས།

སྤྱོད་པའི་སྤྱོད་པ་མཛོན་གསུམ་ཐོབ་པའི་རྩེ་མཛོད་རྩེ་གཤམ་པའི་ཡོངས་སྤྱོད་གསུམ་པར་མཛོད་ནས་ཁ་མོ་གླིང་དང་
འཛམ་གླིང་གཞན་ལ་རྒྱ་ཐོག་པ་རིམ་དགྱའི་ཆོས་ཀྱི་འཁོར་ལོ་བསྐྱེད་ནས། ཁོས་སྤྱོད་ཁྱི་ཐག་ལས་མི་ཉུང་བར་བྱས་ནས་
སྐོམ་ཁང་བསམ་འགྲུབ་སྤྱུག་ཅེར་བཞུགས། (རིག་འཛིན་དག་ཅུ་དོན།, 1979) ཞེས་སྤྱོད་ཆོས་ལ་ལོ་བྱང་དམ་
མཁུངས་རྒྱུ་ཆོས་སྤྱོད་ལ་སྐོམ་ཁང་གི་དོན་ལྡན་ཆོས་འཁོར་སྤོར་ས་དང་སྐོམ་སྤྱོད་གནད་ཡུལ་ཞིག་ཏུ་
བྱུང་ཡོད་པ་གསལ།

ད་དུང་རྣམ་ཐར་ལོར་བྱའི་མཛོད་ལས།

མདོ་ཡི་ཆོས་སྤྱོད་བསྐྱུལ་བར་བསྐྱུལ། དག་འདུན་སྤྱོད་ཅུ་རབ་ཏུ་བྱུང་། །
སོ་སོར་ཐར་དང་བྱང་ཆུབ་སེམས། གྲི་མ་མེད་པའི་ཆོས་འཁོར་བསྐྱེད། །

ཞེས་ཐོག་མར་མདོ་ཕྱོགས་ནས་ཆོས་འཁོར་བསྐྱར་མཛད་ཅིང་། རྒྱལ་བའི་བཀའ་འབྱུང་ལྷན་གསུང་གི་མཛད་པ་མ་ཟད་
སྐུ་བ་ཆེན་ཡང་ཡང་ཚོགས་པ་སོགས་སྐུ་བ་མཛད་པའི་སྐོར་གསུངས་འདུག

རྒྱལ་བའི་བཀའ་འབྱུང་སྐོར་ཆོར་དང་། སྐུ་བ་ཆེན་ཟབ་མོ་སྐོར་ལྷན་དང་།

མདོས་བསྐྱོགས་སོགས་བཙུང་མི་ལང་། ལན་པའི་སྐུ་རིམ་ན་མར་བསྐྱབས།

ཞེས་པ་ལྟར་ན། སྐུ་བ་ཆེན་དང་མདོས་བསྐྱོགས་སོགས་པན་པའི་སྐུ་རིམ་གྲངས་ལས་འདས་པ་རབ་དང་རིམ་པར་སྐུ་བ་
མཛད་པ་གསལ།

ཆེ་གཅིག་བར་ལ་སྐུ་གོན་དང་ཉོན་མོངས་སྤྱིར་བྱེད་ཁྱུས་ཚོགས་སྐུ་བ་མཛད་དེ་མཐར་མྱིང་གི་ཁྲ་མ་ཆེ་རྒྱད་ཀྱན་དགའ་
རྒྱལ་མཛན། རྩྱེད་མཁན་ཆེན་སྐུ་བའི་སེང་གེ འབྲིང་བརྒྱད་ལྷོ་རྒྱུ་རྒྱལ་མཛན། རྩྱེད་བརྒྱད་ཉི་མ་རྒྱལ་མཛན། ལྷ་རབ་
བརྟན་ཆོས་ཀྱི་དབང་ཕྱག འདན་རྗེ་སྐལ་བཟང་རྒྱལ་མཛན། དབུས་ཀྱི་ལྷ་བཟང་རྗེ་རྗེ། ལམས་ཀྱི་ཆོ་བསྙེད་རྒྱལ་མཛན།
གཙང་གི་ཤེས་རབ་རྗེ་རྗེ། བྱང་པའི་བསམས་གཏན་ཆོས་གྲགས། ཟུར་པ་འོད་ཟེར་ཆོས་གྲགས། སྐུ་བའི་ཀྱན་དགའ་རྒྱལ་
མཛན། སོག་བན་སེར་པོ་དཀོན་མཆོག་འབྱུང་གནས་སོགས་མྱིང་གི་ཁྲ་མ་བཅུ་གསུམ་དང་། ཕྱོགས་མེད་ཀྱི་ཁྲ་མ་
རྩམས་ཀྱིས་སློབ་དཔོན་མཛད་ནས་སློབ་བྱ་ཀྱན་ལ་ཁྱུས་བྱས་པས་ཉོན་མོངས་ཀྱི་སྤྱི་གསྐུ་ཐམས་ཅད་དག་ནས། ཡང་
དག་པའི་སྐོར་དུ་རུང་བ་རྩམས་བྱུང་ངོ་། (དམངས་ཁྲོད།, ༡༩༤༥)

དེ་ཡང་དཔལ་མྱིང་རྒྱུ་རྒྱུ་མཛན་པ་ཆེན་པོ་ལས། ཆོ་སྐྱོད་བྱ་མོས་སྤྲོ་མ་པ་ཞུས། ཕྱག་རྒྱུ་མཛན་ལ་ཉམས་ལེན་བྱས། ཞེས་
མྱིང་གི་སྐུ་མཆོག་སྐུ་སྐུ་ལོ་སེང་ལུས་འབྲུག་མོ་ཡང་སྐུ་ཆེ་སྐྱོད་ལ་ཕྱག་རྒྱུ་མཛན་ཀྱི་ཆོས་ལ་ཉམས་ལེན་པ་ཞིག་དུ་བྱུར་
པ་མཆོན་མྱིང་པ་ཀྱན་ཉམས་ལེན་པ་ཤ་སྐྱག་ཡིན་པ་གསལ།

དེ་ནས་སྐུ་མཆོག་ཉིད་ཀྱི་ལུས་པོ་སྤྲིན་ཅིང་གོལ་བའི་སྤྱི་ཉིག་ཆེན་པོའི་དགོངས་འབྲེལ་ལྷ་བསྐྱོམ་ནས་མཁའ་རྒྱུད།
འོད་གསལ་ཉི་མའི་རྒྱུད། ཤན་འབྲེད་བྱ་རྒྱལ་གཤོག་ཁྲིང་སོགས་སོ་སོའི་སློ་ལ་འཚམས་པའི་ཟབ་ཆོས་བསྟན། རྒྱུ་མཛན་
པ་ཆེན་པོའི་སློམ་ཁྲིད་གནང་ཅིང་། སློབ་ཚོགས་རྩམས་སྐུ་བ་པ་དག་པ་དང་། སྐུ་བ་པ་ཐོབ་པ་ཤ་སྐྱག་ཡིན་པའོ།
(དམངས་ཁྲོད།, ༡༩༤༥)

དེ་ལྟར་སྐུ་བ་པ་སྐུ་དུ་ཐོབ་དོན་ཡང་མྱིང་རྗེ་གི་སར་མཆོག་གིས་ཐབས་མཁས་ཐུགས་རྗེ་ཆེན་པོས་སློབ་ཚོགས་རྩམས་ཀྱི་
ལོ་ན་སོགས་གནས་བབས་དང་འཚམས་པའི་སློམ་ཁྲིད་གནང་མས་དག་གནང་ནས་སེམས་ཅན་བདེ་ལ་བཀོད་པའི་སྐོར་
རྩམ་ཐར་ནོར་བུ་མཛོད་ལས་ཀྱང་།

ཤིན་དུ་རྒྱས་ཤིང་འཁོགས་པ་ལ། ལ་བསྐྱོམ་འཕོ་བའི་གདམས་པ་བྱིན། ཞེས་དང་།

དེ་འོག་རྒྱས་པ་ཕོ་མོ་ལ། སེམས་ཉིད་དོ་བོ་མཚུབ་རྒྱགས་བྱས། །

མྱེད་སྐྱེད་ཕུ་མའོན་པའི་གེས་དང་འབྲེལ་བའི་སྒྲིམ་སྒྲུབ་སྟོན།

ཞེས་ཆོ་ལུས་གཅིག་ལ་རིག་འཛིན་པ་དང་། དེ་བཞིན་སྒྱུ་མེད་ཅུང་ཟེར་བ་ཐོབ་ཐུབ་པའི་གདམས་ངག་བསྟུལ་བ་རྣམ་
ཐར་དེ་ཉིད་དུ་གསལ།

དེ་བཞིན་ཆོས་ལ་ཕྱོགས་པའི་སྒྱུ་འགྲོ་རྣམས་ལ་ཆོས་ཀྱི་སྤྱིང་པོ་བྱང་རྒྱབ་སེམས་མཆོག་བསྟན་ནས་སྤྲིན་གྲོལ་གྱི་ལམ་དུ་
ཁྱིད་མཛད་ཀྱི་ཡོད་པ་རྣམས་ཐར་དེ་ཉིད་དུ།

འགྲོ་འདུལ་སྒྲུག་གཟིགས་ཕྱག་བཞི་པའི། །སྒྲོམ་བརྒྱས་དབང་ལུང་སྤྲིན་པར་བྱས། །ཞེས་སོ།།

དེ་བཞིན་རྒྱལ་མཆོག་གེ་སར་གྱིས་འཁོར་རབ་རྣམས་ལ་ཕྱག་རྒྱུགས་གཉིས་ཀྱི་སྒྲོམ་སྒྲུབ་ཉམས་ལེན་ལ་བསྟུལ་གནད་
བ་དང་། འབྲིང་རྣམས་ལ་ཆོས་ཀྱི་འཁོར་ལོ་རྒྱ་ཆེན་སྟོར་ཞིང་རིམ་བཞིན་དབང་བསྟར་མཛད་དེ་གྲུབ་པ་ཐོབ་པ་ཤ་སྟག་
བྱང་། དཔུལ་སྤྱིང་རྒྱུགས་པ་ཆེན་པོ་ལས། སྤྱི་དཔོན་རོང་ཆ་ཁ་ཀླན་པོ་བྱང་གནམ་རྩྭ་ཕྱག་མོ་ཁྱེད་གཤེགས་ནས་ལྷོ་
ལུབ་སྤིན་པའི་གྲོང་ཁྱེར་དུ་རིག་འཛིན་པ་སྤྱི་ཞིང་ས་བོ་རོའི་ཐུགས་ཀར་ཐིམ་པར་བྱུང་། ཞེས་དང་།

དེ་བཞིན་སྤྱིང་གི་མི་སྡུ་གཞན་རྣམས་སྐྱ་ཆོའི་འཕེན་པ་རྒྱུགས་པའི་སྐྱབས་རེ་རེ་བཞིན་ཞིང་ཁམས་སུ་བྱོན་ཡོད། དཔེ་
མཆོན་ཅམ་ལྷས་ན། ར་མཁའ་ནང་བཅུད་སེང་སྟོན་རྩེ། །སྤུ་ལུས་ཐོར་ནས་སངས་རྒྱས་ཐོབ། །ཅེས་གེ་སར་གྱི་ཡབ་ཆེན་
སེང་སྟོན་སྤུ་གཤེགས་པའི་སྐྱ་གསུམ་གསལ་བཟབ་ནས་འོད་གསལ་འཕོ་བ་ཆེན་པོ་སྤར་བས་ཡབ་ཀྱི་དགོངས་པ་ལུབ་
ཕྱོགས་བདེ་ཆེན་ཞིང་ཁམས་ཀྱི་སྐྱ་གསུམ་གྲོང་དུ་མགོན་པོ་འོད་དཔག་མེད་ཀྱི་དུང་དུ་སངས་རྒྱས་ཚུལ་མཛད།

སྐྱ་སེན་ཅམ་ལས་མ་ལུས་པར། །ཨ་ལུ་ཁོ་ཐུང་ཞི་བར་གཤེགས། །ཞེས་ཨ་ལུ་ཁོ་ཐུང་འཇའ་ལུས་སུ་གྲུབ་ཚུལ་བསྟན་པ་
དང་། ཉི་ལྔ་རྒྱུང་དགོངས་པ་གཞན་ལོན་གཤེགས། །སྒྲོལ་མའི་ཡུམ་དང་གཉིས་མེད་འདྲེས། །ཞེས་དང་། དཔའ་ལྷ་མི་ཐུང་
དཀར་པོ་ཆོས་དབྱིངས་བདེ་ཆེན་པོ་བྱང་དུ་སྐྱ་ཞི་བར་གཤེགས། །ཞེས་དང་། སྐ་སྤྲེ་ཆོས་སྦྱང་བེར་ནག་དེ། མེ་འབར་
མགོན་པོ་བེར་ནག་གི། །ཐུགས་ཁར་སྐྱ་འོད་ཟེར་དང་བཅས་ཐིམ། །ཞེས་དང་། ལྷ་མོ་གཡུ་སྟོན་གཟིམ་ཁང་ལ་སྐྱ་སེན་
དང་ན་བཟའ་ལས་མ་བཞག་ནས་ཤར་ཕྱོགས་དཔལ་ལྷན་ཞིང་ལ་གཤེགས། །ཞེས་སོགས་མང་། དེ་བཞིན་རྒྱལ་མཆོག་
ཉིད་ཀྱི་སྐྱ་གསུང་ཐུགས་གསུམ་དེ་རིགས་གསུམ་ཐུགས་ཀར་ཐིམ། །ཡོན་ཏན་དང་འཕྲིན་ལས་རོལ་བ་དེ་སྤུལ་སྐྱ་བད་
འབྱུང་ཡབ་ཡུམ་ལ་ཐིམ་པར་གདའོ། །ཞེས་སོགས་མཛོན་ནོ།།

སྤྱིང་རྩེ་གེ་སར་རྒྱལ་པོས་སྒྲུབ་སྤྲེ་མང་དུ་བཅུགས་ཤིང་ཡོན་བདག་གནད་སྟོར།

གེ་སར་གྱི་རྣམ་ཐར་ཡང་སྤྱིང་གསེར་གྱི་ལྷན་མ་ཡོན་ཏན་ནོར་བུའི་མཛོད་ལས་ཆོས་རྒྱས་ཏ་ཅང་རྒྱ་ཆེན་པོ་བཅུགས་པའི་
སྟོར་མང་དུ་འབྱུང་ཏེ། དཔེར་ན།

སྟོམ་མཁའ་སེང་ཐུག་སྟག་རྒྱུང་དུ། །པོ་བྱང་མི་འབྱུང་དབུས་ལ་བཞུགས། །ཕུ་ཅུ་རྒྱལ་སྟོན་གྲོས་པ་ཆེ། །

འདུར་ཇ་མཁར་འི་མོ་⁹⁷འཛིན། འདེན་པའི་ཕོ་བྲང་ཡོངས་བྲགས་ལ། རྒྱིད་ཀྱི་ལྷ་མཁར་ལྟན་པ་དང་། །

ལྷ་འི་ཤད་པ་རྒྱུང་ཞེས། རྩོད་གཤམ་ལྷ་ཡི་གཞལ་ཁང་ལ། རྩུ་གསུང་ཐུགས་ཀྱི་རྟེན་མཆོད་བཞུགས། །

ཅེས་གྲིང་རྗེ་གེ་སར་རྒྱལ་པོའི་ཕོ་བྲང་གསུམ་སྟེ། ཕོ་བྲང་ཇ་མཁར་འི་མོ་སྒྲོམ་ཁང་མེད་འབྲུག་སྟག་ཅེ་སྒྲུ་མཆོམས་དང་
སྒྲོམ་གྲིང་སོགས་གནད་སའི་སྒྲུབ་མཁར་དུ་བྱུང་བ་དང་། ཇ་མཁར་འི་མོ་ཆབ་སྲིད་མཁར་རྒྱུང་དང་། ལྷ་འི་ཤད་པ་རྒྱུ་
རྒྱུང་ནི་མཆོད་གནས་ཀྱི་སྟེ་བར་བསྐྱེད་ཡོད་པ་གསལ། ཡང་རྣམ་ཐར་ལས།

སྒྲོམ་སྒྲུབ་བསྐྱེད་པ་གཙུག་ན་བཀོད། ལྷ་དང་གྲ་མའི་དགོངས་པ་བསྐྱེད། བུ་ཏུ་སྟོགས་མཆོད་ཆོས་བསྐྱར་བྱས།།

སྒྲོམ་སྒྲུབ་ཀྱི་བསྐྱར་པ་གཙུག་ལ་བཀྱར་ནས་གཅིགས་ཆེན་དུ་འཛིན་ཀྱི་ཡོད་པ་མཛད།

ཤར་གོང་འོང་ནས་ཕྱོན་པ་ཡིས། སྒྲུབ་པའི་རྣལ་འབྱོར་མཁར་ནག་པ། གྲ་མ་དཔོན་སྒྲོབ་བཏུ་གསུམ་དེ། །

མར་ཁམས་གྲིང་ལ་འབྱོར་ནས་བྱང་། གྲ་མ་སུམ་ཏུ་གོང་དུ་བཀྱར། འདོན་གསེར་འབྲུ་ཅན་ལ་སུམ་ཏུ་བཏབ། །

སྟགས་ཀྱི་སྒྲུབ་སྟེ་ཆེན་པོ་བཏུགས། །

ཞེས་དང་། ཡང་གེ་སར་གྱིས་རྒྱངས་ཨ་ཁྱེས་བྱང་རྒྱབ་འདྲེ་བཀོལ་ལ།

བྱབ་ཐོབ་ཁྱེད་ཀྱི་དཔོན་པར་འབྲུལ། གྲིང་གི་ས་ཡུལ་གར་བདེ་དེ། བྱབ་ཐོབ་བཞུགས་པའི་གནས་སུ་འབྲུལ། །

(བྱང་རྒྱབ་འདྲེ་བཀོལ།, 706)

ཞེས་ཤར་ཕྱོགས་རུབ་བྱང་བཞི་ལ་དཔོན་པ་བཞི་དང་། གྲིང་གི་ཡུལ་གྱི་ཀྱན་ཏུ་སྒྲུབ་གནས་རྣམས་བྱབ་ཐོབ་བཞུགས་
གནས་སུ་ཡུལ་ཞེས་རྒྱངས་ཀྱི་པོ་ཏི་བསེ་རུ་རྒྱས་པར་གསལ།

འབྲི་མུར་དཔལ་ཡོན་དང་། འབྲུག་པའི་དར་ཆེན་རབ་པ་སོགས། འདེན་སྒྲོབ་བརྒྱ་ཕྱག་གཤན་དུ་བྱངས། །

གསང་སྟགས་གྲིང་དང་ཉིན་བྱེད་གྲིང་། ཞེ་ཤམ་མ་ཡའི་བསྐྱེད་རྒྱས་གྲིང་། ཕྱི་ནང་སྲོད་བཅུད་དར་བར་བྱས། ཞེས་
དང་།

གཙང་གྲུ་ཞི་འོད་བཟང་པོའི་གཙོར། འཕགས་པའི་དགེ་འདུན་གཅིག་བརྒྱ་སྟེ། གཤན་བྱངས་མདོ་སྟགས་ཆོས་
བསྐྱེད་བཏུགས། །

ཞེས་གྲིང་ལ་གསང་སྟགས་རྗེ་རྗེ་ཤེག་པའི་སྒྲོམ་སྒྲུབ་ཀྱི་བསྐྱེད་པ་གཙུགས་འདུག སྒྲོམ་སྒྲུབ་ཀྱི་བསྐྱེད་པ་གང་དང་གང་
སྟེ་ལ་འདུག་གམ་ཞེས་དཔོངས་ན། འདི་ལྟར་སྟེ། རྣམ་ཐར་ཡོན་ཏན་ནོར་བུའི་མཛོད་ལས།

བཀྱའ་རྒྱུད་བསྐྱེད་པ་རྒྱས་པར་མཛད། འདི་ནས་རྒྱལ་སྒྲོན་རང་མཁར་བསྐྱང་། །

དམ་པའི་ཆོས་ལ་ཁོ་ནར་སྦྱོད། བཀྱའ་སྦྱིང་[རྒྱུད་]སྒྲོན་འགྲོ་ཆ་བཏུ་བསྐྱལ། །

97 ཇ་མཁར་འི་མོ་ནི་གྲིང་གེ་སར་ཀྱི་རྒྱལ་པོའི་ཕོ་བྲང་དང་པོ་དེ་ཡིན་ཞིང་། རྟོར་གྲིང་སྐབས་ཇ་མཁར་འི་མོ་རྟོར་དམག་གིས་རྒྱང་ནས་བཞག་སོང་
བས་ཕོ་བྲང་མེད་འབྲུག་སྟག་ཅེ་བཞེད་ས་པར་བྲགས། ཕོ་བྲང་ཇ་མཁར་འི་མོ་ཕྱིས་སུ་སྒྲུབ་ཡང་བཞེད་ས་བྱུབ་ཡོད་པ་དཔྱད་ཀྱིང་དུ་གསལ།

སྒྲིབ་སྒྲུབ་ཀྱི་མཛེན་པ་འདི་གེ་སངས་དྲུང་འབྲེལ་བའི་སྒྲོམ་སྒྲུབ་སྒོར།

ཞེས་གསལ་བས་གོ་སར་སྒྲུ་ཆེ་སྒྲིབ་དུ་ཕྱག་རྒྱུ་གཉིས་ཀྱི་བསྟན་པ་རྒྱས་པར་སྒྲེལ་བ་གསལ།

དེ་ལྟར་སྒྲིབ་གོ་སར་གྱིས་མདོ་སྒྲགས་ཀྱི་སྒྲོམ་སྒྲུབ་དང་ཁ་ནས་ཡང་འབྲེལ་མེད་ཀྱིས་ཉམས་ལེན་མཛད་ཅིང་། སྒྲིབ་གི་
ཡུལ་གྱི་སྒྲིབ་སྒྲིབ་པར་གསུམ་ཀྱན་ལ་སྒྲུབ་བརྒྱུད་ཀྱི་བསྟན་པ་གཙུགས། རྒྱལ་ཁབ་ཀྱན་གྱི་ནང་ནས་ཉོན་མོངས་ལས་
རྒྱས་པར་རྒྱལ་བ་མཆོག་ཅེས་གསུངས་པ་ནང་བཞིན། མཛད་པ་ཀྱན་གྱི་ནང་ནས་སྒྲོམ་སྒྲུབ་ཀྱི་ལམ་ནས་བསྐྱེད་པའི་
བསྟན་པ་འགྲོའི་མཛད་པ་མཆོག་ཡིན་ཏེ་སྒྲོམ་ལ་མ་བསྟེན་པར་ཉོན་མོངས་ལས་རྒྱས་པར་རྒྱལ་མི་བྱལ་པས་སོ།།

འོན་ཀྱང་སྒྲིབ་ནང་དུ་གསལ་བའི་སྒྲོམ་སྒྲུབ་ཀྱི་ལྟ་བུའི་རྒྱུ་བཞི་གང་འདྲ་ཞིག་ཡོད་དམ་ཅེ་ན། ནང་པ་སངས་རྒྱས་ཀྱི་
སྒྲོམ་གྱི་རྒྱ་ལས་མ་འདས་ཏེ། སྒྲོམ་གྱི་རྒྱ་བཞི་གཙོ་བོ་དེ་བྱམས་སྤྱིང་རྩེ་འབའ་ཞིག་ཡིན་པ་མཛད་ན། དེ་ཡང་དབྱེལ་སྒྲིབ་
རྒྱུ་གསལ་བ་ཆེན་པོ་ལས།

སྤྱིང་རྩེ་མེད་པའི་སྒྲུ་མ་དེ། །བསྟེན་སྒྲུབ་བརྩོན་ཀྱང་སངས་མི་རྒྱས། །

ཞེས་བྱམས་སྤྱིང་རྩེ་དང་བྱང་རྒྱལ་སེམས་སྒྲོམ་ཉམས་ལེན་གྱི་རྒྱུ་བཞི་ཡིན་ཞིང་། དེ་དང་བྲལ་བའི་སྒྲོམ་སྒྲུབ་ཇི་ཅུ་ཙམ་
ཆེན་ཡིན་ཡང་སངས་རྒྱས་མི་བྱལ།

འོན་ཀྱང་གོ་སར་སོགས་སྒྲིབ་གི་དཔའ་རྒྱལ་གྱལ་ཐོབ་རྒྱལ་གྱི་བདུད་རིགས་གངས་མེད་དྲག་པོའི་ཆོར་བཅད་པས་སྤྱིང་རྩེ་
མེད་པ་ཡིན་ནམ་ཞེ་ན། དེ་མི་འཐད་དེ།

རྒྱལ་མཆོག་གོ་སར་ཉིད་ཀྱི་ཞལ་སྒྲ་ནས།

གསང་སྒྲགས་སྒྲུ་མེད་རྒྱུད་ལུང་ལས། །ཞིང་བཅུ་ཆོངས་བའི་དགྲ་བོ་དེ། །བསྐྱལ་བར་རུས་པའི་མཐུ་ལྡན་ན། །མ་

བསྐྱལ་བྱམས་པ་བྱེད་བྱུར་ཆོ། །གསང་སྒྲགས་དམ་ཆོག་ཉམས་འཕྱུར་གཟིགས། །

ཞེས་ཞིང་བཅུ་ཆོང་བའི་བསྟན་དགྲུ་ལ་བྱམས་སྤྱིང་རྩེ་བསྒྲོམས་ནས་མ་བསྐྱལ་ན་གསང་སྒྲགས་ཀྱི་དམ་ཆོག་ཉམས་པར་
འགོ་རྒྱལ་གསུངས། འོན་ཀྱང་ཞིང་བཅུ་ཆོང་བའི་བསྟན་དགྲུ་མ་ཡིན་པའི་གཡུལ་སར་གྱི་བའི་དམག་མི་དཀྱུས་མ་རྒྱས་མི་
རྒྱར་བྱས་སམ་ཞེས་ན།

ཕན་རྒྱུན་གཡུལ་གྱི་ཆོ་འདས་རྒྱལ་ས། །བདེ་ཆེན་ཐར་པའི་ལམ་ལ་བསྐྱལ། །

ཞེས་བདུད་དབྱེད་གི་དབང་དུ་སོང་བའི་གཡུལ་ཞུགས་དམག་མི་དཀྱུས་མ་གསོན་པོ་ཆོས་ལ་བསྐྱུར་ཞིང་གི་བོའི་རྒྱལ་
ཤེས་དག་ཞིང་དུ་འཕོ་བའི་ལམ་ནས་དྲངས་པ་རྒྱལ་ཐར་དུ་གསལ་ལོ།།

སྒྲིབ་གི་སྒྲུབ་པ་ཐོབ་པའི་སྒྱེ་བུ་དང་སྒྲོམ་སྒྲུབ་ཀྱི་གནས་བབས།

སྐབས་དོན་སྒྲིབ་སྒྲིབ་དུ་མཛད་པའི་གོ་སར་དང་འབྲེལ་བའི་སྒྲོམ་སྒྲུབ་སྒོར་ལ་སྒྲིབ་གསུམ་གཙོ་བོར་གཞི་བཅོལ་ཏེ་ལྷུལ་
ཞིབ་རིག་པ་ཁོ་ནའི་ལམ་ནས་གཞུང་དོན་དཔྱད་ཐབས་ལུང་རིག་དཔེ་གསུམ་གྱི་སྒྲོ་ནས་སྒྲོམ་གྱི་རིག་གནས་སྤྱི་ཁོག་

ཅམ་ལ་དབྱེཞིབ་དང་འཛོལ་ཞིབ་བྱས་པ་དང་། དགོས་རིགས་ཀྱི་གཞུང་དོན་དང་སྤྱོད་དཔེ་འདི་བརྟེན་དཀའ་གནད་ཅན་
ནམས་ལ་གསེད་དྲོལ་མི་ཉེང་བ་བྱས་ནས་དབྱད་ཡོད་ལ། སྤྱོད་དཔེ་གསུམ་ཁོ་ནའི་ནད་དུའང་སྒོམ་གྱི་རིག་གནས་ཕུན་
སུམ་ཚོགས་པ་འདུག་པས་ཞིབ་བརྟག་རྒྱས་དབྱད་བྱེད་པའི་དགོས་པ་མ་དམིགས་ལགས།

སྤྱིང་རྒྱལ་མཚོག་གེ་སར་ཉིད་ཀྱིས་སྒོམ་སྒྲུབ་ལ་བརྟེན་ནས་བྱུང་བ་བརྟེས་ཤིང་སྒོམ་སྤྱོད་ཀྱང་བསམ་གྱིས་མི་བྱུང་བ་
གནད་བམའོན་པ་དང་། རྩ་འཕྲུལ་ལ་བརྟེན་ནས་བདུད་ནམས་བརྒྱལ་བ་མ་ཟད། རྣམ་ཐར་ཡོན་ཏན་མཛོད་དང་དབྱུལ་
སྤྱིང་གཉིས་སུ་སྤྱིང་ལྷ་སྤྱེ་མི་སྤྱེ་ཀྱུན་ཀྱང་དམ་པའི་ཆོས་ཀྱི་སྤྱིང་པའི་ཉམས་སུ་ལེན་བྱེད་སྒོམ་སྒྲུབ་ལ་ཞུགས་ཤིང་། ལྷག་
ཐོགས་ཀྱི་སྒོམ་སྒྲུབ་རྒྱུ་ཆད་མེད་པར་མཛོད་པའི་སྤོལ་དར་བ་གསལ།

ལྷག་པར་དུ་ཆེ་ཡི་རིག་འཛིན་ཐོབ་པའི་སྤྱི་དཔོན་རོང་ཆ་བླ་རྒྱ། ཡི་དམ་རྩ་མགྱིན་ཞལ་གཟིགས་པའི་ཁོ་བྱང་རྒྱལ་པོ།
བྱང་རྒྱལ་མེས་མཚོག་བརྟེས་པའི་མེད་སྒོན་ག་མ་ཅུ་སྟེམ། མགོན་པོ་གཞལ་གཟིགས་པའི་འབྲུ་སྐ་སྤྱོད་ཆོས་སྤྱོད་པེར་
ནག་དང་། རྩ་བཅུན་སྒོམ་མའི་ཞལ་གཟིགས་དཔའ་སར་རྒྱ་བ་དང་། རྣལ་འབྱོར་དབང་མེད་རོལ་གར་བདུད་ཡུལ་ཆོས་
བཞིན་སྤྱོད་མཁན་རྒྱལ་མོ་ཨ་ལྷག་ལྟ་མེད་དང་། སྒོལ་མ་དཀར་མེད་རྣམ་རོལ་སྤྱུ་ལོ་མེད་ལྷམ་འབྲུག་མོ། སྒོལ་མ་སྤྱོན་
མེད་རྣམ་སྤྱུལ་ཉེའུ་རྒྱུད་ལུ་གྲུ་ཆར་ཡག རྟེན་འབྲེལ་ལ་མངའ་བརྟེས་པའི་སྤྱོད་ཉིད་མགར་བཟའ་ཆོས་སྒོན། རིམ་ལྷའི་
དཔེས་བྱུབ་ཐོབ་པའི་སྤྱུ་ལོའི་སྤྱོན་པ་རྒྱལ་མཚོན་གཙོས་སྤྱིང་གི་དཔའ་ཆེན་བརྒྱད་ཅུ། སྤྱིང་གི་དབྱུང་སྤྱུལ་བཅུ། མ་སྤྱུ་མོ་
སྤྱན་སྤུམ་བརྒྱ། སྤྱིང་གི་དུངས་སྤྱན་བཅུ་གསུམ། མཁའ་འགྲོ་མིང་ཆེན་བཙེ་བརྒྱད། སྤྱིང་གི་ལྷ་སྤུམ་བཅུ་གསུམ་མེགས་
ནི་སངས་རྒྱས་ཀྱི་བསྟན་པ་འཛིན་སྤྱོད་སྤྱེལ་གསུམ་ཅམ་མ་ཟད་དེ་ལ་ཐོས་བསམ་སྒོམ་གསུམ་གནད་མཁན་ཤ་རྟག་
ཡིན་པ་གསལ།

མི་སྤྱ་དེ་དག་མལ་ཆེ་བར་རང་རང་ལ་སྒོམ་ཁང་དང་སྤྱོད་གནས་སོ་སོར་ཡོད་པ་སྟེ། དཔེར་ན། གེ་སར་གྱི་སྒོམ་མཁའ་
མེད་འབྲུག་སྟག་རྩེ་གཙོ་བོར་བྱུང་པའི་སྒོམ་གནས་ཉ་ཅང་མང་བ་དང་། དཔའ་རྒྱལ་དང་མོ་སྤྱན་ནམས་ལ་དེ་བཞིན་ཡིན་
འདུག་ལ།མཚམས་བསྟེན་སྤྱོད་ཉི་རྟག་དུ་བགྱིས་ཀྱི་ཡོད། དཔེར་ན། རྩ་རྒྱག་མོར་བུ་མོ་ལོང་ལས།

ཁོ་བྱང་སྤྱིད་པ་ཁོ་མོའི་རོག་རྩྭ་དུ་སྤྱུ་མཚམས་ལ་བཞུགས་ཏེ་རྩེ་གཅིག་ཡིད་ཀྱི་མེ་ལོང་། རྩ་མགྱིན་དམར་པོའི་གསལ་
སྤྱོད་དང་མ་བུལ་བར་བསྟེན་སྤྱོད་ལ་བརྟེན་ (ཨ་ཀར་ལུ་ནི་ཤ་ས།, ༡༩༥༩) ཞེས་གསལ་བ་ལྟ་བུའོ།

དེ་བཞིན་སྤྱིང་དཔའ་ཆེན་བརྒྱད་ཅུའི་རོ་སྤྱོད་དབང་དྲག་སྒོག་གི་ཞགས་པ་ཞེས་པ་ལས་འཇམ་དབྱངས་འོད་ཟེར་གྱིས།

བྱུབ་ཆེན་བརྒྱད་ཅུ་ནག་ཕྱོགས་གཤེད་མ་ན། །བཞེངས་པའི་སྤྱོད་རྒྱལ་ཕྱི་ཡི་མའོན་རྟོགས་རིས།།

ཞེས་སྤོན་ཆོ་སྒོམ་མ་སྤོན་མེད་རྣམ་སྤྱུལ་ཉེའུ་རྒྱུད་མས་རྒྱ་གར་བྱུབ་ཆེན་བརྒྱད་ཅུས་སྤྱིང་གི་དཔའ་མེད་རོལ་གར་བཟུང་
རྒྱུ་པ་དེ་མེད་སྤྱུ་རྩ་རྒྱངས་པའི་དག་འགྲོས་ལ་གཞི་བཙེལ་ནས་གསུང་མཛོད་འདུག་པ་ལས་ཀྱང་སྤྱིང་གི་དཔའ་བྱུལ་

མྱི་སྐྱེ་ཤུམ་པོ་ཤི་གེ་སྤུང་འབྲེལ་བའི་སྐྱོམ་སྐྱེ་བཞོད།

རྣམས་ཀྱི་ཚུལ་དུ་བསྟན་དག་འདུལ་མཁན་དཔལ་ཤོད་ཤིང་སྟག་ཡིན་ཡང་ནང་ལྷ་རྩལ་གྱུ་བ་པོ་བཅིང་རྟོགས་པ་ལྷན་
པའི་ངེས་པའི་དོན་གྱི་ཐུབ་ཆེན་ཞེ་གཅིག་ཡིན་པ་གསལ་ལ། ཐུབ་པ་ནི་སྐྱོམ་ལ་མ་བསྟེན་པར་ཐོབ་མི་སྲིད་དོ།

དེ་ཡང་དབང་དྲག་སྒྲིག་ཞགས་ལས།

མདོར་ན་དཔལ་ཆེན་སྟོང་དང་དགྲ་བརྒྱ་ལྟ། །ཐམས་ཅད་སེང་ཆེན་སྐྱེས་ལུ་མཛད་པ་དང་། །འཕྲིན་ལས་སྟོང་ལ་
དམ་པ་དུ་མའི་འཕྱུལ། །

དཔལ་འབྱོར་ཚུལ་དུ་སྤང་བ་ཤིང་སྟག་ལགས། །སྤང་ཚུལ་ཅམ་ལ་དྲག་རྩལ་དུས་མཐའི་མེ། །དོན་དམ་ཀུན་བཟང་སེང་
ཆེན་ཐུགས་ཀློང་དང་། །

རོག་ཅིག་བྱང་རྩལ་སེམས་ལ་དབང་འབྱོར་བའི། །སྟགས་རིགས་གྲུབ་པའི་སྐྱེས་མཆོག་ཁོ་ནར་ངེས། །

ཞེས་དཔལ་འདུལ་རྣམས་ཀྱི་རང་བཞིན་གསལ་པོར་བཛྲོད་འདུག་པར་གཞིགས་ན་གསལ་པོ་རྟོགས་ཐུབ།

སྤྱིར་གི་སྤྲུལ་སྐྱེས་ལ། མཆོག་གྲུར་སྤྲུལ་བཅུ་གསུམ། སྤྱིར་གེ་སར་གི་མི་ཡི་སྤྲུལ་རྣམས་གཉིས་ཏེ། གུ་རུ་ནི་རྣམ་སྐྱེལ་
སྤངས་ཨ་ཁྱེས་བྱང་རྩལ་དང་། དཔལ་ལ་རྩ་རོ་པའི་དངོས་སྟོབ་དཔལ་དྲན་པ་ཡེ་ཤེས་གྲགས་སོགས་གཙུག་ཏུ་བཀྱར་ཞིང་།
དགེ་བཅུ་ནི་རང་གིས་སྤུང་སྟེ། འཇིག་རྟེན་སྐྱེ་བའི་འཆོ་བའི་ཁྲོད་ནས་རང་བཞིན་རྩལ་ཆེན་རིགས་སོ་སོར་དྲན་
ཤེས་བག་ཡོད་ཀློང་ཤོས་སུ་འབྱོར་བའི་རྩལ་སྐྱོམ་ལ་བརྟེན་པའི་སྐྱོམ་སྟོལ་ཤིག་མདོར་མེད་དུ་དར།

གཞན་ཡང་གེ་སར་གི་རྣམས་ཐར་ནང་བྱན་མོང་དང་བྱན་མིན་གི་སྐྱོམ་དང་འབྲེལ་བའི་སྐྱོམ་གནས་ཀྱང་ཉ་ཅང་མང་པོ་བྱང་
ཡོད། དཔེར་ན། མ་ལྷ་རིའི་ཤེལ་གི་སྐྱེབ་ཕྱག་གོང་མ། ལྷ་རིའི་སྐྱེབ་ཕྱག་སྤྲུལ་ཕྱག་པ། སྐྱོམ་ཁང་དང་། སྐྱེབ་ཕྱག་
མཆོམས་ཁང་། སྐྱོམ་མཁར་སོགས་མང་དུ་མཆིས། དཔེར་ན། ལྷ་ཕྱེད་ཨ་ཁྱེས་སྐྱོམ་པ་རྩ་ཇོ་བདུལ་བའི་བྲག་ཕྱག་
སོགས་དངོས་སུ་དེང་སང་ལའང་གསལ་པོར་མཛལ་རྒྱ་ཡོད་པ་དང་། མཁར་རྫོང་སྐྱོམ་གནས་ཀྱི་རོ་སོར་གྲུར་པ་དཔེར་ན།
གེ་སར་གི་མཁར་རྫོང་ལྷ་སྟོད་པོ་བྱང་ཡིན་ཡང་ཆོ་སྤྲད་སྐྱོམ་ཁང་སེང་འབྲུག་སྟག་ཅེ་ཞེས་ལྷ་རྣམས་པར་རྒྱལ་བའི་ཁང་
བཟང་། མཁར་མཐོང་ཆོད་དན་སོང་མི་འགོ། ཞེས་བྱུད་དུ་འཕགས་པའི་བྱང་ཆོས་ལྷན་པའི་སྐྱོམ་ཁང་ཞིག་ཡིན་པ་ལྷ་བུ་
དང་། གཞན་ཡང་སྤྱིར་གི་མཁར་རྫོང་སོ་སོར་སྐྱེབ་ཁང་ཡོད་པ་སྟེ། དཔེར་ན་ཁ་མཁར་གནམ་རྫོང་ལྷག་མོ་དང་། སྤྱིད་པ་
ཁོལ་མོ་རོག་རྫོང་། དདུལ་རྩ་སྟོ་རྫོང་། པོ་རོག་སྟོང་རྫོང་། མཁར་མི་འབྲུག་སྟག་པོ་བཅུག་དཀྱིས་སོགས་སྤྱིར་གི་དཔལ་
རྩལ་པལ་ཆེ་བར་མཁར་རྫོང་སོ་སོར་སྐྱོམ་གནས་མེད་པ་ཉ་ལམ་མེད་པར་འདོད། ལྷག་པར་དུ།

མེ་ཤེལ་དམར་པོའི་ལྷ་ཁང་དེ། །སེང་ལྷ་མ་འབྲུག་མེའི་སྐྱེབ་ཁང་ཡིན། །

ཞེས་སེང་ལྷ་མ་འབྲུག་མོས་གསུངས་པར་གཞིགས་ན་སྤྱིར་གི་སོ་སྤྲན་(བྱང་མེད) སོ་སོར་ཡང་སྐྱེབ་ཁང་ཡོད་ངེས་སྐྱེས་
མོ།

གྲིང་སྤྱང་དུ་མཛོན་པའི་སྒྲོམ་སྒྲུབ་སྒྲོང་གི་སྒྲུབ་དོན།

གཤམ་སྤྱང་གི་ནང་དུ་སྒྲོམ་སྒྲུབ་ནི་གྲིང་པ་ཀླག་གི་ཕྱགས་འདུན་གཙོ་བོ་དང་སྤྱང་གི་བཟོད་སྤྱང་གཙོ་བོ་གཞན་ཞིག་ཀྱང་
ཡིན་པ་མཛོན་ཞིང་། གྲིང་རྗེ་གཤམ་ཉིད་ནས་བཟུང་སྟེ་དཔའ་ཆེན་སྤྱང་དང་དགྲ་བརྒྱ་སོགས་གྲིང་གི་སྒྲིམ་བུ་རྣམས་ཕྱི་
ཚུལ་དུ་དབྱ་འདུལ་དཔའ་ཆོད་ཤ་སྤྱག་ཏུ་སྤྱང་ཡང་། ནང་ལྟར་ན་དོན་དངོས་སུ་ཕྱུག་སྒྲུབ་པ་ཐོབ་ཅིང་རྟོགས་པ་ལྟན་པ་ག་
སྤྱག་ཏུ་འདོད་ལ། དེ་ཡང་སྒྲུལ་པའི་རྣལ་འབྱོར་གི་ཕྱགས་ལྟར། རང་རང་གི་མཛོད་སྤྱང་རྣམས་སྐབས་དེའི་ཡུལ་དུས་ཀྱི་
སྒོ་གསུམ་སྤྱོད་ལམ་དང་བསྟན་ཡང་། སྒོམ་པ་མ་ཡིན་གོམས་པ་ཡིན། གོམས་པ་གྲོང་དུ་བཤོལ་བ་ཡིན། ཁྱེས་པ་ལྟར་
ནང་སྒོམ་དོན་སེམས་ཉིད་ལ་གོམས་པར་བྱས་ནས་གདུལ་བྱའི་མཐའ་ཆོས་ཕྱོགས་སུ་བསྒྲུབ་པར་མཛོད་འདུག་པ་
གསལ།

དུས་སྐབས་དེ་ལ་བོད་དབུས་སུ་བསྟན་པ་མང་ནས་བཞིག་ དག་འདུན་པ་དམར་གསོད་གཏོང་བའི་དུས་ངན་ཞིག་ཤར་
ཡོད་ཀྱང་། གྲིང་པ་རྣམས་ཀྱིས་དག་བཅུའི་རང་ཁྱིམ་སྤྱང་སྟེ་འཛིག་རྟེན་སྒྲུབ་པའི་འཆོལ་བ་སྒྲེལ་ནས་རང་རང་གི་རིག་
ཕྱུ་ལམ་ལག་ཕྱུ་དང་སྒོམ་ཐབས་བྱང་འབྲེལ་གྱིས་དུན་ཤེས་བག་ཡོད་གྲོང་གོམས་བྱས་ནས་ལུས་སེམས་གཉིས་
ཀའི་བཀག་བྱ་ལས་ཐོལ་ཐབས་ཀྱི་སྒོམ་ཕྱུ་གསར་པ་ཞིག་ཀྱང་དར་བ་མཛོན་སྒྲུབ་ཅིང་། སྒོམ་གནས་ཀྱི་ཆ་ནས་ཀྱང་
རི་ཁོང་དུ་དབེན་པའི་སྒྲུབ་ཕྱག་དང་། མཁར་རྫོང་མོ་མོར་སྒྲུབ་ཁང་དང་། སྒོམ་ཁང་མོགས་མང་པོ་ཡོད་ཅིང་། སྒོམ་
གནས་དེ་དག་ཀྱང་ཐོག་མར་སྒྲུལ་པའི་ཚུལ་གྱི་ཚུལ་སྒོམ་གནང་སྟེ་ཡོད་པ་ནས་རིམ་བཤུགས་མཛོན་གསལ་སྒོམ་ཆོགས་
ཀྱི་དབུས་སུ་ལུས་རྣམ་སྤྱང་ཆོས་བདུན་དང་ལ་སྒོམ་པའི་བར་ལ་འབྱུར་བ་ཕྱིན་པ་གསལ་སྟོན་བྱེད།

མདོར་བསྟུས་ན། སྒོམ་དང་འབྲེལ་བའི་སྒོམ་ཞུ། དཔེར་ན། ཨོ་རྒྱུན་སྒོམ་ཞུ་ཐུང་། སྤྱང་ཉིད་སྒོམ་ཞུ་ཐུང་། (ཞི་
ཚུང་། 2021) དེ་བཞིན་སྒོམ་གྱི་སྒོམ་ཕྱེ། སྒོམ་ཆེན་དང་། སྒོམ་ཁིད། སྒོམ་ཁང་། སྒོམ་གནས་སོགས་རིག་གནས་
ཉ་ཅང་མང་དུ་མཛོན་ལ། དེ་ལྟ་བུའི་གྲིང་སྤྱང་དུ་གསལ་བའི་སྒོམ་སྒྲུབ་ཀྱི་རིག་གནས་ཉ་ཅང་ཕུན་སུམ་ཆོགས་པ་མཛོན་
པས། སྒོམ་སྒྲུབ་རིག་གནས་ནི་གྲིང་སྤྱང་ནང་གི་བཟོད་གཞི་རྒྱ་ཆེ་ཤོས་གལ་ཤིག་ཡིན་པར་འདོད་། སྒོམ་སྒྲུབ་ནི་གྲིང་
སྤྱང་གི་བཟོད་སྤྱང་ཡང་གཙོ་བོ་ཞིག་ཡིན་པ་གསལ་སྟོན་བྱས་འདུག།

གཤམ་སྤྱང་དུ་སྒོམ་སྒྲུབ་ཀྱི་གལ་གནད་དང་བསྟན་དོན།

ཁྱིར་གྲིང་གི་ཕྱུ་སྒོམ་དང་སྒོམ་སུ་གཤམ་པའི་སྒོམ་སྒྲུབ་རིག་གནས་དང་། དེའི་སྤང་དོར་དཀའ་གནད་གདམས་རག་
རྣམས་ནི་སྒོམ་ཆེན་དང་ཉམས་ལེན་དང་། སེམས་ཁམས་སྒྲན་པ་དང་འཕྲོད་བསྟེན་ཆེད་མཁས་པ་སྒོམ་ཉམས་ལེན་པ་
གསར་པ་སོགས་ལ་དེར་སང་ཡང་འབྲེལ་བ་དང་གནད་གནད་ཉ་ཅང་ཆེ་བར་མཐོང་སྟེ།

ཕྱ་རྟིང་འཛིན་སྒོམ་པའི་སྤང་དེ། སེམས་སྤྱང་ཉིད་ལྟ་བུ་མ་རྟོགས་ན། ཁབ་དུན་ནག་པོས་རྟིང་འཛིན་ཕྱང་རབ་མེད། །

ཞེས་སྤྱང་ཉིད་རང་གིས་རྟོགས་དགོས་པའི་གདམས་པ་གནད་བ་འདུག།

མྱིང་སྐྱུང་བྱུ་མཛེན་པའི་གཉིས་པ་དང་འབྲེལ་བའི་སྐྱོམ་སྐྱུབ་སྐོར།

ཕྱ་གསལ་སྐྱོམ་པའི་སྐྱོམ་ཆེན་དེས། །གསལ་འགྲིབ་མེད་པར་མ་བཟུངས། །ལྷ་བདུད་གཉིས་ལ་ནོར་ཆབས་ཆེ། །
བཀའ་མདོ་རྒྱུད་འོ་མའི་རྒྱ་མཚོ་ལས། །ཆོས་ལྷ་སྐྱོམ་མར་གྱི་ཉིང་ཁུ་ལེན། །

སྐྱོམ་སྐྱུབ་ནི་དམ་པའི་ཆོས་ཀྱི་སྤྱིང་པོ་ལེན་པ་ཞིག་ཡིན་པ་དང་དེ་མི་བཞིན་མ་བསྐྱོམས་ན་ཉིང་ལ་ཡོད་པ་གདམས་པ་
གསུངས། །ལྷ་ག་པར་དུ་ནང་པའི་སྐྱོམ་སྐྱུབ་ཀྱན་གྱི་སྤང་གཞིའམ་སྟོག་གིང་ལྷ་བྱ་ནི་སྤྱིང་མེ་ཡིན་ཞིང་སྤྱིང་མེ་དང་ཡ་བྲལ་
པའི་སྐྱོམ་སྐྱུབ་གང་འདྲ་ཞིག་ཡིན་ཡང་སངས་མི་རྒྱས་པ་གསུང་དོན།
སྤྱིང་མེ་མེད་པའི་སྤྲེལ་དེ། །བརྟེན་སྐྱུབ་བརྟེན་ཀྱང་སངས་མི་རྒྱས། །

ཞེས་དང་།

ཡང་མདོ་སྤྲུགས་ཀྱི་ཆོས་ལ་མི་ཅམ་མཁས་ཀྱང་དེའི་སྤྱིང་པོ་སྐྱོམ་སྐྱུབ་ཀྱི་ལམ་ནས་ཉམས་ལེན་མ་བྱས་ན་ཕན་པ་དེ་ཅམ་
མེད་པའི་སྐྱོར།
བཀའ་མདོ་རྒྱུད་སེམས་དང་མ་འདྲེས་ན། །ཆོས་དཔེ་གྲོག་ནི་ཅིའི་མ་ཁི་འདྲ། །

ཞེས་དང་། དེ་བཞིན་སྐྱོ་འདོགས་ཆོད་ན་སྤྲེལ་མའི་གདམས་དག་ཟབ་མོ་དམ་པའི་ཆོས་ཀྱི་སྤྱིང་པོའི་དོན་རྟོགས་ཐུབ་ཅིང་དེ་
ནི་སྐྱོམ་སྐྱུབ་ཉིག་ཅིག་ལ་བརྟེན་དགོས་པ་གསུང་དོན།
ཆོས་ཟབ་མོ་སྤྲེལ་མའི་གདམས་དག་དེ། །དོན་སྐྱོ་འདོགས་ཆོད་ན་མེ་ཟབ་ཡིན། །

དེ་བཞིན་ཐར་པ་དང་ཐམས་ཅད་མཁྱེན་པའི་སངས་རྒྱས་ཀྱི་གོ་འཕང་ནི་སྐྱོམ་སྐྱུབ་ལ་བརྟེན་ནས་ཐོབ་པ་དང་དེ་ནི་རང་
ཉིད་ཀྱིས་ཐོབ་པར་བྱ་དགོས་ཞེས་གསུངས་དོན།

བསྐྱོམས་ནས་སངས་རྒྱས་ཐོབ་དང་གཅིག །དག་བས་ཆོགས་གཉིས་ཆོགས་དང་གཉིས། །
སྤྲིག་པས་འཁོར་བར་འབྱུངས་པ་གསུམ། །རང་རང་ལས་བྱས་བཟང་རན་ཟེད། །

ཅེས་བསྐྱོམས་ནས་སངས་རྒྱས་ཐོབ་ཀྱི་ཡོད་གསལ་པོ་བསྟན། དག་བའི་པན་ཡོན་སྤྲིག་པའི་ཉེས་དམིགས་སོགས་ལས་
འབྲས་ཀྱི་གནས་ལུགས་བསྟན་ཅིང་། །ལྷ་ག་པར་དུ་སྐྱོམ་གྱི་དགོས་དམིགས་དང་ལུས་པ་གསལ་པོ་བསྟན་མཛད་འདུག་
དེ་ལྷར་སྐྱོམ་ཡང་དག་པ་ཡོང་བར་གནད་འགག་གཙོ་བོ་གང་ཡིན་དང་། །བཅུད་ལེན་སྤྲིགས་དོར་དང་ལེགས་ཉེས་སྤང་
དོར་མི་ལྷར་དགོས་པའི་ཐབས་དང་གནད་མི་སྤྱིང་ཅིག་མཛད།

མདོར་ན་གཤམ་སྐྱུང་བྱུ་ཕྱག་ཆོགས་ཟུང་དུ་སྤྲེལ་བའི་སྟོལ་བོད་དུ་དར་སྤྲེལ་གྱིས་ཀྱང་གཤམ་ནས་ཡིན་པ་མཛད་པས་
སྐབས་དེའི་སྤྲི་ཆོགས་ལ་བརྟེན་ནས་སྐྱོམ་ཐབས་གསར་གཏོད་བྱས་པ་ཡང་གྲུབ་ཐོབ་དཔལ་ལྷན་རྒྱལ་གྱི་མཛད་སྤྱོད་
ལས་དག་ཟེད་རྟོགས་ཐུབ་པས། །སྤྱིང་སྐྱུང་བྱུ་མཛེན་པའི་སྐྱོམ་སྐྱུབ་ཀྱི་རིག་གནས་ལ་ཐུན་མོང་མ་ཡིན་པའི་བྱུད་ཆོས་དུ་
མ་ཡོད་པ་གསལ།

དེང་སང་ཡུལ་དུས་ཀྱི་རང་བཞིན་ལ་བསམས་ན། སྤྱིང་སྦྱང་གི་སྒྲོམ་སྦྱབ་རིག་གནས་དེ་དག་ཀྱང་རིམ་བཞིན་ཟང་ཟང་གི་
སྤྱི་ཚོགས་ཁྲོད་དུ་འབྲེལ་བ་ཟེ་བུ་འགྲོ་བ་དང་། རིན་ཐང་དང་གཤམ་གནད་ཆེ་བུ་འགྲོ་རིམ་གཏན་ཅེད་འདོད། རྒྱ་མཚན་
གཅིག་ནི་སྤྱིང་སྦྱང་ནང་དུ་རབ་དུ་བྱུང་མི་དགོས་པར་འཆར་བརྟུ་བྱུབ་པའི་སྒྲོམ་ཐབས་ཤིག་མཛོད་པ་མ་ཟད། ལྷག་པར་
དུ་སྒྲོམ་ཐབས་དང་ལག་ཟུལ་གཉིས་ཟུང་དུ་སྦྱེལ་བའི་དྲན་ཤེས་བག་ཡོད་ཀྲོང་གོམས་བྱས་ཏེ་ཉམས་རྟོགས་སད་པའམ་
སྦྱབ་པ་ཐོབ་བྱུབ་པའི་སྒྲོམ་ཟུལ་ཞིག་ཀྱང་དར་ཡོད་ཚུལ་གསལ་ལ། བྱད་པར་དུ་ནང་ཉམས་སྦྱང་དང་རྟོགས་ཆོས་དག་རྩ་
ལ་དངས་ནས་སྦྱ་བུ་ལེན་པའམ། སྦྱང་གི་སྒྲོམ་གྱི་དམིགས་རྟེན་བྱས་ནས་སྦྱ་དང་སྒྲོམ་ཐབས་ཟུང་འབྲེལ་གྱིས་འགག་
མེད་རྡོ་རྗེའི་སྒྲོམ་སྦྱུའི་ལམ་ནས་བདེ་སྤྱོད་པའི་སྲོལ་མཚོན་པའི་སྒྲོམ་ཟུལ་རིག་གནས་དེ་དག་དེང་གི་དུས་སྤྱིར་གསོ་བུ་
རྒྱ་ཏ་ཅང་གཤམ་ཆེ་སྒྲུམ་སོ།

དཔྱད་དོན་མཚུགས་སྦྱ་བ།

སྤྱིང་སྦྱང་དུ་མཛོད་པའི་བྱ་ནང་གི་སྒྲོམ་སྦྱབ་སྐོར་ལ་སྤྱོད་མེད་ཉམས་ཞིབ་འདི་ཉིད་གྱིས་འབྱུང་འབྱུར་ཞིབ་འཚུགས་གི་
གནས་ལ་མྱེད་གཞིའི་སྤྱི་ཞུ་ཅུང་ཟད་བསྟུབས་ཏེ། རེ་ཞིག་སྤྱིང་སྦྱང་དུ་སྒྲོམ་སྦྱབ་ཐོག་ལ་དཔྱད་པའི་སྤྱོད་ཆ་ཞིག་བསྐྱར་
ཡོད་ཀྱང་། ད་དུང་རིག་གནས་ཚན་པ་སོ་སོའི་ལྟ་སྟངས་ཀྱི་ལམ་ནས་ཞིབ་འཚུགས་བྱེད་འོས་ཤིང་། དེར་ཞིབ་འཚུགས་རིག་
པའི་ཐབས་ལམ་དང་དཔྱད་ཐབས་རྣམ་གཞག་སོགས་ཀྱི་སྤྱོད་ཆ་གང་མང་མཆིས་རེས་པས། ཐེག་པ་སོ་སོའི་ལྟ་སྟངས་
ལྟ་བུ་དང་། བྱག་ཆེན་དང་རྡོག་ཆེན། སེམས་ཁམས་རིག་པ་དང་། མོ་ཆོས་རིང་ལུགས་ལ་སོགས་པའི་རིག་གནས་ནང་
ཆོན་དབར་མ་ཡིན་པར་ལྟ་སྟུགས་སྤྱོད་ཐབས་ཀྱི་དོས་ནས་དཔྱད་པ་བྱེད་རིན་ཆེ་བར་མཐོང་།

གཞན་ཡང་ཞིབ་འཚུགས་འདིའི་ཚོད་འཛིན་རང་བཞིན་ལ་མཚོན། ཐོན་ལུགས་ཀྱི་སྒྲོམ་སྦྱབ་ཇི་ཡོད་ཞིབ་རྒྱས་དང་། ཐོད་གྱི་
གཞུང་ལུགས་ཀྱི་ལམ་ནས་སྒྲོམ་རིམ་སོགས་ལ་དཔྱད་མེད་པའི་སྤྱོད་ཆ་ཡོད། དེ་བཞིན་རྒྱལ་མཆོག་གི་སངས་ཀྱི་སྒྲོམ་
ཁྲིད་སྐོར་ཏ་ཅང་མང་བས་དཔྱད་རྩོམ་འདིར་ས་བཅད་སྤྱོད་མིན་ཅམ་གཏོགས་ཞིབ་རྒྱས་འབྲི་བའི་སྐབས་དབེན་པས་
གཞན་དུ་དཔྱད་འོས། དམིགས་བསལ་དུ་སྤྱིང་སྦྱང་གི་ནང་དུ་སྒྲོམ་དང་འབྲེལ་བའི་རིག་གནས་དཔེར་ན། སྒྲོམ་ལྷ། སྒྲོམ་
ཁྲི། སྦྱབ་ཕུག་སྒྲོམ་མཁར་སོགས་མང་དུ་འདུག་པས་དེ་དག་སོ་སོར་གཞན་དུ་དཔྱད་འོས་པར་མཐོང་།

མདོར་ན་སྐབས་དོན་སྤྱིང་གི་སངས་ཀྱི་སྦྱང་དཔེ་བམ་གྲངས་མང་པའི་ཁྲོད་ནས་གཙོ་བོར་གསུམ་ཅམ་ལ་གཞི་བཅོལ་ནས་
དཔྱད་པ་བྱས་པ་ཡིན་པས། སྦྱང་དཔེ་གཞན་ལ་སྒྲོམ་དང་འབྲེལ་བའི་རིག་གནས་སྤུན་སྤུམ་ཚོགས་པ་ཡོད་པས་དཔྱོད་
བྱེད་གྱི་ཐབས་དང་དཔྱད་བྱའི་ནང་དོན་སོགས་སོ་སོའི་ལམ་ནས་དཔྱད་པ་བྱ་འོས་སོ།། བཀྲ་ཤིས་པར་ལྷུང་ཅིག །

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Pierre Philippot is Professor of Clinical Psychology at the University of Louvain (Belgium), where he is affiliated with the research group "Emotion & Clinical Psychology." His teaching and research domains cover emotion (with specific interests in repetitive thinking, attentional processes, autobiographical memory, and bodily sensations) and psychotherapy, with a focus on how emotional processes bear upon mental health, both in precipitating psychopathology and in serving recovery and health. From this perspective, he has developed research and clinical activities in mindfulness-based interventions for mental health. Pierre Philippot founded and currently directs a clinical center specializing in the treatment of psychological disorders at his home

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Francis Tiso holds the A.B. in Medieval Studies from Cornell University. He earned a Master of Divinity degree (cum laude) at Harvard University and holds a doctorate from Columbia University and Union Theological Seminary where his specialization was Buddhist studies. He translated several early biographies of the Tibetan yogi and poet, Milarepa, for his dissertation on sanctity in Indo-Tibetan Buddhism. Father Tiso was Associate Director of the Secretariat for Ecumenical and Interreligious Affairs of the US Conference of Catholic Bishops from 2004 to 2009, where he served as liaison to Islam, Hinduism, Buddhism, the Sikhs, and Traditional religions as well as the Reformed confessions. Father Tiso is a priest of the Diocese of Isernia-Venafro, Italy, where he is Diocesan Delegate for Ecumenical and Inter-religious Affairs. He is a member of the Board of Directors of Mind and Life Europe, which promotes research in neuroscience, philosophy, and contemplative traditions.

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Rodolfo Gonzalez-Paz is a macromolecular engineer who completed his thesis with honors on bone and its interactions at the nanoscale. He received first place in his research from the International Federation for Medical and Biological Engineering. He holds a master's degree with honors in biopolymers, a doctorate with cum laude mention in biomedical sciences, and Sowa Rigpa doctor degree from Pure Vision Sorig, Clinical and Research Center, Nepal, under the guidance of Dr. Sherab Tenzin. He is currently conducting research on plant oils, proteins, biomass, and Sowa Rigpa to understand and develop nanobiomedicine and biomaterials for medical and environmental applications. He has been particularly fascinated by scientific articles on nanotechnology, which demonstrate that the Sowa Rigpa pharmacopoeia has been producing nanobiomedicine for centuries. This led him to propose collaborations to link Sowa Rigpa tantras with modern science. He is investigating the Sowa Rigpa pills at the most subtle energetic levels using nanotechnology to clarify how these pills can modulate and balance the energetic currents of our body and mind through its “potency.”

Jussi Ahlroth (Lama Trømtsal Dorje) is an ordained practitioner and a lama in the Aro gTér Tradition of the Nyingma School. He holds an MA in comparative literature and philosophy from the University of Helsinki. He is a nonfiction author and culture journalist. He worked for 20 years at Helsingin Sanomat, the largest newspaper in Northern Europe. Since 2026 he has been a freelancer, writing and working in radio for the biggest media in Finland. In addition to teaching Vajrayāna Buddhism, he regularly lectures on philosophy, culture and Buddhism. His book on Buddhism and Western philosophy “Kirje Buddhalta – länsimaisen filosofian buddhalainen historia” was published in 2025 by SKS in Finland. The book has been a commercial and critical success.

Hyung-Jin An is a PhD candidate in the Department of Philosophy at the University of Delhi, where he researches East Asian Pure Land Buddhism and Hindu Bhakti philosophy on an ICCR scholarship. He holds a Bachelor's degree in Buddhist Studies from Dongguk University, Seoul (2020, magna cum laude), and a Master's degree in Philosophy from Hindu College, University of Delhi (2022, first division). He has also supplemented his academic training with one year of monastic practice at Jetavana Monastery in Seoul. His research focuses on the religious philosophy of devotion, social ethics in devotional traditions, and the relationship between inner light, religious subjectivity, and social transformation, engaging comparatively with Pure Land Buddhism, Hindu Bhakti, Sufism, and Quaker mysticism. He has presented his research at over twenty-five international conferences across Asia, Europe, Oceania, and the Americas, including the IAHR World Congress (Krakow), the Ethics in Chinese Philosophy Conference (HKUST), and the Bhutan Meditation Conference 2025. He has published a peer-reviewed article with Buddhist and Pali University (Sri Lanka) and has contributed papers to the conference proceedings of Buddhist Maha Vihara (Kuala Lumpur) and the Indian Philosophical Congress, with further work forthcoming in international journals.

Barbara J. Lehman is a professor of psychology at Western Washington University in Bellingham, WA, USA. She is a social-health psychologist whose research focuses on stress and coping. Dr. Lehman teaches, mentors students, and has authored over 20 peer-reviewed publications in outlets such as *Social and Personality Psychology Compass*, *PLoS One*, *Religion, Brain & Behavior*, *Psychosomatic Medicine*, and *Health Psychology*. Her most recent work attempts to draw traditional Buddhist philosophical teachings together with research in psychology. For example, her 2025 *Compass* article, entitled "How Meditation Promotes Well-Being: Applying a Dual-System Theory," discusses how both research and philosophy suggest that meditation operates both by reducing emotionally charged mental processes and by promoting decentered mental states.

Ellie Hunter is a Senior Social Work Practitioner and PhD student at the University of Kent, England. Her thesis, *Mindfulness in Adoption: Strengthening Support for Adopters in Early Placement*, considers the Buddhist ethical foundations of mindfulness and how these can be

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Sasha Manu is an educator, curriculum designer, and researcher specializing in holistic and contemplative educational systems. He is currently the Founding Middle School Math and Science Teacher at Pine Street School in New York City. He holds a BSc in Physics and Philosophy from the University of Toronto, a Master's in Buddhist Studies from the University of Hong Kong, and a PGCE along with multiple teaching licenses. Sasha has taught STEM and mindfulness in schools across three countries and has led experiential learning trips in Hong Kong, Thailand, Iceland, and the Canadian wilderness. He recently co-authored the Portrait of a Learner framework with the Common Ground Collaborative.

Amelia Hall is an Associate Professor of Religious Studies, Department Chair of Wisdom Traditions, and Dean of Graduate Programs at Naropa University in Boulder, Colorado. She earned her doctorate in Tibetan and Himalayan Studies from the University of Oxford in 2012, previously taught at Central Michigan University and Antioch University's Buddhist Studies Abroad Program, and has over 25 years of experience engaging with Buddhist and Tibetan Buddhist traditions. Her publications address tantric pilgrimage, Tibetan Buddhist treasure revealers, and sacred landscapes in the Eastern Himalayas, and she is writing a book on the Four Noble Truths, forthcoming from Shambhala Publications. Hall also serves as a content editor for the Khyentse Vision Project, leads workshops at Tara Mandala and Drala Mountain Center, and taught a two-year online course on Buddhist history for Google's Buddhism Group (2022–2024).

Ritu Verma, an anthropologist, international development scholar and civil engineer, is adjunct professor at Carleton University and research scholar at the University of California Los Angeles (UCLA). Her life-long fascination of indigenous mountain contexts led her to conceptualize and conduct innovative research in Kenya, Nepal and

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